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1. Setting the scene 
 
1.1. High levels of household debt: so, what? 
High levels of public and private indebtedness in Europe have created many problems in the past 
decade, and have resulted in arrears, dependencies on financial support, and vulnerability to adverse 
economic developments.1 Europe namely faced multiple, interrelated, crises with a crucial role for 
debt in general and household debt in particular: the global financial crisis as well as the European 
sovereign debt crisis.2 Debt has become a problem. 
 
1.1.1. The problems of rising household debt levels in the EU  
In many EU member states household debt increased considerably in the years preceding the global 
financial and the EU crises, as shown in graphs 1.1 and 1.2.3 For a sample of 17 advanced economies, 
of which 13 are EU member states, Jordà et al. (2016) showed that credit growth since the 1970s is 
almost entirely a result of increased mortgage lending, especially to households.4  
 
Studies discovered that strong credit growth is a robust predictor of a crisis.5 Indeed, the rapid credit 
expansion in various countries, combined with highly levered financial institutions and households, 
created credit-financed housing booms, especially in Ireland and Spain, and unstable economic 
                                                          
1 This research has been finalised in September 2017. Later developments have not been taken into account. 
2 The term financial crisis commonly refers to the worldwide crisis that began in 2007 and which origin is 
located in the financial sector, whereas the term sovereign debt crisis usually describes the rapid increase of 
government debt of many EU member states, which resulted in severe economic problems and financial 
support for several countries. For literature discussing the global financial crisis and its roots, see e.g. Crotty 
(2009), European Commission (2009b), European Economic Advisory Group (2009) and Taylor (2009), Roubini 
& Mihm (2010). For a discussion of the sovereign debt crisis and its roots, see e.g. Goddard et al. (2009), p. 368; 
European Commission (2009a), pp. 145-147; Krugman (2011); European Commission (2008), pp. 5-7; European 
Commission (2010a), p. 19; Lane (2012), p. 54; Manganelli & Wolswijk (2009), p. 197; Issing (2011), pp. 739-
743; Burda & Gerlach (2010), pp. 65-66; Zemanek (2010); Shambaugh (2012). 
3 Source data graph 1.1: Financial balance sheets in Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database 
(retrieved 5 July 2016) (search in tree: nasa_10_f_bs). Due to lack of available data, graph 1.1 contains no 
information for Greece, Luxembourg and Malta. Graph 1.2 only concerns euro area member states. Source 
data graph 1.2: Annual sectoral accounts in Eurostat: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database (retrieved 5 
July 2016) (search in tree: tec00104). Due to lack of available data, graph 1.2 contains no information for 
Greece, Luxembourg and Malta. 
4 Jordà et al. (2016), pp. 115-120. 
5 Infra, footnote 250. 
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systems vulnerable to falling house prices.6 High debt levels also lead to vulnerability to rising interest 
rates and declining income, for instance, due to an adverse shock like becoming unemployed, and thus 
increase the likelihood of defaults.7  
 
 
 
When bubbles imploded in the respective EU member states, many banks were confronted with non-
performing loans.8 Meanwhile, after a bust, the collateral value of the house is diminishing, and 
perhaps worth less than the value of outstanding loans.9 Non-performing loans lead to a contraction 
of credit supply, if banks’ capital buffers erode. This hurts economic growth.10 The more leveraged 
banks are, the stronger credit supply will shrink, since losses will have larger effects on the banks. 
Concluding, high levels of household debt could undermine financial stability and create, in terms of 
                                                          
6 Cf. Allen & Carletti (2010), pp. 5-6; Wyplosz (2010), p. 5; European Commission (2010c), p. 8; Krugman (2011); 
Gros (2012), p. 1. 
7 Debelle (2004), p. 21; Dynan & Kohn (2007), p. 20; European Central Bank (2012a), p. 87. Cf. European 
Commission (2012a), p. 18. Hallissey et al. (2014) also show a strong correlation between high debt levels 
(compared to income and the value of the house) and default rates in Ireland, using loan-level data. 
8 Wyplosz (2010), p. 5; Goddard et al. (2009), p. 368.  
9 Liu & Rosenberg, (2013), p. 5.  
10 International Monetary Fund (2012), p. 1010; Liu & Rosenberg, (2013), p. 5. 
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Buiter & Rahbari (2012), systemic fragility.11 Borio (2013) even states that the most promising 
indicators of financial crises are based on the extent to which bank lending to the private sector and 
asset prices are simultaneously above historical patterns.12 This may eventually result in government 
bailouts of banks.13 Therefore, household debt crises could turn into public debt crises. 
 
High levels of household debt can also lead to other difficulties for the financial sector, by creating 
funding risks. If the amount of outstanding loans on their balance sheets is larger than the amount of 
deposits, banks have to find additional funding on the market.14 Often, this additional market funding 
is more expensive and risky than funding with deposits, while its short-term nature provides 
mismatches with the long-term maturity of mortgage loans.15 Therefore, high loan-to-deposits (LTD) 
ratios signal potential liquidity risks for banks. 
 
Furthermore, high household debt levels can affect economic growth by inducing deleveraging, after 
house values or income drop. This may happen if maximum loan-to-value (LTV) or debt-to-income 
(DTI) ratios exist or if households feel uncomfortable with their high debt levels.16 Then, households 
must spend a considerable part of their income on servicing or reducing debt, which decreases 
consumption (and possibly investment).17 This may lead to lower or negative economic growth.18 
Research has discovered that large increases in household debt are often followed by big declines in 
spending, and that indebted households cut spending more.19 On top of this, several economists state 
that the pre-crisis household debt growth was an important driver of economic growth.20 When debt 
                                                          
11 Tudela & Young (2005), p. 7; Buiter & Rahbari (2012), p. 11; Van Nieuwenhuyze (2013), p. 134. 
12 Borio (2013), p. 5. Cf. Taylor (2012), pp. 21-23; Buiter & Rahbari (2012), pp. 11-12; Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 3-
9. Note that the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from historical trend is called the credit gap.   
13 Knedlik and Von Schweinitz (2012), p. 729. 
14 See e.g. De Nederlandsche Bank (2014b), pp. 17-18. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 Cf. Dynan (2012), p. 306. 
17 Cuerpo et al. (2013), p. 2; Liu & Rosenberg, (2013), p. 5. Cf. Bezemer (2011), p. 10; Sutherland & Hoeller 
(2012), p. 7. 
18 See e.g. De Nederlandsche Bank (2014b), p. 10. Cf. International Monetary Fund (2012), p. 91. However, 
some researchers found empirical evidence that debt deleveraging is most likely not that harmful for economic 
growth (Tang & Upper (2010), pp. 33-34; Takáts & Upper (2013), pp. 2, 18). 
19 Mian et al. (2013), Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 5-9, 35-45. Cf. McCarthy & McQuinn (2015), who found a small, 
but significant negative effect of deleveraging on consumption for Irish households (pp. 20-22). Cf. Andersen et 
al. (2016), who found that the increase of debt in preceding years – but not the level of leverage – explains 
reduced consumption (pp. 107-108, 114). 
20 Keen (2009b), p. 350; Guttman & Philon (2010), p. 272; Bezemer (2011), pp. 10-11. 
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levels have to be reduced, this driver disappears, among other things because construction activities 
take a plunge.21 So, high levels of household debt contributed in different ways to the crisis in Europe.22 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Cf. Hartmann (2015), p. 70.  
22 Adverse shocks and/or falling asset prices combined with high levels of debt could also negatively affect 
labour mobility, since it is more difficult to sell houses (Debelle (2004), p. 21). This could hamper economic 
growth too. Note that this study uses the singular (economic) crisis, since the various crises in the EU are 
interrelated. High levels of household debt also contributed to the sovereign debt crisis, since public debt 
increased due to the rescue measures that saved banks and measures that addressed the recession (cf. 
footnotes 2 and 13).   
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1.1.2. Diversity in member states’ household debt levels 
While household debt levels since 2000 have grown – often considerably – in all but one EU member 
state (Germany), the actual level of household debt varies a lot among member states, as evidenced 
by graphs 1.1 and 1.2 above. They show that especially Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom have high levels of household debt, while debt-to-
GDP levels are much lower in large euro area member states like Germany, France and Italy.23 The 
European Commission concludes from an analysis that ‘Ireland, Spain, Estonia, the Netherlands, Latvia, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and, to some extent, Cyprus are amongst those that experienced a rapid 
increase in household indebtedness before the crisis’24, and those countries, as well as Portugal, 
Slovakia and Sweden are prone to face deleveraging pressures from the household side.25  
 
The upward trend in household debt can be explained by common factors to which member states – 
to a greater or lesser extent – are exposed. The decline in interest rates in developed countries in the 
last decades enabled higher debt levels, without causing higher debt-service costs.26 Interest rates 
were low in the pre-crisis years.27 Due to inter alia macroeconomic stability households’ risk aversion 
decreased, and their optimism about their future income and rising house prices increased, 
contributing to higher debt demand.28 Several developments in the financial sector stimulated and 
enabled an expansion of credit supply. Deregulation of the banking sector removed many restrictions 
for lending to households, and created room for rising leverage of banks’ balance sheets, thereby 
increasing vulnerability to negative shocks.29 Securitisation allowed banks to remove risks from their 
balance sheets (or so they thought) and thus to originate more loans.30 The removal of risks led banks 
to control and ration borrowers less, and to reduce discounting of risks in the charged interest rates.31 
In addition, (risky) credit supply was stimulated through huge fees and bonuses.32 Competitive 
                                                          
23 Graph 1.2 only includes member states that have adopted the euro, but also in Denmark, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom household debt increased strongly as a percentage of household income. Yet, low household 
debt levels does not mean an absence of problems or risks. For instance, in Italy the ratio of non-performing 
loans has increasingly risen in the crisis-years (European Commission (2014g), p. 20), whereas the Commission 
warned that rising unemployment, among other things, in France can threaten household indebtedness 
(European Commission (2014e), pp. 16, 44). 
24 Cuerpo et al. (2013), p. 11. 
25 Ibidem, pp. 13-14. 
26 Cecchetti et al. (2011), pp. 7-8. 
27 Cf. Jordà et al. (2015), S16-S17.  
28 Keen (2009b), pp. 350-352; Cecchetti et al. (2011), p. 8; Chmelar (2013), pp. 5-6. Cf. Wolswijk (2010), p. 159. 
29 Crowe et al. (2013), pp. 300-305; Cecchetti et al. (2011), pp. 7-8; Kent et al. (2007), pp. 123, 127. Cf. Debelle 
(2004), pp. 4, 16; Ebner (2013), p. 350. 
30 Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008), p. 249. 
31 Ibidem, p. 253.  
32 See e.g. Crotty (2009), p. 565. 
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pressure led to easing of lending standards and stimulated product innovation, which both contributed 
to higher debt levels.33 According to Chmelar (2013), the development of the single market in financial 
services in the EU facilitated amplified competition.34  
 
Apart from the fact that not all member states are equally exposed to these developments, differences 
in household debt levels are the result of the dissimilar impact of economic and country-specific 
regulatory factors. In “Southern” EU member states interest rates decreased much more than in other 
member states, because of joining the EMU.35 Graph 1.3 reveals that Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Greece experienced negative real interest rates during several years after the adoption of the euro.36 
Together with capital inflows from “Northern” European states, this fuelled a housing and construction 
boom, especially in Ireland and Spain, and created debt overhang.37 In some member states, credit 
demand was also stimulated by falling unemployment.38  
 
Country-specific regulatory factors provide incentives to households for holding and structuring their 
debt and assets. Thereby they interact with relevant economic variables, such as interest rates and 
real estate prices.39 For explaining diverging household debt levels, especially regulatory characteristics 
of the financial and tax system are relevant, such as prevailing rules in financial markets, loan-to-value 
ratios, tax regimes, market structures, mechanisms to enforce debt obligations, type of interest rates 
(fixed/variable), amortisation duration, and the development of the credit market.40 For instance, 
income tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments differs across member states of the EU: in 
some countries mortgage interest payments are not deductible, whereas in others they are, but under 
                                                          
33 Kent et al. (2007), p. 127. Cf. International Monetary Fund (2011b), p. 114. 
34 Chmelar (2013), p. 5. 
35 Chmelar (2013), p. 5. Cf. Zemanek (2010), p. 44-45; Gros (2012), p. 1; Girouard et al. (2006), p. 8; Ebner 
(2013), pp. 349-351. The ECB sets common interest rates for the whole euro area, but because inflation was 
higher than average for some “Southern” EU countries, their real interest rates were historically low. 
36 Graph 1.3 shows data for nine of the twelve member states using the euro since 2001 (other countries were 
left out to ensure visibility). Data comes from the OECD.Stat (see ‘Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics’ 
and ‘Prices and Purchasing Power Parities’) (retrieved 4 July 2016). To calculate the real interest rates, the 
annual short-term interest rates are used, as well as the annual inflation in consumer prices. After the outbreak 
of the crisis, many member states experienced negative real interest rates, but this is the result of central bank 
policies to lower nominal interest rates. 
37 Zemanek (2010), p. 44-45. Cf. Gros (2012). For a specific analysis of the so-called GIPS countries, see Ebner 
(2013).    
38 Cf. Kent et al. (2007), p. 128. 
39 Bertola & Hochguertel (2007), p. 120. 
40 Debelle (2004), pp. 3-5; Bertola & Hochguertel (2007), pp. 118-120, 130; European Central Bank (2012a), p. 
102; Cuerpo et al. (2013), p. 5; Van Nieuwenhuyze (2013), p. 132; Muellbauer & Murphy (2008), pp. 2-3, 16. Cf. 
Guttmann & Plihon (2010), p. 272; International Monetary Fund (2011), table 3.2; Calza et al. (2013), table 1. 
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different conditions.41 The possibility to deduct mortgage interest payments from the income tax 
reduces debt-service costs, and thus incentivises households to take on more debt.42 
 
 
                                                          
41 See European Central Bank (2009), Annex 4 for a description of the main features of mortgage interest 
payment deductibility in euro area member states in 2008.  
42 Cf. Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008); Chlemar (2013), p. 14. 
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1.1.3. The national and EU response 
Both member states and European institutions are aiming at addressing high household debt levels, 
and bringing them back to sustainable levels.43 At national level the responses range from reforms of 
tax systems, to changes in financial regulation and insolvency laws. For instance, the Netherlands 
started with reducing the mortgage interest deductibility in phases, and restricting its eligibility to 
mortgages fully amortising in thirty years on an annuity basis.44 Also, maximum LTV ratios were 
introduced.45 Finland started too with gradually phasing out the deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments.46 In Spain, the regime of mortgage interest deductibility has been eliminated in 2013.47 
Ireland created, among other things, mortgage resolution schemes, reformed the Personal Insolvency 
Act and introduced LTV and LTI caps.48 Portugal reformed its Insolvency Law as well, easing out-of-
court debt restructuring.49 
 
Similarly, the reaction of the EU to the economic crisis in general, and household debt developments 
in particular, was manifold. The financial supervisory system has been overhauled with the creation of 
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the European System of Financial Supervisors in 2010 
and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2013.50 In addition, the Capital Requirements 
Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CDR) IV have been adopted.51 This package 
implements the Basel III accord, which intends to create a more robust financial system by increasing 
its ability to absorb shocks.52 It includes new rules on assigning risk-weights to mortgage and other 
                                                          
43 Regarding the EU institutions, see e.g. European Central Bank (2012a) and Cuerpo et al. (2013). 
44 For a short summary of these reforms, see Financial Stability Board (2014), box 2. 
45 Ibidem. 
46 European Commission (2014d), p. 52.  
47 European Commission (2014c), p. 60.  
48 About the first two policy responses, see Waldron & Redmond (2014), pp. 158-160, while Central Bank of 
Ireland (2014e) provides information about the maximum LTV and LTI caps.  
49 European Commission (2011e), p. 23; European Commission (2011f), pp. 51, 73; European Commission 
(2012c), p. 90; European Commission (2012e), pp. 15, 25; European Commission (2014a), p. 35. 
50 ESRB: Regulation 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010, OJ 2010, L 
331/1. European System of Financial Supervisors: Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010, OJ 2010, L 331/120; European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority: 
Regulation 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24  November 2010, OJ 2010, L 
331/48; European Securities and Markets Authority: Regulation 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 24  November 2010, OJ 2010, L 331/84; European Banking Authority (EBA): Regulation 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24  November 2010, OJ 2010, L 331/12. SSM: 
Council Regulation 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013, OJ 2013, L287/63. The tasks of the EBA were also amended 
after the conferral of these supervisory tasks to the ECB: Regulation 1022/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 October 2013, OJ 2013, L287/5. 
51 Directive 2013/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, OJ 2013, L176/338; 
Regulation 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, OJ 2013, L176/1. 
52 Allen et al. (2013), pp. 247-251.  
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household loans.53 This can affect the supply side of household debt. Furthermore, several legal acts 
in the field of consumer law have been adopted during the crisis, with a view of increasing and 
equalising the level of consumer protection in EU member states.54 These are in particular the 
Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) in 2008 and the Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) in 2014, which inter 
alia contain rules on the provision of information to consumers and the assessment of 
creditworthiness of consumers.55 Moreover, household debt is monitored in the newly adopted 
macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP), a procedure that can be employed to influence member 
states’ fiscal policies affecting household debt.56  
 
1.2. High levels of household debt: what now?  
1.2.1. Effectiveness and EU involvement: the important issues 
These responses to the high levels of household debt induce several questions. A first one is whether 
these responses are or can be made effective in addressing household debt levels.57 Effectiveness 
means the capacity to produce the intended result.58 The legal design of each instrument is crucial for 
this capacity, as will be further explained in the analytical framework.  
 
A second question is to what extent and how the EU should be involved in addressing household 
indebtedness. Questioning this is not without reason. Firstly, the huge diversity in household debt 
levels among member states suggests that their origins are mainly national. Furthermore, the risks of 
high household debt levels – such as defaulting households, deteriorating economic growth and 
systemic fragility – hit national economies in the first place. This raises the question of whether 
member states are the most designated to act. At the same time, it cannot simply be assumed that 
                                                          
53 For the Basel III accord, see https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited 31 August 2016).  
54 Note that national regimes for protecting consumers and treating over-indebted individuals differ 
substantially within the EU, as shown by, among others, Ramsay (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2012d) and Viimsula 
(2010). 
55 CCD: Directive 2008/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008, OJ 2008, L 133/66. 
MCD: Directive 2014/17 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014, OJ 2014, L 60/34. 
For an introduction to these Directives, see e.g. Chlemar (2013) and Hofmann (2012), pp. 449-454. 
56 MIP: Regulation 1176/2011 (supra footnote 1).  
57 Cf. Claessens (2015), who considers the question how macroprudential policies can be made more effective 
as the main question here in the context of ensuring financial stability. 
58 See Sarat (1985), p. 23; Neyer (2004), p. 22; Moschella (2014), p. 1274. See also http://www.merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/effective (last visited 31 August 2016). 
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“more EU” contributes to solving the problems with household debt.59 Moreover, EU law provides 
constitutional and institutional limits to EU involvement in national policies.  
 
The issue is not whether the EU should be involved at all in reducing high levels of household debt. 
The Union is already involved in many areas influencing household debt developments, such as 
financial regulation and consumer law. Moreover, the recent crisis in the EU proved, unfortunately, 
that national economic problems can easily have European consequences, which is an important raison 
d’être for the obligation of member states to coordinate their economic policies.60 Economies are 
interlinked; primarily through the financial system, which is interwoven at both global and European 
level. Consequently, when high household debt levels lead to declining credit supply or financial 
instability, other EU member states can be affected too. This might also affect public debt, due to the 
linkages between the financial sector and sovereigns, and between private and public debt.61 Other 
spillover effects of household debt problems from one member state to another can ensue from 
negative sentiment on the markets, which affects the market assessment of other member states as 
well, as the crisis has clearly shown.62 Member states generally do not take cross-border effects of 
their policies into account. Furthermore, high household debt levels can have adverse consequences 
for the conduct of monetary policy by the ECB: if they result in lower or negative economic growth in 
a member state, through their negative impact on consumption, this might easily lead to asynchronous 
business cycles between EU member states.63 This hampers the conduct of monetary policy, which 
then will have asymmetric consequences: if the ECB, for instance, increases the interest rate to slow 
down on average booming credit supply, member states experiencing an economic downturn will 
suffer.  
 
                                                          
59 Note that Van Gestel & Micklitz (2014) signal that much research in EU law simply assumes that more EU 
involvement is good (they specifically mention “more harmonisation”), instead of asking how much 
involvement is needed (pp. 305-307). 
60 For this obligation, see art. 5 & 121 TFEU. 
61 Cf. sub-section 1.1.1. The dangerous loop between sovereign debt and banking crises is discussed in, among 
others, Mody & Sandri (2012) and International Monetary Fund (2012), pp. 56-57. 
62 See e.g. De Grauwe (2012) and De Grauwe & Ji (2013) about the risk of market panic related to sovereign 
debt in the EMU.   
63 If one country experiences a recession, while the economy in another member state flourishes, their 
business cycles are asynchronous. De Haan et al. (2008, p. 266) already concluded years ago that the business 
cycles of many euro area member states are substantially out of sync, so the risk of asynchronous business 
cycles is surely not purely hypothetical. Further on the role of the housing market in the transmission of 
monetary policy, see e.g. Milcheva & Sebastian (2016). 
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1.2.2. Effectiveness and EU involvement: interrelated issues 
In fact, the questions about effectiveness and EU involvement are interrelated, due to the nature of 
EU law. The involvement of the EU in policy areas is governed by a division of competences between 
the Union and its member states and by several EU principles. Starting point is the competences 
catalogue, since room for EU action is limited by the competences conferred upon the Union, as 
enshrined in art. 2-6 of the TFEU.64 The use of the non-exclusive competences of the EU is governed 
by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.65 The subsidiarity principle means that the EU 
‘shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States, (…) but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level’.66 The principle of proportionality entails that ‘the content and form of 
Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.’67 Hence, 
these two principles are concerned with respectively the objectives of the proposed action and the 
objectives of the EU treaties. Owing to the principle of conferral, when EU institutions exercise the 
competences of the Union, a measure adopted by them must have a specific legal basis, which confers 
a specific task to the EU institution involved.68 
 
Especially the subsidiarity principle is relevant for this study: it requires an analysis whether 
instruments at the level of the member states are sufficiently able to achieve the goal of lowering 
household debt levels – which is the objective of the proposed action – or whether the EU can realise 
better results.69  
 
Therefore, the effectiveness of the instruments determines to a large extent whether the objective of 
lower household debt levels can be achieved better at national or EU level.70 Meanwhile, legal limits 
                                                          
64 The principle of conferral is enshrined in art. 4(1) and 5(1)-(2) TEU.  
65 Art. 5(1) TEU. 
66 Art. 5(3) TEU. 
67 Art. 5(4) TEU. 
68 Van Ooik (1999), p. 65-68; Amtenbrink & Vedder (2017), p. 165-169. The CJEU ruled that the choice for a 
legal basis must be in particular founded on the aim and purpose of the measure (Case C-233/94 Germany v 
Parliament and Council [1997] ECR I-2405, para. 12). Moreover, the measure shall genuinely pursue the 
objectives stated in the legal basis (Case C-376/98 Germany v European Parliament and Council [Tobacco 
Advertising] [2000] ECR I-8419, para. 84-85). 
69 Instead, the application of the proportionality principle leads to an examination whether EU actions to 
influence household debt levels are necessary and suitable to achieve objectives of the EU treaties. 
70 Nevertheless, it shall be clear that it is not only effectiveness which determines the subsidiarity of the 
instruments used to influence household debt determinants. Although EU law is rather goal-oriented – which is 
visible in the wording of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles, and is shown by the importance of 
teleological interpretation – law is not only meant to serve economic or other policy aims. The division of 
competences between the EU and the member states and the principles governing this, are cornerstones of 
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imposed by EU law in general, and the aforementioned principles in particular, can influence the 
possible effectiveness of the instruments. Therefore, the assessment of the preconditions for 
effectiveness of the instruments for influencing household debt levels, and the application of the 
principle of subsidiarity are interrelated.  
 
However, apart from issues related to the effectiveness of instruments, the subsidiarity principle may 
be fulfilled, if the high levels of household debt are caused by factors at EU level. On the contrary, if 
causes are located at national level and differ between member states, the instruments need to be 
either exercised at national level, or differentiated between member states.71 The mere fact that the 
consequences of high household debt levels in one member state spill over to other member states or 
the EU as a whole is insufficient for meeting the subsidiarity principle: if national instruments can 
effectively prevent or address this, there is no need for EU action. The subsidiarity principle might also 
be met, if differences between national instruments exert a significant negative impact on the internal 
market, and harmonisation can solve this, without hurting the effectiveness of the instruments.72 Then, 
the next question is whether the proportionality principle is fulfilled as well.   
 
1.2.3. Research question and sub questions 
The issues concerning the effectiveness of policies to address household indebtedness and EU 
involvement in these policies underlie the research question and sub questions. In fact, these two 
issues are interconnected, since the effectiveness of instruments partly depends on the level – national 
or European – at which rules are enacted and vice versa. This will be further substantiated in the 
analytical framework.  
 
Hence, the research question is: 
 
To what extent are instruments at both EU and national level able to effectively influence 
household debt levels? 
 
 
                                                          
the EU constitutional and institutional legal order, which possess more than instrumental value (Van Gestel & 
Micklitz (2014) warn that law is increasingly instrumentalised and legal researchers often tend to overlook legal 
issues (p. 297, 300-301, 303-305)). So, it is also a question of whether constitutional and institutional limits 
exclude some instruments that could be useful to influence household debt levels. 
71 Member states need to have enough instruments to tackle problems in their countries (cf. Jeanne & Korinek 
(2014), p. 167).   
72 Cf. High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (2009), para. 101. 
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The sub questions are: 
 
a) Which instruments are available to influence household debt levels, and how do they 
influence household debt levels? 
b) How does the design of these instruments affect their ability to effectively influence 
household debt levels? 
c) To what extent are these instruments governed by national and EU law, and how does this 
affect their ability to effectively influence household debt level? 
d) How do these instruments complement, substitute or conflict with each other, and how does 
this affect their ability to effectively influence household debt levels?  
 
The analytical framework will elucidate how these sub questions are answered, especially how the 
potential effectiveness of the instruments is affected by their design, which includes the created 
possibilities to enforce them and the actors empowered to apply them. Due to the relationship 
between the issues about the effectiveness of the instruments and the degree of EU involvement, the 
latter issue will be integrated into the analysis. Therefore, in the course of the analysis of the 
preconditions for effectiveness, simultaneously most aspects of the question of whether the 
subsidiarity principle is met, are answered. Questions related to the internal market are an exception 
to this integrated approach. Since maintaining the integrity of the internal market is not a function of 
effectiveness, this issue is not directly related to the research question, and only receives briefly 
attention in later chapters, insofar as conflicts between creating effective instruments and advancing 
the internal market need to be discussed.73 
 
This research will focus on instruments that are directly targeted at affecting the amount of debt that 
consumers can borrow or lenders can supply. These are several macroprudential instruments – LTV, 
DSTI, LTI and DTI limits, sectoral risk-weighted capital requirements and the counter-cyclical capital 
buffer – as well as the regime for mortgage interest deductibility (MID) and provisions in consumer law 
prohibiting credit supply to consumers which are judged unable to meet their repayment obligations. 
The reasons for this choice are elaborated in chapter 2, where it will become clear that their 
effectiveness in influencing lending to household is promising, and that legal research into those 
instruments is highly necessary.  
 
                                                          
73 This issue is particularly discussed in sub-sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.1.3.2, and also in section 3.3.2.2. 
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1.3. Approach and methodology 
1.3.1. An interdisciplinary approach 
Policymakers seek to influence household debt developments by means of instruments, which are 
legal or at least operate within a certain legal framework. Therefore, the topic of this study is located 
at the intersection of two disciplines: law and economics. Indeed, this research is conducted using both 
a legal and an economic point of view, and can be characterised as interdisciplinary. However, 
interdisciplinary research is a container concept, as Taekema and Van Klink (2011) rightly argue, 
encompassing all kinds of combination of two or more disciplines.74 To facilitate the analysis of the 
types of interdisciplinary research that can be distinguished, Taekema and Van Klink (2011) identify 
five elements that determine the perspective of a particular discipline.75 These are (1) the concepts, 
(2) the methods to acquire knowledge, (3) the object, (4) the problem awareness and (5) the research 
goals of the discipline.76 While most of these elements are clear without further explanation, the last 
two deserve some clarification. The term “problem awareness” stands for the type of problems that 
receive attention from a discipline, and the term “research goals” for the kind of aims researchers 
within a discipline generally pursue: e.g. describing, explaining or evaluating.77 Building upon these 
elements, Taekema and Van Klink (2011) distinguish various types of interdisciplinary legal research, 
differing in the degree to which the interdisciplinary research moves beyond a single discipline.  
 
This study is a form of “integrated” interdisciplinary research, using the terminology of Taekema and 
Van Klink (2011), meaning that ‘the research process itself contains elements from both disciplines and 
the researcher welds together the concepts and methods from each or applies a more general 
methodological approach to both.’78 This can be clarified by means of the aforementioned elements. 
The object of this research are legal instruments with economic goals. Economic theories, concepts, 
literature and findings are used to understand the causes of household debt. The analysis of the 
selected instruments is based on an analytical framework built upon legal literature, findings and 
concepts, but also informed by economic literature, findings and concepts. Therefore, insights from 
various disciplines are integrated in a single analytical framework, which guides the research. The 
methods are predominantly legal: literal, teleological and systemic interpretation of texts. However, 
economic reasoning supports the comprehension of the instruments, and guides the understanding of 
                                                          
74 Taekema & Van Klink (2011), p. 7. 
75 Ibidem, pp. 7-8. 
76 Ibidem, p. 8. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Ibidem, p. 11. 
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the transmission mechanisms through which the instruments affect household debt. In turn, the 
analysis of EU involvement is mainly based upon legal principles.  
 
From an economic perspective, the most relevant question is the suitability of the instruments for 
influencing household debt determinants. From a legal viewpoint, it is most relevant to know whether 
the created framework of instruments respects the legal system, values and principles in place, i.e. 
whether the rule of law is upheld. This research examines both. Finally, the goals of this research – 
describing, explaining and evaluating – fit better in a legal than an economic discipline, especially since 
the dominant economic method for explaining, i.e. quantitative empirical research, is not used in this 
study.  
 
A combination of several disciplines is relatively new in European law, since, until recently, most legal 
research was doctrinal and reluctant to integrate various disciplines, according to Van Gestel and 
Micklitz (2011).79 However, the present research calls for this integrated multidisciplinary approach for 
several reasons. Firstly, the causes of household debt developments must be understood in order to 
know whether instruments would be able to influence them effectively. Moreover, ideally the 
instruments are analysed from both an economic and legal perspective, which are concerned with 
respectively issues related to effectiveness and the rule of law. It namely lacks sense to examine only 
whether instruments fit into the legal system and respect legal principles, whilst not knowing whether 
they can be effective. However, neglecting these legal issues, and solely focussing on the potential 
effectiveness is undesirable too, since the EU and its member states are based upon respect for the 
rule of law. Moreover, it is highly questionable whether economic research into the effectiveness of 
legal instruments could successfully be accomplished without legally assessing and interpreting these 
rules, using appropriate hermeneutic methods, such as literal, teleological and systemic interpretation. 
Furthermore, since a considerable amount of these instruments has been created recently, it is 
necessary to clarify and systemise them legally, in order to grasp the entirety of applicable legislation. 
Above all, legal and economic issues are intertwined. On the one hand, the possible effectiveness of 
an instrument depends on its legal status, for instance its enforceability. On the other hand, the 
potential effectiveness of an instrument determines whether it should – according to the principle of 
subsidiarity – be exercised at national or EU level, and thus partly determines its legal status. 
Concluding, a multidisciplinary approach is necessary and contributes to the existing literature.  
 
                                                          
79 Van Gestel & Micklitz (2011), p. 18. 
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1.3.2. Literature review 
Knowing which factors determine household debt levels is a precondition for answering the research 
question and sub questions. Consequently, this research will start with identifying the factors that 
affect household debt levels in the member states of the European Union, based on economic theory 
and reviews of several streams of literature explaining household debt. Special attention will be paid 
to factors related to the financial system and the housing market, because of their role in the European 
crisis. Based upon the acquired knowledge, an overview of the different determinants will be provided, 
indicating whether they influence the level of household debt through demand or supply channels. 
Empirical data, from various sources, is used to illustrate differences in household debt levels, as well 
as in economic and regulatory characteristics between member states.  
 
1.3.3. Doctrinal legal research and supporting interviews 
Having established the impact of the economic and regulatory factors on household debt, an analysis 
of the instruments addressing these factors is the next step needed to answer the research question. 
The backbone for doing this is formed by legal research, because the design and working of the 
instruments, which are created by legislation, have to be explained and understood. Only then, the 
state of the preconditions for effectiveness can be assessed.  
 
Because a range of EU and national instruments exists or is being created, systemisation – i.e. grasping 
the entire picture – is necessary. The first step is mapping these instruments. After selecting the 
instruments which will be investigated in this study, their position within the legal order of the EU and 
its member states is examined. Thereafter, the substantial content and design of and decision-making 
processes on these instruments, as well as their scope with respect to influencing household debt 
levels will be investigated. This entails doctrinal research into primary and secondary Union law, as 
well as national law. Many of the EU instruments consist of secondary EU law, namely regulations or 
directives. For instance, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the financial supervisory 
authorities have been created by means of regulations, while the capital requirements package 
consists of a regulation and a directive, and the CCD and MCD are both directives. This secondary law 
is based on primary law: the EU treaties. Those treaties, interpreted and supplemented with case law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), also provide limits to the use of the EU 
instruments. Examples are the competences catalogue and the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Consequently, the research includes an investigation of how EU treaties, principles 
and case law enable and constrain the use of the instruments which can influence household debt 
levels. Whenever necessary other relevant legal sources, such as soft law, have to be examined, since 
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it is a general trend in EU law that hard and soft law are increasingly combined in EU governance80 (the 
core of the distinction between hard and soft law is that the former is binding, contrary to the latter).81 
Directives have to be implemented in national law and leave room for national peculiarities, 
particularly if they are not subject to maximum harmonisation. Consequently, the national 
implementation of the aforementioned directives will be examined too. Insofar as relevant, other 
national legislation and case law will be investigated as well.  
 
All these EU and national legal sources can be typified as the data for this research.82 Text analysis is 
the common legal approach to such “data”.83 This approach will be used in this thesis as well. The 
hermeneutic methods that are used are literal, teleological and systemic interpretation. The two latter 
are the most applied interpretational principles in European law, as pointed out by, among others, 
Hahn-Lorber (2010).84 Whenever necessary, this is complemented by applying case law. Case law can 
be described as authoritative interpretation.85  
 
The process described thus far can be characterised as doctrinal legal research. To verify the findings 
of this legal research, and to obtain additional insights, a number of interviews have been conducted, 
with officials of authorities involved in applying the instruments. These are officials from financial 
supervisors in each member state examined in this study, as well as an official of the Dutch Ministry of 
Finance.86 The interviews are only conducted to support the main research, and are not the core of the 
study. They were semi-structured, meaning that each respondent was asked more or less similar 
questions, which were drafted in advance, while digressing from the questions was possible. Each 
interview covered various themes and was conducted using a so-called tree model: it contained main 
questions, sub-questions, and follow-up questions.87 Sometimes, the information obtained through 
                                                          
80 Van Gestel and Micklitz (2011), pp. 14-15 and 27. 
81 See e.g. Boyle (2010), p. 122. Nevertheless, the exact meaning of “soft law” is debated among academics, as 
nicely summarised by Terpan (2015), pp. 68-72. He distinguishes two criteria for defining hard and soft law: 
obligation and enforcement. If both are hard, law is hard (pp. 72-77). The softness of an obligation derives from 
the softness of the source and/or the content of the rule. ‘Soft enforcement is about procedures aimed at 
ensuring compliance without necessarily resorting to coercion or constraint.’ (p. 74). 
82 Cf. Van Hoecke (2011), p. 11. 
83 Ibidem, p. 6. 
84 Hahn-Lorber (2010), pp. 765-766; 773-776. The CJEU generally uses teleological and systemic interpretation 
(Maduro (2008), p. 3; Itzcovich (2011), pp. 552-553, 555-557; Dawson (2014), pp. 424, 426-427). Of course, 
these two interpretational principles are often intertwined with each other, as acknowledged by Maduro 
(2008), p.3 and Hahn-Lorber (2010), p. 774. 
85 Bankowski et al. (1991), pp. 13-16; Van Hoecke (2011), p. 11. 
86 The next sub-section explains which member states will be examined in this study. 
87 Evers & De Boer (2007), pp. 55-60. 
1. Setting the scene 
32 
 
the interview helped to understand other information better; other times the information provided 
new insights. If so, it is used with explicit reference. 
 
1.3.4. Comparative legal research and country selection 
1.3.4.1. Comparative legal research 
The present research goes beyond classical doctrinal legal research in another respect too, since it has 
comparative aspects. National laws and regulations regarding household debt levels in several 
member states are compared, in particular the regulatory framework establishing LTV, LTI, DSTI and 
DTI ratios, the fiscal treatment of debt, and other law which affects the effectiveness of the 
instruments to address household indebtedness, such as law on enforcement and regulatory and 
supervisory independence.88  
 
Traditionally, comparative legal research compares law of some selected countries, based upon a 
common methodology: it starts, after an explanation of the research design, with a description of the 
different legal orders to provide the necessary context. Thereafter, in the actual comparison, 
differences and similarities are mapped. Finally, those differences and similarities are explained.89 This 
study will respect these main elements of comparative legal research. It needs to be noted that this 
study describes both the European and the national legal orders, insofar as relevant for understanding 
the instruments that are created to address household debt levels. 
 
1.3.4.2. Country selection  
In this study, member states are selected based upon two criteria. Firstly, given the subject-matter of 
the research, it is relevant to examine countries with and without high levels of household debt. It is 
important to signal which (regulatory) factors can possibly explain differences between those types of 
member states. However, since not the causes of, but the instruments addressing high levels of 
household debt are central in this research, the member states with high debt levels will receive more 
attention. These countries will most likely employ most effort to create instruments to reduce 
household debt levels. As became clear in section 1.1, relevant member states with high household 
debt levels include the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain, while large member states with relatively low 
levels of household debt are Germany, France and Italy. A second criterion is variation between 
member states regarding the instruments employed to address household debt levels. For instance, 
                                                          
88 See section 1.4 on these issues. 
89 See e.g. Adams (2011) and Lemmens (2012).  
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some countries use LTV limits, contrary to others. The Netherlands and Ireland are the member states 
with the highest gross levels of household debt before and during the crisis, even substantially higher 
than Spain, which, like Ireland, faced a pronounced housing bust with severe consequences. Unlike 
Ireland and Spain, the Netherlands did not face increasing arrears on mortgages, which especially 
Ireland did. Because of these differences, Ireland and the Netherlands will be further examined, also 
since they have been both active after the crisis in enacting rules for addressing household debt levels, 
but with considerable differences, for instance regarding instruments as LTV and LTI ratios and 
mortgage interest deductibility.90 Germany, with its low levels of household debt, differs from other 
countries with respect to the instruments for influencing household debt levels, such as LTV caps and 
mortgage interest deductibility. For this reason, Germany is also selected for further study, from the 
group of member states without problems with household indebtedness. To provide the necessary 
context, a brief introduction to the legal order and economic situation of each of these three countries 
is called for.  
 
1.4. The analytical framework 
Using classical doctrinal and comparative legal research, issues related to the effectiveness of the 
instruments in reducing household debt levels will be examined. This research is not concerned with 
effective judicial protection or the implementation and application of EU law in the national legal 
orders per se, issues that are governed by various EU legal principles.91 In addition, this study does not 
test the actual effectiveness – the capacity to produce the intended result – of the legal instruments.92 
Instead, this study complements empirical, quantitative approaches by examining how the legal design 
of the instruments affects their potential effectiveness.  
                                                          
90 This will become clear in chapters 4 & 6.  
91 An EU principle of effectiveness exists, which is normally understood as aiming at effective judicial protection 
by requiring ‘that national remedies and procedural rules must not, in practice, render their beneficiaries’ 
enjoyment of Community rights excessively difficult.’ (Herlin-Karnell (2012), pp. 46). Cf. Ross (2006), p. 479; 
Klamert (2014), p. 125). Consequently, an important goal of this principle is to ensure compliance of member 
states with EU law (Nebbia (2008), p. 292; Klamert (2014), pp. 125, 131; Rott (2013), p. 181). Some scholars 
consider ensuring (1) effective judicial protection and (2) compliance of member states with EU law as different 
roles of the EU principle of effectiveness (Nebbia (2008), p. 302; Klamert (2014), p. 131)). The EU principle of 
effectiveness is closely related to the principles of effet utile and direct effect (Klamert (2014), pp. 261-262), 
which govern the implementation and application of EU law in the national legal orders (for these principles, 
see e.g. Hartley (2010), chapter 7; Vlaicu (2011), pp. 166-167). Nonetheless, scholars point out that the term 
effectiveness is used in variety of meanings in the case law of the CJEU and in EU law (Ross (2006), p. 479; 
Herlin-Karnell (2012), pp. 46, 50; Klamert (2014), p. 125. Cf. Snyder (1993), pp. 25-26). It is, for instance, also 
used as a principle for deciding whether EU action is justified at all, namely in the context of the proportionality 
principle (Herlin-Karnell (2012), p. 46). 
92 For an example of a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of law, see Pistor et al. (2000), pp. 341-348. 
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1.4.1. The preconditions for effectiveness as the yardstick 
The present research will focus on the legal preconditions which must ensure that instruments can be 
effective in influencing household debt levels. Law can either create the right preconditions for 
effectiveness, or constrain effective action.93 These preconditions determine to what extent the 
instruments are able and suitable to produce the intended effect of lower household debt levels.94 
Legal research is indispensable for examining to what extent these preconditions are fulfilled, since 
the instruments have to be interpreted and understood within the broader legal framework.95 
 
The analytical framework operationalises the preconditions for effectiveness in order to have criteria 
for guiding the assessment of the instruments which are created to influence household debt levels. 
The preconditions and their operationalisation are mainly derived from legal, but also from non-legal, 
strands of literature. Three preconditions are related to the individual instruments, whereas another 
concerns the interaction between all instruments. In view of the literature, as will be discussed in the 
sub-sections below, three important criteria for guiding the assessment of individual instruments can 
be distinguished, and are thus used in this study.96 It is required for each instrument that:  
1. Its rules are determinate and complete; 
2. Its rules are enforceable with proportionate and dissuasive sanctions; 
3. Its rules can and are likely to be applied, enforced and amended independently. 
 
The potential effectiveness of instruments addressing household debt levels not only depends on 
aspects related to a single instrument. In addition, the interaction between various instruments is 
relevant for the effect which they will have on behaviour. So, an overarching criterion for evaluating 
the functioning of various instruments in the context of the whole system is whether the relationship 
between these instruments is non-conflicting and, whenever necessary for achieving the aim of 
influencing household indebtedness, complementary or substitutive.97 An instrument is 
complementary to another instrument if it addresses different aspects of the same goal or problem. 
                                                          
93 Cf. Aelen & Van den Broek (2014). Also, the field of institutional economics delivers the insight that 
instruments both constrain and incentivise/enable, as further discussed in box 2.1. Cf. International Monetary 
Fund (2015), which concludes with respect to macroprudential tools that their ‘careful design (…) will also be 
important to maximizing their efficacy.’ (p. 22). 
94 Cf. McCrudden (1993), who considers effectiveness in his article as ‘fit for achieving the objectives…’ (p. 325). 
95 The hermeneutic methods necessary for conducting such research have been discussed in sub-section 1.3.3. 
Note that the fulfilment of the criteria is a matter of degree, and not binary (Cf. Harding (1997), p. 22). 
96 The first and third criteria are partly based upon Van ‘t Hof (2016). 
97 Cf. Voigt (2013), p. 11; Marmor (2010), pp. 145-146. Note that Chambers (2004) states too that interlinkages 
with other legal instruments should be taken into account for understanding legal effectiveness, as well as non-
binding, but supportive provisions of binding law. (pp. 527-529, 531-532). 
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An instrument is a substitute for another instrument if it can achieve the same aim with a similar 
degree of effectiveness. Therefore, it will be analysed whether and to what extent these relationships 
exist among and between national and EU instruments. If conflicts occur between instruments at the 
national level on the one hand, and the EU level on the other hand, the subsidiarity principle might be 
fulfilled for EU action that will solve this.98 Then, it might be necessary to shift some instruments to 
another level in order to align them with each other.  
 
The next sub-sections explain and operationalise the preconditions for effectiveness related to the 
individual instruments. Table 1.1 already provides an overview of their operationalisation.99 
 
Table 1.1: Operationalising the preconditions for effectiveness 
Determinacy and 
completeness 
Possibility proportionate and 
dissuasive enforcement 
Room for independent 
application, enforcement and 
amendment 
Determinacy:  
 no vague, ambiguous, or 
unclear general phrases: 
reading them in accordance 
with their plain meaning, in 
light context and aims, 
suffices to understand the 
instrument 
 
Completeness: 
 scope includes all relevant 
types of debt, borrowers, 
and lenders 
 no gaps due to inconsistency 
or silence 
 exceptions are subject to 
clear and protective 
conditions 
Proportionate enforcement:  
 availability whole range of 
sanctions, from light to 
severe  
 
Dissuasive enforcement: 
 availability high of 
administrative fines 
 mandatory publication of 
sanctions, apart from specific 
exceptions 
 possibility to sanction 
individuals 
 availability threatening 
sanctions, like withdrawal 
licence 
 possibility criminal conviction 
 ability and willingness to 
act: instrument has clear 
legal basis, well-defined 
policy objectives, 
corresponding to clear 
mandate decision-maker, 
and framework provides 
room for action 
 decision-maker is 
operationally independent: 
no interference by 
executive or industry 
 decision-making procedure 
is based on guided 
discretion 
 presence of accountability 
mechanism 
Interaction between instruments 
Relationship is non-conflicting and, if necessary, complementary or substitutive 
 
                                                          
98 Although member states are only allowed to exercise a shared competence to the extent that the EU has not 
exercised its competence (art. 2(2) TFEU), different types of instruments can address the same problem, and 
might thus conflict with each other. Problems related to this issue are regarding consumer protection will be 
discussed in (sub-)sections 5.4 and 7.1.1.2. 
99 For a few parts of chapter 5 and 6, some of the preconditions will be operationalised slightly differently, 
because the instruments and actors discussed in these chapters require so. 
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1.4.2. Determinacy and completeness  
The determinacy and completeness of law matter for its effectiveness, as well as for the degree of legal 
certainty.100 The concept of determinacy ‘refers to the existence of such legal regulation as can be 
intelligibly identified and applied to the underlying facts.’101 This affects its effectiveness, since the 
regulatees are otherwise unaware of what is expected from them, or can purposely abuse 
indeterminacy to their own advantage.102 Completeness of law means that the established rules ‘cover 
the subject-matter of their regulation in its entirety.’103 This is a prerequisite for effective law, since 
gaps and loopholes can trigger circumvention or undo results obtained elsewhere in the law.104 The 
importance of complete law is confirmed by an economic body of literature on financial regulation and 
supervision, which highlights the need to take the risks of leakage and circumvention into account 
when designing the regulatory framework.105 If gaps and resulting loopholes are a consequence of 
different rules between member states, regulatory arbitrage is facilitated. The resulting ineffective 
rules might pose a reason for harmonisation. Determinacy and completeness of law are related: 
indeterminate provisions might create a loophole, whereas a legal gap can result in difficulties of 
identifying and applying law to the underlying facts.106 Hence, further specifications are necessary to 
distinguish between both concepts and operationalise them.  
 
1.4.2.1. Operationalising the assessment of the determinacy of law  
It is first necessary to zoom in on the causes of indeterminacy of law. According to Hart (1961), this is 
the result of the open texture of rules, whose meaning and application can never be completely 
defined and delineated.107 More specifically, Poscher (2012) distinguishes three main causes of 
                                                          
100 On the latter: cf. Brown et al. (2006), pp. 61, 66. Cf. Stern (2012), pp. 244-245. 
101 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 22.  
102 On the effcts of determinacy on the effectiveness of law, see e.g. Allott (1981), p. 236; Brown et al. (2006), 
p. 61; Orakhelashvili (2008), pp. 22-24. 
103 Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 20. 
104 Ibidem, pp. 20-21. Cf. Pistor & Xu (2002), p. 932;  
105 These concepts will be explained and discussed in more detail in section 2.3. See e.g. Lim et al. (2011), p. 31; 
Aiyar et al. (2014b), pp. 209-210; Aiyar et al. (2014a); Kim (2014), p. 126; Jeanne & Korinek (2014), pp. 166-167.  
106 It is also possible to see indeterminacy as a subcategory of incompleteness (see e.g. Pistor & Xu (2002), 
especially pp. 945, 959-961) or vice versa. However, in this research both concepts are operationalised as two 
different, albeit highly interrelated, issues, since their focus is slightly different. 
107 Hart (1961), pp. 123-124. According to Hart, rules are not only subject to the open texture of language as 
such, but also to a specific form of open texture of rules, namely that their application might be subject to 
indeterminacy (Schauer, 2011, pp. 7-10). Indeed, indeterminacy in the application of rules can be distinguished 
from indeterminacy in the language of the rules, since the application does not only depend on the wording of 
the individual rules, but also on the question of whether new, unforeseen, cases fall under the same rules and 
on the interpretation by judges, who even might interpret a rule contra legem (cf. Bix, 1993, p. 181).  
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indeterminacy, namely vagueness, ambiguity and generality.108 Ambiguous phrases have multiple 
meanings.109 Vagueness concerns the presence of borderlines cases, for which it is unclear whether 
rules apply or not.110 This can be the result of difficulties with delineating or classifying the matter 
governed by the rules, for instance because the application of the rules to that matter is unforeseen.111 
Imprecise language might also cause vagueness.112 Finally, generality refers to the use of general terms 
– which are not necessarily vague, but can rather be characterised as (intentionally) underspecified, 
although it is sometimes difficult to disentangle vagueness and generality from each other.113 
Moreover, causes of indeterminacy can coincide: for instance, open-ended norms are often both 
general and vague.114 
 
Therefore, an instrument is determinate if the rules governing its use are not unclear due to (1) vague 
phrases, (2) ambiguous phrases, or (3) general phrases that raise doubt about the classification of 
specific situations under the rules. Assessing the indeterminacy of a phrase requires further 
operationalisation, especially in case of detecting vagueness: a phrase is determinate if its addressees 
can straightforwardly derive its meaning and apply it.115 This is the case if reading the phrase in 
accordance with its plain meaning, in light of the context and aims of the instrument, suffices to 
understand it.116 In this respect, the instrument’s aims shall be clearly stated in the preamble or an 
attached explanatory memorandum: there should be no need to guess what they are.117 In addition, it 
is hard to consider a phrase as determinate if consulting the instrument itself, the provisions on which 
it is based and the general legal framework in the respective member state, as well as laws and 
                                                          
108 Poscher (2012), pp. 128-131. 
109 Ibidem, p. 129. This is rarely an issue in legal interpretation, since the context often clarifies the meaning of 
expressions (ibidem). Cf. Waldron (1994), p. 512. 
110 Poscher (2012), p. 129. Cf. Waldron (1994), p. 513; Marmor (2010), pp. 146-150. 
111 Poscher (2012), pp. 121-134. 
112 Ibidem, p. 133. Cf. Torpman & Jorgensen (2005), who state that the ‘language of the law is frequently so 
vague that determination of the exact behaviour prescribed or forbidden must be extracted by using a certain 
method of interpretation.’ (p. 148). 
113 Poscher (2012), p. 130; Sorensen (2001), pp. 404-408. Poscher give the example of ‘living being’, a concept 
which is more general than ‘tree’. Generality can be functional to encompass many situations under one rule.  
114 An open norm leaves room for subjective judgment and disagreement (Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 26). 
115 Note that this is comparable with the doctrine of acte clair in EU law, where the defining criterion for 
allowing not lodging a preliminary reference is that ‘the correct application of Community law may be so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question raised is to be 
resolved.’ (Case 283/81, CILFIT, [1982], ECR 3415, para. 16).  
116 Cf. Bix (1993, p. 67), who states that the ‘clarity of the language in a legal rule, that is straightforward 
relative to the fact to which the rule will be applied, is not sufficient (…) for the application of that rule to be a 
clear case’. A literal reading may namely be either inconsistent with the purpose of the rule or lead to absurd or 
unjust results. Leaving aside the last option – since it is less relevant for regulatory rules as at stake in this study 
– the first option can be tackled by reading the phrase in the light of the context and aims of the instrument, as 
stated in the main text.  
117 Cf. Bix (1993), pp. 65-71. 
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legislation to which the instrument refers, are not sufficient for understanding its meaning.118 On the 
contrary, the presence of a borderline case, rather than a plain case, can be identified by asking 
whether a judge’s choice between open alternative interpretations is required to interpret a phrase.119  
 
1.4.2.2. Operationalising the assessment of the completeness of law  
The assessment of the completeness of the instruments is operationalised by verifying whether the 
following requirements are met. Firstly, it is analysed whether the scope of the instrument includes all 
relevant types of debt and all relevant borrowers and lenders.120 Secondly, it is examined whether 
there is no gap in the rules of the instrument. This might inter alia happen if they are inconsistent or 
silent on (aspects of) important issues.121 A gap can create a loophole, and can lead to so-called creative 
compliance. This means that the regulatees engage in box-ticking and formal compliance with the 
rules, but act against their purpose, circumventing the restrictions set by the rules as much as 
possible.122 Taking advantage of loopholes is often referred to as regulatory arbitrage. Finally, it is 
analysed whether exceptions to the rules are subject to clear and protective conditions in order to 
avoid abuse. Some of these issues are interrelated. For instance, whether all relevant borrowers and 
lenders – both domestic and foreign – are included in the scope of the instrument matters for the 
possibilities for regulatory arbitrage. The opportunities for regulatory arbitrage are also influenced by 
issues as whether an instrument applies at the level of an individual loan, borrower or lender, at the 
level of a country, or even at the level of the EU.123 If national instruments cannot prevent significant 
                                                          
118 This requirement is less strict than the condition in the CILFIT case that ‘every provision of Community law 
must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question 
is to be applied.’ (Case 283/81, CILFIT, [1982], ECR 3415, para. 20). However, although an analogy with case law 
of the CJEU is useful, an analogy always has its limitations and applying a less strict criterion is justifiable for 
two reasons. Firstly, the literature is critical on the strict criteria of the CJEU (see e.g. Broberg (2008), pp. 1388-
1390; Hartley (2010), pp. 310-312). Secondly, the requirement as cited above must be applied by national 
courts, which can be expected to have more expertise than an addressee of a rule. A requirement to evaluate a 
rule in the light of all EU or national law is thus less burdensome for a court than for an average addressee of a 
rule.      
119 Cf. Solum (1987), p. 462; Bix (1991), p. 65; Bix (1993), p. 18. 
120 Cf. FinCoNet (2014). In that report the, the following aspects of the scope of a regulator’s oversight are 
distinguished: type of product, type of entity (e.g. a bank or non-bank lender), type of activity, type of 
consumer and the conduct of the regulator (p. 32).  
121 Regarding silence on important issues: Orakhelashvili (2008), p. 21. Cf. Pistor & Xu (2002), pp. 932, 941. 
Silence might be a result of socioeconomic or technological changes not covered by existing laws. In turn, this 
can be tackled by using open-ended provisions (Pistor & Xu (2002, pp. 932-933). However, this impairs the 
determinacy of the law. 
122 McBarnet & Whelan (1991), pp. 848-850; Black et al. (2007), pp. 194-195; Black (2008), pp. 437-438; 
Akinbami (2013), p. 19.  
123 Cf. European Central Bank (2015a), pp. 124-126.  
1. Setting the scene 
39 
 
regulatory arbitrage resulting from differences between national instruments in EU member states, 
the subsidiarity principle is fulfilled.124   
 
1.4.2.3. The tension between determinacy and completeness of law  
When designing rules, there often is a tension between the goal of realising determinacy and 
completeness. This becomes apparent when comparing three archetypes of rules.125 Firstly, a 
straightforward and encompassing rule is most likely determinate and complete. However, it risks 
being blunt – which can lead to negative side effects – and not fine-tuned to actual risks.126 These 
problems are tackled by the second type of rule, which is a complex and detailed rule. In this case, the 
prescribed outcome depends on the presence of particular circumstances and the fulfilment of certain 
conditions. However, there are various threats to the determinacy and completeness of this kind of 
rules. The risk of a gap is larger in case of a complex system of rules, especially if new developments 
change the regulated market. These gaps, as well as the complexity in itself, increase the risk of creative 
compliance. Furthermore, if rules become very complex, the system can become opaque, impeding its 
determinacy.127 In turn, such problems might be solved by adopting principles. Principles are often 
general and lack the specificity of rules and point, instead, towards a certain aim or direction.128 
Advantages of principles are the possibilities to fine-tune the application to actual risks and new 
developments, as well as the potential to combat creative compliance. However, this comes at the 
expense of a lack of legal certainty and room for non-compliance through utilising the vagueness of 
the principles to develop a self-serving interpretation.129 So, principles can more easily be complete, 
but are often vague and thus indeterminate.130 All in all, this reveals the difficulty of creating rules that 
are determinate, complete and fine-tuned to actual risks. 
 
                                                          
124 Note that the De Larosière report considered a lack of consistent financial regulatory and supervisory rules 
as a major problem, since it encouraged regulatory arbitrage (The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in 
the EU (2009), para. 101, 104). 
125 Cf. Black et al. (2007), Black (2008), pp. 436-438, Brown (2015), pp. 574-575. 
126 This can lead to additional costs for society and/or decreased legitimacy of the rule.  
127 Cf. Haldane & Madouros (2012), who argue that, especially in a complex environment which is characterised 
by uncertainty instead of risk, simple rules often outperform complex rules. See also Georgosouli (2013), pp. 
214-215. 
128 Black et al. (2007), pp. 194-195; Black (2008), p. 437. On the nature of principles, see also Ratsiborinskaya 
(2016), pp. 24-26. 
129 For a comprehensive discussion of these and other disadvantages of using principles in regulation: Black et 
al. (2007), pp. 196-200; Black (2008), pp. 446-456. Cf. De Vries (2013).   
130 Nevertheless, general principles are often operationalised over time by detailed guidelines. This might 
diminish their vagueness to a certain extent. However, the result can also bet that the framework might 
become even more opaque than under detailed rules, since the guidelines are less accessible and certain than 
these rules (see Black et al. (2007) and Black (2008)).  
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1.4.3. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement  
Rules fall short of accomplishing their purpose if they are not complied with. Non-compliance can be 
caused by a lack of knowledge about the applicable rules – for instance, because they are 
indeterminate – or by inability or unwillingness to comply with them. Each cause may require a 
different solution; for instance, clarification, capacity building, and sanctioning. Nevertheless, in order 
to incentivise compliance, the possibility to enforce a rule is a necessary, but not always sufficient, 
precondition for legal effectiveness. Indeed, traditionally enforceability belongs to the concept of 
effective law.131 Still, enforceability is an irrelevant precondition for effectiveness for rules only 
creating incentives instead of prohibiting behaviour, with taxes and subsidies as the most prominent 
examples.132 For enforcement to be effective, sanctions must be at least proportionate and 
dissuasive.133 Therefore, in line with its focus on preconditions, this study examines the possibility to 
impose proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.134  
 
1.4.3.1. Operationalising the possibility of proportionate enforcement  
Many supervisors work with an enforcement pyramid, meaning that enforcement starts with a 
persuasive approach, but escalates to more punitive measures if regulatees do not change their 
behaviour.135 De-escalation starts once the regulatee cooperates.136 Proportionate enforcement is 
                                                          
131 Cf. Snyder (1993), pp. 19, 24-25; Allott (1981), pp. 234-235, 238; Sarat (1985), p. 27; Neyer (2004), pp. 22-23; 
Pistor & Xu (2002), p. 934. The importance of enforceability is also discussed in specific strands of literature, 
such as consumer protection (see e.g. Iff/ZEW (2010), pp. 59-60; World Bank (2013), p. 15), financial regulation 
and supervision (see e.g. Aiyar et al. (2014b), p. 185), and institutional economy (see e.g. Voigt (2013), pp. 2, 8, 
10). Often, the effectiveness of law is measured by the degree of implementation of or compliance with the law 
(Chambers (2004), p. 505; Torpman & Jorgensen (2005), p. 148-149; Cf. Snyder (1993), pp. 19, 24-25; Allott, 
1981, pp. 234-235, 238; Sarat, 1985, p. 27; Neyer (2004), pp. 22-23). Legal positivists even contend that law 
cannot be considered law if there is no compliance with it. However, compliance does not show that law 
actually affects behaviour, since the regulatees might have behaved similarly without the existence of that 
particular law (Murphy (2014)). 
132 Cf. Torpman & Jorgensen (2005), p. 150. 
133 Cf. Case 68/88, Commission v. Greece [1989] ECR 2965, para. 24 (EU:C:1989:339); European Commission 
(2010), p. 4. 
134 Admittedly, it is also relevant for their deterring effect whether violations can be detected, and whether 
sanctions are actually imposed (cf. Dorn (2011), pp. 3-4). However, this is to a large extent dependents on 
actually capacity, and to a lesser degree on legal preconditions.  
135 Mascini (2013), p. 53. Cf. Baldwin & Black (2008), pp. 62-63, Elder (2013). 
136 Mascini (2013), p. 48. Cf. Baldwin & Black (2008), p. 63. In practice, applying the enforcement pyramid is not 
without problems. For instance, de-escalating after the application of punitive measures can be difficult, since 
the relationship between the supervisor and regulatee might be troubled due to the punishment. For a 
discussion of this and other problems, see e.g. Baldwin & Black (2008), pp. 62-64; Gunningham (2010), pp. 127-
131; Mascini (2013), pp. 50-53. 
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possible if the whole range of enforcement measures under the enforcement pyramid is available, 
from light to severe sanctions.137  
 
1.4.3.2. Operationalising the possibility of dissuasive enforcement  
The main insight of the deterrence perspective on inducing rule-abiding behaviour is that sanctions 
are dissuasive if the benefits of violating the rules and requirements are lower than the probability of 
receiving the sanction multiplied by the costs or impact of this sanction.138 This perspective assumes 
rational behaviour of potential offenders, which can generally be considered plausible within the 
context of “white-collar crime”.139 Meanwhile, some studies point at downsides of using sanctions to 
deter – such as hurting the relationship between the supervisor and regulatee – and advocate ensuring 
compliance by means of persuasion and advice.140 However, persuading and sanctioning are not 
mutually exclusive, and are mostly combined in current practice, by means of the enforcement 
pyramid.141 Hence, it remains relevant whether there is the treat of dissuasive sanctions. 
 
The evaluation of the potential dissuasiveness of sanctions for non-complying lenders is 
operationalised by verifying to what extent several prerequisites are met.142 Firstly, administrative 
fines shall be high enough to offset benefits acquired from violating the rules.143 It is difficult to quantify 
an exact level, but in the financial services sector the maximum amount likely needs to be at least 
                                                          
137 Otherwise it would be impossible to impose a sanction that reflects the gravity of the violation while not 
going beyond what is necessary to achieve the aims pursued (cf. European Commission (2010), p. 4; MacNeil 
(2015), p. 296. 
138 Armour et al. (2015), pp. 7-8, Faure et al. (2009), pp. 166-167; Polinsky & Shavell (2000), pp. 47-48, 70-71; 
Jackson & Roe (2009), p. 209; Gunningham (2010), p. 122; European Commission (2010), p. 4; Yeung (1999), pp. 
449-450. Cf. MacNeil (2015), pp. 282-283, 298; Van Wingerde (2012), pp. 21-67; Mein (2015a), p. 131. The 
work of Becker (1968) was influential for fuelling research based on this perspective. For a discussion of the 
deterrence perspective, see e.g. Yeung (1999), pp. 441-457. 
139 Faure et al. (2009), pp. 166-167. 
140 See e.g. Van Wingerde (2012), pp. 35-62; Gunningham & Kagan (2005), pp. 213-214. Cf. Singh (2003), p. 302; 
Black & Baldwin (2010), pp. 186, 199; Gunningham (2010), pp. 122-125. For a broader discussion on the various 
supervisory approaches, see e.g. Black (2012) and Tombs (2015). 
141 Gunningham (2010), pp. 123-131; MacNeil (2015), p. 283. Cf. May (2005), p. 32. 
142 For administrative enforcement these are partly based upon the issues which the European Commission 
(2010) correctly identified as important for ensuring that sanctions in the financial services sector – providing 
loans is a financial service – are dissuasive. The International Monetary Fund (2011) fully supported the view of 
the Commission (see e.g. pp. 1, 3). Also some scholars explicitly agreed with the view of the Commission: see 
e.g. Dorn (2011), p. 2. 
143 European Commission (2010), p. 12; International Monetary Fund (2011a), p. 4. Cf. Dorn (2011), p. 4. The 
literature on financial sanctions in general, as well as experiments, confirm that administrative fines need to be 
sufficiently high. See e.g. the discussion and references in Kurz et al. (2014), pp. 170-171. 
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several million euros.144 In addition, the financial strength of the offender should be taken into account 
when determining the amount of the fine, since large lenders might consider the sanctions otherwise 
as “peanuts”.145 Moreover, setting minimum levels of administrative fines helps to avoid under-
sanctioning, which might stem from regulatory capture.146 Secondly, the publication of sanctions must 
be mandatory, apart from some specific, well-defined exceptions.147 Research shows that the 
publication of sanctions contributes to prevention and deterrence by being a form of naming-and-
shaming.148 The reputational damage resulting from the publication is likely to have even a much larger 
impact on the offender than the administrative fine itself.149 If publication serves the goal of warning 
the public and preventing future violations, it must be timely and reach consumers.150 Studies namely 
show too that (the threat of) reputational damage is low if the offender is unknown to the public and 
the publication receives no media attention.151 Publication must be surrounded with sufficient 
safeguards, in order to ensure legal protection of the offender.152 Thirdly, in order to align incentives 
to comply with rules, it must be possible to sanction both the individual who is essentially responsible 
for the violation and the financial institution that benefitted from the violation.153 Fourthly, credible 
non-pecuniary sanctions need to be available for situations that financial sanctions cannot be 
imposed.154 Such a sanction can be withdrawal of the lender’s licence, but it needs to be realised that 
this ultimate sanction is not a credible threat for every lender, especially not for systemic 
                                                          
144 I am not aware of any empirical research, outside the area of securities, on the required magnitude of fines 
in order to reach sufficient deterrence. For research in the area of securities, see e.g. La Porta et al. (2006), 
Coffee (2007) and Armour et al. (2015). The European Commission (2010) discusses that ‘[v]iolations of 
financial services legislation can lead to gains of several million euros’ (p. 7). This requires the possibility to 
impose fines of several million euros. 
145 European Commission (2010), p. 14. Cf. International Monetary Fund (2011a), p. 5. Note that supervisors 
sometimes show a tendency to sanction only small offenders (e.g. Van Erp (2010), pp. 425-426, 429). 
146 On minimum levels of sanctions, although not in relation to regulatory capture, see: European Commission 
(2010), pp. 12-13; International Monetary Fund (2011a), pp. 3-4. For more on regulatory capture, see the next 
sub-section. 
147 European Commission (2010), pp. 7, 12; International Monetary Fund (2011a), p. 4. 
148 Ibidem. 
149 Armour et al. (2015), pp. 22-23, 29; Van Erp (2011), pp. 289-290. 
150 Van Erp (2010) discusses that in the Netherlands generally a year passes between the detection of a 
violation and the imposition of a sanction, meaning that a publication of the sanctions loses its relevance as 
warning device for the public (p. 424). Moreover, if sanctions are only published on the website of the 
supervisor and do not receive media attention, they do not reach the public at large and hence their function 
as instrument of protecting consumers (Van Erp (2010), pp. 425-428).  
151 Van Erp (2011), p. 290, 296. Cf. Van Erp (2010), pp. 420-422. 
152 Ottow (2015), pp. 178-180. She discusses the issue that publication before no appeal is possible anymore 
can hurt an offender irreversibly, but waiting till no appeal is possible anymore can take years and thereby 
reduces the effectiveness and timeliness of the publication.  
153 European Commission (2010), pp. 8, 13; International Monetary Fund (2011a), p. 5; MacNeil (2015), p. 295. 
154 For instance, it could be that a lender would go bankrupt due to a fine. 
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institutions.155 Therefore, the availability of another ultimate threat is desirable, namely the threat of 
a criminal sanction. 
 
Although administrative enforcement is the standard within regulation, it is not the only option: 
criminal prosecution is another avenue.156 Criminal sanctions are likely dissuasive, due to the “stigma” 
of a criminal conviction and the possibility of imprisonment. However, criminal proceedings often 
require substantial costs and efforts, reducing the likelihood that proceedings are started.157 
Therefore, criminal prosecution is often sub-optimal compared to administrative enforcement. 
However, due to its dissuasiveness, it can function as an ultimate threat at the top of the enforcement 
pyramid. This can be a credible threat, even in situations where a withdrawal of authorisation is not. 
 
1.4.4. Room for independent application, enforcement and amendment 
The effect of an instrument is influenced by decisions of the actors involved in the process of applying, 
enforcing and amending it (amendment stands for adjusting the legal design of an instrument, whereas 
application refers to using the instrument as it is currently designed). Any actor which applies, 
enforces, or tightens rules to restrict lending to households, can expect fierce resistance, probably 
mostly from the financial industry and politicians. Such decisions are often unpopular, because even 
though they benefit longer-term general interests – such as financial stability – they can go against 
special interests, and their costs are felt in the short-term. Therefore, the industry may try to capture 
a regulator or supervisor, meaning that it is able to influence regulatory or supervisory decisions.158 
Capture can be the result of active lobbying, but also of unconscious biases, like identification of 
regulators or supervisors with the industry they are supposed to regulate and supervise.159 Therefore, 
it is vital for the effectiveness of rules that the risk of inaction or inadequate action – which may be the 
result of industry and political pressure – is minimised by the allocation of powers and the design of 
decision-making processes, while the ability and willingness to act is maximised. 
 
                                                          
155 Elder (2013), p. 235. It is unlikely that a supervisor will proceed with withdrawing the licence of a large bank. 
156 In consumer law, private enforcement is another alternative for administrative enforcement. However, 
since only one chapter in this study deals with consumer law, the advantages and disadvantages of private 
enforcement compared to public enforcement will be discussed in that chapter, in section 5.2. 
157 Faure et al. (2009), p. 177; Ottow (2015), pp. 174-176. In addition, criminal sanctions are often only imposed 
long after the violation took place, which may weaken the perceived connection between the violation and the 
sanction, and may thus diminishes the deterrent effect as well. 
158 Mitnick (2011), p. 35. For more on capture and the need to be shielded from it, see e.g. Quintyn & Taylor 
(2003), p. 265; Den Hertog (2003), pp. 24-25; Barth et al. (2006), pp. 34-46; Pacces & Van den Bergh (2012). 
159 Kwak (2013), p. 98; Aelen (2014), pp. 117-119; Veltrop & De Haan (2014), pp. 22-24; Jansen & Aelen (2015), 
pp. 26-28. Cf. Lunn (2013). On ongoing post-crisis lobbying of financial industry groups, see Young (2013). 
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1.4.4.1. Increasing the ability and willingness to act, decreasing the inaction bias 
The ability and willingness of an actor (often a regulator or supervisor) to act is fostered if the 
instrument has (1) a clear legal basis, and (2) well-defined policy objectives, which (3) correspond with 
a clear mandate of the actor, and (4) a framework which provides this actor with room for action.160 
 
Secondly, in this context, the literature has stressed the importance of allocating powers to a regulator 
or supervisor that is (sufficiently) independent: this enables achieving the objectives, without political 
and industry interference.161 This benefits the effectiveness of the rules.162 Only one dimension of 
independence is directly relevant for this study, namely operational independence.163 This entails that 
a regulator or supervisor can, within the confines of the law, take decisions about an instrument, to 
achieve the objectives for which it received this instrument, without approval of and interference by 
                                                          
160 For a discussion of these kinds of issues in the context of macroprudential policy, see International 
Monetary Fund, Financial Stability Board and Bank for International Settlements (2016), p. 7; International 
Monetary Fund (2014b), p. 6. Cf. Nier (2011), pp. R7-8. 
161 See e.g. Quintyn & Taylor (2003), p. 259, 264-266; Di Noia & Gargantini (2014), pp. 5-6. For an introduction 
to this literature, see: Majone (2005), Masciandaro et al. (2008), Amtenbrink & Lastra (2008). The principles of 
independence and accountability are included in the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, 
published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012). Also art. 4(4) Directive 2013/36 requires 
member states to ensure that national supervisors (competent authorities) have enough independence to carry 
out prudential supervision. Furthermore, art. 19(1) of the regulation establishing the SSM, regulation 
1024/2013, requires national supervisors to act independently when acting within the SSM. These provisions 
have not yet been interpreted by the CJEU. Also, the ESRB recommends member states to ensure that 
macroprudential authorities are, in the pursuit of their objectives at least operationally independent, in 
particular from political bodies and from the financial industry (European Systemic Risk Board 
Recommendation 2011/3, Section 1, Recommendation E(1)). Concerning broader about good agency 
principles, including independence, see Ottow (2015), especially the third chapter. For a discussion, based upon 
a principle-agent model, about the question whether certain tasks can be better delegated to politicians or 
bureaucrats (such as regulators), see Alesina & Tabellini (2007, 2008). 
162 Empirical research finds evidence that independence of regulators increases financial stability: see e.g. 
Dincer & Eichengreen (2012), pp. 323-324; Quintyn & Taylor (2003), pp. 262-263. Cf. Jordana & Rosas (2014), p. 
685; Amri & Kocher (2012), pp. 33-38. 
163 The literature distinguishes various dimensions of independence. While categorisations vary somewhat, the 
underlying issues are similar. A first dimension – called operational, functional or decision-making 
independence – focusses on the regulator’s degree of independence in deciding on its primary tasks. Another 
dimension concerns the legal status of the agency and its staff, independence in matters regarding the 
organisation of the agency, and the appointment and dismissal of its head and other staff. Finally, budgetary 
independence focusses on independence from politics with respect to the funding of the agency. For 
categorisations, see e.g. Quintyn & Taylor (2003), pp. 267-274; Szydlo (2012), p. 800; Gilardi (2002, 2005b); 
Gilardi & Maggetti (2011); Hanretty & Koop (2012, 2013), Gadinis (2013). Lavrijssen & Ottow (2012) qualify 
functional independence as “more equal” than the other dimensions (p. 428). Others add informal measures of 
independence to these formal dimensions, such as the frequency of contacts, and revolving doors between the 
regulator and politicians, and the regulator and the industry (Gilardi & Maggetti (2011), pp. 211-215; Thatcher 
(2002), p. 962-966), where the term “revolving door” refers to regulators moving from regulatees to the agency 
and then back to regulated industries and similarly for politicians and the regulator (Thatcher, 2002, p. 963)). 
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the executive, another public authority, or the industry.164 The operational independence of a 
regulator or supervisor is being restricted if someone else than the judiciary and the legislator limits 
its discretion.  
 
Thirdly, the effective use of an instrument is supported by a decision-making process that is 
characterised by a combination of rules and discretion.165 On the one hand, rule-based decision-
making reduces the risk of inaction. On the other hand, a certain degree of discretion is both 
unavoidable and necessary to be able to react timely to new developments, to tailor action to the 
specific situation at hand, and to make decisions in complex situations that cannot be incorporated in 
a simple rule.166 Therefore, to combine the advantages of rules and discretion, a decision-making 
procedure should be based upon so-called “guided discretion”.167 Guided discretion is characterised 
by a combination of rules that steer action, and a certain degree of discretion when applying these 
rules.168 In practice, the design of a guided discretion mechanism may differ: for instance, exceeding 
the threshold of an indicator may trigger an act-or-explain principle, or exceeding this threshold may 
only function as a warning signal.169 A successful use of available discretion is facilitated by well-defined 
policy objectives and a clear mandate, since these provide direction to discretionary decisions.170   
 
                                                          
164 Quintyn & Taylor (2003), p. 267; Lavrijssen & Ottow (2012), p. 428; Szydlo (2012), p. 801; Aelen (2014), pp. 
235-236; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012), principle 2, essential criterion 1. 
165 After the crisis, the issue of rules vs. discretion started to be discussed for macroprudential policy: see e.g. 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2010), pp. 6-7; Goodhart (2011), pp. 18-19. This issue has 
previously been discussed as well for monetary and fiscal policy: see e.g. Barro & Gordon (1983); Wyplosz 
(2005, 2011). 
166 Cf. Agur & Sharma (2013), pp. 4-10; International Monetary Fund, Financial Stability Board and Bank for 
International Settlements (2016), pp. 12-13; Crowe et al. (2013), p. 317; Galati & Moessner (2013), p. 853; 
MacNeil (2015), p. 283. Rules, especially if part of legislation, will always be adjusted too late (Cf. Aelen (2014), 
p. 159; Ottow (2015), pp. 10-11, 71-72).  
167 Cf. Crowe et al. (2013), p. 317; European Systemic Risk Board (2014a), pp. 172-180.  
168 In this regard, the ESRB recommends macroprudential authorities to use a sound framework for applying 
their instruments, including ‘appropriate indicators to monitor the emergence of systemic risks and to guide 
decisions on the application, deactivation or calibration of time-varying macro-prudential instruments as well 
as an appropriate coordination mechanism with relevant authorities at the national level.’ (European Systemic 
Risk Board recommendation 2013/1, Section 1, Recommendation C(1)(b)). 
169 A strict guided discretion mechanism, imposed by the legislator, is somewhat similar to what the CJEU, in 
the context of the delegation of tasks to EU agencies, denotes as limited discretion, namely: ‘clearly defined 
executive powers the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to strict review in the light of objective 
criteria’ (Case 9/56 Meroni [1958] ECR 11, p. 152), or powers which are ‘circumscribed by various conditions 
and criteria’ (Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v European Parliament and Council [2014], para. 45). Cf. Case C-
301/02 P Tralli v ECB [2005] ECR I-4071 and Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 The Queen, on the application 
of Alliance for Natural Health and Others v Secretary of State for Health and National Assembly for Wales 
[2005] ECR I-6541. However, in regulatory and supervisory practice often a wider margin of discretion exists. 
170 Cf. Lastra (2013), p. 224. 
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Fourthly, all this may not benefit the effectiveness of an instrument, if the risk of serving other interests 
is not monitored. For this, an accountability171 mechanism must ensure that an independent regulator 
or supervisor stays within its mandate, complies with its objectives, interacts with political institutions 
and stakeholders, and avoids traps like capture and over-regulation.172 Accountability mechanisms 
come in all shapes and sizes, and can range from a reporting obligation to an override mechanism for 
approving, annulling or guiding decisions.173 In order to create a yardstick to hold the regulator or 
supervisor to account, it is, once again, important that its mandate and the policy objectives of an 
instrument are well defined.174 Probably, an accountability mechanism contributes more to an 
effective use of instruments if it allows attaching consequences to regulatory or supervisory 
inaction.175 
 
1.4.4.2. Analysing restrictions on an actor’s discretion in the decision-making process 
An analysis of the instrument’s legal basis, its objectives in relation to the actor’s mandate, the room 
for action, and the decision-making process of applying, enforcing and amending an instrument will 
reveal to what extent the aforementioned, interrelated, issues are taken into account. This also shows 
how other (national and EU) actors are involved in this process, and to what extent this affects the 
actor’s operational independence and accountability. To this end, it is helpful to examine how the 
actor’s discretion is restricted. This unveils whether a guided discretion mechanism is in place, and to 
what extent an actor’s operational independence, if present, is affected by restrictions. The latter is 
the case if restrictions do not come from the judiciary or legislator, but from the executive, another 
public authority, or the industry.176  
                                                          
171 Accountability can be defined as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment, and 
the actor may face consequences.’ (Bovens (2007), p. 450). The literature on independent regulatory agencies 
usually focusses on the accountability mechanism between the delegating actor – the legislator or executive – 
and the holders of the delegated power – the regulator or supervisor (see e.g. Quintyn & Taylor (2003), p. 278; 
Majone (2005), pp. 147-152). 
172 Quintyn & Taylor (2003), p. 278; Quintyn (2009), p. 273, 278-280. Cf. Aelen (2014), pp. 154-158. Although 
this is not the topic of this study, a more fundamental reason that accountability is indispensable is that 
regulators and supervisors perform, with a degree of discretion, complex tasks that affect individual rights and 
freedoms and potentially are accompanied with large welfare implications (cf. Szydlo (2012), pp. 805-806 and 
Amtenbrink (1999)). 
173 For more on override mechanisms, see e.g. Amtenbrink (1999), pp. 51-54; Amtenbrink & Lastra (2008), p. 
125. For more on accountability mechanisms, see e.g. Bovens (2007), Biela & Papadopoulos (2014), pp. 1-9. 
174 Cf. Amtenbrink & Lastra (2008), p. 118; Quintyn & Taylor (2003), pp. 280-281; Amtenbrink (1999), pp. 40-59; 
De Haan et al. (1999), pp. 172-173. 
175 Cf. Amtenbrink & Lastra (2008), pp. 123-126; Bovens (2007), pp. 463-464. 
176 Moreover, in judgments about powers given by an EU directive to regulatory authorities in the 
telecommunication sector, while the directive instructed member states to guarantee the independence of 
these authorities, the CJEU ruled that national legislation may not encroach on the authority’s discretion to 
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For analysing restrictions on an actor’s discretion, a further comprehension of this concept is useful. 
Szydlo (2012) distinguishes three types of discretionary powers. Firstly, he discerns administrative 
discretion in a strict sense, meaning a degree of freedom in opting for a particular decision amidst all 
possible decisions.177 A second form of discretion is the interpretation of clauses that are formulated 
in a relatively general and imprecise way.178 This is called interpretative discretion in the remainder of 
this study. A third type of discretion is present if an actor has a margin of appreciation when assessing 
whether a specific ‘factual situation may be subsumed under the given legal notion (…) in order to 
apply the legal norm that uses such notion.’179 The term subsuming discretion is used as a shortcut for 
this type of discretion in this study. All three types of discretion can be constrained by the legislator, 
judiciary, executive, or the actor itself.180 Restrictions can be imposed at different points in time, 
namely before, during and after the moment of taking a decision.181 
 
All three forms of an actor’s discretion can be restricted ex ante by adopting detailed rules or 
guidelines.182 This may create a guided discretion mechanism. It depends on its design which types of 
discretion are constrained. For example, threshold-based indicators that are only used as signals solely 
limit an actor’s subsuming discretion to classify a particular situation as risky or problematic. However, 
if there is a rule demanding action or explanation by the actor if a threshold is exceeded, its 
administrative discretion in a strict sense is constrained as well. Finally, it depends on the determinacy 
and completeness of the rules how much interpretative discretion is left for the actor to interpret the 
rule in a certain manner.183  
 
The presence of restrictions during the decision-making process mainly affects an actor’s 
administrative discretion in strict sense. This happens if decision-making powers are shared with other 
actors, if approval of another actor is required, or if decisions are subject to ongoing control in the 
                                                          
exercise the powers given by the EU legislator (Case C-424/07 Commission v. Germany [2009], ECR I-11431, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:749, para. 54, 61, 74, 78-79, 83; Case C 543/09 Deutsche Telekom [2011], ECR I-03441, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:279, para. 43). So, apparently, if the EU legislator gives powers to an independent regulator or 
supervisor, the national legislator is not allowed to restrict the discretion to exercise these powers. 
177 Szydlo (2012), pp. 798-799. 
178 Ibidem, p. 799. 
179 Ibidem. Szydlo (2012) uses three German concepts to distinguish these types of discretion, namely 
respectively Verwaltungsermessen, unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe and Beurteilungsspielraum (p. 798). 
180 For instance, case law and legal principles may confine both the interpretative and subsuming discretion, 
while a legislator can restrict the administrative discretion in a strict sense and the interpretative discretion by 
adopting clear and detailed legislation. The actor can constrain its own discretion by adopting policy rules. 
181 Cf. Busuioc (2009), who distinguishes ex ante, ongoing and ex post control (pp. 604-610). 
182 Cf. Lavrijssen & Ottow (2012), p. 429. 
183 Cf. Pistor & Xu (2002), pp. 946-947. 
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form of steering, directing or issuing orders.184 While the operational independence of a regulator or 
supervisor diminishes if its decision-making powers are shared with another actor, the effectiveness 
of the rules will not necessarily be impaired. This depends on the mandate and independence of the 
actor with whom the decision-making powers are shared.185 Moreover, participation of other actors 
during the decision-making process may increase the accountability of the (main) decision-maker. For 
instance, it can be expected that consultation procedures contribute to the accountability of a 
regulator or supervisor, by increasing transparency about the practice of decision-making and the 
influence of other actors, in particular of the financial industry, and by inducing providing feedback to 
responses.186 Moreover, it requires the actor to explain its decisions, which is a soft form of 
accountability.187 
 
Ex post restrictions on an actor’s discretion can be the result of judicial review or the presence of an 
override mechanism, through which specific decisions can be altered, annulled or suspended by 
someone else than the judiciary. Whether an override mechanism will increase or decrease the 
effectiveness of the instruments depends on the framework for intervening. If the mechanism is rule-
based, the situations in and conditions under which overriding a decision is allowed, are well defined. 
If not, the authority with the overriding power has ample discretion to decide on intervention. Rule-
based override mechanisms are to be preferred, since they provide clarity, and limit the room for 
violating the operational independence of a regulator or supervisor for wrong reasons.188 A rule-based 
override mechanism can be part of an accountability relationship, as it enables attaching consequences 
to the (in)action(s) of an actor.189  
 
1.5. Legal and economic background of selected countries 
1.5.1. The Netherlands  
The Netherlands is a civil law country. Primary legislation, wetten (acts), is adopted by the bicameral 
parliament. Acts can authorise the adoption of an algemene maatregel van bestuur (AMvB) (general 
administrative order), which is a delegated form of regulation from the legislator to the government. 
                                                          
184 Cf. Busuioc (2009), p. 609. 
185 Cf. Gilardi (2002), p. 883; Gilardi (2005b), p. 149.   
186 Cf. Thatcher (2002), pp. 966-967; Masciandaro et al. (2008), p. 846. 
187 It is only a soft form of accountability, since the forum to which the actor gives account cannot attach 
consequences to the actor’s action (supra, footnote 171). 
188 Cf. Quintyn & Taylor (2003), p. 282. 
189 Supra, footnotes 171-173. Cf. De Haan et al. (1999), pp. 175. 
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In turn, an AMvB can provide for the adoption of certain aspects of a regulation by means of a 
ministerial decree, a form of sub-delegation from the government to a minister. While an AMvB is 
discussed in the Dutch Council of Ministers, and has to be sent to the Council of State for advice, this 
is not required for a ministerial decree. Although discussion in the parliament is officially not required 
for both an AMvB and a ministerial decree, they are often sent to the parliament before adoption, to 
give it the opportunity to discuss it.190 All in all, a hierarchy exists between an act, a general 
administrative order, and a ministerial decree. The Netherlands has opted for a twin-peaks model of 
financial sector supervision, where De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), the Dutch central bank, is 
responsible for microprudential and macroprudential supervision, while the Autoriteit Financiële 
Markten (AFM) (Authority for the Financial Markets) exercises conduct of business supervision.191 
Microprudential and macroprudential supervision have as objectives the soundness of individual 
financial institutions, partly for protecting their consumers, and the stability of the entire financial 
system, respectively.192 Conduct of business supervision is aimed at ensuring appropriate behaviour 
and transparency of financial institutions, and monitoring behaviour that can be harmful to both 
customers and to the functioning of markets.193 In 2012, a Financial Stability Committee has been 
created to reinforce consultations between DNB, the AFM and the Ministry of Finance on financial 
stability issues, and to identify systemic risks and make recommendations to deal with them.194 
 
In the run-up to the crisis, the Netherlands experienced a large increase in household debt, among 
other things, due to deductibility of mortgage interest payments and easier available credit.195 The 
loan-to-deposit ratio is high in the Netherlands, leading to funding risks.196 The Netherlands 
                                                          
190 Van der Pot (2014), pp. 682-690. 
191 Art. 1:24 and 1:25 Wet op het financieel toezicht (Wft) (Act on Financial Supervision), available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020368. Macroprudential supervision is officially a primary task of DNB since 
1 January 2014 (art. 1:24(1) Wft and art. 3(2) and 4(1)(c) Bankwet 1998. Cf. Wissing & Dieben (2014), p. 90. The 
Bankwet 1998 is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0009508. The Wijzigingswet financiële markten 
2014 official introduced macroprudential policy as a primary task of the DNB: see Wijzigingswet financiële 
markten 2014, Staatsblad, 2013, 487. It is available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2013-
487.html (last visited 28 July 2016). The AFM shall take the interest of the stability of the financial system into 
account when performing conduct of business supervision (Art. 1:25(1) Wft). Cf. Wissing & Dieben (2014), p. 
90).  
192 Ayuso & Blanco (2013), p. 437; Galati & Moessner (2013), p. 848. Although the perspective and purpose of 
macro- and microprudential regulation and supervision differs, their instruments are to a considerable extent 
comparable: many of them are employed at the level of individual financial institutions and are related to 
capital and liquidity ratios (Osinki et al. (2013), pp. 8-9).  
193 De Haan et al. (2009), pp. 304-317; Dragimor (2010), pp. 53-55.  
194 See further Box 4.1 in sub-section 4.1.3.2. 
195 European Commission (2013), pp. 15-16. 
196 European Commission (2013), p. 38; European Commission (2014h), p.46; De Nederlandsche Bank (2014b), 
pp. 17-18. 
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experienced a considerable housing boom and bust. Yet, while many houses were underwater, the 
percentage of non-performing loans is low, clearly below EU-average.197 Deleveraging resulted in a 
drag on consumption, and thus GDP growth.198 The Netherlands did not experience negative real 
interest rates in the years before the crisis.199 In 2016, house prices have risen considerably, but around 
30% of the houses were still underwater.200 
 
1.5.2. Ireland  
Ireland is a common-law country with a constitution and statutory law.201 Primary legislation – called 
Acts – is adopted by the bicameral parliament, the Oireachtas. Secondary legislation is formed by 
Statutory Instruments (S.I.).202 Explicit conferral of law-making powers in an Act is required for a S.I. to 
be legal.203 An individual provision in an Act is named a “section” and an individual provision in a S.I. a 
“regulation”. Ireland has opted for an integrated model of financial sector supervision, in which the 
Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) is responsible for microprudential and macroprudential supervision of all 
regulated entities, as well as for consumer protection in the area of financial services.204  
 
Ireland experienced a pronounced housing boom and bust, which resulted in high levels of arrears, 
widespread negative equity, and a sharp decline of GDP.205 The housing boom and the increase of 
household debt has been driven by rapid credit expansion through the banking sector and tax 
incentives for housing investment, like deductibility of mortgage interest payments.206 According to 
Regling and Watson (2010), the rapid credit expansion was a result of the adoption of the euro, which 
led to falling interest rates (real interest rates were even negative for several years) and abundant 
                                                          
197 De Nederlandsche Bank (2014b), p. 44; Whitehead et al. (2014), pp. 16-23. 
198 International Monetary Fund (2014c), pp. 4-9. 
199 See graph 1.3. 
200 European Commission (2016a), pp. 25-26. 
201 See e.g. http://www.ucc.ie/law/irishlaw/guide/ (last visited 30 July 2016) 
202 Five types of Statutory Instruments exist: orders, regulations, rules, bye-laws and schemes. 
203 Often different Acts and Statutory Instruments on the same issue coexist without being integrated: this 
hinders understanding the complete legal framework. 
204 Section 6A Central Bank Act 1942 lists the objectives of the CBI, which include ‘the stability of the financial 
system overall’ and ‘the proper and effective regulation of financial service providers and markets, while 
ensuring that the best interests of consumers of financial services are protected’. A financial services provider 
is a person carrying on a business of providing one or more financial services or products (section F14 and F5 
Central Bank Act 1942). A consolidated version of the Central Bank Act 1942 is available at 
http://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/1942/act/22/front/revised/en/html (last visited 29 April 2017). The CBI 
received its responsibility to protect consumers with the Central Bank Reform Act 2010, available at: 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2010/en/act/pub/0023/ (last visited 17 April 2015). 
205 See e.g. Norris & Coates (2014). Cf. Priemus & Whitehead (2014), table 1; Whitehead et al. (2014), pp. 16-
23.   
206 European Commission (2011a), p. 6. 
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availability of cross-border bank funding without foreign exchange exposure.207 This contributed to the 
credit boom, rising household debt and the property bubble. This was reinforced by lower lending 
standards due to competitive pressure.208 Loan-to-deposits ratios in Ireland strongly increased since 
the beginning of the 2000s.209 Arrears on mortgage loans have rapidly grown in the crisis years, 
reaching levels above 15% since 2012.210 In recent years, house prices started to grow strongly, but 
households remain vulnerable due to high debt levels.211 
 
1.5.3. Germany  
Germany is a civil law country as well. At the federal level, Gesetze (acts) are adopted by the Bundestag 
and Bundesrat, consisting of directly elected parliamentarians and representatives of the Länder 
(federal states), respectively. Secondary legislation is formed by Verordnungen (regulations), which 
require explicit delegation in an act. The Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) 
(Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) is the main German prudential supervisor, with decision-
making powers, but the Bundesbank, the German central bank, received certain tasks as well, including 
ongoing supervision of banks and the responsibility for monitoring financial stability and identifying 
systemic risks.212 BaFin has no mandate to protect individual consumers.213 In 2012, a Financial Stability 
Committee has been created to strengthen cooperation between the Ministry of Finance, the 
Bundesbank and BaFin, and to issue warnings and recommendations on financial stability risks.214 
 
Germany had its housing boom in the 1990s after the reunification, and has since engaged in a more 
restrictive policy regarding mortgage lending, including tax reforms in 2005 eliminating tax incentives 
                                                          
207 Regling & Watson (2010), pp. 24, 28-29. This is confirmed by Whelan (2014, pp. 427, 430) and the role of 
international funding possibilities also by Addison-Smyth et al. (2009, p. 389); Everett (2015, p. 362). 
208 Norris & Coates (2014), pp. 304-305. Cf. Honohan (2010), para. 6.9 and 6.39. 
209 Lowering these LTD ratios was part of the Irish Economic Adjustment Programme (European Commission 
(2011a), pp. 10, 24). 
210 European Commission (2012b), p 9; European Commission (2012d), p. 11-12; European Commission (2014f), 
p. 35. 
211 See e.g. International Monetary Fund (2016d), pp. 9, 11, 22. 
212 §§ 6-7 of the Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (KWG) (Banking Act), BGBl. I, 1998, 2776, available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kredwg/; § 1 Finanzstabilitätsgesetz (FinStabG) (Financial Stability Act), 
BGBl. I, 2012, 2369, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/finstabg/. English translations of these acts 
are available at respectively https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/dl_kwg_en.html 
and  
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Bundesbank/Organisation/act_monitoring_financial_s
tability.pdf (all last visited 3 September 2016).  
213 Cf. sub-section 5.3.4. 
214 See further Box 3.2 in sub-section 3.3.1.  
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for acquiring owner-occupied houses.215 Moreover, Kofner (2014) explains that the German lending 
culture is conservative, with high creditworthiness standards, many fixed-rate mortgages, and few 
innovative products, such as interest-only mortgages.216 Thus, Germany did not experience a housing 
boom during the last decade.217 Nevertheless, in 2016 the IMF concluded that house price growth in 
some regions deserve monitoring, even though credit growth is still moderate.218 
 
1.6. Scientific and societal relevance 
This study examines a topic that is located at the intersection of various disciplines and sub-disciplines. 
This multi-dimensional perspective helps to further the scientific knowledge, but comes at the risk of 
losing depth in the analysis. Still, this study contributes in many ways to existing knowledge, also in 
specific sub-disciplines. It starts with, but goes beyond, offering a comprehensive review of the range 
of approaches, across various fields of research, which identify and examine the factors behind rising 
household debt levels.  
 
Methodologically, this study builds an analytical framework based upon combined insights from 
various disciplines and sub-disciplines – law, economics, and the literature on regulation and 
supervision. The literature on enforcement is enriched by a comparison of enforcement possibilities in 
several member states, and conditions under which powers can be exercised. Moreover, this research 
adds to the literature on regulatory and supervisory independence by examining it in the context of 
macroprudential policy, and analysing the actual operational independence of supervisors. By 
analysing the role of guided discretion mechanisms in this regard, it explores new avenues to achieve 
and combine independence and accountability.  
 
What is more, this research adds to various specific literatures. It contributes to the literature on EU 
law by mapping the influence of the Union on the sensitive topic of household finance across sub-
fields, such as financial regulation and supervision and consumer protection. This reveals the 
implication of EU action. It analyses the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality with 
respect to the examined instruments, in particular macroprudential instruments. This study highlights 
were EU action is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of these instruments. Specifically regarding 
                                                          
215 European Commission (2014b), pp. 38-39, 45-46, 52; Kofner (2014), pp. 262-263. 
216 Kofner (2014), pp. 270-272. Cf. Hamm (2008), pp. 47-48. But see Immobilien Zeitung (2015), which indicates 
that some lenders are adopting less conservative practices. 
217 Kofner (2014), pp. 255-256; Whitehead et al. (2014), p. 21. 
218 International Monetary Fund (2016c), p.17. 
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the system of economic governance in the EU, the influence of several new procedures, the 
macroeconomic imbalance procedure and the enhanced surveillance procedure, on household finance 
is analysed. This shows the interplay between these instruments, and the effects of the various reforms 
in practice.    
 
This study contributes particularly to the analysis of financial regulation and supervision in the EU. It 
examines the functioning of new EU (macroprudential) instruments within the banking union, and 
investigates the procedural aspects of decision-making by supervisory authorities within the SSM. This 
ends in uncovering the need for improvements to the institutional structure and macroprudential 
decision-making within the banking union. Moreover, this study adds to the growing literature on 
macroprudential policy in general by examining the conditions under which it can be effective. This is 
mainly done from a legal perspective, while most research on macroprudential policy still does not 
offer an in-depth analysis of the legal framework underlying macroprudential instruments, especially 
borrower-based caps.  
 
This study also contributes to the literature on consumer protection in the European Union, by 
comparing the Consumer Credit Directive and the Mortgage Credit Directive, and analysing them in 
light of the literature on creditworthiness assessment, which has not been done yet. In addition, it 
compares their implementation in various member states. The comparison of aspects of consumer law 
in the area of financial services in several countries helps to detect where improvement is crucial. 
 
By analysing and comparing national legislation in the fields of financial regulation and supervision and 
consumer protection, this study helps to identify areas for improvement, and contributes to the Dutch, 
Irish and German legal strands of literature on these issues. It also updates these strands of literature 
by discussing the recent regulatory changes, coming from either EU legislation or national reforms.   
 
Undoubtedly, this study also has significant societal relevance. It contributes to the understanding of 
the problem of household indebtedness, and analyses how it is possible to improve EU, Dutch, Irish 
and German instruments that seek to address the problem of household indebtedness and try to 
prevent future crisis due to excessive credit growth. Furthermore, it contributes to topical policy 
discussions on designing the institutional structure of (macroprudential) regulation and supervision (of 
household debt), from an independent perspective, firmly based upon previous scientific literature. 
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1.7. Overview of the study 
Chapter 2 starts with a literature review examining which factors affect household debt levels, in order 
to find out what needs to be targeted by the instruments that seek to limit household indebtedness. 
After having given an overview of these factors, it continues with reviewing the existing – mainly 
empirical and economic – literature on the effectiveness of these instruments. This chapter answers 
the first part of sub-question (a), as well as, to some extent, the second part, albeit without going into 
the details of the transmission mechanisms. 
 
Chapters 3-6 each examine a subset of instruments, and answer the second part of sub question (a), 
sub-question (b), as well as the first part of sub-question (c). Chapter 3 discusses the preconditions for 
effectiveness of the selected capital-based instruments, i.e. risk-weighted capital requirements, the 
countercyclical capital buffer, and, briefly, the leverage ratio. Thus, the EU system of financial 
regulation and supervision is scrutinised. It also examines the use of LTV ratios in covered bonds 
regulation. Chapter 4 turns to the preconditions for effectiveness of borrower-based caps – LTV, DSTI, 
LTI and DTI limits – in the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany, which are part of national law. Thereafter, 
chapter 5 analyses the potential effectiveness of the rules on mandatory creditworthiness assessment 
of consumers, which have mainly been transposed from EU directives. Chapter 6 looks at the systems 
of mortgage interest deductibility and relief in the Netherlands and Ireland, respectively. It examines 
and how they affect household debt levels.  
 
Finally, chapter 7 examines the interaction between the various instruments, draws overarching 
conclusions regarding the preconditions for effectiveness, and provides some recommendations to 
improve the instruments. This answers sub-question (d), as well as the remainder of sub-question (c), 
and the main research question, insofar not already answered for individual instruments in the 
previous chapters. It discusses as well conflicts between creating effective instruments and ensuring 
the unity of the internal market.219 More than other chapters, it analyses the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality with respect to the examined instruments, and indicates were EU action is 
necessary to ensure their effectiveness. 
  
  
                                                          
219 Supra, footnote 73. 
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2. The determinants of household debt and the 
instruments to influence them 
 
People take on debt for various reasons. It is crucial to know why households borrow, and how debt 
affects the economy and households’ behaviour. Therefore, this chapter starts with examining 
literature that tries to explain why people take on debt, and why household debt levels have increased 
during the past decades. This literature review results in an overview and classifications of the 
determinants of household debt. In section 2.3, this is followed by a discussion of the available 
instruments for addressing these determinants, which partly answers the first and second sub-
questions, as stated in sub-section 1.2.3. This results in a selection of the instruments to be examined 
in this research.   
 
2.1. Identifying household debt determinants: a literature review 
The literature review starts with studying theories and research with a macroeconomic perspective. 
This includes relevant literature about the role of household debt in the financial system. 
Subsequently, the findings based on theories explaining household debt from the perspective of 
individual consumers or households will be discussed.  
 
2.1.1. A macroeconomic perspective  
The first chapter put forward several macroeconomic explanations for rising household debt levels, 
including macroeconomic stability, diminished inflation, and falling unemployment. These factors 
reduce costs and risks for both borrowers and lenders, and lead to an easing of credit constraints.220 
Yet, from a macroeconomic perspective, there is more to say about rising household debt levels.  
 
  
                                                          
220 Kent et al. (2007), pp. 128, 131-138; Cecchetti et al. (2011), p. 8. 
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2.1.1.1. Household debt in macroeconomic models and theories 
Household debt in mainstream macroeconomic models and theories 
Economists often use models – stylised, mostly mathematical, representations of reality – to 
understand economic processes and behaviour. Surprisingly, until recently most mainstream 
macroeconomic models did not explicitly take credit market and thus household debt into account.221 
The theories behind these mainstream models considered the functioning of the credit market as 
irrelevant for understanding the working of the economy. This can be traced back to the concept of 
monetary neutrality. Traditionally, neoclassical economists argue that money is neutral, at least in the 
long run, meaning that changes in the stock of money – e.g. doubling the amount of money in 
circulation – affect nominal variables proportionality, and thus do not affect real variables. Money is a 
veil in this view. This idea sounds logical: money is – among other things – a unit of account, and 
changes in the unit of account do not need lead to changes in the real variables. If money only is a veil, 
modelling the credit market is irrelevant. This “irrelevance view” has been the dominant perspective 
on the role of money and credit markets in the economy during the past decades.222  
 
The concept of monetary neutrality is, however, contested: several schools of thought disagree with 
it. Keynes has argued that money cannot be regarded as neutral, since nominal variables – in particular 
wages – are rigid. Consequently, changes in the money stock affect real prices and wages. In addition, 
the monetarist school, based on the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), regards changes in the 
money supply as highly relevant for explaining growth and short-run fluctuations.223 Another school of 
thought, disagreeing with the neutrality of money and credit markets, adheres to the “credit view”.224 
In this view, the availability and costs of bank credit, as well as the composition of banks’ balance 
sheets and their leverage, are important for explaining macroeconomic performance, among other 
things, due the assumption of imperfect information.225 Consequently, banks and other intermediaries 
are crucial for gathering and transmitting information in the credit market, and cannot be considered 
as irrelevant.226 Nonetheless, although not all economists uphold the (absolute) neutrality of money, 
                                                          
221 E.g. Stiglitz (2011), p. 626; Eggertson & Krugman (2012), pp. 1470-1471; Bezemer (2010), p. 678. Cf. 
Goodhart & Hofmann (2008), p. 180. This view relates to the ideas of inter alia Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
222 Schularick & Taylor (2012), p. 1030. 
223 Ibidem. 
224 Ibidem. 
225 See e.g. Bernanke (1993), Anari et al. (2002), p. 267; Schularick & Taylor (2012), p. 1030. This is different 
from the model of Modigliani and Miller (1958), which assumes perfect information. 
226 Bernanke (1993), pp. 51-53. In the “credit view” the banking sector has also a special role in the 
transmission of monetary policy, since bank credit is considered an imperfect substitute for other forms of 
credit (for an explanation, see Bernanke (1993), pp. 55-59). 
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the mainstream models describing the working of the entire economy – the general equilibrium 
models – did not explicitly model credit markets and household debt.227 
 
After the outbreak of the financial crisis, economic models that ignore the credit market, were 
criticised again by various economists, mostly those associated with New Keynesian economics. 
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) consider it somewhat surprising that most mainstream models 
completely abstract from debt, given its prominent place in the discussion of the crisis, and the long 
tradition of regarding debt as an important factor in explaining economic contractions.228 Stiglitz (2011) 
is critical about the standard models, inter alia because they do not take into account excess 
indebtedness, debt deleveraging and restructuring, and their distributional aspects, since 
representative agents229 are assumed and financial markets are not modelled.230 One of his many other 
points of critique is that these models do not incorporate institutional characteristics, while 
institutional details are often of first-order importance to understand the functioning of the 
economy.231  
 
In recent years, models that include credit markets have been developed.232 The features of these 
models are, among other things, heterogeneous agents,233 financial frictions,234 non-linearities,235 
endogenous determined boom-bust cycles,236 or the assumption that banks create money instead of 
                                                          
227 Supra, footnote 221.  
228 Eggertsson & Krugman (2012), pp. 1470-1471. 
229 This means that individuals are considered identical and can be aggregated in the analysis. 
230 Stiglitz (2011), pp. 598, 626-628. 
231 Stiglitz (2011), p. 604. Also Kohn, then the Vice-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, regarded the 
macroeconomic models as inadequate, among other things, because they abstract from institutional 
arrangements (cited in Muellbauer (2010), p. 1). Interestingly, Bezemer states that economists who saw the 
global financial crisis coming, share inter alia an attention to debt and a critical attitude towards mainstream 
economic models. More specifically, shared elements in their thinking are a rejection of mainstream tenets 
such as neglecting assets and debt (Bezemer, 2010, p. 678), rational individual optimisation, efficient financial 
markets, or the irrelevance of financing methods as stated by the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Bezemer, 2011, p. 
7). Furthermore, they all examine the evolution of financial institutions and their influence on society over 
time, while considering attention to organisational and historical detail (Bezemer, 2011, p. 7). 
232 Cf. Borio (2014) on the key features that models need to include: (1) a ‘move away from model-consistent 
(‘‘rational’’) expectations’, (2) ‘attitudes towards risk that vary with the state of the economy, wealth and 
balance sheets’, and (3) ‘capture more deeply the monetary nature of our economies.’ (p. 188). 
233 See e.g. Eggertson & Krugman (2012); Pintus & Wen (2013); Boissay et al. (2016). 
234 See e.g. In‘t Veld et al. (2011); Bekiros & Paccagnini (2015); Clerc et al. (2015); Boissay et al. (2016). 
235 Non-linearities can account for sudden events or shocks. See e.g. Bekiros & Paccagnini (2015); Boissay et al. 
(2016). 
236 See e.g. Pintus & Wen (2013); Boissay et al. (2016). Cf. Hillebrand & Kukuchi (2015), who developed an 
overlapping generations model to this effect. 
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being an intermediary.237 Some economists developed other models than the prevailing dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, in order to better capture certain phenomena.238  
 
Household debt in non-mainstream economics 
Among the contemporary economists focussing on issues around household debt are Keen, Bezemer, 
Mian, and Sufi. They base themselves on the work of Schumpeter (1939), Minsky (1978, 1980, 1982), 
and Kindleberger (1978).239 Mian and Sufi (2015) explain the crucial role of debt in booms and busts. 
Several factors cause expanding credit supply. Households were willing to borrow too much due to 
their ‘irrational behavioural tendencies.’240 Lenders were willing to supply credit to borrowers with a 
low creditworthiness, because securitisation enabled them to pass on risks. In turn, investors were 
willing to buy securities, because they were supposed to be safe, due to the involved tranching.241 So, 
securitisation led to an expansion of mortgage credit. The increased credit supply led to rising house 
prices in areas with inelastic housing supply.242 This enabled more borrowing, since rising house prices 
increase housing wealth and reduce borrowing constraints, due to the possibility of home equity 
withdrawal (using mortgage credit for consumption).243 Mian and Sufi (2015) expound that debt 
magnifies this process, because it feeds a bubble by enlarging the buying power of the people who are 
over-optimistic about the value of houses.244 Due to their increased demand, house prices will rise. 
 
This theory, including the key role for over-optimism in explaining rising debt levels, shows large 
similarities with the work of Minsky on financial instability.245 In his theory, rising expectations about 
future investment success and decreasing risk aversion push up asset (e.g. real estate) prices, which 
                                                          
237 See e.g. Jakab & Kumhof (2015).  
238 See e.g. Caiani et al. (2016), who acknowledge improvements in DSGE models, but remain critical of these 
models (mentioning the fallacy of composition and the assumption of external shocks (p. 376)), and therefore 
developed an Agent Based and Stock Flow Consistent model. See also De Grauwe & Macchiarrelli (2015), who 
developed a New Keynesian Model with banks, and actors without rational expectations (their beliefs are 
biased, but they want to learn from their mistakes), in order to capture so-called animal spirits. 
239 Keen (2009b), pp. 348-352; Bezemer (2010), p. 680; Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 106-108. 
240 Mian & Sufi (2015), p. 90. For more on such irrational behavourial tendencies, see sub-section 2.1.2.2. Cf. 
Nofsinger (2012), who explains boom-bust cycles with household behaviour and their psychological biases. 
241 Mian & Sufi (2015), chapter 7. Securitisation involves packing up to several thousand mortgage loans 
together in a mortgage-backed security (MBS) to disperse risks. A MBS often exists of several tranches, varying 
in seniority of their claims on the cash-flow from the pool of mortgage loans. MBS are sold and, in principle, 
removed from the originator’s balance sheet, although the risks, in practice, do not completely disappear for 
the originator, since it often holds some MBS, or provides guarantees (cf. sub-section 3.1.3). 
242 Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 80-85. 
243 Ibidem, pp. 86-90. Cf. sub-section 2.1.1.2. 
244 Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 106-108. This is in line with the findings of Kindleberger, who discovered that asset 
bubbles, including real estate bubbles, depend on and are often preceded by credit growth. 
245 Minsky (1978, 1980, 1982). Minsky’s theory is summarised in Keen (2009b), pp. 351-352; Roubini & Mihm 
(2010), pp. 51-52. Cf. Bhattacharya et al. (2015), p. 932. 
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stimulates borrowers to take on more debt, for some even beyond their repayment capacities, because 
they rely on rising asset prices for repayment. In this way, a boom is created. However, eventually 
some borrowers are forced by their debt-service costs to sell some assets, which preludes the bust. 
 
For these kinds of reasons, Bezemer and Keen warn against increasing debt-financed investment in 
existing unproductive assets (including houses).246 This only inflates asset prices, in contrast to credit 
provided to entrepreneurs in the real economy in order to enable investment, which increases 
productivity.247 Bezemer (2010) concludes that a trade-off exists between credit that flows to the 
productive sector, and credit that flows to the financial and real estate sector.248 An increase in 
unproductive credit might hurt economic growth.249 
 
Several scholars have tried to empirically investigate the theories of Minsky and Kindleberger that 
financial instability and crises are caused by credit booms. A range of studies found that credit booms, 
measured by credit growth, are indeed good predictors of a financial crises.250 Several studies report 
findings that are more specific. Roy and Kemme (2012) discovered that increasing private sector debt, 
together with housing and stock bubbles, in a period of financial liberalisation, best predicts banking 
crises.251 Bezemer and Zhang (2014) show that credit booms in which the share of mortgage credit in 
total credit increases, and in which there are surges in capital inflows, increase the probability of a 
                                                          
246 Drawing on the work of Schumpeter, they distinguish between productive and unproductive debt (Bezemer 
(2010), p. 680; Bezemer (2009), p. 97; Keen (2009b), p. 352; Bezemer (2014)). 
247 See Bezemer (2009), p. 97; Keen (2011), p. 156. The following example clarifies their argument: 
‘Speculation, rather than investment, was overwhelming the focus of post-1990 lending [in Australia]. The 
primary role of mortgage debt was to purchase existing dwellings rather than to finance the construction of 
new ones: in 1985, less than 25 per cent of new mortgage finance was for new dwellings; by 2000, this had 
fallen below 10 per cent. Therefore, 85 per cent of the additional $985 billion of mortgage debt accumulated 
since 1986 predominantly has inflated house prices, rather than built new homes.’ (Keen, 2009b, pp. 349-350).  
248 Bezemer (2010), p. 683. 
249 Bezemer (2014), pp. 936, 939-941. 
250 Borio & Drehmann (2009) found that an indicator based upon the credit-to-GDP gap, combined with either 
the property price gap or the equity price gap is useful for predicting crises (pp. 40-41). Jordà et al. (2011), 
using a dataset covering 140 years and 14 countries, suggest that credit growth – i.e. growth of banks loans – is 
a better variable than money growth to explain financial crises (pp. 354-355). Schularick & Taylor (2012), using 
the same dataset, found that growth of bank loans is a very good predictor of a heightened risk of financial 
crises (pp. 1045, 1057). Also Dell'Ariccia et al. (2016), using a dataset covering 175 countries over 50 years, 
found that credit booms are often followed by financial crises (pp. 309-313). Babecký et al. (2014) find that 
private credit growth is the most robust early warning indicator of a banking crisis (pp. 3, 10-13). For an 
overview of more studies confirming that excess credit growth is powerful in predicting financial crises, see 
Giese et al. (2014), pp. 26-27. Note that Giese et al. (2014) also discuss some empirical difficulties of this 
indicator. Other researchers experienced mixed results when using measures of credit growth to predict 
financial crises (Kauko (2014), pp. 295-296). 
251 Roy & Kemme (2012), p. 292. 
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bust.252 The relevance of mortgage credit is underlined by the findings of Jordà et al. (2016), who show 
that, for a sample of 17 advanced economies, credit growth since the 1970s is almost entirely a result 
of increased mortgage lending, especially to households, which become much more leveraged.253 Davis 
et al. (2016) demonstrate that the effect of private debt growth on the probability of a crisis is much 
larger when combined with a current account deficit – so, when financing comes from foreign 
lenders.254 Lainà et al. (2015) discovered that not only indicators of household loan growth, but also of 
house price growth and of loan-to-deposit ratio growth are successful predictors of banking crises. 
Jordà et al. (2011) also found that several global crises, including the 2007/2008 crisis, were preceded 
by periods in which interest rates were unusually low relative to real growth rate in the economy.255  
 
Dell'Ariccia et al. (2016) identify triggers of credit booms, which usually are financial liberalisation, 
capital inflows and buoyant economic growth.256 Others explain lending booms as a result of herding 
in loan decisions, whether in combination with competition or not, or reduced incentives for banks to 
screen borrowers when interest rates are low.257  
 
2.1.1.2. Housing, taxation and household debt 
The previous sub-section showed the relevance of housing for understanding household debt 
developments. Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) explain how house prices can affect credit demand (and 
thus debt) of homeowners in various ways. Firstly, a wealth effect of housing on credit exists: ‘a 
permanent increase in housing wealth leads to an increase in household spending and borrowing’.258 
Secondly, there is a collateral effect of rising house prices, as houses are commonly used as collateral 
for loans, thereby enabling increased borrowing.259 Thirdly, credit demand grows, because higher 
housing prices stimulate investment in housing, since the value of the houses compared to the 
                                                          
252 Bezemer & Zhang (2014), pp. 27, 30. Cf. Jordà et al. (2016), pp. 125-127, 139-140. 
253 Jordà et al. (2016), pp. 115-120. 
254 Davis et al. (2016), p. 376. Cf. Borio et al. (2011), who observe that in many countries which experienced a 
crisis, cross-border credit grew rapidly, or at least stronger than overall credit (pp. 47-54). 
255 Jordà et al. (2011), pp. 352-353. 
256 Dell'Ariccia et al. (2016), pp. 313-317. Cf. Borio (2014), pp. 185-186. 
257 De Bandt et al. (2010), pp. 652-653, and references there. See e.g. Gorton & He (2008) for a model where 
lending standards depend on strategic interaction between competing banks, and an empirical test of this 
model. 
258 Goodhart & Hofmann (2008), p. 181. This follows from the life-cycle model of household consumption, 
which will be discussed below. 
259 So, higher house prices not only stimulate homeowners to spend and borrow more – which is the wealth 
effect – but also enable them to do so, by strengthening their borrowing capacity. 
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construction costs increases.260 Effects for starters on the housing market are, however, different. On 
the one hand, higher house prices diminish demand of housing and thus mortgage loans. On the other 
hand, if house prices are higher, starters need more money, which increases credit demand. In 
addition, under ‘adaptive expectations, households may interpret current house price increases as 
indicating an upward trend, creating incentives to buy the dwelling to benefit from future capital 
gains.’261 These combined effects may contribute to a boom; housing booms are closely related to 
credit booms, because credit has a significant share in explaining housing booms.262 Generally, factors 
as low interest rates, abundant liquidity, deregulation and (tax) policies that stimulate homeownership 
have been identified as determinants of housing booms, as well as over-optimistic expectations about 
rising house prices.263  
 
Various tax policies affect demand for and prices of houses, and may contribute to higher household 
debt levels. While especially mortgage interest deductibility is considered a culprit,264 also other tax 
policies support housing and stimulate to take on mortgage debt, most importantly those regarding 
imputed rents, housing transactions, capital gains and consumption (VAT). In most EU countries, 
imputed rents are not taxed in case of owner-occupied housing.265 This means that homeowners ‘pay 
their rent out of pre-tax income, while tenants pay their rent out of after-tax income. This tax 
advantage can be, however, mitigated or offset by the imposition of property taxes on 
homeowners.’266 Property taxes are levied in most EU countries.267 In most, but not all, member states 
primary dwellings are exempted from the capital gains tax, while in almost all member states a transfer 
tax is levied, although the amount varies substantially.268 Finally, in most member states reduced or 
                                                          
260 Goodhart & Hofmann (2008), p. 181. Cf. Basten & Koch (2015), who found empirical evidence for higher 
credit demand due to higher house prices. 
261 Wolswijk (2006), p. 137. 
262 On the relationship between housing and credit cycles, see e.g. Igan et al. (2011) and Mian & Sufi (2015), as 
discussed in the previous sub-section. Goodhart & Hofmann (2008) and Favara & Imbs (2015) also explain how 
exogenous changes in credit supply affect house prices. 
263 See e.g. Agnello & Schuknecht (2011). Cf. sub-section 1.1. However, contrary to most studies, Glaeser et al. 
(2010), conclude from their research with US data, covering 30 years, that the effects of relaxed credit 
constraints and low interest rates on the recent housing boom in the United States are much smaller than 
often claimed (pp. 2-3, 38). According to them, higher approval rates and higher LTV ratios cannot explain the 
boom in the US either (pp. 5-7, 39). Case & Shiller (2003) and Shiller (2005, 2007) put forward the influence of 
over-optimistic expectations on house prices. Their views are supported by, among others, Glaeser et al. 
(2010), p. 39; Dokko et al. (2011), p. 271. Cf. Mian & Sufi (2015).  
264 Debelle (2004), p. 3, Cecchetti et al (2011), p. 7-8; Sutherland & Hoeller (2012), p. 11. Cf. Keen et al. (2010), 
p. 63. 
265 European Central Bank (2009), p. 34; Wolswijk (2010), pp. 161-162. Cf. Keen et al. (2010), pp. 58-59. 
266 André (2010), p. 32.  
267 European Central Bank (2009), p. 34; Wolswijk (2010), p. 162. 
268 Table 6.1. Cf. European Central Bank (2009), pp. 34-35; André (2010), p. 32; Wolswijk (2010), p. 162. Cf. 
Keen et al. (2010), p. 59 
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zero VAT rates apply to the supply, construction, and renovation of houses, even though buying a 
house is partly consumption, and therefore would, in a neutral fiscal system, be ‘subject to the same 
VAT rate as buying another durable good such as a car.’269 These tax policies, and other domestic 
factors, can produce substantial differences between member states in terms of the effective (average) 
tax rate on housing and home ownership.270  
 
2.1.1.3. Financial regulation and household debt 
Many scholars point out that the same factors that cause credit booms explain the high levels of 
household debt. This is convincing, because bank lending (credit) to households, and household debt 
more or less mirror each other. Consequently, lower real interest rates and deregulation of the 
financial sector – which happened since the 1980s – are counted among the important causes of higher 
debt levels.271 Cecchetti et al. (2011) describe that ‘restrictions on financial market activity and lending 
had been progressively and systematically removed’.272 Deregulation is a necessary, although not 
sufficient, condition for creating competitive pressure among banks.273 This pressure contributed to 
the easing of credit constraints and development of innovative financial products, reinforcing the 
effects of deregulation.274 Moreover, deregulation led to a removal of many restrictions for lending to 
households, and created room for rising leverage of banks’ balance sheets.275 This is particularly true 
for mortgage lending, which was tightly controlled.276 Yet, in the past decades, many countries relaxed, 
among others, controls and ceilings for interest rates, as well as restrictions on amortisation schemes, 
and on the amount and allocation of lending. This resulted in reduced borrowing constraints for 
households.277 In various member states, the loosened restrictions led to an extension of loan 
maturities, the creation of interest-only loans and loans with flexible repayment schedules, higher 
                                                          
269 Wolswijk (2010), p. 163. 
270 Kent et al. (2007), p. 131. The effective (average) tax rate on housing is ‘the ratio of the [present value] of 
total taxes over an expected holding period to the sum of the [present value] of imputed rent and capital 
gains.’ (Keen et al. (2010), p. 61). 
271 Cecchetti et al. (2011), pp. 7-8; Sutherland & Hoeller (2012), p. 10; Kent et al. (2007), p. 127; Girouard et al. 
(2006), p. 8; OECD (2006), p. 137; Debelle (2004), pp. 6, 15-17; Wolswijk (2006), pp. 142, 144; Georgopoulos et 
al. (2011); Buiter & Rahbari (2012), pp. 8-9. 
272 Cecchetti et al. (2011), p. 8 
273 Cf. Wolswijk (2006), p. 137. Note that Cubillas & González (2014) found empirical support indicating that 
financial liberalisation increases risk-taking by banks by promoting stronger competition among banks.  
274 Kent et al. (2007), p. 127. 
275 Crowe et al. (2013), pp. 300-305; Cecchetti et al. (2011), pp. 7-8. Cf. Debelle (2004), pp. 4, 16; Buiter & 
Rahbari (2012), p. 9; sub-section 1.1.2. 
276 Debelle (2004), p. 15. 
277 Debelle (2004), pp. 15-17; André (2010), p. 21; Agnello & Schuknecht (2011), p. 185. Cf. Wolswijk (2006), p. 
137; Buiter & Rahbari (2012), p. 9. 
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loan-to-value ratios, and a larger share of loans with variable interest rates, as well as the development 
of securitisation and home equity withdrawal.278  
 
These loan characteristics affect the amount of debt that a household can take on. Variable interest 
rates enable banks to shift credit risk to the borrower and thus to lend more.279 Interest-only loans 
reduce net debt-service costs if borrowers benefit from mortgage interest deductibility, but create 
vulnerability to interest rate developments.280 Flexible repayment schedules, longer loan maturities, 
higher LTV ratios and the possibility of home equity withdrawal enable or stimulate higher household 
debt levels.281 Securitisation seemingly allows banks to remove risks from their balance sheets and 
avoid higher capital requirements, and thus to originate more and riskier loans.282 Due to 
securitisation, credit rationing diminished and risks were discounted to a smaller extent in interest 
rates charged.283 Studies have found that longer loan maturities played a role in the Spanish housing 
boom, whereas increasing securitisation was a factor in the Irish boom.284 However, others argue that 
securitisation and the proliferation of new mortgage products must not be regarded as causes of the 
lending boom, because they predate it.285 
 
Partly as a reaction to the trend of deregulation, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an 
international standard-setting body in which regulatory and supervisory authorities of 28 large 
financial economies are represented,286 adopted the first Basel Accord in 1988, leading to the first 
global standards on financial regulation and supervision.287 Although the Basel standards are not legally 
binding, they have been transposed into binding legislation in many jurisdictions, including the EU.288 
The Basel standards prescribe how much capital banks minimally have to hold relative to outstanding 
loans and other assets. The higher the risk-weight of an asset is, the more capital banks are required 
                                                          
278 European Central Bank (2009), pp. 25-36; André (2010), pp. 20-21. 
279 European Central Bank (2009), p. 28. Note that the variation in adjustable interest rates is capped in some 
countries (p. 27). 
280 André (2010), p. 20; Scanlon et al. (2008), p. 114. 
281 Cf. Igan & Kang (2011), who found that limiting LTV and DTI ratios in Korea contributed to lower house price 
appreciations and less housing transactions. 
282 Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008), p. 249; Starr (2010), p. 464; Nield (2010), pp. 623-624; Allen (2004), p. 79. Cf. 
Bertola & Hochguertel (2007), p. 118. 
283 Schwartz & Seabrooke (2008), p. 253; Starr (2010), p. 464; Debelle (2004), p. 1; Carbo-Valverde et al. (2015). 
Cf. Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 101-103. 
284 Dokko et al. (2011), p. 271. 
285 Gerardi et al. (2010), p. 334. 
286 For the members of the BCBS: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm (last visited 31 December 2016). 
287 Hellwig (2010), p. 5. 
288 Allen et al. (2013), pp. 247-251. 
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to hold.289 Basel II and III – on which the current CRR and CRD IV are based – distinguish between two 
possibilities for calculating risk-weights: the Standardised Approach and Internal Ratings Based (IRB) 
Approach.290 The former approach prescribes a system with standardised risk-weights for various 
categories of loans, while the latter approach allows banks, under certain conditions, to use their own 
rating-system to assign risk-weights to classes of assets. The advantage of the IRB Approach is that the 
required capital can be closely aligned to the actual risks, because banks know themselves best how 
risky their borrowers are.291 However, banks exploited this freedom, with low capital levels as result.292 
According to Hellwig (2010), this contributed to the excessive indebtedness in the US,293 and it cannot 
be excluded that the same is true for some EU member states.  
 
Other flaws in the Basel accords may also have contributed to this. Allen (2004) signals that the first 
Basel accord inadequately measured credit risk in the mortgage market, since no risk-weight 
adjustments are made for loan-to-value ratios and mortgage insurance.294 Consequently, incentives 
existed for banks to issue uninsured mortgages with high LTV ratios.295 According to Allen (2004), this 
‘may explain the growth of the jumbo mortgage market in the post Basel I years.’296 Nonetheless, this 
author also mentions that several European countries adopted more restrictive mortgage limitations 
than those in the Basel I standards.297 
 
2.1.2. An individual perspective 
Most research on household debt is conducted from the perspective of the individual household or 
consumer. The most prominent strand of literature is based on the permanent income and/or lifecycle 
hypotheses, but there are alternative perspectives on household borrowing as well, perhaps currently 
most notably the behavioural economic approach.  
 
                                                          
289 For a more extensive explanation, see e.g. Farag (2013), Drumond (2009), pp. 809-812; Dermine (2013), pp. 
660-661. Cf. sub-section 3.1. 
290 See e.g. Drumond (2009), p. 811. 
291 Benink & Benston (2005), p. 305; Drumond (2009), p. 811. 
292 Hellwig (2010), p. 3; Mavroudeas & Papadatos (2012), p. 493. Cf. Drumond (2009), pp. 811-812; Alexander 
(2012), pp. 336, 341; Wolf (2015), pp. 132-133; Mészáros (2013), p. 169; Admati (2016), p. R8; Behn et al. 
(2016), p. 32. Crotty (2009) also points to various problems regarding calculation and incentives from which the 
models which banks use to calculate the risks suffer (pp. 570-572). 
293 Hellwig (2010), p. 3. 
294 Allen (2004), pp. 85-86; Calem & LaCour-Little (2004), p. 648. Cf. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013), pointing at the 
flaws in Basel I regarding risk weights secured by mortgages (p. 1149). 
295 Allen (2004), p. 85. 
296 Ibidem. 
297 Ibidem. 
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2.1.2.1. The permanent income and lifecycle hypotheses 
The basic idea behind the permanent income and lifecycle hypotheses is that households’ 
consumption choices are not determined by their current income, but by their income over their entire 
life-time.298 The permanent income hypothesis is based on the work of Friedman (1957), and the 
lifecycle hypothesis on the essays of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954, 1979).299 It follows from these 
theories that debt is used to smooth consumption over the lifecycle of consumers or households.  
 
Several assumptions are underlying those theories, at least in their purest form, including rational 
intertemporal decision-making, certainty about future income, and the absence of liquidity 
constraints, such as borrowing or lending constraints.300 The term rationality is interpreted in various 
ways in economics, but is mostly used to refer to agents (such as consumers) acting as if they maximise 
utility.301 Generally, it is assumed that they are capable enough of doing this, and do not behave 
inconsistent or make systemic errors.302 These and other assumptions have been criticised in the 
literature.303 Empirical tests of the lifecycle hypothesis have produced mixed results.304 Empirical 
research into borrowing behaviour, based upon the lifecycle hypothesis,305 generally acknowledges 
that liquidity constraints exist, and investigates how both demand and supply factors shape borrowing 
behaviour through the incentives and constraints that they provide. Regulatory factors are considered 
important in explaining differences in household debt levels between countries.306  
                                                          
298 See e.g. Romer (2012), pp. 365-371; Dynan & Kohn (2007), p. 3. The former hypothesis contends that people 
base their consumption on their permanent instead of their current income. The latter theory states that for 
people’s consumption decisions expected income over their entire lifetime is leading. 
299 See also Modigliani’s Nobel Prize lecture (pp. 152-153). http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/1985/modigliani-lecture.pdf (last visited 13 August 2016) 
300 On certainty see e.g. Romer (2012), pp. 365-371. Under uncertainty, consumption will probably exhibit 
features of a so-called random walk (cf. Hall, 1978). On liquidity constrains, see e.g: Jappelli & Pagano (1989), p. 
1088; Vandone (2009), p. 11. 
301 See e.g. Hodgson (2012), pp. 94-96. 
302 See e.g. Burda & Wyplosz (2005), p. 103. 
303 See e.g. Muellbauer (1983), Deaton (1992), chapter 6-7; Carroll (2001, 2014); Geiger et al. (2016), pp. 6-22. 
For instance, the assumption of representative agents and homogeneity of assets have been criticised, because 
housing affects consumption differently than financial assets, and institutional aspects matter in this respect: 
down-payment requirements (i.e. LTV limits lower than 100%) determine how much households need to save 
to buy a house, and the possibility of home equity withdrawal stimulates borrowing for consumption (Geiger et 
al. (2016), pp. 17-18). 
304 Results which mainly support the hypotheses of these theories are reported in, among others, Haug (1991), 
Jappelli (1999), DeJuan & Seater (1999, 2007), and Gerlach-Kristen (2014), while results which mainly reject the 
hypotheses of these theories are reported in, among others, Deaton (1987), Flavin (1993), and Leong & 
McAleer (1999). 
305 For convenience, the remainder of this chapter refers to the life-cycle hypothesis instead as to the 
permanent income and life-cycle hypotheses. Also within the literature, the term life-cycle model is used more 
often. The intuition behind both hypotheses with respect to borrowing behaviour is similar.  
306 See e.g. Crook & Hochguertel (2007), p. 8. 
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The permanent income and lifecycle hypotheses: demand 
Household characteristics are the first group of demand factors that have often been deemed relevant 
in theoretical and empirical work about the lifecycle model. Most prominently, this includes age or life-
stage, education and the expected income-profile, the attitude towards debt, prudence and the time 
preference regarding present versus future consumption.307 Age is important because young people, 
who often await rising income, borrow more in order to raise consumption, or to finance owner-
occupied housing.308 The expected income-profile determines the permanent or lifetime income, while 
education is an important factor in explaining expected income, since higher-educated people will 
commonly earn more.309 Unsurprisingly, studies found a significant influence of the attitude towards 
credit on taking out loans.310 Prudence is a factor that is invoked by various researchers to explain the 
finding that the debt behaviour of households does not perfectly correspond with the standard 
lifecycle model.311 Finally, demographic changes can boost aggregate debt.312 
 
Besides household characteristics, economic and legal factors influence households’ borrowing 
behaviour, and may lead to deviations from the situation predicted by a standard lifecycle model. 
Credit demand is namely strongly influenced by tax incentives, the structure and actual working of the 
financial sector and economy, and the characteristics of the debt instruments.313 Relevant loan 
characteristics are inter alia the type and maturity of debt, tax treatment, as well as associated interest 
costs and risks for borrowers.314 Several researchers observe that borrowing constraints have been 
diminished in the years preceding the financial crisis due to financial innovations.315 From the 
                                                          
307 See e.g. Jappelli & Pagano (1989); Barnes & Young (2003); Baek & Hong (2004); Tudela & Young (2005), Del 
Rio & Young (2006, 2008); Bertola & Hochguertal (2007); Dynan & Kohn (2007); Jappelli et al. (2013); Bover et 
al. (2014). 
308 See e.g. Jappelli & Pagano (1989), pp. 1098-1099; Barnes & Young (2003), p. 7; Del Rio & Young (2006), p. 
1137; Jappelli et al. (2013), p. 27. Instead of age, some researchers investigate the role of lifecycle stages – e.g. 
households in the empty nest or solitary households – and found a significant effect of these lifecycle stages on 
consumer debt (see e.g. Baek & Hong (2004), p. 381). 
309 See e.g. Del Rio & Young (2006), p. 1138; Dynan & Kohn (2007), p. 5; Bover et al. (2014), p. 15. 
310 Baek & Hong (2004), pp. 363-364, 382. Much economic and psychological research into the effects of 
attitude on debt behaviour is performed. To name but a few: Chien & Devaney (2001), Kamleitner et al. (2012), 
Cosma & Pattarin (2012). Borrowing can be seen as dissaving; saving and dissaving show consumers’ 
intertemporal preferences regarding consumption (Baek & Hong (2004), p. 361). 
311 See e.g. Baek & Hong (2004), p. 361-362, 382. Cf. Tudela & Young (2005) about facts not fitting the basic 
lifecycle model (p. 34).   
312 Dynan & Kohn (2007) provide the following illustrative example: ‘households with more education generally 
have steeper life-cycle income paths and therefore do more borrowing at young ages. The increase in average 
educational attainment of the population would then be expected to push up debt accumulation.’ (p. 5). 
313 See e.g. Jappelli & Pagano (1989), p. 1089; Bertola & Hochguertal (2007), p. 120. Cf. sub-section 2.1.1.2. 
314 Bertola & Hochguertal (2007), pp. 123-130. Types of debt are, for example, revolving credit, credit card 
balances, or instalment credit. Also substitutes for classical loans exist, such as leasing contracts (p. 131). 
315 Dynan and Kohn (2007), p. 5. Cf. Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano (2006), p. 7. Cf. Ortalo-Magné & Rady (1999), 
who extended a lifecycle model to show that financial liberalisation contributed to boosts in housing prices. 
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perspective of consumption smoothing, deregulation is favourable, since it enables households to 
choose a more desirable path of consumption over their lifetime.316 However, it comes with risks.317 
 
The permanent income and lifecycle hypotheses: supply 
A considerable amount of research investigates how credit rationing and credit constraints influence 
credit supply and hence debt levels.318 It has been found that the chance of rejection of an application 
for a loan is negatively related to the applicant’s income and wealth.319 Credit rationing by banks is a 
result of uncertainty and asymmetric information, which incites banks to reject some loan applications, 
since they are unable to perfectly determine the risk of non-repayment.320 Due to this lack of perfect 
information, credit supply depends on the lender’s possibilities to assess the prospect of repayment, 
and on the chance of recovering non-performing loans.321 Therefore, researchers have examined two 
types of legal and regulatory factors, namely arrangements for information sharing, and the efficiency 
of the legal system in recovering non-performing loans.322 Information sharing is facilitated by public 
credit registries and private credit bureaus, i.e. organisations maintaining a database with financial 
information about households. The possibilities for efficient recovery of non-performing loans depend 
on creditor rights and the efficiency of the judicial system.323 Both information availability and 
efficiency of recovering credit from delinquent borrowers reduce lenders’ risks.324 Arrangements for 
ex ante information sharing and ex post legal enforcement are not mutually exclusive, but can reinforce 
each other, or be substitutes.325  
 
Theoretically, arrangements for information sharing and creditor rights contribute to bank lending.326 
This is indeed confirmed by empirical research, covering both European and other countries.327 
                                                          
316 Ramsay (2012a), p. 26; Barba & Pivetti (2009), p. 119. 
317 Cf. sub-sections 1.1.2 and 2.1.1.3. 
318 See e.g. Cox & Jappelli (1993), Jappelli & Pagano (1989), p. 1089; Gross & Souleles (2002), Rinaldi & Sanchis-
Arellano (2006), p. 12; Crook & Hochguertel (2007), Vandone (2009), pp. 11-12, 18-19. 
319 Vandone (2009), p. 18; Crook & Hochguertel (2007), pp. 25, 29-30, 32. 
320 Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano (2006), p. 12; Vandone (2009), p. 11. Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano (2006) explain 
that asymmetric information can lead to moral hazard and adverse selection, which induces banks to ration 
borrowers (p. 12). 
321 See e.g. Jappelli & Pagano (2000, 2002). Brown & Zehnder (2007) find that information sharing 
arrangements are less important when relationship-banking takes place. 
322 See e.g. Jappelli et al. (2005), Crook & Hochguertel (2007), p. 11; Magri (2007); Vandone (2009), pp. 11-12; 
Jappelli et al. (2013). 
323 Djankov et al. (2007, 2008); Safavian & Sharma (2007). 
324 Djankov et al. (2007), pp. 300-301, 303; Crook & Hochguertel (2007), p. 11. 
325 Djankov et al. (2007), p. 301. 
326 Ibidem. 
327 Jappelli & Pagano (2002), p. 2033; Jappelli et al. (2005), p. 224; Jappelli & Pagano (2006), pp. 354-355; 
Djankov et al. (2007), pp. 301, 325, Jappelli et al. (2013), p. 40; Nketcha Nana (2014), p. 316. Cf. Fabbri & Padula 
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Therefore, debt levels increase, but the risk of insolvencies decreases.328 Indeed, research finds that 
information-sharing arrangements does not only reduce the ratio of non-performing loans,329 but also 
the likelihood of banking crises.330 Some studies also find that information-sharing arrangements 
reduce the costs of extending credit.331 Duygan-Bump and Grant (2009) consider these factors from 
the side of the borrower, assuming that a default of a borrower is not necessary a genuine inability to 
repay, but can be a choice, which depends on the costs of default.332 Their research shows that better 
information sharing and enforcement lead to fewer arrears, because incentives to default decrease.333 
 
2.1.2.2. Behavioural economics and household debt 
The permanent income and/or lifecycle hypotheses are contested. The behavioural economics 
perspective on household debt departs from assumptions underlying these hypotheses. For instance, 
Shefrin and Thaler (1988) adjusted the lifecycle model in order to incorporate changing utility over 
time, as well as non-rational behaviour.334 Behavioural economists acknowledge that households 
might act non-rational in saving, spending and debt decisions.335 ‘Consumers may favour the short 
term over the long term, underestimate risk and be over-confident in their ability to stay out of trouble. 
Individuals may also act in a herd like fashion.’336 This can increase debt levels. 
                                                          
(2004), p. 2386; Magri (2007), pp. 403-405, 423-424; Warnock & Warnock (2008), pp. 245-250. Cf. Bae & Goyak 
(2009), who showed that better contract enforceability significantly and largely increases the size of the loan, 
lengthens its maturity, and reduces loan spreads (p. 824). Contradicting aforementioned findings, Horioka & 
Sekita’s (2011) research into Japanese households shows that better judicial enforcement increases in some 
cases the probability of being rationed, while it decreases the size of the loan. In these studies, information 
sharing is usually measured by the existence of credit registries or bureaus. Creditor rights are inter alia 
measured by the possibility to seize the collateral, and the existence of priority for secured creditors to be paid 
out in case of bankruptcy. Efficiency of the legal system in recovering non-performing loans is commonly 
measured as the number of days necessary to enforce a loan contract. 
328 Jappelli et al. (2013), p. 40. 
329 Jappelli & Pagano (2002), p. 2035. Cf. Brown & Zehnder (2007), pp. 1883-1886, 1908-1909; Miller (2014). 
330 See e.g. Houston et al. (2010) and Büyükkarabacak & Valev (2012). 
331 Brown et al. (2009), p. 152. Brown & Zehnder (2007), (p. 1884). Cf. Pagano & Jappelli (1993). 
332 Duygan-Bump & Grant (2009), p. 110. Their research covers 10 EU member states. The possibility to default 
would enable consumers to smooth consumption more, since they are better insured against adverse shocks 
(Livshits et al. (2007), p. 402). 
333 Duygan-Bump & Grant (2009), p. 130-131. More specifically they found that longer recovery procedures 
increase arrears, and that public and private coverage of defaults (reporting/databases) decrease arrears, 
either because households care about their reputation or because they can be excluded from the credit 
market. 
334 Shefrin & Thaler (1988), pp. 609-610, 636-637. 
335 On bounded rationality and not fully informed people, see e.g. the work of Kahneman, summarised in his 
Nobel Prize lecture (Kahneman, 2003). For a short summary of some findings from behavioural economics, see 
Ramsay (2001), pp. 369-374; Ramsay (2012c), pp. 57-61. Non-rational behaviour can also have inhibitory 
effects: according to Prelec & Loewenstein (1998), consumers display also debt aversion. 
336 Ramsay (2012a), p. 27. Cf. Kilborn (2005, pp. 18-19) and Vandone (2009, p. 19) about over-confidence. Cf. 
Starr (2010) about underestimation of risks (pp. 461-464).  
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The over-confidence of and underestimation of risks by individuals is reflected in findings that 
individuals can be non-rational in their assessment of the probabilities that a certain event will happen: 
they tend to assess it based upon their own available experience, instead of on objective analyses.337 
‘Consequently, if experiences of certain adverse events, such as liquidity crises, financial difficulties or 
over-indebtedness, are not available, individuals will tend to underestimate the chances of being 
affected by such events.’338 
 
The findings that individuals lack self-control and attach greater weight to the short term compared to 
the long term explains why they choose “buy now, pay later” deals that bring immediate satisfaction 
at future costs.339 If individuals lack self-control and their borrowing constraints are relaxed, their debt 
can easily increase, while their long-term utility might decrease.340 Studies have found a significant 
relationship between lack of self-control and higher debt levels.341 Wonder et al. (2008) found other 
time-inconsistencies in the behaviour of consumers as well, showing that individuals understand the 
undesirability of high interest rates, but ‘generally [have] a weak sense of the time value of money and 
compound interest.’342 Those effects are stronger for less educated individuals. 
 
These latter findings are related to another area of research, financial literacy, which examines 
whether households’ knowledge about debt and other financial concepts influences their decisions.343 
It has been found that individuals who are more debt illiterate, make choices leading to more 
borrowing-costs.344 Individuals with lower self-reported debt literacy levels are much more likely to 
have debt difficulties.345 The potentially imprudent decisions resulting from financial illiteracy (or 
behaviour biases) make households vulnerable to negative income shocks.346 Financial illiteracy also 
                                                          
337 Kilborn (2005), pp. 19-21; Vandone (2009), p. 20. 
338 Vandone (2009), p. 20. 
339 Ibidem. Cf. Akerlof (2002), pp. 422-424. 
340 Dynan and Kohn (2007), pp. 6-7. 
341 Achtziger et al. (2015), p. 146 (and pp. 142-143 for references to more studies). Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.4. 
342 Wonder et al. (2008), p. 266. Cf. Frederick et al. (2002) for other time-inconsistencies of people when 
discounting money. 
343 Campbell (2016) mentions five types of financial ignorance of households, being a lack of understanding of 
(1) even the most basic financial concepts, (2) the terms of financial contracts, (3) the explanatory power of 
historical data over their own limited experiences, (4) their own financial capacity, and finally of (5) the 
incentives and behaviour of other parties (pp. 9-14). 
344 Lusardi & Tufano (2015), p. 361. Cf. Lusardi & Mitchell (2014) who refer to several other studies with similar 
findings (pp. 22-23). 
345 Lusardi & Tufano (2015), p. 356. On the contrary, Bover et al. (2014), found less robust results for an effect 
of financial literacy on households’ debt levels (p. 32). 
346 Braunstein & Welch (2002), p. 445.  
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makes consumers vulnerable to unscrupulous lenders, who offer them loans that are disadvantageous 
to them.347  
 
Behavioural economics also abandons the assumption of complete information. Individuals cannot 
only lack capabilities to process available information, but also information itself, for instance, about 
the loan characteristics and associated risks.348 Therefore, asymmetric information might hurt both 
lenders – as discussed before in the context of credit registries – and borrowers.  
 
2.1.2.3. The loan-for-wages hypothesis and household debt 
Another approach to explain households’ borrowing decisions, departing from the permanent income 
and/or lifecycle hypotheses, is taken inter alia by Barba and Pivetti (2009). They try to explain the 
empirical fact that in the United States DTI and LTV ratios are highest for the lowest and middle 
incomes.349 The authors interpret the phenomenon of rising household debt as an ‘effort by low and 
middle-income households to maintain, as long as possible, their relative standards of consumption in 
the face of persistent changes in income distribution in favour of households with higher incomes’350 
and the retrenchment of the welfare state.351 The shortcut “loans for wages”352 refers to this 
substitution of loans for (falling) wages.353 Therefore, in contrast with the predictions of the permanent 
income and lifecycle hypothesis, debt-financed consumption is not driven by households’ own lifecycle 
income, but by income of other households. Several studies confirm the loans for wages hypothesis, 
namely that the amount of outstanding loans increases with the perceived income of a social circle,354 
or the likelihood that households take out loans increases with the comparison income of the 
neighbourhood.355 Disney et al. (2008) discovered that individuals who became unemployed use 
consumer credit to maintain their consumption.356 
                                                          
347 Ibidem, pp. 446-447. 
348 See e.g. Vandone (2009), pp. 75, 77. Cf. Broekhuizen (2016), pp. 103-111. 
349 Barba & Pivetti (2009), pp. 113-114. 
350 Ibidem, pp. 121-122. Cf. Ramsay (2012a), p. 27.   
351 Barba & Pivetti (2009), p. 114. 
352 Ramsay (2012a) uses this phrase to describe this theory (p. 27). Still, it should be noted that this theory 
encompasses not only loans for wages, but also the notion of the retrenchment of the welfare state. 
353 On this substitution: Barba & Pivetti (2009), pp. 127-129. 
354 Georgarakos et al. (2014), p. 1426. Using Dutch data, they find that ‘the higher the perceived income of a 
social circle is, the greater the tendency is that respondents will have outstanding and sizeable loans’, both 
collateralised and uncollateralised. This finding is significant for households with a perceived lower income 
than that of their social circle. Also, Starr (2010) refers to lines of research investigating whether consumption 
patterns are driven by a concern to keep them in line with relevant social norms (p. 460). 
355 Berlemann & Salland (2016), p. 8. They use data of a large German urban savings bank. 
356 Disney et al. (2008), p. 31. 
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Guttman and Philon (2010) follow a similar reasoning as Barba and Pivetti (2009), explaining that 
Americans use household debt to buy services that are not provided by the state.357 In this reasoning 
public and private debt could easily become substitutes. A crucial question is whether this model could 
also explain household debt in European countries, since the welfare state is organised differently in 
these countries.358 The higher social security benefits are, the less dependent a household will be on 
debt for sustaining consumption. Generally, Anglo-Saxon and Southern European welfare states have 
lower levels of social security benefits,359 so one might expect that households in these countries 
borrow more, if dependent on social security benefits. However, Crouch (2012) could not empirically 
confirm this.360 Instead, Angel and Heitzmann (2015) discovered a significant negative effect of the 
level of employment benefits on the risk of over-indebtedness.361 
 
2.1.2.4. The literature on over-indebtedness 
The literature discussed thus far is concerned with explaining borrowing behaviour of households, 
including the factors that can lead to high household debt levels. Another strand of literature focusses 
specifically on over-indebtedness. It attempts to find out when household debt is unsustainable, and 
which factors cause this.362 Researchers employ a large variety of indicators to measure over-
indebtedness, and the choice for certain indicators seems rather ad hoc and arbitrary.363 Nonetheless, 
the various types of indicators for measuring over-indebtedness or debt sustainability can be divided 
into different categories, although there is no agreement about this classification.364 A first approach 
defines over-indebtedness by using objective criteria, mostly ratios concerning income and debt 
repayment.365 Commonly, individuals who spend more than 30% of their gross monthly income on 
total borrowing repayments are considered over-indebted.366 A second approach uses subjective 
indicators to define over-indebtedness, such as households’ feelings about the burden of their 
                                                          
357 Guttman & Philon (2010), p. 272. 
358 Ramsay (2012a), p. 27; Chrouch (2012), pp. 389-391. 
359 See e.g. Esping-Andersen (1989), pp. 21-25; Ferreri (1996); Bonoli (1997); Arts & Gelissen (2002), pp. 143-
144. Generally, the literature distinguishes four types of welfare states in Europe, depending on the extent to 
which they stimulate equality, and the degree on which people need the market for acquiring income. 
360 Chrouch (2012), pp. 393, 405. 
361 Angel & Heitzmann (2015), p. 344.  
362 Vandone (2009), p. 69. 
363 Cf. Betti et al. (2007), p. 137. 
364 Somewhat different categorisations have been proposed by: Betti et al. (2007), p. 138; Davydoff et al. 
(2008), pp. 38-39; Vandone (2009), pp. 71-72. Cf. D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), p. 8. 
365 Betti et al. (2007), p. 138. 
366 See e.g. Disney et al. (2008); D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), p. 8. Many variations exist: some indicators also take 
assets and poverty into account, or distinguish between secured and unsecured debt, and recurring and 
temporary expenses (see e.g. Disney et al. (2008), p. 11; European Commission (2010b), pp. 3-4; D’Alessio & 
Iezzi (2013), p. 8). 
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borrowing repayments.367 Finally, legal or administrative approaches consider households over-
indebted, if they are in arrears, in a debt settlement procedure, or face other legal consequences of 
their inability to redeem their debt.368  
 
Researchers also investigate which factors cause over-indebtedness, whereby some differentiate 
between active and passive over-indebtedness. The former is understood as the result of wrong 
decisions that lead to unsustainable debt levels. In this regard, a lack of financial literacy and self-
control, financial imprudence and poor management of money have been found to contribute to over-
indebtedness.369 The same holds for spending too much and buying goods that cannot be afforded, 
while paying it by using one loan to repay another.370 
 
Passive over-indebtedness arises from factors beyond the immediate control of individuals, such as 
economic variables and unexpected events, both in the economic and the social sphere. Shocks that 
have been identified as important are becoming unemployed, losing income, rising interest rates and 
divorce.371 Disney et al. (2008) report that unemployment is especially a problem, if people want to 
sustain their level of consumption.372 Other unexpected shocks that have sometimes been found 
relevant are illness,373 getting children,374 and rising costs of living.375 Studies often find that having a 
low income contributes to over-indebtedness.376 Wage and social security levels have been discovered 
as relevant too.377 Several studies report that debt-servicing-to-income costs, and especially interest-
                                                          
367 Betti et al. (2007), p. 138; Disney et al. (2008), p. 11; Vandone (2009), p. 72; Davydoff et al. (2008), p. 39. 
368 Betti et al. (2007), p. 138. Vandone (2009), p. 72. Regarding the third approach: some scholars consider 
indicators focussing on arrears and indicators measuring whether people are involved in debt settlement or 
face other legal consequences as different approaches (Davydoff et al. (2008), p. 39; Vandone (2009), p. 72). 
369 Disney et al. (2008), p. 27; Davydoff et al. (2008), pp. 24-25; Gathergood (2012), Disney & Gathergood 
(2013), Civic Consulting (2013), p. 8; Gathergood & Weber (2014). Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.2. 
370 Betti et al. (2007), p. 141; Disney et al. (2008), p. 28; Davydoff et al. (2008), pp. 25-26. 
371 Becoming unemployed and losing income: May & Tudela (2005), p. 25; Anderloni & Vandone (2008), p. 8-9; 
Davydoff et al (2008), pp. 23-24; Disney et al. (2008), p. 31; Keese (2009), p. 28; Vandone (2009), pp. 74-75; 
European Commission (2010b), pp. 42-45; Civic Consulting (2013), pp. 6, 8; D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), p. 6; Kelly & 
McCann (2015), pp. 14-19; Angel & Heitzmann (2015), pp. 339-342. Cf. Piorkowsky (2012). Rising interest rates: 
Disney et al. (2008), pp. 33-35; D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), p. 6; Civic Consulting (2013), p. 6. Divorcing: Disney et 
al. (2008), p. 32; European Commission (2010b), p. 37; D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), p. 6; Kelly & McCann (2015), pp. 
14-19; Angel & Heitzmann (2015), pp. 339-342. Cf. Piorkowsky (2012). 
372 Disney et al. (2008), p. 31. Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.3. 
373 Anderloni & Vandone (2008), p. 9. 
374 Keese (2009), p. 21; D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), p. 6. 
375 Civic Consulting (2013), p. 7. 
376 Anderloni & Vandone (2008), pp. 8-9; Davydoff et al (2008), p. 24; European Commission (2010b), p. 33; 
D’Alessio & Iezzi (2013), pp. 17-18; Civic Consulting (2013), p. 5; Angel & Heitzmann (2015), pp. 333, 342.  But 
see Betti et al. (2007), who signalled that in some EU countries younger, high-income households reported 
more debt problems (p. 154).  
377 Civic Consulting (2013), p. 6; Angel & Heitzmann (2015), p. 344. Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.3. 
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servicing costs, are a contributing factor causing over-indebtedness.378 Some scholars find that higher 
DTI and LTV levels increases the risks of arrears,379 while others conclude that this relationship is 
weak.380 Kelly and McCann (2015) find that the existence of non-mortgage debt increases the chance 
of experiencing long-term mortgage arrears.381 Finally, renters face a higher risk of becoming over-
indebted than homeowners,382 although this trend recently reversed in Ireland and Spain.383 
 
2.2. Household debt determinants: an overview and classifications 
2.2.1. Overview of and relationships between debt determinants  
From this review of the strands of literature, a wide range of debt determinants emerge, from both 
the demand and supply side. Table 2.1 provides a comprehensive overview of the factors, 
distinguishing between levels and types of factors, based upon the findings of the literature. Relevant 
at a macro level are both regulatory and economic factors – the former concept is discussed in box 2.1. 
At a micro level, both characteristics of the loan and the parties involved – households at the demand 
side and banks at the supply side – play a role.384 Alternatively, factors can be differentiated from the 
perspective of a loan transaction, that is there are factors affecting the context in which the transaction 
takes place (regulatory and economic factors), the parties involved in the transaction (individual 
characteristics of households and banks), and the product of the transaction (loan characteristics).  
 
Table 2.1 indicates whether a factor affects household debt levels (mainly) through the demand (D) or 
supply (S) side, or through both,385 and whether it contributes to higher (+) or lower (-) household debt 
levels. The relationship between these factors and arrears or other measures of debt problems are not 
shown. Although higher debt levels normally imply a higher risk of financial fragility, and an increased 
sensitivity of households to adverse developments, for some factors this relationship is less 
                                                          
378 May & Tudela (2005), pp. 24-25; Kelly & McCann (2015), pp. 14-19. 
379 DTI levels: Rinaldi & Sanchis-Arellano (2006), pp. 28-29; Anderloni & Vandone (2008), p. 11. LTV level: Kelly 
& McCann (2015), pp. 14-19. 
380 European Commission (2010), p. 32. 
381 Kelly & McCann (2015), pp. 14-19. 
382 Anderloni & Vandone (2008), p. 9; European Commission (2010b), p. 38; Civic Consulting (2013), p. 6. 
383 Civic Consulting (2013), p. 6. 
384 For reasons of clarity the term “banks” is used, although also other credit suppliers can provide loans to 
households. 
385 If a factor mainly affects one side, it is only coded with the corresponding letter, even if it also indirectly 
affects the other side. For instance, the existence of mortgages with flexible repayment schemes mainly affects 
debt demand, because it enables households to adjust their repayments in case of temporary shocks. 
Meanwhile, indirectly it affects the supply side, since risks and lending possibilities for lenders might alter. 
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straightforward. Arrangements for information sharing and the efficiency of loan recovery in case of 
delinquency of a borrower contribute to higher household debt levels, but reduce the risk of arrears.386 
 
Box 2.1: The term regulatory factors 
The term regulatory factors, as used in this study, includes what economists (and in particular 
institutional economists) call institutions. This latter term has, however, different meanings in 
different disciplines. In (European) law, an institution denotes a body that acts for the legal entity 
EU and is identified as such in primary Union law; and is used accordingly in this study. In institutional 
economics, institutions have been defined as the ‘humanly devised constraints that shape 
interaction.’387 They both constrain and incentivise/enable, and can be formal and informal.388 
Formal institutions comprise of laws and legislation, and informal institutions of norms, self-
imposed codes of conduct, which underlay and supplement formal institutions.389 In this area, 
almost all institutions are formal, justifying the use of the term regulatory factors. 
 
The two upper rows show the factors at a macro level that influence demand and supply of debt. 
Regulatory and economic factors differ in at least one important aspect, namely the required time to 
change them. Basically, economic factors can quickly adjust in response to market developments, 
whereas regulatory characteristics are based upon choices of policymakers or regulators, and must be 
changed by them.390 In other words, the economy functions within a given regulatory context. In 
addition, regulatory factors can influence economic factors: for instance, tax policies can affect the 
credit flows to the unproductive sector, including the housing market. The two bottom rows of the 
table show factors at a micro level: respectively the characteristics and situation of the parties to the 
loan contract, and the characteristics of the loan, most notably the price of debt – the interest costs – 
and fees. Three types of household characteristics are distinguished: (1) demographic and social 
characteristics, (2) mental and cognitive characteristics and (3) the economic situation. For the parties 
                                                          
386 Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.1. 
387 North (1990), p. 3. Cf. Hodgson (2006), p. 2; Acemoglu et al. (2005). Cf. Voigt (2013), p. 7. It can be difficult, 
both analytically and empirically, to distinguish between institutions on the one hand, and their outcome or 
policies on the other hand. To solve this problem, Glaeser et al. (2004) put forward that a defining element of 
an institution is its permanent or stable character (p. 275). Cf. Davis (2010), p. 5; Voigt (2013), pp. 3-4. Rodrik et 
al. (2004) use another approach to differentiate between institutions and policies, namely by thinking of policy 
as a flow variable, in contrast to institutions, which is a stock variable. (p. 156). They regard institutions as the 
cumulative outcome of previous policies. Cf. Milo (2007), pp. 22-23; Voigt (2013), p. 23.  
388 Hodgson (2006), p. 2; Acemoglu et al. (2005). Cf. Voigt (2013), p. 7.  
389 North (1990), p. 4; North (1994), p. 360; De Jong (2009), p. 32. 
390 Although this is generally true, the reality is more complex. For instance, wages are not only determined by 
demand and supply, but also governed by regulations, and determined by wage negotiations by labour unions.  
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to the loan contract, the regulatory and economic factors are given – they cannot directly change them 
– and provide constraints and incentives. 
 
Table 2.1: Types of household debt determinants at various levels 
Level Factors influencing household debt levels 
Macro level: 
regulatory 
factors 
 
(context) 
General: 
Arrangements for 
information 
sharing (S+) 
Efficiency of 
recovery in case 
delinquency 
(S+) 
Social security 
level (D-) 
Financial sector: 
Maximum DTI & LTV ratio (D-) 
Interest rate controls (S-) 
Possibilities securitisation (S+) 
Strictness capital requirements (S-) 
Housing equity withdrawal possible 
(D+) 
Type of mortgage amortisation 
schemes, such as: 
Interest only possible (D+) 
Flexible repayments possible (D+) 
Taxes (D): 
Mortgage interest deduction 
possible (+) 
Imputed rents taxed (-) 
Property tax applicable to 
housing (-) 
Housing transactions taxed (-
) 
Capital gains on housing 
taxed (-) 
VAT applicable to housing (-) 
Macro level: 
economic 
factors 
 
(context) 
Macroeconomic stability (+) 
Inflation (-) 
Wage level (D+) 
Level of unemployment (D-) 
Capital inflows (+) 
Credit flows to unproductive/productive sector (D+) 
Monetary policy interest rates (-) 
House prices (+) 
Micro level: 
individual 
characteristics 
and situation 
 
(parties) 
Household (D): 
Demographic and social characteristics: 
Age / lifecycle stage  
Number children  
Experienced a divorce  
Illness  
Peer-income in social group (+) 
 
Mental and cognitive characteristics: 
Time preference regarding consumption  
Attitude towards debt 
Prudence (-), self-control (-), and risk aversion (-) 
Financial literacy (-) 
Over-optimism about economic / house price developments 
(+) 
 
Economic situation: 
Income & expected lifecycle income (+) 
Education (+) 
Employment status 
Renting/owner-occupied housing 
Value collateral (+) 
Bank (S): 
Funding costs / wedge 
between borrowing & 
lending rates (-) 
Maturity match on both 
sides balance sheets 
LTD-ratio (-) 
Reduced lending standards 
due to inter alia 
competitive pressure, fees 
or sales targets (+) 
Over-optimism about 
economic / house price 
developments (+) 
Micro level: 
loan 
characteristics 
 
(product) 
Interest costs (D-, S+) 
Fees (D-, S+) 
Risks related to a certain type of loan (-) 
Maturity (D+) 
Lack of information about the product and associated risks (D+) 
“+” indicates a positive relationship between the factor and household debt levels, while “-“ indicates a 
negative relationship. “D” and “S” stand for respectively affecting demand and supply of household debt.  
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There are top-down, bottom-up, and horizontal effects between the various factors that influence 
household debt levels. For instance, the economic situation of a household, and the interest rate of a 
loan, depend partly on economic factors, such as the stability of the economy, and – in case of the 
interest rate – (expected) inflation.391 In fact, economic factors mainly have an indirect effect on 
household debt levels, through these top-down influences on other factors. Bottom-up effects are 
feedback effects flowing from determinants in the lower rows of the table, to the factors by which they 
are influenced.392 Regulatory factors might be changed in response to their effect on borrowing and 
lending behaviour. An example of horizontal effects – between factors categorised at the same level 
in table 2.1 – is that a rising wage level leads to inflation, whereas increasing unemployment generally 
sets a drag on wages. Finally, the household debt determinants are also influenced by other factors. 
For instance, competition in the financial market influences the wedge between borrowing and lending 
rates, and sentiments and risks on the financial market determine part of the costs for banks.393   
 
2.2.2. EU and national influences on household debt determinants 
Most of the regulatory and economic factors driving household debt are affected by national as well 
as European influences. For instance, financial regulation is adopted at both levels,394 while some basic 
rules regarding information sharing are set at EU level, but most of them at national level.395 In 
addition, economic determinants of household debt levels are influenced by both national and 
supranational developments, although national factors will often determine the exact outcome. For 
example, in the EMU, real interest rates are determined by the combination of the nominal policy rates 
as set by the ECB, and inflation, which varies per member state.396 In this regard, it is telling that 
household debt levels vary a lot among EU member states. This supports a nuanced view about the 
level at which issues should be addressed, and thus to which degree the subsidiarity principle is fulfilled 
for possible EU action.397 Acting is not done by either the EU or a member state, but rather by both, 
each with their own responsibilities. Considering this influence of national factors, the subsidiarity 
principle is certainly not easily met for creating far-reaching instruments at EU level that deprive 
member states of possibilities to act. 
                                                          
391 The economic situation of a household can also depend on the social security level. Loan characteristics 
which are restricted by regulatory factors are another example of a top-down influence. 
392 Cf. Williamson (1998), p. 26; Williamson (2000), pp. 596-600.  In his institutional model higher institutional 
levels impose constraints on lower institutional levels, whereas feedback effects flow vice versa.  
393 Cf. De Nederlandsche Bank (2014b), p. 13.  
394 Cf. chapters 3-4. 
395 Cf. section 5.1. 
396 Cf. graph 1.3, which shows a clear common trend in member states’ real interest rates, but also substantial 
differences between them. 
397 Cf. sub-section 1.2.2. 
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2.3. Influencing household debt: selecting instruments to analyse 
Several instruments are able to somehow influence the plethora of determinants of household debt. 
These are part of one of the following categories: financial regulation, fiscal policy, monetary policy, 
employment policy, and consumer protection and support.  
 
Inevitably, choices on the instruments to analyse have to be made, apart from the fact that every 
research needs demarcation. A first reason for being selective in the analysis is that not all causes are 
equally important and thus deserve the same attention. Table 2.1 and its discussion show that some 
factors have a direct effect on borrowing and lending behaviour, while others only have indirect effects 
by influencing more proximate causes of borrowing and lending behaviour. The problem with using 
indirect instruments for influencing household debt is uncertainty about achieving the desired result, 
which highly depends on the transmission channels. It is thus reasonable to pay attention to factors 
that exert a direct influence on borrowing and lending behaviour. Arguably, the factors identified as 
contributing to over-indebtedness are especially relevant.398  
 
The choice of instruments to analyse can be further circumscribed based on the following 
considerations. Firstly, if certain instruments have main goals other than influencing borrowing and 
lending behaviour, large side effects on their primary objectives can occur when using them to 
influence household debt levels. Consequently, such instruments are less useful for influencing 
household debt, and consequently require no further investigation. Secondly, the scope of this study 
and the findings of existing literature provide further guidance for selecting instruments to analyse. 
Since the problems and risks of high household debt levels are the motivation for this study, 
instruments requiring examination are those that are directly targeted at the amount of debt that 
consumers can borrow or lenders can supply.399 The only reason for not investigating instruments that 
fulfil this criterion is that existing literature gives a clear indication that an instrument will not be 
effective, even if legally constructed in the best possible manner. Similarly, instruments aimed at 
influencing borrowing and lending behaviour, but not directly at influencing the amount of debt are 
only examined if existing literature clearly indicates that an instrument significantly reduces household 
debt levels.  
 
                                                          
398 Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.4. 
399 Such hard restrictions can halt a growing boom and can function as a buffer for household to prevent that a 
shock pushes them from being indebted to being over-indebted. 
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Consequently, monetary policy and employment/social security policy will not be further examined in 
this study. They are able to affect more proximate determinants of household debt, such as the 
economic situation of households and interest costs of loans, but do so indirectly. Furthermore, their 
primary objectives are not to affect household borrowing and lending. Hence, large side effects on 
their primary objectives can occur when using these policies for influencing housing debt levels, as for 
monetary policy is widely highlighted in the literature.400 Thirdly, these policies do not directly affect 
household debt levels.  
 
2.3.1. Financial regulation  
Financial regulation ‘concerns the drafting and implementation of rules and regulations governing the 
activities of the financial system’401, and consists of prudential and conduct of business regulation.402 
Some financial regulatory instruments directly affect the amount of debt that can be lent, namely the 
so-called borrower-based caps, like DTI and LTV limits, while other instruments only exert an indirect 
influence on this amount, such as rules governing securitisation. Some instruments do not directly 
restrict lending quantities, but are nevertheless closely related to the amount of debt supplied to 
households. Firstly, this concerns risk-weighted capital requirements, which are aimed at covering 
credit risk, which is ‘the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its obligations 
in accordance with agreed terms.’403 This risk is directly related to the borrower, unlike other risks 
related to the process of lending.404 Secondly, this is true for the countercyclical capital buffer, since 
its objective is building up capital buffers during periods of excessive credit growth.405  
                                                          
400 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016, pp. 321-326) and Crowe et al. (2013, p. 306) conclude that monetary policy is able 
to reduce the demand for loans by increasing policy interest rates (cf. Maddaloni et al. (2013), p. 145), but they 
(and others) conclude too that it can be rather costly to use monetary policy to reduce debt demand and house 
prices, given the negative (side) effects on overall economic growth (Crowe et al. (2013), pp. 306-309; Dokko et 
al. (2011), pp. 272-275; Jeanne & Korinek (2014), p. 166. Cf. Baldi (2014), Badarau & Popescu (2014), p. 310). In 
the euro area, the concerns about negative side effects are even reinforced, because it is difficult to avoid 
negative side effects for one or more national economies, due to the low chance that all economies are in the 
same stage of the business cycle (Cf. Lim et al. (2011), p. 11; Crowe et al. (2013), p. 311). 
401 Masciandaro & Quintyn (2013), p. 263. Note that financial ‘supervision is about ensuring that financial 
institutions obey the regulatory framework, and imposing sanctions on those institutions that do not abide by 
the rules and regulations.’ (ibidem).  
402 Cf. sub-section 1.3.4.2. 
403 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000), p. 3. Cf. De Haan et al. (2009), p. 305. The borrower itself 
can be the counter-party, if the lender keeps the loans on its own balance sheet. However, the counter-party 
can also be the lender or another bank, for instance if the lender repackages loans into securities or covered 
bonds and sells them to another party. Then the default of a borrower can trigger the non-performance 
according to contractual agreement of other parties. 
404 For a definition of several types of risks, see De Haan et al. (2009), pp. 305-306. Cf. art. 76-87 Directive 
2013/36, which prescribe how various risks need to be treated. 
405 If necessary, these buffers can be released to compensate for losses during periods of stress. 
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2.3.1.1. Types of macroprudential instruments 
The potential effectiveness of these instruments needs to be assessed with a special focus on the 
literature on macroprudential policy, since household debt levels are mainly limited for 
macroprudential purposes, and the identified instruments are macroprudential, except for risk-
weighted capital requirements, which combine microprudential and macroprudential features.406  
 
Many researchers consider macroprudential policy most appropriate for dealing with credit and 
housing booms, especially because it can be more directly targeted at the problems and thus produce 
fewer distortions than monetary policy,407 while they are considered more flexible than fiscal 
instruments.408 Macroprudential policies are relatively new, and many countries lack experience with 
them, especially developed economies.409 Consequently, many researchers stress that the 
effectiveness of macroprudential tools is still unclear and that more research on those instruments is 
necessary.410 Three types of instruments can be distinguished:411  
1. Credit-based tools, either static or time-varying, such as maximum LTV, DTI and LTI ratios, ceilings 
for credit or credit growth, and caps on foreign currency lending; 
2. Liquidity-based tools, like loan-to-deposit ratios, limits on currency or maturity mismatch, and 
reserve requirements; 
3. Capital-based tools, such as countercyclical capital requirements, sectoral risk-weights, dynamic 
provisioning,412 maximum leverage ratios, and systemic risk buffers. 
 
The credit-based tools are especially intended to affect credit supply to households (and other actors), 
but liquidity and capital-based tools can indirectly influence this too. For instance, sectoral risk weights 
may curb credit growth in certain sectors, while the countercyclical capital buffer introduced in Basel 
III is primarily intended to increase resilience for a bust that may follow a period of excessive credit 
growth, but secondary to lean against a boom.413 In addition, a loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio can diminish 
                                                          
406 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1. 
407 See e.g. Lim et al. (2011), p. 10; Dokko et al. (2011), p. 276; Dell'Ariccia et al. (2016), pp. 327-328; Crowe et 
al. (2013), p. 317, Shi et al. (2014), pp. 25-26; Angeloni (2014), p. 77. 
408 Lim et al. (2011), p. 10. 
409 See e.g. Claessens et al. (2013), p. 183; Crowe et al. (2013), p. 312. 
410 Dokko et al. (2011), pp. 276-277; Crowe et al. (2013), p. 312; Clerc et al. (2014), p. 184; Galati & Moessner 
(2013), p. 861; Galati & Moessner (2014), p. 8. Cf. Angeloni (2014), p. 72; Claessens & Kodres (2014), p. 16. 
411 Lim et al. (2011), p. 8. Also (slightly) different categorisations are possible, see e.g. Balogh (2012), pp. 644-
645; Dell'Ariccia et al. (2016), p. 328; Knot (2014), table 1; Galati & Moessner (2014), pp. 3-6. 
412 This is mandating higher loan loss provisions during upswings. 
413 Cf. See e.g. table 1 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2013/1 of 4 April 2013, OJ 2013, C 
170/01; Knot (2014), table 1; Galati & Moessner (2014), p. 4. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
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the procyclicality of credit supply by limiting the use of non-deposit funding.414 Reducing procyclicality 
is relevant for increasing financial stability, since the risk of extending too much credit is especially 
present in upswings. This might result in painful deleveraging in the subsequent downturn. Still, since 
worldwide only a handful of regulators impose LTD ratios on banks, this instrument will not be included 
in the literature review.415 Moreover, a LTD ratio is in particular aimed at stabilising funding, not at 
reducing lending.416 
 
2.3.1.2. The potential effectiveness of credit-based prudential instruments 
A literature on the effectiveness of credit-based tools is emerging. Not much research on ceilings on 
credit growth exists, since these instruments are barely used in developed countries, including EU 
member states.417 Generally, empirical research finds that maximum LTV, DTI and DSTI ratios are 
effective in limiting (procyclical) credit supply to households, and thus in affecting household debt 
levels.418 Nonetheless, interpreting and generalising these results is not possible without being aware 
of some limitations. Firstly, such ratios are not binding in all countries; in some instances they are only 
guidelines.419 Secondly, their design can vary a lot.420 The caps can apply undifferentiated to everyone, 
be targeted at certain groups, or be differentiated depending upon household characteristics, loan 
maturities, or housing prices.421 In addition, those limits can be constant or time-varying, in line with 
the cycle. Moreover, decision-making about their adjustment can be rule-based or discretionary.422 So, 
doing further research is necessary, taking into account the relevant differences; among other things, 
                                                          
(2010) described the primary aim of the countercyclical capital buffer as ‘to achieve the broader 
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth’ (p. 8). 
414 Kim (2014), p. 128. 
415 Cf. Van den End (2016). 
416 Van den End (2016). Cf. Recommendation B of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2013/1 of 4 
April 2013, OJ 2013, C 170/01. 
417 See table 2 in Claessens et al. (2013) and the database of Shim et al. (2013) on the use of these instruments. 
418 Lim et al. (2011), pp. 18, 22, 25; Crowe et al. (2013), p. 31; European Central Bank (2013), pp. 103-105; 
Kuttner & Shim (2013), pp. 20, 22-26, 29, 31-32; He (2014), p. 106; Kim (2014), p. 126; Cerutti et al. (2015), pp. 
12-13, 28; Jácome & Mitra (2015), pp. 25-29, 31. Note that Kuttner & Shim (2013) found that especially DSTI 
caps have a significant effect on housing credit, more than maximum LTV ratios (pp. 20, 22-26, 29, 31-32). Cf. 
Claessens et al. (2013), who found that LTV and DTI caps are quite effective in reducing bank vulnerabilities, 
such as bank leverage (pp. 154, 170). McDonald (2015) found that tightening of LTV and DTI ratios has larger 
effects than loosening them (pp. 19-20). 
419 Crowe et al. (2013), p. 312; Galati & Moessner (2013), p. 861. 
420 Cf. Kuttner & Shim (2013), p. 13. 
421 Lim et al. (2011), p. 64; Kim (2014), p. 125. 
422 Lim et al. (2011), p. 65. 
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their calibration in relation to the characteristics of member states’ legal and financial and financial 
systems need to be considered.423  
 
There are relevant differences between maximum LTV ratios on the hand and DTI, LTI and DSTI ratios 
on the other hand. Firstly, LTV caps are particularly aimed at addressing risks of house price shocks, 
residual debt and diminished usefulness of the collateral in case of default, whereas income-based 
limits especially reduce the risks of non-repayment. Moreover, maximum DTI, LTI and DSTI ratios are 
less dependent on the cycle and speculation, since income is less prone to bubbles than house 
prices.424 Therefore, both types of borrower-based caps can be considered complementary, but DTI, 
LTI and DSTI limits can be expected to prevent excessive credit growth better than LTV limits.425 Basten 
and Koch (2015) even question the effectiveness of a maximum LTV ratio, since their and some other 
research indicates that house prices grow faster during a boom than mortgage credit.426 
 
2.3.1.3. The potential effectiveness of capital-based prudential instruments 
Theoretical and empirical research identified several conditions that need to be fulfilled for (risk-
weighted) capital requirements to be effective in containing credit growth.427 Firstly, bank capital must 
be a relatively costly means of bank financing; otherwise it would be costless to raise it.428 A substantial 
empirical literature confirms that this is indeed the case, according to Aiyar et al. (2014b).429 
Meanwhile, Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that equity – most bank capital is equity – is primarily 
more expensive for banks than debt, because of the higher risks (the first losses are borne by the 
shareholders), and the tax-incentives for debt-financing.430 Therefore, if a bank’s equity will increase, 
its relative price will probably decrease, because the bank’s leverage and associated risks become 
smaller.431  
 
Secondly, capital requirements must be binding constraints, and affect actual capital ratios.432 
According to Aiyar et al. (2014b), the empirical literature delivers mixed results regarding the response 
                                                          
423 Many researchers stress the need to investigate the design and calibration of macroprudential tools: e.g. 
Lim et al. (2011), p. 31; Claessens et al. (2013), p. 155; Claessens & Kodres (2014), p. 16. 
424 Gelain (2013), pp. 229-230. 
425 Cf. footnote 418. 
426 Basten & Koch (2015), pp. 2, 21-22. 
427 See Aiyar et al. (2014b) and also Athanasoglou et al. (2014). 
428 Aiyar et al. (2014b), p. 183. 
429 Ibidem.  
430 Admati & Hellwig (2013), in particular chapters 7-9. 
431 Ibidem. 
432 Aiyar et al. (2014b), p. 185. 
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of actual bank capital to changes in capital requirements.433 Barros and Blanco (2003) conclude in an 
empirical study that capital requirements contribute to actual capital buffers, but that market pressure 
is more important.434  
 
A third condition is that loan supply depends on the capital buffers of banks. ‘Many studies (…) suggest 
that increases in regulatory capital requirements can precipitate contractions in the supply of credit’.435 
Aiyar et al. (2016) find ‘that lending growth responds negatively to increases in capital 
requirements’.436 Similarly, simulations of the ECB with a DSGE-model show that increases of both 
system-wide and sectoral capital requirements lead to declining loan supply.437 However, Crowe et al. 
(2013) find that the empirical evidence of the effectiveness of capital requirements in influencing credit 
supply to the private sector is mixed.438 They explain that capital requirements and procyclical risk-
weights will turn ineffective when actual bank capital ratios are well above the regulatory minima, as 
often is the case during booms.439 Also Kuttner and Shim (2013) found mostly insignificant results when 
testing whether risk-weighted capital requirements can contain housing credit.440 Recently, 
Michelangeli and Sette (2016) found that higher capital ratios lead to more rather than fewer 
acceptances of credit applications, while Gambacorta and Shin (2016) discovered that bank capital 
increases lending growth.441 Although these findings sound counterintuitive, they confirm that capital 
requirements function as a constraint, since less capitalised banks are apparently unable to lend more. 
All in all, the literature delivers mixed, but more confirmative than dismissive results regarding the 
question of whether capital requirements can contain credit growth.  
 
Furthermore, various scholars discuss how procyclical bank lending can be mitigated by countercyclical 
measures, such as the countercyclical buffer and dynamic provisioning.442 These measures intend to 
                                                          
433 Ibidem, p. 185. 
434 Barros & Blanco (2003), p. 1956. 
435 Ibidem, p. 184. 
436 Aiyar et al. (2016), pp. 150, 158 
437 European Central Bank (2013), pp. 103-105. 
438 Crowe et al. (2013), p. 314. 
439 Ibidem, p. 313. 
440 Kuttner and Shim (2013), pp. 20, 22-26, 29, 31-32. These results concerning risk-weighted capital 
requirements are based upon an analysis of 50 countries (p. 27). 
441 Michelangeli & Sette (2016), p. 19; Gambacorta & Shin (2016), pp. 18-19, 23. The former also find that banks 
with lower capital ratios accept less risky borrowers.  
442 This is related to the question of whether “standard” capital requirements reinforce the procyclicality of 
bank lending. The presumption behind this is that banks can easily expand lending during upswings, while 
capital requirements become stricter during a downturn, leading to diminished lending (see e.g. Jokipii & Milne 
(2008), pp. 1440, 1450; Andersen (2011), p. 138; Agénor & Pereira da Silva (2012), pp. 43-44). In principle, 
several conditions must be fulfilled for capital requirements to be procyclical. Firstly, capital requirements have 
to increase in the downward phase of the cycle and vice versa. Secondly, banks’ actual capital buffers have to 
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build up capital buffers – on top of the minimum capital requirements – during periods of excessive 
credit growth, in order to use them, when necessary, to compensate for losses during periods of 
stress.443 López et al. (2014) find positive effects of countercyclical provisions in Colombia, namely 
lower loan amounts.444 Lim et al. (2011) find that dynamic provisioning can reduce procyclical credit 
growth, and Jiménez et al. (2014) report that countercyclical dynamic provisioning in Spain contributed 
to smoothing credit supply, although it did not prevent the boom from happening.445 However, 
according to Crowe et al. (2013), dynamic provisioning is better fit for strengthening the system during 
a bust than for preventing a boom.446  
 
Finally, the Basel III accord introduced the leverage ratio, which requires banks to hold a minimum 
level of Tier 1 capital for their unweighted exposures.447 The leverage ratio is still under development, 
but the literature is mostly positive about it, because it is not based upon banks’ internal models, which 
can be used to manipulate risk-weights.448 However, if the leverage ratio is not applied in combination 
with risk-weights, it can incentivise banks to take on riskier assets, because all types of exposures need 
to be capitalised equally, while riskier exposures may generate more profits.449 
 
2.3.1.4. The influence of circumvention or leakage on the effectiveness of prudential instruments  
Another factor determining the effectiveness of macroprudential measures is the degree to which 
circumvention of macroprudential rules or regulatory leakage is possible. Regulatory leakage is ‘the 
extent to which non-regulated forms of credit offset changes in the supply of credit from regulated 
institutions.’450 Jeanne and Korinek (2014) consider two general forms of regulatory leakage. ‘First, 
                                                          
be close to their regulatory minimum, which however is in practice often not the case, according to 
Athanasoglou et al. (2014, p. 67). Nonetheless, they explain how various elements in the calculation of the 
capital requirements are indeed affected by the economic cycle (p. 68). They conclude that the literature 
confirms the procyclicality of Basel II banking regulation (pp. 68-69. Cf. Blum & Hellwig (1995), p. 740; Heid 
(2007), p. 3898; Jokipii & Milne (2008), pp. 1440, 1450; Andersen (2011), p. 138; Agénor & Pereira da Silva 
(2012), pp. 43-44; Coffinet et al. (2012), Grosse & Schumann (2014)). Consequently, this strand of literature 
actually confirms that capital requirements have an effect on bank lending, albeit not the desired effect.   
443 See e.g. recital 80 of the preamble of Directive 2013/36 (CRD IV). 
444 López et al. (2014), p. 14. 
445 Lim et al. (2011), pp. 25, 66; Jiménez et al. (2014), pp. 22-23. Cf. Peydró (2014), 221. 
446 Crowe et al. (2013), pp. 314-315. 
447 Cf. Schoenmaker (2015), pp. 477-478. 
448 Cf. footnotes 292 and 574. E.g. Schoenmaker (2015, pp. 477-478) and Wolf (2015, p. 243) are positive about 
the leverage ratio. Also, Brei & Gambacorta (2014) found that the leverage ratio is more countercyclical than a 
risk-weighted capital ratio. 
449 The expected returns for riskier assets are higher, while a bank needs to hold as much capital as for a low-
risk asset. Cf. European Systemic Risk Board (2015), p. 14. Cf. Kiema & Jokivuolle (2014), p. 250. 
450 Aiyar et al. (2014a), p. 50. 
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some of the borrowing and lending activities that generate negative externalities may occur outside 
of the banking sector and as such fall outside the scope of banking regulation.’451 They observe that it 
is a common trend that lending activities moved from banks to non-bank financial intermediaries, 
which are less or not regulated.452 Secondly, lending activities might shift from domestic to foreign 
credit providers, if a national regulator or supervisor tightens restrictions. Obviously, these kinds of 
problems diminish the effectiveness of regulation and supervision. Indeed, empirical research shows 
that the effects of regulatory measures are often subject to a considerable degree of leakage,453 but 
that measures can have still significant effects, since leakage is only partial.454 
 
In order to battle the substantial leakage and improve the reach of regulators, Jeanne and Korinek 
(2014) and the European Systemic Risk Board (2016b) propose to move macroprudential regulation 
beyond banking regulation and align it as closely as possible to the activities that generate externalities 
leading to system problems.455 Jeanne and Korinek (2014) regard leverage in the real estate sector as 
the origin of many externalities, and thus propose measures aimed at highly leveraged borrowers, for 
instance, by using consumer protection laws and tax laws.456 
 
All in all, this literature review shows that especially credit-based instruments like LTV and DTI caps are 
promising for addressing household debt levels, and thus deserve attention. Capital-based measures 
cannot a priori be ignored in this research: the literature reports mixed, and certainly not unequivocally 
negative, results about their potential effectiveness regarding containing lending to households. 
Therefore, sectoral risk-weights of capital requirements and the countercyclical capital buffer will be 
examined as well.  
 
2.3.2. Tax policy  
Taxes are among the causes of high household debt levels, especially taxes related to housing. 
Consequently, whenever fiscal policies are part of the problem, they should be changed to become 
                                                          
451 Jeanne & Korinek (2014), p. 166. 
452 Ibidem, p. 167. Cf. Crowe et al. (2013), p. 315. See also the findings of Jiménez et al. (2013), pp. 25-26. 
453 Aiyar et al. (2014b) show the presence of considerable leakage of increased capital requirements in the UK 
(pp. 209-210). Reinhardt & Sowerbutts (2015) and Cizel et al. (2016) examine macroprudential measures in 
dozens of countries and demonstrate the presence of considerable leakage. Kim (2014) reports that practical 
experiences with LTV and DTI limits show that banks try to circumvent them, among other things, by increasing 
types of household lending not being subject to the caps (p. 126). 
454 Aiyar et al. (2014b), pp. 209-210; Cizel et al. (2016), pp. 17-19, 21. 
455 Jeanne & Korinek (2014), pp. 167-168. Cf. European Systemic Risk Board (2016b). 
456 Ibidem, p. 168. 
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part of the solution. Fiscal policies can be used to incentivise households or to support households at 
risk of over-indebtedness by means of allowances or tax benefits. Several taxes stimulate 
homeownership and thus household lending, but especially the fiscal treatment of debt is relevant, 
since it directly influences the amount of debt that consumers can borrow.457 This is true even though 
the primary objective of measures like mortgage interest deductibility is different, namely supporting 
home-ownership. 
 
Various authors discuss the suitability of fiscal tools for addressing credit and real estate booms. 
According to Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016), they are likely not effective in taming a boom, due to significant 
time lags and political difficulties in its application.458 In addition, they state that removing borrowing 
incentives will have no cyclical effects on credit growth.459 They refer to empirical evidence supporting 
those considerations.460 However, if the only goal is lowering household debt levels, regardless of the 
cycle, time lags or cyclical effects matter less.  
 
Generally, research reveals a significant relationship between mortgage interest deductibility on the 
one hand, and borrowing behaviour and household debt levels on the other hand. Studies find that 
reforming mortgage tax deductibility can lead to lower actual LTV ratios and a decline in housing 
prices,461 to lower mortgage demand,462 and to lower interest payments.463 On the contrary, Jappelli 
and Pistaferri (2007) find no response of Italian borrowers to a changed mortgage interest deductibility 
                                                          
457 In this literature review only fiscal tools directly related to the fiscal treatment of debt will be discussed. 
Crowe et al. (2013) also reviewed the literature regarding the financial transaction tax and property tax. They 
expound that property taxes can help to contain a boom, for which there is supporting empirical evidence. 
Nonetheless, this tax does not address the main causes of the boom, namely excessive credit growth and 
leverage. (p. 310). Neither is it directly related to household debt. They argue that financial transaction taxes 
could help to “thin” the market, and thus to tame booms. Results from practical experiences are however 
mixed (p. 309). Since a financial transaction tax is aimed at transactions in the market, it affects primarily 
trading, and not lending. So, it is less relevant for this research. This is confirmed by Buckley and North (2012), 
who summarise possible achievements of a financial transaction tax: this list (p. 794) shows that it is primarily 
aimed at trading and not lending. 
458 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016), pp. 326-327. The phrase “political difficulties in its application” refers to the term 
“political economy factors”, as used by the authors. 
459 Ibidem. 
460 Ibidem. Kuttner & Shim (2013) found in some specifications of their regressions that housing-related taxes 
exert a significant influence on housing credit (pp. 20, 29). 
461 Crowe et al. (2013), p. 310. This concerns research on tax reforms in the UK, US and Sweden. 
462 Saarimaa (2010), pp. 30-37. His results show that a reduction or elimination of mortgage interest 
deductibility in Sweden would result in a reduction in mortgage demand. 
463 Alan et al. (2016) show that interest payments reduced for Danish households after mortgage interest 
deductibility was cut back. Raya & Kucel (2015) find that the Spanish mortgage interest subsidy stimulated risky 
borrowing by households, and that the resulting increase in annual payments exceeded the savings that stem 
from the subsidy (pp. 104-107). 
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regime,464 indicating a lack of effectiveness of the incentives given by such a regime. Keen et al. (2010) 
show that in countries which offer tax relief for mortgage interest, the effective average tax rate on 
housing falls if leverage increases.465 This implies that taking on mortgage debt is stimulated. Indeed, 
they refer to evidence showing that countries that offer more favourable tax treatment for home 
ownership, display higher mortgage debt ratios.466 Comparably, Wolswijk’s (2006) research into 
mortgage debt determinants shows that the after-tax interest rate chokes off demand for housing 
loans, although the effect is not very large.467 This indicates that mortgage interest deductibility 
increases the demand for loans, since it reduces the after-tax interest rate.468 This brief literature 
review highlights that mortgage interest deductibility has effects on debt demand and levels, and thus 
deserves further attention in this study. 
 
Another potential fiscal instrument is a countercyclical tax on debt. Jeanne and Korinek (2010, 2014) 
propose this tax, because individual borrowers do not internalise all the social costs of their borrowing 
choices – i.e. the increased leverage in the economy, which can force deleveraging in bad economic 
times – and hence take on excessive debt levels, leading to a vulnerable economy in bust times.469 Also 
Bianchi and Mendoza (2013) propose a tax on debt, because their model shows that it neutralises the 
externality of overborrowing.470 According to Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016), a countercyclical tax on debt 
goes directly to the heart of the problem, and will solve problems of circumvention as well, since it, 
unlike prudential regulation, does not only apply to banks.471 However, they fear practical difficulties, 
like tax planning. Despite its promising potential, the countercyclical tax on debt will not receive further 
attention in this study, due to the absence of concrete legal rules or even concrete proposals to 
analyse. 
 
                                                          
464 Jappelli & Pistaferri (2007), pp. 248-249, 264-270. They attribute this finding to lack of information about the 
tax reform and borrowing constraints due to judicial inefficiency (pp. 268-269). 
465 Keen et al. (2010), p. 61. 
466 Ibidem, pp. 63-64.  
467 Wolswijk (2006), p. 139. 
468 Of course, this conclusion should be drawn with care, since Wolswijk (2006) did not distinctly investigate 
mortgage interest deductibility, so it cannot be determined whether the significance of his indicator is a result 
of the pre-tax interest rates, the tax influences or both.    
469 Jeanne & Korinek (2010), pp. 3, 6, 33; Jeanne & Korinek (2014), p. 165. Cf. Bianchi & Mendoza (2011), p. 4. 
Also Clerc et al. (2014) consider the effects of borrowing behaviour on house prices, an externality that is not 
taken into account by borrowers, while it affects their collateral constraints and net worth (p. 186).  
470 Bianchi & Mendoza (2011), p. 51. 
471 Dell’Ariccia et al. (2016), p. 327. 
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2.3.3. Consumer protection  
Consumer law seeks ‘to guarantee and protect the autonomy of the individual, who appears in the 
market without any profit-making intentions, primarily against undertakings which engage actively in 
the market’.472 A range of instruments aims at protecting consumers who borrow. This includes 
mandatory information disclosure, financial education, interest rate ceilings, as well as mandatory 
creditworthiness assessments. Uniting these instruments is that they either intend to correct 
behavioural deficiencies, or try to overcome market failures, such as information asymmetries.473 
Although credit registries or bureaus and efficient insolvency procedures are not necessarily aimed at 
protecting consumers, they are comparable with these instruments by also intending to resolve market 
failures, including information asymmetries. 
 
2.3.3.1. Instruments addressing behavioural deficiencies and market failures  
Many of these instruments are aimed at addressing the mental and cognitive characteristics and 
capabilities of households, like time preferences regarding consumption, attitude towards debt, 
prudence, self-control and risk aversion. People’s cognitive capabilities and awareness for risks can be 
improved by means of financial education, advertorial campaigns and debt counselling agencies that 
offer advice to households and requirements for lenders to disclose risks to consumers or even warn 
them.474 This addresses behavioural deficiencies and causes of active over-indebtedness. However, 
these instruments do not directly aim at restricting the amount of debt. In addition, they are not legal 
instruments, and their optimal content and design requires no legal research. Moreover, the literature 
reports at best mixed results for the effectiveness of financial education.475 Therefore, these types of 
instruments will not be examined in this study. 
 
Mandatory information disclosure, credit registries or bureaus and efficient insolvency procedures 
provide the necessary conditions for borrowing and lending, and try to overcome market failures like 
information asymmetries. Thereby, they – at least the credit registries and insolvency procedures476 – 
                                                          
472 Reich (2009), p. 6. 
473 These kind of issues are the rationale for consumer protection: see e.g. Ramsay (2012c), pp. 41-84. 
474 On financial education and debt counselling agencies, see e.g. Vandone (2009), pp. 75-83. 
475 See e.g. Lusardi & Mitchell (2014), p. 2, 12-27, 33; Fernandes et al. (2014), pp. 1867-1872; García (2013), p. 
303; Willis (2009), p. 456. Cf. Kilborn (2005), p. 23. But see Martin (2007), p. 22; Brown et al. (2013), p. 23. 
476 The significant influence of credit registries and bureaus and efficient insolvency procedures is discussed in 
section 2.1.2.1. 
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exert a significant, but nonetheless indirect, influence on household debt levels.477 Moreover, they are 
not primarily meant for influencing the amount of household debt, but for facilitating and creating a 
sound credit market in general. So, this study will not further examine these instruments either.478 
 
2.3.3.2. Interest rate ceilings and mandatory creditworthiness assessments  
Interest rate ceilings set an upper limit to the interest rate or the annual percentage rate of charge.479 
This study will not further investigate them. Although these ceilings affect an aspect of the debt-service 
costs, they do not directly target the amount of debt, and are only indirectly related to debt levels.480 
This becomes even clearer when considering that the high-cost credit market segments - which are 
most sensitive to interest rate ceilings – only represent a minor share of the total volume of credit.481 
In addition, studies on interest ceilings – in the EU or in general – deliver mixed conclusions about their 
effectiveness.482    
 
Instead, rules on mandatory creditworthiness assessments will be examined, since they are directly 
aimed at restricting lending to certain consumers, especially when combined with an obligation to 
refrain from lending in case of a negative outcome. A creditworthiness assessment means that the 
lender examines the likelihood that a borrower will meet his repayment obligations.483 This implies an 
assessment whether the borrower can afford the loan.484 Traditionally, the creditworthiness of a 
                                                          
477 The literature is critical about the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure (see e.g. Ben-Shahar & Schneider 
(2011), pp. 665-679), especially because consumers are not able to benefit from extra information, due to 
information overload (Bar-Gill & Ferrari (2010), p. 116. Cf. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar (2013), pp. 117-118) and 
behavourial biases in their decision-making (Kilborn (2005), p. 23; Stark & Choplin (2011), pp. 12-19). 
Nonetheless, some empirical studies find that certain types of mandatory disclosure can have positive effects, 
under the right conditions: see e.g. Bertrand & Morse (2011) and Salisbury (2014). 
478 Credit registries will briefly receive attention, but only insofar as they support other instruments that are 
analysed. 
479 The annual percentage rates of charge cover the actual costs for obtaining a credit, including fees. Some 
countries apply ceilings to the interest rate, and others to the annual percentage rates of charge (Maimbo & 
Henriquez Gallegos (2014), p. 10).  
480 Still, avoiding the negative macroeconomic consequences of high levels of indebtedness can serve as a 
reason for adopting interest rate ceilings (several countries have adopted ceilings), besides the important aim 
of protecting the poor for behavourial mistakes and against predatory lending (Ramsay (2010), pp. 708-710; 
Morris (1988), pp. 152, 159-160). 
481 Iff/ZEW (2010), p. 238. 
482 See e.g. Iff/ZEW (2010), pp. 57-60, 226-245, 263-273, 313-316; Ramsay (2010), p. 710; Littwin (2008), p. 452; 
Zinman (2010), p. 554; McKernan et al. (2013), p. 208; Hynes & Posner (2002), pp. 179-180. 
483 Cf. art. 4(17) Directive 2014/17. 
484 However, some researchers distinguish between a creditworthiness and an affordability assessment, stating 
that the latter focusses especially on the question of whether a borrower is able to meet its obligations in a 
sustainable way, while still being able to afford an acceptable level of consumption (Bijak et al. (2014), pp. 4, 7). 
This point of view is mainly based on the situation in the UK, where official guidelines made this distinction (cf. 
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borrower was assessed in a judgmental process by a loan officer, often guided by the so-called five C’s. 
These are the borrower’s character, own capital, capacity to repay, the availability of collateral and 
finally the conditions in the market and the economy.485 Although this process has the advantage of 
taking into account qualitative characteristics, it easily becomes subjective, inconsistent, and prone to 
individual preferences of the loan officer.486 During the last decades, credit scoring has become the 
prevailing method for assessing a borrower’s creditworthiness. This approach uses statistical 
techniques and large amounts of quantitative information to predict whether a borrower with certain 
characteristics is creditworthy.487 Besides using credit-scoring models, lenders will often consult a 
credit registry or credit bureau to check the applicant’s repayment history and outstanding loans.488 
 
Credit scoring models are not uniform. Firstly, all kinds of variables are used in credit scoring models, 
varying from personal characteristics, such as gender, age and type of job, to information about income 
and other debt.489 Also actual LTV and DSTI ratios are often used.490 Moreover, developments 
concerning big data enable lenders to feed their models with a range of other variables, even 
information from Facebook.491 Secondly, all kinds of statistical models and techniques are used to 
predict the creditworthiness of a person, resulting in a strand of literature that develops and evaluates 
such models.492 In their literature review, Abdou and Pointon (2011) conclude that there is no overall 
best statistical technique for building credit score models, but that more advanced and sophisticated 
techniques perform better in terms of predictive ability.493 
 
                                                          
Nield, 2010, pp. 624-626). Nevertheless, it is true that affordability puts the emphasis on the borrower, while 
creditworthiness is mainly a concern of the lender. 
485 Durkin & Elliehausen (2010), p. 559; Thomas (2000), p. 152. 
486 Hand (2001), p. 141; Abdou & Pointon (2011), p. 61. 
487 Durkin & Elliehausen (2010), p. 560; Abdou & Pointon (2011), pp. 59-61. Two types of credit scoring can be 
distinguished, namely application scoring and behavioural scoring. The former is a static analysis, which 
compares the characteristics of the applying person with the relevant data in the lender’s records about other 
borrowers. The latter means that data about the past performance of the applicant is used in the analysis. 
(Thomas (2000), pp. 161-162; Thomas et al. (2001), p. 91; Hand (2001), pp. 141-142; Crook et al. (2007), p. 
1463). 
488 Ferretti (2010), p. 1. Cf. Lehnert (2010), who describes the credit extension decision regarding a mortgage 
loan (pp. 568-571). 
489 Abdou & Pointon (2011), p. 66; Ferreira et al. (2014), pp. 185-186. 
490 Lehnert (2010), pp. 568-571; Ferreira et al. (2014), pp. 185-186. 
491 See e.g. Metz (2014) and Alloway (2015). 
492 Abdou & Pointon (2011), pp. 68-76; Kalapodas & Thomson (2006), pp. 26-38. Examples of this strand of 
literature are Thomas (2009), Fabozzi et al. (2010), Yap et al. (2011), Huynh (2013), Rězác (2015), Kirkos (2015), 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2016) and Sousa et al. (2016). The issue of creditworthiness assessment is also 
investigated from another side, by a strand of literature which examines to what extent households are credit-
constrained: see e.g. Jappelli (1990), Cox & Jappelli (1993), Getter (2006), Johnson & Li (2010) and Deku et al. 
(2015).  
493 Abdou & Pointon (2011), p. 79. 
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Generally, researchers are quite positive about the abilities of assessing creditworthiness by means of 
credit scoring.494 However, these practices have not prevented the financial crisis from happening, nor 
did they preclude widespread arrears on household loans in several member states.495 Indeed, the 
literature points to drawbacks and flaws in credit-scoring models, with as most-mentioned weakness 
the fact that most models do not take the general economic conditions into account.496 
 
Hence, it can be concluded that creditworthiness assessments can be effective in limiting risky forms 
of household debt. However, the extent to which this is the case depends on the type and accuracy of 
the credit-scoring model, and on the variables that are included in the model. The incorporated 
variables must take the general economic conditions into account, and at least be sensitive to the 
commonly identified determinants of household over-indebtedness. This implies that a credit-scoring 
model should include predictors of the economic cycle and factors like income, DSTI ratios, education 
and preferably data about spending.497 Additionally, there must be a certain buffer to allow for 
unexpected shocks, without immediate arrears as a consequence of these shocks. Moreover, it is 
crucial that lenders attach consequences to the outcome of a creditworthiness assessment, be it a 
denial of credit or a higher interest rate to account for the increased credit risk.498 Although the latter 
provides an economic incentive to households to reconsider the borrowing decision, it does not offer 
consumer protection. Attaching consequences to the outcome of a creditworthiness assessment might 
sound obvious and in the best interest of the lender too, but the latter is not necessarily the case. A 
lender might choose to mainly rely on a LTV ratio, because the house can be sold if payment problems 
occur. He can also build upon on a strategy of passing on risks by means of securitisation. Alternatively, 
a loan officer might be subject to distorted incentives, due to fees or bonuses.  
 
                                                          
494 For instance, Abdou & Pointon (2011) call ‘credit scoring techniques (…) an astonishingly useful tool, which 
should help banks control an array of risks’ (p. 79). Kirkos (2015) concludes – albeit in an article on credit 
scoring applied to businesses, instead of consumers – that ‘[r]ecent research has yielded fruitful results in 
terms of building models capable of predicting business failure cases’ (p. 120). Cf. Crook et al. (2007), p. 1463.  
495 Cf. Ferretti (2015), p. 365. 
496 See e.g. Thomas (2000), pp. 163-165; Kalapodas & Thomson (2006), pp. 39-40; Thomas (2010), p. 50. For 
other drawbacks or challenges, see e.g. Ferreira et al. (2014), pp. 186-187 and Thomas (2010). 
497 Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.4. 
498 Getter (2006) found that, while borrowers who pose the highest non-repayment risk face credit rejections, 
there is also a group of high-risk borrowers who face a higher credit price instead of an outright rejection (p. 
60). 
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2.4. Conclusion: the instruments deserving examination 
In the light of the literature review and the considerations stated in sub-section 2.3, the subsequent 
chapters of this study focusses, amidst all instruments, on maximum LTV, DTI, LTI and DSTI ratios, 
sectoral risk weights used in capital requirements, the countercyclical capital buffer, the fiscal 
treatment of debt, and consumer law provisions that prescribe creditworthiness assessment and 
prohibit credit supply to consumers who are judged unable to meet their repayment obligations. In 
addition, some brief remarks will be included about the future leverage ratio. 
 
Before continuing, the heterogeneous use of maximum LTV, DTI, LTI and DSTI ratios in EU member 
states need to be clarified. Firstly, direct LTV, DTI, LTI and DSTI caps are in force in many, but not all, 
EU member states. This study reserves the term direct maximum ratio/limit/cap for an instrument 
directly applying to a borrower, limiting the amount which he is allowed to borrow vis-à-vis the value 
of the house or a measure of income. Direct ratios are also referred to as borrower-based caps. 
Although this is the most common understanding of a LTV, DTI, LTI or DSTI ratio, it is not the only 
manner in which they are applied. Alternatively, a LTV ratio can determine the risk-weight of capital 
requirements, i.e. a higher risk-weight is assigned to (the part of) a loan with a LTV ratio above a certain 
threshold. Thirdly, it is possible that only the part of the loan below a certain LTV ratio is eligible for 
some types of funding, such as covered bonds. Finally, other arrangements involving LTV caps can be 
used. For instance, in the Netherlands eligibility for a scheme of mortgage guarantees is subject to 
meeting certain DSTI, LTI and LTV ratios.499 Consequently, the various types of maximum ratios will be 
discussed in separate chapters. Borrower-caps will be discussed in chapter 4, whereas the use of LTV 
ratios in combination with capital and liquidity requirements will be examined in chapter 3. 
 
  
                                                          
499 Cf. Box 4.1. Before Portugal discontinued its guarantee scheme was, it also imposed LTV requirements. 
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3. Capital- and funding-based regulatory instruments 
 
The most promising macroprudential instruments for influencing household debt seem credit-based 
tools, such as LTV and LTI caps, but also some specific capital-based tools, i.e. sectoral risk-weighted 
capital requirements and countercyclical capital requirements, as discussed in the previous chapter. 
These capital-based instruments will be examined in this chapter, including the role of LTV ratios in 
determining risk-weights. The leverage ratio, which is expected to be fully implemented in 2018, is 
briefly discussed as well. The backbone of these instruments is part of EU legislation, but they are also 
partly a national matter. Whenever necessary national aspects or the national implementation will be 
examined – often only a brief discussion suffices. In addition, some funding-based instruments impose 
LTV requirements. The use of LTV ratios in these instruments, which are partly governed by EU and 
partly by national law, is briefly discussed in this chapter. The discussion of these capital- and funding-
based regulatory instruments is based upon the analytical framework, described in section 1.4. Hence, 
the first sub-section examines their determinacy and completeness, the second sub-section the 
proportionality and dissuasiveness of their enforcement, and the third sub-section the room for 
applying, enforcing and amending them independently.  
 
3.1. Determinacy and completeness of capital- and funding-based instruments 
The risk-weights for capital requirements and the countercyclical capital buffer are governed by the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV, adopted in 
June 2013.500 These legal acts implement the international Basel III standards on capital.501 They set 
forth rules applying to banks, and assign specific powers for specifying and enforcing these rules to 
European and national supervisors (in this study, the term “bank” refers to the term “credit 
                                                          
500 CRR: Regulation 575/2013. CRD IV: Directive 2013/36 (supra, footnote 51). The CRR is the first regulation on 
capital requirements, whereas the CRD IV replaces the CRD III. These two legal acts are a step towards the 
Single Rulebook, a set of fully harmonised rules, minimising discretion for national supervisors: the CDR IV 
package removed many options and derogations existing in the CRD III (Moloney (2010), p. 1357. Cf. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-527_en.htm?locale=en). Before the crisis, minimum 
harmonisation and optionality characterised EU financial regulation, but with the latest reforms, the EU 
institutions seized the opportunity to strive for maximum harmonisation and removing optionality, in order to 
contribute to the internal market (European Commission (2012f), p. 4. Cf. Wymeersch (2014), pp. 5-6).  
501 The Basel III standards intend to create a more robust financial system by increasing its ability to absorb 
shocks, inter alia by raising capital requirements. See Allen et al. (2013), pp. 247-251. For the Basel III accord, 
see https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited 23 July 2016). 
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institution”, as made clear in box 3.1).502 Insofar as relevant, the proposals for amendments of the CRR 
and CRD IV, as recently published by the Commission, will be discussed, as well as the ongoing review 
of the EU macroprudential framework.503 The CRR and CRD IV distinguish between two types of 
national supervisors: competent and designated authorities. The competent authority is the national 
prudential supervisor.504 However, the CRR and CRD IV enable member states to designate some 
macroprudential instruments to the designated authority, which can be the same or a different 
authority as the competent authority.505 In other words, member states can have a single prudential 
supervisor or a different micro and a macroprudential supervisor.  
 
Box 3.1: Official terms of the institutions regulated by the CRR and CRD IV 
Most of the rules and requirements in the CRR and CRD IV – including those investigated in this 
research – apply to credit institutions and investment firms, together called institutions.506 A credit 
institution is defined as ‘an undertaking the business of which is to take deposits or other repayable 
funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account.’507 This is what is traditionally 
understood as a bank.508 Hence, for reasons of convenience, the term “bank” will be used in this 
study to denote for a “credit institution”.509 Entities that lend to consumers, but do not fulfil all the 
basic elements of this definition, are not subject to the requirements of the CRR and CRD IV.510 In 
the definition of an investment firm providing certain investment services and activities is of decisive 
importance.511 Since investment firms are less relevant for this research, the term “banks” is used 
for all institutions which are subject to the CRR and CRD.  
 
The CRD IV and CRR are based upon three pillars, like the Basel standards.512 The first pillar, primarily 
incorporated in the CRR, contains rules on capital to cover various kinds of risks, mainly based upon a 
quantitative risk assessment. The second pillar, included in the CRD IV, regulates the governance and 
                                                          
502 The general powers of the EU supervisory institutions are governed by the regulations which established 
them. The general powers of national supervisors are governed by national law. 
503 European Commission (2016c,d,e,f). 
504 Art. 4(1)(40) Regulation 575/2013. 
505 Art. 129(3), 130(3), 131(1), 133(2) and 136(1) CRD IV and art. 458 CRR. 
506 Art. 4(1)(3) Regulation 575/2013. 
507 Art. 4(1)(1) Regulation 575/2013. 
508 For an extensive explanation and discussion of this definition, see Theissen (2013a), pp. 140-146, 173-189. 
509 Cf. Theissen (2013a) and Wymeersch (2014, p. 27), who also use the term “banks” for “credit institutions”. 
510 Cf. Theissen (2013a), pp. 141-144, 176. 
511 Art. 4(1)(2) Regulation 575/2013 in combination with art. 4(1)(1)-(2) and Section A and C of Annex I of 
Directive 2004/39 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004, OJ 2004, L 145/1. 
512 See the summary of Basel III at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf (last visited 23 July 
2016); Theissen (2013a), pp. 8-9, 47; Alexander (2015b), pp. 349-359). Cf. De Haan et al. (2009), pp. 304-309). 
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risk management of banks, and the supervisory review by authorities. It focusses on a qualitative risk 
assessment. A relevant example is the obligation of competent authorities to ensure that ‘credit-
granting is based on sound and well-defined criteria’.513 The third pillar, contained in the CRR, sets 
disclosure requirements in order to facilitate and enhance market discipline. Apart from 
microprudential rules, which are largely uniform for all member states, the CRR and CRD IV contain 
macroprudential instruments.514 Table 3.1 presents an overview of the key macroprudential measures 
covered by the CRD IV and CRR.515 The instruments in italics are particularly relevant for this research. 
Some of these measures are meant for both micro and macroprudential use, including these governed 
by art. 124 and 164 Regulation 575/2013 and the so-called Pillar 2 measures.516  
 
Table 3.1: Coverage of macroprudential instruments by EU legislation 
CRR CRD IV Not included in the CRD & 
CRR 
Sectoral capital requirements/risk 
weights (Art. 124, 164, 458) 
Countercyclical capital buffer 
(Art. 130, 135-140) 
Loan-to-value ratio caps 
Leverage ratio (Art. 429) Pillar 2 measures Loan-to-income ratio caps 
Liquidity coverage ratio (Art. 412, 
458) 
Systemic risk buffer (Art. 133) Loan-to-deposit ratio caps 
 
Net stable funding ratio (as of 
2019) (Art. 413, 510, 458) 
Capital surcharge for SIFIs (Art. 
131) 
Margin and haircut 
requirements  
Large exposure limits (Art. 
392,395-403, 458, 493) 
Capital conversation buffer (as 
of 2016) (Art. 129, 141-42) 
Levy on non-stable funding 
Increased disclosure 
requirements (Art. 431-455, 458) 
  
 
                                                          
513 Art. 79(a) CRD IV. This provision resulted in Germany, for instance, in an obligation of banks to assess, inter 
alia, the debt-servicing capacity of the borrower, with the intensity of the assessment depending on the 
riskiness of the loan. See B.T.O. 1.2.1 of Rundschreiben (Circular) 10/2012 - Mindestanforderungen an das 
Risikomanagement (MaRisk) (Minimum Requirements for Risk Management), available at 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Rundschreiben/rs_1210_marisk_ba.html. An 
English translation is available at 
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Meldung/2014/meldung_140815_marisk_ueberset
zung_en.html (both last visited 2 August 2016). 
514 The microprudential rules are mainly included in the CRR. 
515 This table is an adaptation of table A.1 in the Financial Stability Review of May 2013 of the European Central 
Bank (2013). Note that the listed instruments are almost similar to those included in table 1 of European 
Systemic Risk Board Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 of 4 April 2013, OJ C 170/1. 
516 European Banking Authority (2014b), pp. 17-19, 44-47; European Systemic Risk Board (2014b), pp. 9-10. 
Originally, Pillar 2 measures were designed for microprudential purposes, but currently they may be used for 
macroprudential aims (see art. 97(1)(b) and 103-104 Directive 2013/36). 
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3.1.1. Sectoral risk-weighted capital requirements  
The standard, microprudential, framework of risk-weighted capital requirements is based upon Basel 
II standards, since the standards on calculating risk-weights for credit-risk were not amended with the 
adoption of the Basel III standards.517 However, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
launched consultations for amendments of the standards on these issues, in December 2014, 
December 2015 and March 2016.518 These proposals require attention, because of the prospect that 
they will become law. After the discussion of the microprudential rules on risk-weights for household 
loans, the options to increase these risk-weights will be examined, followed by an overall evaluation 
of the determinacy and completeness of risk-weighted capital requirements. 
 
3.1.1.1. The microprudential rules on risk-weights for household loans  
The capital requirements for credit risk are set forth in Title II of Part Three of the CRR, prescribing how 
much capital a bank must hold in relation to various types of risks, most prominently credit risk.519 The 
preceding Part Two sets the rules on bank capital itself, i.e. regulating what qualifies as bank capital.520 
In the EU, a bank is required to have a total capital ratio of 8% of the risk-weighted exposures.521 An 
exposure is ‘an asset or off-balance sheet item’.522 Loans to households are part of banks’ assets and 
thus exposures. As a rule, the risk-weight is applied to the accounting value of the exposure.523 If a risk-
weight of, for example, 50% is assigned to an exposure, a bank must hold 4% capital for that exposure. 
Risk-weights are higher for riskier exposures.  
 
The CRR distinguishes between two approaches for calculating risk-weights: the Standardised 
Approach and Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB Approach).524 The former approach prescribes a 
system with standardised risk-weights, while the latter approach allows banks, under certain 
                                                          
517 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006).  
518 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b,c, 2015, 2016). 
519 Art. 107-311 CRR deal with credit risk. Other risks are dealt with in subsequent titles of Part Three. 
520 Part Two is titled “Own Funds” and consists of art. 25-91 Regulation 575/2013. In EU financial law, “own 
funds” ‘means the sum of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital’ (art. 4(1)(118) Regulation 575/2013). Tier 1 and 2 
capital is respectively core capital and additional capital of a bank. For an extensive discussion of the own funds 
requirements and the capital ratios, see e.g. Theissen (2013a), pp. 291-310, 375-429) 
521 Art. 92 Regulation 575/2013. Total capital is the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (art. 92(2)(c) in combination 
with art. 4(1)(118) Regulation 575/2013). This provision requires not only a total capital ratio of 8%, but also of 
a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5% and a Tier 1 capital ratio of 6%. For these two concepts, see art. 
25-60 Regulation 575/2013.  
522 Art. 5(1) Regulation 575/2013. 
523 Art. 111(1) and 166(1) Regulation 575/2013. 
524 See Chapter 2 and 3 of Title II of Part Three of the CRR, respectively. Moreover, within the IRB Approach 
banks can opt for a foundation IRB or advanced IRB Approach (cf. Theissen, 2013, pp. 454-464). 
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conditions, to use their own rating-system to assign risk-weights to classes of assets. The CDR IV states 
that competent authorities must encourage significant banks to use the IRB approach.525 Both 
approaches will be briefly discussed with respect to risk-weights of unsecured and secured loans. 
 
Risk-weights of household loans under the Standardised Approach  
The Standardised Approach distinguishes between various classes of exposures, with own rules for 
each class to assign the risk-weights to an exposure.526 Loans to households can be classified under 
two exposure classes: retail exposures and exposures secured by mortgages on immovable property.527  
 
Unsecured credit supplied to consumers – either in the form of instalment loans or revolving credit or 
credit cards – will be classified as retail exposures, and consequently receives a risk weight of 75%, 
upon fulfilling certain conditions.528 Unsecured loans not fulfilling these conditions are assigned a risk-
weight of 100%.529 Securities are not eligible for the retail exposure class.530 Nothing prevents banks 
from classifying mortgage loans as retail exposures, but they will generally prefer to classify them as 
exposures secured by mortgages on immovable property, due to the preferential risk-weight of that 
class.531 However, classifying mortgage loans as retail exposures is prohibited in the proposed 
amendments for the Basel standards.532 Since the rules on retail exposures are not sensitive to actual 
risks, the BCBS considered amendments, but decided, after consultations, to keep the risk-weight at 
                                                          
525 In the context of this provision, significance depends on the size, internal organisation and the nature, scale 
and complexity of the activities of a bank (art. 77(1) Directive 2013/36).  
526 If a risk-weight of 100% is assigned to an exposure under the Standardised Approach, this reflects that the 
banks needs to take its full risk into account (cf. 111(1) Regulation 575/2013). A 50% and 0% risk-weight 
respectively reflects that the exposure is medium-risk and low-risk. For more information about the 
Standardised Approach for calculating capital requirements for credit risk, see Theissen (2013a), pp. 448-454. 
527 Art. 112, 123-125 Regulation 575/2013. 
528 Loans to a consumer or household can be classified as retail exposures, if their total amount is lower than € 
1 million, excluding loans which are fully and completely secured on residential property and are assigned to 
the corresponding exposure class. Furthermore, a loan must be one of a significant number of loans with 
similar characteristics in order to substantially reduce the risks associated with the lending. This condition is 
vague and general, and thus leaves banks with plenty of room to categorise loans under this exposure class: it 
suffices to offer a significant number of more or less comparable loans to consumers. Nevertheless, with 
respect to most mortgage loans this is no major risk, since these will generally be not very atypical. Note that 
the conditions of art. 123 Regulation 575/2013 differ slightly from the criteria in the Basel standards, as 
described in para. 70 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). 
529 Unless these loans are exposures secured by mortgages on immovable property, no other class of exposures 
is available for them. So, they are assigned a 100% risk-weight according to art. 113(5) Regulation 575/2013.  
530 A special regime for assigning risk-weights to securities exists, so if a certain amount of consumer loans is 
repackaged into securities, they cannot be retail exposures (art. 123, 130 and 242-270 Regulation 575/2013).  
531 Art. 123 Regulation 575/2013 differs in this respect from the Basel standards, which explicitly exclude 
mortgage loans from the class of retail exposures if the mortgage loans qualify for the class of exposures 
secured by mortgages on immovable property (para. 70 of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006). 
532 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), para. 46 (at p. 33). 
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75%, because views on the necessity of introducing risk sensitivity where mixed, while introducing it  
would result in ‘undue complexity’.533  
 
The assignment of risk-weights to loans qualifying for the class of exposures secured by mortgages on 
immovable property is governed by more differentiated rules. Moreover, these rules provide for an 
option to increase the risk-weights, as will be discussed in the next sub-section. A loan receives a risk-
weight of 35% if it qualifies as an exposure fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential 
property.534 In order to ensure that banks assign the 35% risk-weight only to low-risk loans, four 
conditions determine whether a loan is fully and completely secured in the sense of art. 124-125 
Regulation 575/2013: 
1. The value of the house must not materially depend upon the credit quality of the borrower.535 
This excludes the possibility to assign the low risk-weight to mortgage loans in some cases of 
speculative house prices, not based upon fundamentals. However, this phrase is vaguely worded, 
and might lead to questions in borderline cases. 
2. The risk and debt repayment capacity of the borrowers may not materially depend upon the 
underlying house and cash flows generated by it, coming, for instance, from letting or selling it. 
Instead, it must depend on other sources of income. Banks are obliged to set LTI limits for these 
other sources, and to obtain suitable evidence of relevant income.536 No specific LTI limits are 
prescribed. This condition must guarantee the soundness of lending policies and capital ratios, by 
preventing high-risk lending to borrowers who cannot afford a house.537 Banks may derogate from 
this condition, if the relevant competent authority has shown evidence of very low loss rates.538 
Although this condition provides banks with some guidance to develop sound lending policies, the 
phrase “not materially depend” is vague and creates leeway for circumvention.  
3. The part of the loan to which the 35% risk weight is assigned, is not allowed to exceed a loan-to-
value ratio of 80%.539  
                                                          
533 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), p. 10; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014c), pp. 
13-14. 
534 Art. 125(1) Regulation 575/2013. Residential property is defined as ‘a residence which is occupied by the 
owner or the lessee of the residence’ (art. 4(75) Regulation 575/2013).  
535 Art. 125(2)(a) Regulation 575/2013. Purely macroeconomic factors that affect both the house value and the 
performance of the borrower may be excluded from an assessment whether the value of the house is 
dependent on the credit quality of the borrower.  
536 Art. 125(2)(b) Regulation 575/2013. 
537 The best-known example of the kind of lending that is prohibited by this condition is sub-prime mortgage 
lending: households with a sub-prime mortgage could not afford their house, but the lender speculated on the 
rising value of the collateral, the house. 
538 Art. 125(3)-(4) Regulation 575/2013.  
539 Art. 125(2)(d) Regulation 575/2013. 
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4. The valuation requirements of art. 208 and 229(1) CRR for the collateral (the home) must be 
satisfied.540 Art. 208 CRR contains criteria on, among other things, the legal enforceability of the 
mortgage, on documentation, as well as on monitoring the house value. According to art. 229(1) 
CRR, the house value must be determined by an independent valuer at or at less of either the 
market value or the mortgage lending value. Then, it must be documented in a transparent and 
clear manner. The mortgage lending value is the prudent value of the house, taking into account 
its long-term sustainable aspects, while disregarding speculative elements.541 This valuation 
method can only be used in member states that have laid down rigorous criteria for the 
assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions.542 The EBA will 
develop regulatory technical standards for specifying these rigorous criteria, but has not yet done 
this.543 These valuation requirements provide some safeguards against circumventing the LTV 
requirements by inappropriate valuation, but are still rather vague. Moreover, while the mortgage 
lending value prevents that banks calculate actual LTV ratios with the use of (substantially) 
overvalued house prices, the market value does not offer this protection.  
 
If not all conditions are satisfied, a mortgage loan is not fully and completely secured and a risk-weight 
of 100% applies.544 However, the part of the loan exceeding a LTV ratio of 100% must receive the risk 
weight applying to the unsecured exposures of the counterparty involved.545 If the borrower is the 
counterparty, this is the 75% risk-weight applying to retail exposures. This creates the strange situation 
that a risk-weight of 100% is assigned to the part of the loan with a LTV ratio between 80% and 100%, 
but a risk-weight of only 75% to the part above a LTV ratio of 100%. However, a bank can avoid the 
risk-weight of 100% by assigning the part of the loan with a LTV ratio above 80% to the class of retail 
exposures. A bank is namely allowed to assign any part of the loan to another exposure class, provided 
                                                          
540 Art. 125(2)(c) Regulation 575/2013. 
541 Art. 4(74) and 229(10) Regulation 575/2013. The former provision defines the mortgage lending value as 
‘the value of immovable property as determined by a prudent assessment of the future marketability of the 
property taking into account long-term sustainable aspects of the property, the normal and local market 
conditions, the current use and alternative appropriate uses of the property’. The market value is defined as 
‘the estimated amount for which the [immovable] property should exchange on the date of valuation between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm's-length transaction after proper marketing wherein the parties 
had each acted knowledgeably, prudently and without being under compulsion (art. 4(76) CRR).  
542 Art. 229(1) CRR. It is unclear, due to the wording of art. 124(1) CRR, whether banks are even allowed to use 
the market value under the Standardised Approach (cf. European Banking Authority (2015b), pp. 5-6). 
543 Art. 124(4) Regulation 575/2013. The EBA has issued an opinion to the Commission to ask clarification about 
certain issues, and waits for this clarification before it proceeds: European Banking Authority (2015b). 
544 Art. 124(1) Regulation 575/2013. Note that the terminology in art. 124(1) and art. 125(1)-(2) might cause 
confusion. Art. 124(1) uses the term ’fully secured‘ and art. 125(1)-(2) ’fully and completely secured‘. Reading 
these articles in their context reveals that ’fully secured‘ means that the LTV ratio does not exceed 100%, 
whereas “fully and completely secured” means that the four conditions of art. 125(2) are satisfied. 
545 Art. 124(1) Regulation 575/2013. 
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that the conditions for that exposure class are met. By allowing loansplitting, the EU is non-compliant 
with the Basel standards, which explicitly forbids this.546 
 
This discrepancy will be solved if the proposed amendments to the Basel standards will become law, 
since they do not allow for assigning mortgage loans to the category of retail exposures.547 Moreover, 
in these proposals, actual LTV ratios will play an important role in determining risk-weights, because 
the LTV ratio is considered as the most appropriate risk driver, by best predicting the losses incurred 
in case of a default.548 Loans with a lower LTV ratio are also less likely to become non-performing.549 In 
the first instance, the BCBS intended to use the DSTI ratio as well for determining risk-weights, but it 
later abandoned this idea, because of ‘the challenges of defining and calibrating a [DSTI] ratio that can 
be equitably applied across jurisdictions’.550 Table 3.2 shows the proposed risk-weights as a function 
of the actual LTV ratios.551 A risk-weight will apply to the full loan; loansplitting is not allowed.552 The 
proposed risk-weights in the second BCBS proposal for reform are lower than those in the first 
proposal.553  
 
Table 3.2: Proposed risk-weights as a function of the actual LTV ratios 
LTV ≤ 40% 40% ≤ LTV < 
60% 
60% ≤ LTV < 
80% 
80% ≤ LTV < 
90% 
90% ≤ LTV < 
100% 
LTV ≥ 100% 
25% 30% 35% 45% 55% 75% 
 
The risk-weight in table 3.2 only applies if various criteria are met; otherwise it will be 100%.554 These 
criteria are concerned with, among other things, legal enforceability and hierarchy of claims over the 
house, documentation, the repayment capacity of the borrower, valuation, and the calculation of the 
LTV ratio.555 In order to guarantee that the borrower’s repayment capacity is taken into account, 
national supervisors must ensure that banks use underwriting policies with metrics like DSTI ratios.556 
For calculating the LTV ratio, the ‘value of the property will be maintained at the value measured at 
origination unless national supervisors elect to require banks to revise the property value downward. 
                                                          
546 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014a), pp. 19, 34. 
547 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), para. 46 (at p. 33). 
548 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014c), p. 15; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), p. 
13. 
549 Ibidem. 
550 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), p. 13. 
551 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), para. 54 (at p. 36). 
552 Ibidem. 
553 Cf. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014c), para. 38 (at p. 36). 
554 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2015), para. 55 (at p. 36). 
555 Ibidem, para. 50 (at p. 34). 
556 Ibidem, para. 51 (at pp. 34-35). 
3. Capital- and funding-based regulatory instruments 
100 
 
The value must be adjusted if an extraordinary, idiosyncratic event occurs resulting in a permanent 
reduction of the property value.’557 To ensure prudent valuation, the ‘value must exclude expectations 
on price increases and must be adjusted to take into account the potential for the current market price 
to be significantly above the value that would be sustainable over the life of the loan.’558 Hence, this 
proposal for reform will improve safeguards, and is more sensitive to actual risks than the current 
regime for calculating risk-weights. Also, it will reduce circumvention by prohibiting loansplitting.  
 
Risk-weights of household loans under the IRB Approach 
The Internal Ratings Based Approach, under which banks use their own rating-system to calculate risk-
weights, was introduced in the Basel II framework because of the conviction that banks were better 
able to estimate the true counterparty credit risk than the “one-size-fits-all” Standardised Approach.559 
For lending to consumers, this own-rating system is often an application of a bank’s credit scoring 
model.560 Black (2012) depicts the IRB Approach as a form of meta-regulation, because banks use their 
own systems to assess risks, but subject to several requirements and conditions.561 The conditions 
include that a bank’s rating system must provide for a meaningful assessment of debtor characteristics, 
a meaningful differentiation of risk, and accurate and consistent quantitative estimates of risk.562 If 
these requirements and conditions have been met, the competent authorities must permit banks to 
use the IRB Approach.563  
 
Under the IRB Approach all loans to consumers – both secured and unsecured – belong to the class of 
retail exposures, at least if fulfilling eligibility conditions similar to those of the class of retail exposures 
under the Standardised Approach.564 Except for securitised household loans, the risk-weights of retail 
exposures are calculated with the formula prescribed by art. 154 CRR.565 Central to this formula are 
two important indicators: the Probability of Default (PD) and the Loss Given Default (LGD), standing 
for, respectively, the probability that a counterparty defaults, and the loss incurred in case of a 
                                                          
557 Ibidem, para. 52 (at p. 35). 
558 Ibidem.  
559 See e.g. Dragomir (2010), pp. 135-136. 
560 Thomas (2010), pp. 44, 48-49; Sousa et al. (2016), p. 341. 
561 Black (2012), pp. 1045-1046. On the advantages and disadvantages of meta-regulation, see Black (2012), pp. 
1045-1046; Akinbami (2013), pp. 19-21. 
562 Art. 144(1) Regulation 575/2013. Other conditions are listed in art. 144-150 and 169-191 CRR. 
563 Art. 143(1) Regulation 575/2013. The EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the 
assessment methodology that competent authorities shall follow in assessing whether a bank complies with 
the requirements to use the IRB Approach (art. 144(2) CRR). Cf. Theissen (2013a), pp. 332-336, 454-464. 
564 Art. 147(2)(d) and 147(5) Regulation 575/2013.  
565 Art. 151(1) and 154 Regulation 575/2013. According to art. 151(10) CRR, the risk-weights of securitised 
household loans are calculated in accordance with the regime of art. 242-270 Regulation 575/2013. 
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default.566 Both indicators are estimated by the banks themselves, based upon historical experience 
and empirical evidence, and subject to certain requirements, such as the obligation to take into 
account (changes in) lending practices, economic and market conditions, and using data that covers at 
least five years.567 However, these requirements lack determinacy, due to their generality. This 
conclusion fits in with the large variety of risk-weights assigned under the IRB Approach, as reported 
by the EBA, based upon input and data in December 2012 from 43 banks, active in 14 member states. 
While the average risk-weight of loans secured by residential mortgages was 15-20%, it varied from 
5% in Sweden to 45% in Ireland (10% in the Netherlands, 16% in Germany).568 The reports of the EBA 
also reveal considerable variety across Europe of the sensitivity of assigned risk-weights to actual LTV 
ratios.569 Although all this can be partly explained by country-specific circumstances, it shows that the 
IRB Approach grants banks considerable freedom in assigning risk-weights. 
 
The CRR sets input floors for both the PD and the LGD: the estimated PD of a consumer or household 
loan must at least be 0.03%, while the weighted average LGD for loans secured by residential property 
must at least be 10%.570 In 2016, the BCBS published a consultative document, in which it proposed 
input floors for certain parameters, namely 0.05% and 10% for the PD and LGD, respectively.571 It also 
proposed output floors, meaning that risk-weights calculated with internal models under the IRB 
Approach may not be lower than a certain percentage of the risk-weights prescribed by the 
Standardised Approach.572 This should tackle the low level of and diversity in assigned risk-weights, 
and create a level playing field between banks using the Standardised and IRB Approach.573 These 
proposals possess the potential to improve the present rules.  
 
                                                          
566 The PD is defined as ‘the probability of default of a counterparty over a one year period’ and the LGD as ‘the 
ratio of the loss on an exposure due to the default of a counterparty to the amount outstanding at default’ (art. 
4(1)(54) and 4(1)(55) Regulation 575/2013 respectively). 
567 Art. 151(6)-(7), 163-164 and 179-181 Regulation 575/2013. For estimating the PD of highly leveraged 
obligors, which might include borrowers with a loan with a high LTV ratio, the performance of the underlying 
assets, i.e. the house, shall be taken into account (art. 180(1)(a) Regulation 575/2013). Furthermore, the 
estimated LGD must be appropriate in an economic downturn and should take into account a potential inability 
to seize and liquidate a collateral (art. 181(1)(b) and 181(1)(e) Regulation 575/2013). 
568 European Banking Authority (2013), pp. 11, 16, 96; European Banking Authority (2014a), p. 27. The IRB 
Approach is used for mortgage loans by all but one of the examined banks. 
569 European Banking Authority (2014a), pp. 19, 24-26. 
570 Respectively art. 163(1) and art. 164(4) Regulation 575/2013. This concerns the weighted average LGD of 
mortgage loans not benefiting from guarantees from central governments. 
571 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016), p. 6. 
572 Ibidem, p. 2; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b), pp. 4-6. 
573 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b), pp. 4-5. 
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Indeed, currently the rules on assigning risk-weights under the IRB Approach cannot effectively 
contribute to prudent lending policies. Firstly, the requirements that the banks’ models need to satisfy 
are general and vague and, therefore, not determinate. Moreover, the rules leave ample room for 
banks to shape their lending policies and models of assigning risk-weights. So, their completeness 
cannot be guaranteed. These conclusions are confirmed in the literature: for instance, Admati (2016) 
states that internal models allow banks to manipulate risk-weights, and often ignore tail risk.574 Behn 
et al. (2016), using German loan-level data, conclude that internal models underestimate default 
risks.575 Apparently, this type of meta-regulation does not work.  
 
The rules for assigning risk-weights to household loans can be different – both under the Standardised 
and IRB Approach – when mortgage guarantees are provided, such as common in the Netherlands for 
a large group of mortgage loans.576 If a range of conditions is fulfilled, the risk-weight of the loan – 
under the Standardised Approach – or the LGD and/or PD value of the loan – under the IRB Approach 
– can be partly or completely replaced by the risk-weight/value related to the guarantee.577 Usually 
this leads to lower risk-weights, because a risk-weight of 0% can be assigned to the part of the loan 
covered by the guarantee.578 Risk-weights might become very low, especially if the lender bears the 
first losses, which in certain situations is the case under the Dutch regimes for mortgage guarantees.579  
 
3.1.1.2. Increasing risk-weights for household loans  
Three options exist to increase risk-weights in a targeted fashion for household loans, in order to 
reduce potential losses, or to address systemic risks, such as housing bubbles. This is possible by means 
of rules enshrined in art. 124 and 164 CRR, Pillar 2 measures, or art. 458 CRR, which lists the so-called 
national flexibility measures. These options differ in terms of determinacy and completeness. 
 
 
 
                                                          
574 Admati (2016), p. R8. Cf. Alexander (2012), pp. 336, 341; Wolf (2015), pp. 132-133; Mészáros (2013), p. 169; 
Mariathasan & Merrouche (2014). Cf. sub-section 2.1.1.3. 
575 Behn et al. (2016), p. 32. But see Barakova & Palvia (2014). 
576 For more information about the Dutch mortgage guarantee scheme, see Box 4.1 in sub-section 4.1.1.2. 
577 Allen & Overy (2014) explains the system of unfunded credit risk mitigation, which includes rules on 
guarantees. Cf. art. 4(1)(57)-(59), 108, 192-194, 201-203, 213, 215 and 233-236 Regulation 575/2013.  
578 Cf. Ernst & Young (2015), pp. 40-41, and answers of the Dutch Minister of Finance to questions asked by a 
member of parliament, available at http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-
publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/07/10/antwoorden-kamervragen-ecb-toezicht-en-risicogewichten-
nederlandse-hypotheekportefeuilles/antwoorden-kamervragen-ecb-toezicht-en-risicogewichten-nederlandse-
hypotheekportefeuilles.pdf (last visited 25 February 2015). 
579 Cf. Box 4.1. 
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Using art. 124 and 164 CRR to increase risk-weights 
Under the Standardised Approach, art. 124(2) Regulation 575/2013 allows setting higher risk-weights 
than 35% for exposures secured by residential property, with a maximum of 150%. In addition, stricter 
criteria may be set for the four conditions that determine whether a house is fully and completely 
secured, and is, hence, eligible for the 35% risk-weight. It is possible to set a lower LTV ratio than 80% 
as dividing line between the part of the loan that qualifies for the lower risk-weight, and the part that 
does not. Art. 124(2) CRR explicitly allows increasing risk-weights for all residential property in the 
member state concerned, or only for one or more property segments. This enables differentiation 
between regions or price segments. Banks are granted a six-month transitional period to comply with 
the higher risk-weights or stricter criteria, which makes a countercyclical use of this option it difficult.580  
 
Comparably, under the IRB Approach, art. 164(5) CRR allows setting a higher minimum value than 10% 
for the weighted average LGD for loans secured by residential property, where appropriate on the 
basis of financial stability considerations. Art. 164 CRR does not (explicitly) allow to differentiate 
between property segments, nor does it provides banks with a transitional period to comply with the 
higher minimum LGD value. Unfortunately, the rules of art. 164 CRR are manifestly incomplete, since 
the LGD value is only one factor determining the ultimate risk-weight, while the CRR does not create 
options to raise or fix other values. If banks change the PD estimation or other elements of the formula 
for calculating the risk-weight, the minimum LGD value becomes ineffective.581  
 
If authorities in a certain member state use art. 124 or 164 CRR to increase risk-weights or the 
minimum LGD value, all EU banks are obliged to apply these to loans secured by residential property 
in that member state.582 This requirement prevents sidestepping the increased risk-weight by lending 
from another member state, or by lending through a branch of a credit institution established in 
another member state. However, increasing the risk-weight and the LGD value by means of art. 124 or 
164 CRR has no effect to the extent that this risk-weight or LGD value is replaced by the risk-weight 
belonging to a mortgage guarantee, i.e. when an unfunded credit mitigation technique is used. This is 
not true for the other two means of increasing risk-weights, which will be discussed below. 
 
Thus far, no supervisor has set higher risk-weights for household loans for banks using the 
Standardised Approach. In several member states stricter criteria apply – pursuant to art. 124 CRR – 
                                                          
580 Art. 124(3) Regulation 575/2013; Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), p. 25. 
581 European Banking Authority (2014b), p. 37. 
582 Art. 124(5) and 164(7) Regulation 575/2013. 
3. Capital- and funding-based regulatory instruments 
104 
 
to loans for qualifying as fully and completely secured: in Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, and Slovenia.583 In Ireland one criterion is stricter than the criteria of art. 125(2) CRR:  a LTV 
ratio of 75% instead of 80% applies for determining which part of the loan qualifies for the 35% risk-
weight.584 The Latvian supervisor is the only supervisor that sets a higher minimum LGD value.585 
 
Using Pillar 2 measures to increase capital risk-weights 
A competent authority has a broad toolbox at its disposal to address risks discovered during the 
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP), an evaluation of the risks of individual banks, 
including the risks that a bank poses to the financial system.586 Among other things, it can require a 
bank to hold capital in excess of the requirements of the CRR and the CRD IV.587 Moreover, the CRD IV 
creates the possibility to apply the SREP and the corresponding measures to a group of banks that have 
similar risk profiles or pose similar risks to the financial system.588 So, Pillar 2 measures can be used to 
address risks related to lending to a certain segment of households.589 However, the Commission 
proposal for the amendments of the CRD IV removes the option to apply Pillar 2 measures to a group 
of banks, or to use them for macroprudential reasons, since Pillar 2 measures are considered non-
transparent and potentially conflicting with other macroprudential requirements.590 
 
Some conditions are attached to the use of Pillar 2 measures. Most importantly, requiring a bank or 
group of banks to hold capital in excess of the requirements of the CRR and CRD IV is only allowed 
when the concerned risk, or elements of it, are not completely covered by the capital requirements of 
the CRR, which are meant for entirely quantifiable, uniform and standardised elements of, among 
other things, credit risk.591 Many risks will always contain elements that are not entirely quantifiable, 
                                                          
583 This information needs to be disclosed (see art. 143(1)(b) Directive 2013/36), and is available at 
http://www.eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/options-and-national-discretions 
and https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/shared/pdf/overview_macroprudential_measures.xlsx (both 
last visited 29 August 2015).  
584 Central Bank of Ireland (2014a), p. 22. For determining this LTV ratio, the market value of the property is 
used (ibidem). 
585 Supra, footnote 583. 
586 Art. 97(1)(b) Directive 2013/36. Cf. European Systemic Risk Board (2014a), p. 134. 
587 Art. 104(1)(a) Directive 2013/36. 
588 Art. 103(1) Directive 2013/36. In this regard, it is in particular relevant whether banks pose similar risk to the 
financial system (see art. 103(1) in combination with art. 98(1)(j) and 97(1)(b) Directive 2013/36). 
589 In fact, the ESRB Handbook on operationalising macroprudential policy explicitly mentions this example: 
‘capital surcharges through (…) increases in risk weights can be implemented on specific segments of the 
mortgage market, targeting only new credits or specific high-risk segments such as high LTV mortgages.’ 
(European Systemic Risk Board (2014a), p. 138). 
590 European Commission (2016e), pp. 11, 27-28. It proposes removing art. 103 and adding art. 104a(1) CRD IV. 
591 This is at least what a systemic interpretation of art. 104(1)(a) CRD IV in combination with art. 1 CRR seems 
to suggest, although these provisions are vague. In addition, art. 104(2)(b) Directive 2013/36 lists various 
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uniform and standardised, especially systemic risks. Therefore, this condition limits the room to apply 
Pillar 2 measures to address risks related to lending to households, but does not disable their use: if 
risks can be covered by increasing risk-weights by means of art. 124 and 164 CRR, taking Pillar 2 
measures is not permitted; otherwise it is. Another condition is the obligation to assess the necessity 
of additional capital requirements.592 
 
Apart from these rather vague conditions, a wide discretion is enjoyed when using Pillar 2 measures. 
No pre-defined boundaries or limits exist for increasing risk-weights.593 This flexibility allows targeting 
all kind of risks in a tailor-made fashion. The supervisor can design the measure in a way that minimises 
the possibilities for circumvention. However, there is no mandatory reciprocity of the measures for 
banks which are supervised by other competent authorities, as is the case when risk-weights are 
increased by means of art. 124 and 164 CRR. This creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage, and 
hampers the completeness of this option to increase risk-weights. The determinacy of Pillar 2 
measures depends on the wording of the concrete measure taken. 
 
Since the Pillar 2 measures are part of a directive, national implementation is required, which is done 
differently in each of the three member states examined in this study. In the Netherlands, the Pillar 2 
measures are implemented on two levels, namely partly by primary law and partly by ministerial 
decree.594 In Ireland, Directive 2013/36 is implemented by means of secondary legislation, which 
closely follows the text of the provisions in the CRDI IV on the SREP and Pillar 2 measures.595 Germany 
incorporated the Pillar 2 measures in primary law.596 Generally, the implementation in these three 
                                                          
occasions in which competent authorities at least shall impose additional capital requirements, including the 
situation that the concerned risk or elements of it are not covered by the rules of the CRR and CRD IV.   
592 Art. 104(3) Directive 2013/36. Systemic risks and the outcome of the SREP must be taken into account. 
593 Cf. European Systemic Risk Board (2014a), p. 138. 
594 Art. 3:18a and 3:111a Wft contain the basics of the SREP, including the risks that need to be evaluated, and 
the supervisory powers to take Pillar 2 measures applying to individual banks. The possibility to apply a SREP 
and the Pillar 2 measures to a group of banks having similar risk profiles or posing similar risks to the financial 
system is implemented differently: a ministerial decree prescribes DNB to apply art. 103(1) Directive 2013/36 
when exercising its prudential tasks (art. 1a of the Regeling taakuitoefening en grensoverschrijdende 
samenwerking financiële toezichthouders Wft (Decree on performance of duties and cross-border cooperation 
of financial supervisors). Provisions of the CRD IV are implemented in the Wft by means of the 
Implementatiewet richtlijn en verordening kapitaalvereisten, Staatsblad, 2014, 253, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/33849/stb-2014-253.html. The ministerial decree is based 
upon art. 1:24(4) Wft, and is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0032529. The inclusion of this article 
in the ministerial decree was published in the Staatscourant, 2013, No. 35108: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2013-35108.html (all last visited 25 July 2016). 
595 See in particular regulations 85, 91 and 92 S.I. 158/2014 (available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2014/en/si/0158.html, last visited at 20 July 2016). 
596 § 10 (3)-(4) KWG (supra, footnote 212). The German implantation of the supervisory power to impose Pillar 
2 measures is more elaborate than the provisions in the CRD IV itself by providing more guidance on the cases 
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countries does not lead to noteworthy differences compared to the text of the CRD IV. However, one 
aspect requires attention: the Dutch and the German implementation do not include the condition 
that the concerned risk or elements of it are not covered by art. 1 CRR. Consequently, Dutch and 
German supervisors face fewer restrictions when exercising their powers to adopt Pillar 2 measures: 
they can opt for Pillar 2 measures in situations where increasing risk-weights by means of art. 124 and 
164 CRR would suffice as well. 
 
An elucidating example of a supervisor that used Pillar 2 measures to address risks related to 
household lending is Finansinspektionen (FI), the Swedish competent authority. In May 2013, it set a 
minimum average risk-weight of 15% for Swedish mortgage loans, applying to all banks that are 
authorised to use the IRB Approach.597 The reason for setting this risk-weight floor is that FI judged 
that the risk-weights that banks assigned to their mortgage loans (on average 5%) by means of their 
internal models, underestimated the actual credit risks.598 In May 2014, FI increased this minimum 
average risk-weight for Swedish mortgage loans to 25%.599 The additional 10 percent point was added 
to cover for systemic risks, caused by the high indebtedness of Swedish households, which creates 
vulnerability to rising interest rates and declining house prices, which in turn might lead to reduced 
consumption, affecting the whole Swedish economy.600 FI has set the minimum average risk-weight by 
means of a Pillar 2 measure instead of exercising the discretion of art. 164 CRR to introduce a minimum 
LGD value, since the pass-through of a minimum LGD value to the risk-weights depends on banks’ 
internal models and would result in uneven risk-weights.601 
 
  
                                                          
in and the purposes for which these measures can be used. The KWG provides a non-limitative list of ten cases 
or purposes when additional capital shall at least be required from banks. This includes the situation that a risk 
is likely understated, although the capital requirements of the CRR are met (section 10(3)(4) KWG). Also, it can 
be ordered for the purpose of creating a buffer for adverse economic times (section 10(3)(5) KWG). The KWG 
explicitly allows using Pillar 2 measures for macroprudential aims (see in particular section 10(4) KWG). 
597 Finansinspektionen (2013a), pp. 25-26. 
598 Finansinspektionen (2013a), pp. 17-18; Finansinspektionen (2013b), p. 2.  
599 Finansinspektionen (2014), pp. 57-58. 
600 Ibidem, pp. 52-55. 
601 Ibidem, p. 52. 
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Using national flexibility measures to increase risk-weights 
Art. 458 CRR enables taking so-called national flexibility measures for all or a subset of domestically 
authorised banks.602 These measures include increasing risk-weights in order to target asset bubbles 
in the residential property sector.603  
 
These measures can only be applied to domestically authorised banks. Designated authorities of other 
member states are allowed, but not required, to recognise the increased risk-weights, and apply them 
to branches of banks located in their country operating in the member state which increased the risk-
weights (cross-border supply of credit is not explicitly mentioned).604 Art. 458(8) CRR partly eases the 
absence of mandatory reciprocity: it allows the member state concerned to ‘ask the ESRB to issue a 
recommendation as referred to in art. 16 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 to one or more Member States 
which do not recognise the measure.’ In 2015, the ESRB issued a general recommendation on 
reciprocity of national flexibility measures (and some capital buffers included in the CRD IV).605 When 
an authority adopts a measure, the ESRB adds it to this recommendation, and recommends authorities 
in other member states to apply the measure to banks supplying services, across borders or through a 
branch, in that member state.606 The recommended reciprocity is subject to a de minimus threshold: 
banks with limited exposures in the member state concerned may be exempted.607 A recommendation 
of the ESRB is subject to a comply-or-explain principle, so other member states face some pressure to 
recognise the measure, but are still free to decide otherwise.608 Hence, this restricted scope of art. 458 
CRR creates a gap, enabling leakage.  
 
Until now, only two supervisors have used art. 458 CRR to increase risk-weights for loans secured by 
residential immovable property: the National Bank of Belgium and the Finnish supervisor.609 The 
Belgian central bank imposed a 5 percentage point add-on to the risk-weights for Belgian banks using 
                                                          
602 Art. 458(1)-(2) Regulation 575/2013. In the Netherlands, DNB is designated as authority for taking national 
flexibility measures (art. 3:66 Wft; supra footnote 979). In Ireland, the Central Bank of Ireland is designated as 
the authority in charge of applying art. 458 CRR (regulation 3 S.I. 159/2014, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2014/en/si/0159.html, last visited at 25 July 2016). In Germany, BaFin is 
authorised to apply national flexibility measures (section 6(1) KWG; supra, footnote 596).  
603 Art. 458(2)(d) Regulation 575/2013.  
604 Art. 458(5) Regulation 575/2013. Art. 458(6)-(7) regulates some procedural issues for this recognition. 
605 Recommendation C in section 1 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2015/2 of 15 December 
2015, OJ 2016, C 97/9. 
606 See e.g. European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2016/4 of 24 June 2016, OJ 2016, C 290/1. 
607 Art. 2(1) in section 2 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2015/2. 
608 Art. 16 Regulation 1092/2010. 
609 See https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/other/html/index.en.html and 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
02+Opinion+on+measures+to+address+macroprudential+or+systemic+risk.pdf (both last visited 25 July 2015).  
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the IRB approach, while the Finnish supervisor imposed a minimum level of 10% for the average risk 
weight on housing loans for banks using the IRB approach. The Dutch supervisor reciprocated the 
measure for branches of banks that provide mortgage loans to Belgian households, whereas the French 
supervisor reciprocated it for loans of French banks secured on Belgian houses.610 
 
3.1.1.3. Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of sectoral risk-weighted capital requirements 
The discussions in the previous sub-sections revealed that the rules of the Standardised Approach are 
reasonably determinate and complete, albeit that certain conditions are somewhat vague, as 
discussed in section 3.1.1.1. This concerns especially the unspecified requirement for banks to use LTI 
ratios, and the possibility to switch between exposure classes in order to obtain favourable risk-
weights. The latter problem will be solved if the proposed amendments to the Basel standards 
becomes EU law. Moreover, the rules will then become more sensitive to actual risks and LTV ratios. 
Hence, the proposed amendments have to be welcomed. Also, the possibility to increase risk-weights 
based on art. 124 CRR is mostly complete, due to the possible differentiation and the mandatory 
reciprocity, which prevents regulatory arbitrage between member states. However, an important 
caveat is the problem that banks can freely choose to assign loans to the class of retail exposures. So, 
de facto an increase of risk-weights above 75% - which is the risk-weight for retail exposures – is 
ineffective.611 Moreover, the increase does not affect exposures benefitting from mortgage 
guarantees. 
 
On the contrary, the requirements of the IRB Approach are too general and vague, and thus 
indeterminate. Furthermore, internal models often underestimated default risks.612 Moreover, the 
possibility to require a minimum LGD value is incomplete, since other parameters for calculating the 
risk-weights are uncovered. This problem can be addressed by setting a minimum risk-weight floor or 
a risk-weight add-on by means of respectively Pillar 2 and national flexibility measures. However, the 
problem with these two options is that reciprocity is not mandatory (and the possibility to use Pillar 2 
measures for macroprudential reasons is removed in the proposed amendments to the CRD IV613). 
 
                                                          
610 See https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/other/html/index.en.html, 
www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/150107_DNB_notification_of_Belgium_reciprocity.pdf and 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/2016-03-
18_haut_conseil.pdf?c1dc47ad6ecd45bc5fd2a60cea315b8e (all last visited 25 July 2015). 
611 Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), p. 9. 
612 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1.1. 
613 Supra, footnote 590. 
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The completeness of these rules depends not only on these rules themselves, but also on the scope of 
the CRR and CRD IV, which is limited to credit institutions and investment firms. Hence, not all possible 
lenders are subject to these rules: for instance, insurance undertakings are not. Although insurance 
undertakings are subject to other capital requirements, based upon the Solvency II Directive,614 this 
legal act does not provide for increasing risk-weights of capital requirements, and contains no explicit 
macroprudential instruments.615 Secondly, the definition of a credit institution excludes some semi-
bank lenders from the scope of the CRR and CRD IV, such as lenders that do not take deposits from the 
public, but from professional parties, for instance, “shadow banks”.616 This creates the possibility of 
regulatory arbitrage. In the Netherlands, banks are reducing their portfolio of mortgage loans on their 
balance sheet, due to increased capital requirements, while insurance undertakings and pension funds 
are increasing the amount of mortgage loans on their balance sheets.617 Thirdly, the material scope of 
the rules governs bank capital, instead of household loans. Hence, the effect of capital requirements 
on lending depends on a transmission mechanism. Effects can leak away, as shown in figure 3.1, which 
depicts the transmission channels of increased sectoral risk-weighted capital requirements.618 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the various possible responses of banks to an increase in risk-weights for (mortgage) 
loans to households. It has no impact on lending to households, if banks reduce the capital buffer which 
they hold in excess of the minimum requirements or try to circumvent the increase – for instance, by 
adjusting their internal models used under the IRB Approach. Alternatively, banks can pick one or more 
of the five listed options to address the need for extra capital. Some of these responses – lending 
spreads or raising equity – lead to repricing of loans to the household or other sectors. This affects the 
demand for credit by households. However, insofar as non-household loans are repriced, the effect of 
increasing the risk-weights on lending to households leaks away.619 Banks can also reduce the amount 
of household loans or other loans on their balance sheet, which leads to curtailed credit supply.620 
                                                          
614 Directive 2009/138 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009, OJ 2009, L 335/1. 
Cf. art. 191 of Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35 of 10 October 2014, OJ 2015, L 12/1.   
615 European Systemic Risk Board (2016b), p. 22. Still, although not explicitly meant for macroprudential use, 
art. 37 Directive 2009/138 enables supervisors to set a capital add-on for an insurance or reinsurance 
undertaking, after the supervisory review process, in order to address certain risks. 
616 Theissen (2013a), pp. 176, 188 (cf. pp. 178-184). Cf. Theissen (2013b), pp. 151-161. 
617 Battes (2015b). 
618 Based upon Figure 3.1 in European Systemic Risk Board (2014a) and Graph 3.1 of Committee on the Global 
Financial System (2012). For a general discussion of transmission and potential spillover mechanisms with 
respect to macroprudential instruments, see European Central Bank (2015a), pp. 124-133. 
619 This reduces credit demand in these other sectors, which is not shown in this figure (but see Figure 3.1 in 
European Systemic Risk Board (2014a) and Graph 3.1 of Committee on the Global Financial System (2012)). 
620 The latter effect is not shown in this figure, but see Figure 3.1 in European Systemic Risk Board (2014a) and 
Graph 3.1 of Committee on the Global Financial System (2012). 
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Insofar as credit supply to other sectors is reduced, the aim of the increased risk-weights is impaired. 
In addition, effects of increased risk-weights on credit supply and demand may partly be offset by 
leakage to the non-banking or foreign banking sector. Finally, this figure shows the interaction with 
house prices and the working of the expectation channel. The latter means that banks and the market 
might already anticipate expected increases of risk-weights: so, the measure can have effect before 
being implemented.621  
 
Figure 3.1: Transmission channels of increased risk-weights for (mortgage) loans to households 
 
 
                                                          
621 European Systemic Risk Board (2014a), p 53; Committee on the Global Financial System (2012), pp. 21-22. 
Cf. Grace et al. (2014), p. 94. 
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The situation in the Dutch mortgage market demonstrates how increased risk-weights can be 
transmitted. As a response to higher risk-weights, Dutch banks, especially Rabobank, removed 
mortgage loans from their balance sheets.622 They also expect to increase lending rates in the future.623 
Furthermore, more credit is supplied by entities which are subject to lower or no capital requirements, 
such as shadow banks, insurance undertakings and pension funds.624 
 
Therefore, an increase in sectoral risk-weighted capital requirements will probably have effects on 
household debt levels, but part of the effect will – most likely – be lost due to the transmission process. 
The final effect on household debt levels partly depends on the legal possibilities to minimise 
circumvention and leakage. The extent to which leakage occurs, remains an issue for empirical 
research.  
 
3.1.2. The countercyclical capital buffer and the leverage ratio 
3.1.2.1. The countercyclical capital buffer 
The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) – included in the CRD IV625 – is an additional capital buffer on 
top of existing capital requirements, with a rate between 0% and, normally, 2.5% of a bank’s total 
amount of risk-weighted exposures.626 If the CCB is set above zero, a bank needs to hold additional 
capital for all its assets in the respective member state, not only specifically for household loans. The 
buffer is meant to protect the banking sector from periods of excessive credit growth, while leaning 
against the build-up of excessive credit is a positive side effect.627 So, the CCB is not intended to manage 
debt levels in general, nor household debt levels in particular. However, when the causes of increasing 
household debt levels are those underlying a (general) credit boom, activating the CCB helps to 
counteract soaring household debt levels.  
 
The magnitude of the CCB is based upon the credit cycle, and the presence of risks arising from excess 
credit growth.628 Especially deviations from a member state’s long-term credit-to-GDP ratio, but also 
                                                          
622 Het Financieele Dagblad (2016), Keuning (2016), De Horde (2016).  
623 Lalkens & Bökkerink (2015). 
624 Koelewijn (2015), Battes (2015b), Battes & Bökkerink (2015). 
625 Art. 130, 135-140 and 160 Directive 2013/36. The buffer applies at both individual and consolidated level 
(art. 130 Directive 2013/36). 
626 Art. 136(4) and 130(1) Directive 2013/36. 
627 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), p. 1. Cf. recital 80 of the preamble of Directive 2013/36. 
628 Art. 136(2) Directive 2013/36. 
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changes in other indicators, underlie decisions on setting the countercyclical capital buffer.629 The CCB 
may be set higher than 2.5% if justified by the long-term credit-to-GDP ratio and other indicators.630 
When a supervisor increases the CCB rate, it shall simultaneously set the date at which banks need to 
comply with the increased rate.631 The standard and maximum term for compliance is one year, but a 
shorter deadline may be ‘justified on the basis of exceptional circumstances’.632 Although a bank will 
probably start with increasing capital before the deadline, this long compliance period might seriously 
impede the effectiveness of the CCB, and hurts its countercyclical working.633 A reduction of the CCB 
rate can take immediate effect, and the supervisor shall indicate a non-binding period in which no 
increase is expected.634 After a supervisor has taken a decision, the rules are likely determinate for the 
banks, but prior to that, it might not be completely clear whether the rate will be increased, although 
banks can partly predict it, based upon the credit-to-GDP ratio.635 
 
Up to a rate of 2.5%, a countercyclical capital buffer set in a member state automatically applies to all 
exposures ofEU banks in that member state. This reduces the room for regulatory arbitrage. Above 
2.5% reciprocity is not mandatory, but depends on recognition by the national supervisors.636 If a 
supervisor does not recognise the CCB in another member state above the rate of 2.5%, banks shall 
apply a rate of 2.5%.637 If a bank operates in various member states, it shall hold a CCB which is a 
weighted average of the countercyclical capital buffers in each member state.638 Small and medium-
sized investment firms can be exempted from holding a CCB if this does not threaten financial 
stability.639 A decision to exempt these investment firms needs to contain their exact definition.640 This 
is the only exception to the CCB, which is relatively limited. All in all, the rules are fairly complete. 
 
Transitional provisions apply to the maximum countercyclical capital buffer from 2016-2018: in these 
years, the maximum rate is respectively 0.625%, 1.25% and 1.875%.641 Member States can opt for a 
                                                          
629 Art. 136(2)(a) Directive 2013/36. 
630 Art. 136(4) Directive 2013/36. 
631 Art. 136(5) Directive 2013/36. 
632 Ibidem.  
633 Cf. McDonnell (2013), pp. 137-138. 
634 Art. 136(5) Directive 2013/36. 
635 Cf. sub-section 3.3.2.1. 
636 Art. 137 Directive 2013/36. 
637 Art. 140 Directive 2013/36. 
638 Art. 130(1) and 140(1) Directive 2013/36. 
639 Art. 130(2) Directive 2013/36. On the definition of investment firms, see Box 3.1. Whether an investment 
firm is small or medium-sized is determined in accordance with Recommendation 2003/361/EC (art. 130(4) 
Directive 2013/36. 
640 Art. 130(2) Directive 2013/36. 
641 Art. 160 Directive 2013/36. 
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shorter transitional period, but neither the Netherlands, nor Ireland and Germany have done so.642 
Also for other aspects, the implementing legislation in these three member states contains no relevant 
differences with the provisions on the CCB in the CRD IV. 
 
Figure 3.2: Transmission channels of increasing the countercyclical capital buffer 
 
 
                                                          
642 Then, the application of the higher rates by foreign banks is not mandatory, but subject to recognition of the 
shorter transitional period by their supervisor (art. 160(6) Directive 2013/36). The Netherlands implemented 
the provisions on the CCB in primary and secondary law, in art. 3:62a Wft (supra, footnote 594) and art. 105 
and 105b Besluit prudentiële regels Wft (available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020420). Ireland 
implemented these provisions by means of regulations  
115-116, 118-120, 125-128 S.I. 158/2014 (supra, footnote 595). Germany implemented these provisions in 
sections 10d and 64r KWG (supra, footnote 596), as well as in the sections 33-36 Solvabilitätsverordnung (BGBl. 
I, 2013, 4168, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/solvv_2014). 
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The transmission mechanisms of an increased rate of the countercyclical capital buffer – as shown in 
figure 3.2643 – are largely comparable to those of increased risk-weights for household loans. Yet, a 
first important difference is that the CCB is not specifically targeted at household loans. Therefore, the 
effect of an increase of the CCB rate on household loans depends on how the bank obtains the required 
additional capital, which not necessarily results in adjusting the price and/or the supply of household 
loans. In addition, figure 3.2 confirms that the CCB cannot appropriately be used if there is only 
excessive credit supply in the household sector and not in other sectors, since this would lead to 
negative side effects to these other sectors. An advantage of the CCB, compared to the options to 
increase risk-weights for household loans, is that regulatory arbitrage within the banking sector is more 
difficult, because the CCB is a broad measure, and reciprocity is mandatory up to a rate of 2.5%. Yet, it 
should be noted that this does not cover non-banks. 
 
The CCB is based upon the system of risk-weighting by requiring banks to hold an additional buffer vis-
à-vis their risk-weighted exposures. Consequently, if banks assign very low risk-weights to household 
loans by means of their internal models, the CCB will barely have effect. To be effective in this sector, 
it might be necessary to complement the use of the CCB with measures that create a minimum risk-
weight floor. 
 
3.1.2.2. The leverage ratio 
Apart from complementing the CCB with minimum risk-weights, supervisors can use another 
instrument, the leverage ratio. This tool does not build on risk-weights, either these applying under 
the Standardised Approach, or those set by banks’ own models, which are criticised in the literature 
for being flawed and vulnerable to manipulation.644 Instead, the leverage ratio requires banks to hold 
a minimum level of Tier 1 capital for their unweighted exposures.645 As the ESRB clarifies, ‘in a 
framework with both a leverage ratio and risk-weighted requirements, banks with low average risk 
weights will be constrained by the leverage ratio, while banks with high average risk weights will be 
constrained by the risk-weighted requirement.’646 A harmonised EU-wide minimum leverage ratio is 
                                                          
643 Figure 3.2 is based upon Figure 2.1 in European Systemic Risk Board (2014a) and Graph 3.1 of Committee on 
the Global Financial System (2012). 
644 Admati (2016), p. R8; Alexander (2012), pp. 336, 341; Wolf (2015), pp. 132-133; Mészáros (2013), p. 169. Cf. 
European Systemic Risk Board (2015), pp. 13, 24. 
645 Art. 429 Regulation 575/2013, as replaced by art. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/62 of 10 
October 2014, OJ 2015, L11/37 (adopted based upon art. 456(1)(j) CRR). Cf. Schoenmaker (2015), pp. 477-478. 
646 European Systemic Risk Board (2015), p. 15. Cf. Wolf (2015), p. 243; Kiema & Jokivuolle (2014), p. 250. 
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expected to be in place as of 2018.647 Its effect will depend on its exact level; currently there are large 
differences in the average leverage of banks in EU member states, as shown in graph 3.1.648 Currently, 
banks are only required to disclose their actual leverage, but not to meet a binding requirement.649 
 
The leverage ratio and its transmission channels exhibit a lot of similarities with the CCB and its 
transmission channels. Comparable to the CCB, the leverage ratio can be used to address overall credit 
expansion, but it is not suitable to restrict lending towards only one sector, such as the household 
sector. A notable difference is that the leverage ratio, if correctly calibrated, can be expected to be 
more restrictive than a CCB, because it is not based upon on banks’ own risk-weights.650 On the 
contrary, the absence of mandatory reciprocity increases the risk of leakage for the leverage ratio. The 
leverage ratio is not explicitly countercyclical.  
 
 
                                                          
647 Recital 18 (and 93) of the preamble of the CRR. Cf. European Systemic Risk Board (2015), p. 10; European 
Central Bank (2015b), p. 122. 
648 Graph 3.1 is based upon data from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9689428 (retrieved 5 July 2016). 
649 Only the UK already implemented the leverage ratio for some banks. See 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/other/html/index.en.html (last visited 17 September 2016). 
650 As the European Systemic Risk Board (2015) writes: ‘Compared with risk-weighted capital requirements, 
leverage requirements have a more dampening effect on credit growth during credit booms when risk weights 
tend to fall, reducing the probability and severity of adverse shocks.’ (p. 31).  
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3.1.3. The use of LTV ratios in funding-based instruments 
Since banks need to fund all credit which they extend, linking LTV ratios with eligibility for certain types 
of funding provides banks with incentives to reduce loan-to-value ratios. The main types of funding for 
mortgages are deposits, covered bonds, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and wholesale funding. In 
a system of deposit-financed lending – the traditional means of funding mortgage lending – the 
originator (mortgage lender) issues deposits to finance the loans.651 In a securitised mortgage system, 
lending is financed by so-called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This is the most complex system of 
financing, in which up to several thousand mortgage loans are packed together in a MBS to disperse 
risks.652 A MBS often exists of several tranches, varying in seniority of their claims on the cash flow 
from the pool of mortgage loans.653 MBS are sold and are, in principle, removed from the originator’s 
balance sheet. In practice, the risks do not completely disappear for the originator, since it often holds 
some MBS, or provides guarantees.654 For financing mortgage lending with covered bonds, the 
originator issues bonds that have been secured on a cover pool with mortgage loans. The mortgage 
loans remain on the balance sheet of the originator, incentivising him to care about repayments 
prospects. The buyer of the covered bonds enjoys dual protection: not only a claim on the issuer of 
the covered bonds, but also a preferential claim on the mortgage loans in the cover pool and their cash 
flows, if the issuer would become insolvent.655 Since the mortgage loans function as guarantee for the 
buyer of the bonds, these mortgage loans must fulfil various requirements and eligibility criteria, 
including criteria on LTV ratios and property valuation.656 Wholesale funding is a broad concept that 
covers various types of funding from other participants on the financial market.657 In EU legislation and 
the laws of the examined member states, LTV ratios are applied to only one of these three funding 
                                                          
651 For a brief summary of the advantages and disadvantages of deposit-financed lending in terms of incentives 
to manage risks, see Campbell (2012), p. 17. 
652 Crotty (2009), p. 566.  
653 The cash flow ‘is used first to pay interest and the principal to the tranche with the highest and most senior 
status; the remaining cash is then used to pay the holders of a second tranche, with lower status; what is left is 
paid to a third tranche, and so on.’ (European Economic Advisory Group (2009), p. 64. Cf. Lehnert (2010), pp. 
583-584). So, if borrowers default, less or no money is received from the lowest tranches. For a more extensive 
introduction to securitisation, see e.g. Marques Ibanez & Scheicher (2010). 
654 Originators often hold MBS, ‘as inventory for their MBS distribution business or because bank capital 
regulation favors these investments.’ (Campbell (2012), p. 18. Cf. Crotty (2009), p. 569). Nevertheless, due to 
the transfer of risks from the originator to the buyer of the securities, problems with information asymmetries 
and incentives appear (cf. Mian & Sufi (2015), pp. 101-103). 
655 European Commission (2006), p. 45; Avesani (2007), p. 4. Cf. Spangler & Werner (2014), p. 2. Commonly, an 
individual covered bond has no claim on an individual mortgage loan, but on the whole pool (Avesani (2007), p. 
4; European Commission (2006), p. 25). The originator ‘must replenish the collateral pool when individual 
mortgages in the pool default.’ (Campbell (2012), p. 18-19). 
656 Campbell (2012), p. 18-19; Avesani (2007), p. 4. 
657 For an introduction to wholesale funding, see Beau et al. (2014). 
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systems, namely to covered bonds.658 This already shows that these rules are incomplete in at least 
one aspect: they can be avoided by using another means of funding. 
 
3.1.3.1. LTV requirements in EU and national covered bonds legislation  
The CRR includes rules on assigning risk-weights to covered bonds. Under the Standardised Approach, 
banks can benefit of a preferential treatment for assigning risk-weights, if certain conditions are 
fulfilled.659 One of them is that loans secured on residential property can only serve as collateral for 
covered bonds up to the lowest of either ‘the principal amount of the liens that are combined with any 
prior liens’ and 80 % of the house value.660 Alternatively, residential mortgage backed securities which 
are composed of at least 90% of mortgage loans up to a LTV ratio of 80% are eligible as collateral for 
the cover pool.661 Because the part of the loan above 80% of the house value cannot serve as collateral 
for covered bonds, other funding is necessary above this threshold. In addition, houses serving as 
collateral for the covered bonds must meet the valuation requirements of art. 208 and 229(1) CRR.662 
 
National laws may impose additional LTV and valuation requirements. In the Netherlands, the issuance 
of covered bonds is regulated at three levels, namely by a parliamentary act, a general implementing 
decree and a ministerial decree.663 These rules require that for covered bonds backed by loans secured 
on residential real estate, the value of the mortgage loans up to the LTV ratio of 80% shall be at least 
equal to the value of the covered bonds.664 The valuation requirements of art. 208 and 229(1) CRR 
must be met and the houses serving as collateral must be revalued at least yearly.665 
 
                                                          
658 For an introduction to the regulatory regime for securitisation and covered bonds in the CRR, see Theissen 
(2013a), pp. 484-507. Note that the European Commission (2015e,f) proposed a new regulation on 
securitisation, as well as a regulation with amendments of the provisions on securitisation in the CRR. 
659 Art. 129(1),(4)-(5) CRR. The European Commission considers creating a common EU framework on covered 
bonds: see http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/covered-bonds/index_en.htm (last visited 10 August 2016). 
660 Art. 129(1)(d)(i) Regulation 575/2013. 
661 Art. 129(1)(d)(iI) Regulation 575/2013. Cf. EBA (2014c), p. 151. For the rules for the situation when 
additional guarantees are provided, see art. 129(1)(e) Regulation 575/2013. In addition, art. 129(1) CRR refers 
to art. 52(4) Directive 2009/65, which imposes some additional requirements. 
662 Art. 129(3) Regulation 575/2013. For a discussion of these requirements, see section 3.1.1.1. 
663 Art. 1:107(3)(n), 3:33a and 3:33b Wft, art. 40d-40k Besluit prudentiële regels Wft (supra, footnote 642) and 
art. 20a-20i Uitvoeringsregeling Wft (available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020537) (last visited 19 July 
2016). For an introduction to the Dutch legislation on covered bonds, see Scheltema (2015). 
664 Art. 40f(2) Besluit prudentiële regels Wft. This follows from the obligation to comply with the requirements 
of art. 129 CRR, as introduced in 2015 (Ministerie van Financiën (2015), p. 2; Scheltema (2015), p. 180) by 
means of the Wijzigingswet financiële markten 2015 and the Wijzigingsbesluit financiële markten 2015, 
respectively available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/33918/stb-2014-472 and 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/33918/stb-2014-524 (both last visited 21 July 2015). 
665 Art. 20(d)(4)-(5) Uitvoeringsregeling Wft. 
3. Capital- and funding-based regulatory instruments 
118 
 
In Ireland, covered bonds are named “asset covered securities” and regulated by the Asset Covered 
Securities Act 2001, the Asset Covered Securities (Amendment) Act 2007 and Statutory Instruments 
(S.I.) based on these acts.666 Under this framework, for individual household mortgage loans, any value 
above a maximum LTV ratio of 75% has to be disregarded for calculating the value of the cover pool.667 
When the total outstanding amount of a mortgage loan falls below 75% of the prudent market value 
of the house – due to redemption – the maximum amount which is allowed to be included in the cover 
asset pool is 100% of the amount of the mortgage loan.668 So, while loans are allowed to exceed a LTV 
ratio of 75%, the part above this threshold cannot be funded by means of covered bonds. However, 
the total amount of the mortgage loans of a bank is not allowed to exceed 100% of the prudent market 
value of the houses.669  
 
In Germany, the issuance of covered bonds, called Pfandbriefe, is governed by the Pfandbriefgesetz 
(PfandBG), in force since 2005.670 §§ 12-19 of this act stipulate criteria for the eligibility of loans as 
cover.671 § 14 PfandBG rules that it is only allowed to use mortgages as cover up to the first 60% of the 
mortgage lending value, as established in accordance with § 16 PfandBG.  Loans with a higher LTV ratio 
are not completely ineligible for the cover pool: only the part above this limit is ineligible.672 The 
remainder of the loan can be funded through other means. In fact, currently only a small part of issued 
mortgage loans for German households is secured by covered bonds: in 2014 around 10% of mortgage 
loans for household issued by German banks.673 § 16 PfandBG sets the basic conditions for determining 
the mortgage lending value, which shall be done by a valuer who is not involved in the loan decision.674 
The Beleihungswertermittlungsverordnung (BelWertV) (Regulation on the determination of the 
mortgage lending value), adopted by the Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the Ministry of 
                                                          
666 These acts are available at respectively http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2001/en/act/pub/0047/ and 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2007/en/act/pub/0013/ (both last visited 20 July 2015). 
667 Sections 32(8)(b), 32(11) and 32(13)(a) of the Asset Covered Securities Act 2001.  
668 Art. 9 of the Regulatory Notice of the Central Bank of Ireland, adopted on the basis of section 41(1) and 
41A(7) of the Asset Covered Securities Act, available at https://www.centralbank.ie/docs/default-
source/Regulation/industry-market-sectors/credit-institutions/regulatory-requirements/gns-4-4-3-2-
regulatory-notice-(section-41(1)-41a(7)-and-41b)-2008).pdf?sfvrsn=0 (last visited 29 April 2017). 
669 Section 31(1) of the Asset Covered Securities Act 2001 in combination with regulation 3 S.I. 123/2012 (latter 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2012/en/si/0123.html (last visited 21 July 2015)). 
670 The PfandBG, BGBl. I, 2005, 1373, is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/pfandbg/, whereas an 
English translation is available via https://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_111.htm. For an 
introduction to the German system of covered bonds, see Spangler & Werner (2014), as well as the website of 
the Verband Deutsche Pfandbriefbanken (VDP) (Association of German Pfandbrief Banks): 
https://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en.htm (all last visited 17 July 2015). 
671 For a brief discussion of these criteria, see e.g. Quirk (2010), pp. 1337-1339; Spangler & Werner (2014), p. 7. 
672 Cf. Spangler & Werner (2014), p. 7. 
673 Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), p. 10. 
674 Section 16(1) PfandBG. 
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Justice, based upon § 16(4), regulates the details of assessing the mortgage lending value.675 The 
mortgage lending value is not allowed to exceed the market value, nor the value resulting from a 
prudent assessment of the future marketability of the house, when its long-term sustainable aspects 
are taken into account and speculative elements and temporary value fluctuations are disregarded.676 
 
3.1.3.2. Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of the LTV ratios in covered bonds legislation 
The LTV requirements imposed by EU and national legislation on covered bonds are determinate: 
although the rules are certainly technical, they are not vague, ambiguous or general. In itself the rules 
are complete as well: in all three examined member states, the rules apply to all licensed banks, while 
banks need a license to issue covered bonds.677 Moreover, the respective LTV limit in each member 
state applies to all banks, without exceptions.  
 
However, although the rules are determinate and complete, they are ill-suited for addressing 
household debt levels. First of all, the LTV ratios are not binding: it is allowed to provide loans with 
higher LTV ratios, and to issue covered bonds for these loans, albeit that the part above the LTV 
threshold cannot serve as collateral for the covered bonds. This part can be funded differently. 
Moreover, the whole loan can be funded via others means.  
 
Nevertheless, these LTV ratios – which determine whether mortgage loans are eligible as collateral for 
covered bonds – can have some impact, as shown in figure 3.3. Banks face three options when 
confronted with LTV ratios that limit collateral eligibility for covered bonds. Firstly, they can increase 
funding through deposits. Then, the effect of the LTV limit will partly leak away. However, often 
deposits need to be available locally: this might limit mortgage supply.678 In addition, funding costs are 
probably higher for deposits than for covered bonds, due to preferential capital requirements and low 
interest rates for the latter. So, not all effects will leak away. Secondly, banks can choose to constrain 
lending. Thirdly, banks can create MBS. This type of funding is possibly as cheap as funding with 
covered bonds. With this option, banks have fewer incentives to take repayment prospects into 
account – since most risks disappear from their balance sheet. Hence, choosing this option might lead 
to adverse effects, namely less prudent lending. Nevertheless, notwithstanding all these limitations of 
                                                          
675 The BelWertV, BGBl. I, 2006, 1175, is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/belwertv/index.html, 
and an English translation at https://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_111.htm (both last 
visited 17 July 2015). 
676 Section 16(2) PfandBG and 3(1) BelWertV. For more details on (determining) the mortgage lending value, 
see in particular sections 3, 4(1), 4(3)-(4), 14-19, 24 and 26 BelWertV. 
677 NL: art. 3:33a Wft. IE: section 3(1) of Asset Covered Securities Act 2001. DE: sections 1-2 PfandBG. 
678 Campbell (2012), p. 17. 
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LTV limits on collateral eligibility, they prevent at least that the consequences of household defaults 
will spread to the holders of covered bonds. 
 
Figure 3.3: Transmission channels of LTV ratios determining collateral eligibility for covered bonds    
 
3.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of capital- and 
funding-based instruments 
While the CRD IV contains several requirements for measures to enforce financial regulation, most of 
the details of the enforcement regime are left to the member states.679 On top of that, Regulation 
1024/2013 grants specific enforcement powers to the ECB for carrying out its tasks within the Single 
                                                          
679 These requirements are in particular included in Title VIII, Chapter 1, Section IV of the CRD IV, which are the 
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Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).680 The availability of enforcement measures for violations of financial 
regulation differs between the various national supervisors and the ECB, the most important 
supervisor within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Before discussing the national rules on 
enforcement, the provisions on enforcement in the CRD IV, as well as the working of and enforcement 
within the SSM require explanation. 
 
3.2.1. Rules on enforcement in EU legislation 
3.2.1.1. Basic requirements on enforcement in the CRD IV 
Directive 2013/36 contains several general and specific requirements on sanctions for breaches of the 
CRR and the CRD IV. Art. 70 CRD IV seeks to guarantee the proportionality and dissuasiveness of 
penalties. It obliges member states to ensure that competent authorities must, when imposing 
sanctions, take into account the gravity and duration of the breach, as well as, among other things, the 
losses caused by the breach.681 Furthermore, they must consider recidivism and the financial strength 
of the offender. 
 
Moreover, the CRD IV contains specific requirements on sanctions, although not particularly for 
breaching capital requirements. Firstly, member states must provide competent authorities with all 
necessary powers to intervene in banking activities, including the possibility to withdraw an 
authorisation and to impose Pillar 2 measures, such as restricting business or requiring banks to hold 
additional capital.682 Secondly, when sanctions can be imposed upon a bank due to a breach of a rule 
of the CRR or CRD IV, member states must ensure that administrative sanctions may be applied to ‘the 
members of the management body and to other natural persons who under national law are 
responsible for the breach.’683 Thirdly, publication of administrative sanctions is mandatory if appeal 
is not possible anymore.684 The sanction, ‘including information on the type and nature of the breach 
and the identity of the natural or legal person on whom the penalty is imposed’685, must be published 
at the official website of the competent authority, without undue delay after having informed the 
recipient. However, publication must be anonymous, if the stability of the financial markets would 
otherwise be jeopardised, or if publication would cause disproportionate damage to the legal or 
                                                          
680 Art. 18 Regulation 1024/2013. 
681 Art. 70 Directive 2013/36. 
682 Art. 64(1) Directive 2013/36. 
683 Art. 65(2) Directive 2013/36. 
684 Art. 68(1) Directive 2013/36. 
685 Ibidem. 
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natural person involved.686 Finally, art. 67 CRD IV lists some sanctions which at least should be available 
for certain violations, including fines up to 10% of total annual net turnover and up to twice the profits 
gained or losses avoided, withdrawal of authorisation, and fines up to € 5 million for natural persons. 
However, these particular sanctions are not directly linked with violations of sectoral capital 
requirements.687  
 
The CRD IV creates a specific measure for enforcing the countercyclical capital buffer and other buffers: 
if a bank does not meet the combined requirements of these buffers, member states must impose 
restrictions on the distribution of capital.688 In addition, within five days after identifying that it fails to 
meet these requirements, a bank must submit a capital conservation plan that indicates how the 
requirements will be met.689  
 
3.2.1.2. Enforcement within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The working of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
The SSM – operational since November 2014 – is a mechanism in which the execution of the 
supervision of credit institutions is shared between the ECB and national competent authorities of 
participating member states.690 Participating member states are all the euro area member states, as 
well as the non-euro area member states that have chosen and were permitted to participate in the 
SSM by means of ‘close cooperation’ agreement with the ECB.691 The latter is provided with the 
exclusive competence to carry out the listed microprudential supervisory tasks – which are the usual 
tasks for banking supervision, including enforcement – within the framework of art. 6 of this 
regulation.692 Tasks not conferred on the ECB remain with national supervisors.693 The ECB has the 
demanding duty to apply both the CRR and national law implementing the CRD IV, as well as the vast 
amounts of technical standards adopted based upon these acts.694 This includes applying the national 
                                                          
686 Art. 68(2) Directive 2013/36. 
687 Art. 67(1) Directive 2013/36. 
688 Art. 141 Directive 2013/36. 
689 Art. 142 Directive 2013/36. 
690 Art. 1 and 4(1) Regulation 1024/2013. Cf. Wymeersch (2014), p. 21. For the date that the SSM became 
operational, see art. 33(2) Regulation 1024/2013. 
691 Art. 2(1) and 7 Regulation 1024/2013. 
692 Art. 4 Regulation 1024/2013. Cf. Wymeersch (2014), pp. 38-39. 
693 Art. 1 Regulation 1024/2013. Recital 28 lists several tasks not conferred on the ECB. 
694 Joossen (2015) estimates that the technical standards will consists of approximately 6000 pages (p. 121). All 
the national rules will come on top of this. In addition, at least for Germany, it is argued that there are 
constitutional problems when the ECB, as an EU institution, applies national law, because it might deprive 
banks from their rights of an effective remedy under national law (Peuker (2014), pp. 768-769). For applying its 
tasks, the ECB shall adopt guidelines and recommendations, and take decisions (art. 4(3) Regulation 
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law detailing the options and discretions as granted by the CRR.695 The ECB needs to conduct its tasks 
‘with a view to contributing to the safety and soundness of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system within the Union and each Member State’.696 
 
For microprudential supervision, a two-layered system is created, in which the European Central Bank 
directly supervises banks meeting criteria regarding (i) size, (ii) significance for the economy of a 
member state or (iii) cross-border activity, as well as at least the three most significant banks in a 
member state, while national authorities keep supervising the less significant banks, but under 
guidance of the ECB.697 Hence, national competent authorities execute part of the supervisory tasks, 
including enforcement for less significant banks. To guide the supervision by national authorities, the 
ECB is authorised to issue regulations, guidelines or general instructions setting forth how supervisory 
decisions are adopted and how the microprudential supervisory tasks that fall within its competence, 
must be performed.698 In addition, the ECB may at any time, when necessary to ensure consistent 
application of high supervisory standards, ‘on its own initiative after consulting with national 
competent authorities or upon request by a national competent authority, decide to exercise directly 
itself all the relevant powers’699 for one or more banks that in principle falls under the supervision of 
this national authority.  
 
Conducting macroprudential policy remains, in the first instance, the task of national supervisors, but 
the ECB receives some tasks and powers as well.700 The ECB has no role in the use of macroprudential 
tools that are not provided for by the CRR and CRD IV. However, when a national supervisor of a 
participating member state takes a macroprudential measure that is included in the CRR or CRD IV, it 
must inform the ECB ten working days in advance. The ECB is allowed to provide a reasoned, but non-
                                                          
10241/2013). Indeed, the ECB has adopted a regulation which sets forth how some options and discretions in 
the CRR are exercised, but this does not cover the options and discretions relevant for this study. The 
regulation only applies to significant institutions (art. 1 Regulation 2016/445 of the European Central Bank of 
14 March 2016, OJ 2016, L 78/60). 
695 Art. 4(3) Regulation 1024/2013. 
696 Art. 1 Regulation 1024/2013. 
697 Art. 6(3)-(7) Regulation 1024/2013. In addition, the ECB also supervises banks ‘for which public financial 
assistance has been requested or received directly from the EFSF or the ESM’, and banks, which must fulfil 
some conditions related to cross-border activity, which considers the ECB on its own initiative significant (art. 
6(4) Regulation 1024/2013). 
698 Art. 6(5)(a) Regulation 1024/2013. In 2014 the ECB issued the SSM Framework Regulation, a comprehensive 
regulation covering these issues: Regulation 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014, OJ 2014, 
L 141/2. 
699 Art. 6(5)(b) Regulation 1024/2013. 
700 Art. 5(1) Regulation 1024/2013. 
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binding objection within five working days.701 Moreover, if the ECB deems it necessary, it can apply 
higher requirements for capital buffers – including the CCB – than the concerned national authority 
does.702 If deemed necessary, the ECB can also apply more stringent macroprudential measures that 
are effectuated at the level of individual banks, in the cases specifically set out in, and in accordance 
with the procedures of, relevant EU law – i.e. the CRR and CRD IV.703 So, for credit institutions, the ECB 
can increase risk-weights by means of art. 124, 164 or 458 CRR or through Pillar 2 measures. When it 
intends to apply a macroprudential measure, it must closely cooperate with the concerned national 
designated authorities and inform them ten working days in advance. These authorities are allowed to 
provide a reasoned, but non-binding objection within five working days.704  
 
Enforcement powers of the ECB within the Single Supervisory Mechanism  
The European Central Bank is vested with sufficient powers to perform its tasks: for the exclusive 
purpose of carrying out the tasks conferred on it, the ECB is the competent or designated authority in 
the participating member states and has all the accompanying powers under EU law, unless provided 
otherwise by Regulation 1024/2013.705 Moreover, the ECB is allowed to require national supervisors 
to use their powers, to the extent necessary for performing its tasks.706 The regulation lists some 
particular powers of the ECB as well, which it, thus, can exercise by relying on this regulation instead 
of on the national transposition of Directive 2013/36.707 These include enforcement powers, and 
especially here it becomes complicated.708 
 
The European Central Bank receives the usual Pillar 2 supervisory powers, which can be exercised when 
a bank fails to comply with or is likely to breach requirements of the CRR and CRD IV.709 Pillar 2 
measures are not sanctions, but can be used to dictate compliance. These powers namely include the 
                                                          
701 Ibidem. Art. 5(1) Regulation 1024/2013 states that ‘[t]he concerned authority shall duly consider the ECB’s 
reasons prior to proceeding with the decision as appropriate.’ 
702 Art. 5(2) Regulation 1024/2013. 
703 Art. 5(2) Regulation 1024/2013 allows the ECB to ‘apply more stringent measures aimed at addressing 
systemic or macroprudential risks at the level of credit institutions’, in accordance with the procedures of the 
CRR and CRD IV. The position of this adverbial clause in italics creates interpretational difficulties, but, most 
likely, it intends to limit the scope of the ECB’s macroprudential powers to the banking sector, because the ECB 
received only powers to supervise credit institutions. This interpretation corresponds with comments of the 
Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board (2013), para. 17. 
704 Art. 5(4) Regulation 1024/2013. Regarding dealing with the objection, this article states that ‘[t]he ECB shall 
duly consider those reasons prior to proceeding with the decision as appropriate.’  
705 Art. 9(1) Regulation 1024/2013. 
706 Ibidem. 
707 Art. 9(1) and 10-18 Regulation 1024/2013. Cf. Wymeersch (2014), pp. 38-39.  
708 Cf. Schneider (2014), Gortsos (2015) and Kraaijeveld & Ter Kuile (2015). 
709 Art. 16 Regulation 1024/2013. Cf. art. 102 and 104(1) Directive 2013/36. 
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possibility to oblige banks to hold capital requirements in excess of the normal requirements of the 
CRR and CRD IV, to present a plan for restoring compliance or to use profits to strengthen bank capital, 
and the possibilities to restrict business and remove management board members who do not fulfil 
their requirements. The ECB can exercise these powers with respect to the banks it supervises, i.e. the 
significant banks.  
 
Art. 18(1) Regulation 1024/2013 allows the ECB to impose penalties on banks, subject to several 
restrictions. Firstly, it exercises its powers only vis-à-vis significant banks, whereas national supervisors 
are responsible for enforcing financial regulation regarding less significant banks.710 Secondly, the ECB 
can only punish violations of directly applicable EU law, meaning the CRR, and not violations of the 
national implementation of the CRD IV.711 Hence, the ECB cannot impose a penalty for not meeting the 
CCB. Thirdly, the European Central Bank cannot sanction individuals.712 However, the ECB can require 
national supervisors to use their powers, among other things, to sanction individuals and to enforce 
national law that implements the CRD IV.713  
 
For penalising violations of the CRR by banks, the ECB can use the powers created by art. 18 Regulation 
1024/2013, as well as the sanctioning powers that it has acquired through Council Regulation 2532/98, 
as amended by Council Regulation 2015/159.714 Consequently, the ECB can punish violations of the 
CRR and of its own regulations and decisions with fines of up to 10% of a bank’s annual turnover, or 
up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided.715 Also, the ECB can inflict periodic 
penalty payments up to 5 % of the average daily turnover per day of infringement, for a maximum of 
six months, for violations of its regulations and decisions – but not for violations of the CRR.716 The 
imposition of a fine or a periodic penalty payment must always be published on the website of the 
ECB, without undue delay, whether it has been appealed or not.717 This obligation goes further than 
that of art. 68(1) CRD IV, because in the latter case, publication is only mandatory if appeal is not 
possible anymore. While postponing publication until this moment may hurt the timeliness of the 
                                                          
710 Cf. art. 134-135 Regulation 468/2014; Schneider (2014), pp. 19-20; Gortsos (2015), p. 27; Kraaijeveld & Ter 
Kuile (2015), p. 238. 
711 Art. 18(1) Regulation 1024/2013. Cf. Schneider (2014), p. 19; Kraaijeveld & Ter Kuile (2015), p. 233. 
712 Art. 18(5) in combination with recital 53 of the preamble Regulation 1024/2013. Cf. Lo Schiavo (2014), p. 
130; Gortsos (2015), p. 27; Kraaijeveld & Ter Kuile (2015), p. 238. 
713 Art. 18(5) Regulation 1024/2013 and art. 134 Regulation 468/2014. 
714 Art. 18(7) Regulation 1024/2013. Art. 120-137 Regulation 468/2014 (the SSM Framework Regulation) repeat 
and further detail the sanctioning powers of the ECB. 
715 Art. 18 (1) Regulation 1024/2013 and art. 4a(1)(a) Regulation 2532/98. 
716 Art. 4a(1)(b) and 1(6) Regulation 2532/98. 
717 Art. 18(6) Regulation 1024/2013, art. 1a(3) Regulation 2532/98 and art. 132 Regulation 468/2014. 
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publication and the resulting deterrent effects, it offers more protection of the rights of the offender. 
Under some circumstances, publication must be anonymous.718 Another power, exclusively possessed 
by the ECB for all credit institutions, is the possibility to withdraw authorisation, under some 
procedural conditions.719 Still, national authorities can block this withdrawal of authorisation, as long 
as they remain competent to resolve credit institutions, if withdrawal would prejudice actions 
necessary for resolution or for maintaining financial stability.720 
 
In principle, these powers enable the ECB to enforce the rules of the CRR dissuasively, since threatening 
fines, which are larger than the obtained benefits, can be imposed, and publication of these fines is 
mandatory. However, it depends on national law whether and how managers can be sanctioned. 
Moreover, the ECB is dependent on the cooperation of national supervisors for penalising individuals, 
for enforcing obligations included in the CRD IV, and for imposing the heavy punishment of withdrawal 
of authorisation. This creates additional hurdles, and may reduce the likelihood that these sanctions 
are imposed, which decreases their dissuasiveness. Practice needs to show how cooperation between 
the ECB and national authorities takes place. The ECB cannot initiate criminal proceedings.721 
 
It is possible for the ECB to enforce with proportionate means, because it can impose all kinds of Pillar 
2 measures, and can vary the magnitude of the fine.722 However, the enforcement pyramid seems 
incomplete, especially when compared to powers under national law, because the ECB lacks non-
pecuniary sanctions, and needs to involve national supervisors to impose these. Still, this means that 
the ECB is able to use such penalties indirectly. 
 
                                                          
718 Art. 132(1) Regulation 468/2014 and art. 1a(3) Regulation 2532/98. Cf. art. 68(2) CRD IV; sub-section 3.2.1.1. 
719 Art. 14(5) Regulation 1024/2013 in combination with art. 18(d) Directive 2013/36. Cf. Theissen (2013a), pp. 
224-224.  
720 Art. 14(6) Regulation 1024/2013. 
721 Yet, it must, if it with reason suspects that a criminal offence might have been committed, request national 
supervisors ‘to refer the matter to the appropriate authorities for investigation and possible criminal 
prosecution, in accordance with national law.’ (art. 136 Regulation 468/2014). 
722 It is another question of whether actually imposed sanctions are proportionate.  
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3.2.2. Enforcement measures in national law    
3.2.2.1. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of capital- and funding-based 
instruments in Dutch law 
In the Netherlands, the Wft provides the prudential supervisor, DNB, with several administrative 
powers to enforce financial legislation.723 Some of these powers have also been granted to the ECB, 
when acting as supervisor within the SSM. Most available sanctions are of administrative nature, but 
lenders who violate rules related to capital requirements can face criminal sanctions as well. Apart 
from resorting to enforcement measures, DNB can take Pillar 2 measures, such as restricting business 
or requiring banks to hold additional capital, if a bank does not meet the capital requirements.724 If a 
bank does not meet the requirements of the CCB, it must submit a capital conservation plan, which 
indicates how the requirements will be met, within five working days after identifying that it fails to 
meet these requirements.725 DNB can approve this plan, or impose restrictions on the distribution of 
capital.726 These measures are no sanctions, but can put pressure on banks to comply with financial 
regulation.  
 
Administrative sanctions 
If DNB intends to impose a sanction, it needs to respect provisions of general administrative law, in 
particular the general framework for administrative sanctions, as provided by Chapter 5 of the 
Algemene wet bestuursrecht (Awb) (General administrative law act).727 Art. 5:46(2) Awb applies the 
principle of proportionality to sanctions, by requiring to tune the magnitude of the fine to the 
seriousness of the offence, and to other relevant circumstances.728 Case law shows that relevant 
circumstances are the duration, character and scale of the offence, as well as the intent, size and 
financial capacity of the offender. It also matters whether the offender is a reoffender, has harmed 
consumers, or has obtained an advantage due to the offence.729 
 
                                                          
723 See chapter 1.4 and 1.5 of the Wft, which lists the enforcement powers of the AFM and DNB. 
724 Art. 3:111a Wft. 
725 Art. 3:62a(3)-(5) Wft and art. 105i Besluit prudentiële regels Wft (supra, footnote 642). Cf. art. 142 CRD IV. 
726 Art. 3:62a(6) Wft. 
727 The Awb is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005537.  
728 Art. 5:46(2) Awb. This provision specifically concerns sanctions. See also art. 3:4(2) Awb, which codifies the 
proportionality principle, as applying to all decisions of administrative organs. Art. 5:46(3) Awb obliges reducing 
the fine if the offender reasonably shows that special circumstances justify this. 
729 These circumstances are discussed, with reference to case law, in Van Emmerink & Saris (2014), pp. 158-
165. 
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Before using its formal powers, DNB often uses informal measures: a warning letter or a conversation 
aimed at transmitting the norms.730 These two measures – which in fact are similar, apart from the 
form – are a top-down communication that certain behaviour is not allowed, and function as a last 
warning.731 These informal measures are neither mentioned in the Wft, nor defined in the enforcement 
policy of DNB and the AFM, the conduct of business supervisor.732 Nevertheless, they are implicitly 
recognised as enforcement instruments in several court cases.733 At the same time there is no 
obligation to use these informal measures before taking formal measures, as has been made clear by 
the District Court of Rotterdam in a case concerning excessive credit supply.734  
 
The formal enforcement powers include measures aimed at recovery rather than at punishment. 
Firstly, an instruction to adhere to a particular line of conduct within a reasonable term can be 
issued.735 This power is also provided to the ECB, within its supervisory competences.736 Secondly, DNB 
can impose an order for incremental penalty payments. The payment will be forfeited if the violating 
behaviour does not cease.737  
 
Furthermore, DNB can punish the breaching of capital requirements with an administrative fine of the 
third category, the highest category in the Netherlands.738 The standard fine for a violation of the third 
                                                          
730 Palm-Steyerberg (2009), p. 44; Voerman & Bast (2011), p. 114; Mein (2015b), p. 274. 
731 Sachse (2013), pp. 395-396. 
732 Ibidem, p. 395. 
733 See e.g. Rb Rotterdam 3 September 2008, NL:RBROT:2008:BF1175, JOR 2008/274 or AB 2008/346 or RF 
2008/94; Rb Rotterdam 2 July 2009, NL:RBROT:2009:BJ1746, JOR 2009/262 or JONDR 2009/490; Rb Rotterdam 
16 December 2010, NL:RBROT:2010:BP0011, JOR 2011/83 or RF 2011/27 or JONDR 2011/164; Rb Rotterdam 5 
April 2007, NL:RBROT:2007:BA3126, PJ 2007/76 and CBb 1 April 2008, NL:CBB:2008:BC8271, PJ 2008/42 or RF 
2008/65 or AB 2010/142. 
734 Rb Rotterdam 4 May 2011, NL:RBROT:2011:BQ3835, JONDR 2011/148, para. 2.12. Cf. Sachse (2013), pp. 
404-405. 
735 Art. 1:75 Wft. An instruction should only prescribe the necessary conduct for ceasing the norm-violating 
behaviour (Palm-Steyerberg (2009), p. 44; Jansen (2013), p. 183). 
736 Art. 1:75(1) Wft. 
737 Art. 1:79(1)(a) Wtf. For a brief explanation of this power, see Palm-Steyerberg (2009), p. 45. This power can 
only be exercised regarding violations of rules enshrined in or arising from specific provisions listed in the 
attachment to art. 1:79(1)(a) Wft. Art. 3:57 Wft in combination with art. 59 of the Besluit prudentiële regels Wft 
(Decree on prudential rules Wft) requires banks to upheld the capital requirements of the CRR. For art. 59 
Besluit prudentiële regels Wft, see http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020420/Hoofdstuk10/101/Artikel59. Art. 
3:57 Wft is listed in the attachment to art. 1:79(1)(a) Wft: wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020368/Bijlage_2. In 
addition, an order for incremental penalty payments can directly be imposed for violations of the system of 
assigning risk-weights as stipulated by the CRR, by means of art. 4 and attachment 1 of Besluit uitvoering EU-
verordeningen financiële markten (Decree execution EU regulations financial markets), which is available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0032230 (all last visited 19 July 2016). 
738 Art. 1:80(1)(a) Wft. This power can only be exercised regarding violations of rules enshrined in or arising 
from specific provisions listed in the attachment to art. 1:80(1)(a) Wft. Art. 3:57 Wft (which requires banks to 
upheld the capital requirements of the CRR; supra, footnote 737) is listed in the attachment to art. 1:80(1) Wft: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020368/Bijlage_3. A breach of art. 3:57(1)-(2) Wft can be punished with a 
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category is € 2.5 million, but this amount can be decreased or increased with a maximum of 50%, if 
justifiable depending on the severity or duration of the violation. Moreover, it can be increased with a 
maximum of 50% considering the degree of culpability of the lender.739 In principle, the maximum fine 
for violating capital requirements is € 5 million, or, if this amount is higher, a maximum of 10% of a 
bank’s last year’s revenue.740 Also the manager who was responsible for the breach, can receive a fine 
up to this amount.741 Breaching the LTV ratios related to covered bonds can be punished with a fine of 
the second category, with as maximum fine € 1 million.742 However, in all cases, irrespective of the fine 
category and the corresponding maximum, the fine can be raised to three times the amount of the 
obtained benefit.743 
 
Various other severe penalties can be applied as well. Firstly, the manager who was responsible for 
the breach can be prohibited to exercise a function at a bank for maximum a year, with the possibility 
to extend this prohibition with another year.744 Both DNB and the ECB are empowered to apply this 
measure.745 Secondly, a custodian can be appointed for some or all organs or persons of a bank, if it – 
partly or completely – fails to comply with an issued instruction.746 This far-reaching measure can only 
be taken if the interests of consumers are in severe danger.747 Finally, withdrawing authorisation is 
possible if a lender does not, or insufficiently so, comply with an issued instruction relating to its 
                                                          
fine of the third category (cf. art. 1:81 Wft), according to art. 10 of the Besluit bestuurlijke boetes financiële 
sector (Decree administrative fines financial sector), available via: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0026204 (all 
last visited 19 July 2016). In addition, administrative fines of the third category can directly be imposed for 
violations of the system of assigning risk-weights as stipulated by the CRR by means of art. 5(1) and attachment 
2 Besluit uitvoering EU-verordeningen financiële markten (supra, footnote 737). Cf. Van de Vijver (2014). 
739 Art. 1:81(2) Wft and art. 2 Besluit bestuurlijke boetes financiële sector. The fine can also be adjusted to the 
offender’s financial capacity (art. 4 Besluit bestuurlijke boetes financiële sector). These two times 50% of the 
standard amount can be cumulated, leading to the extreme ends of € 0 and € 5.000.000 (cf. Van Es & Verrest, 
2013, p. 106). 
740 Art. 1:81(1) and 1:82(1) Wft. However, in case of recidivism within five years, the maximum amount can be 
doubled (art. 1:81(4) Wft and art. 3 Besluit bestuurlijke boetes financiële sector). 
741 This is possible, since art. 5:1(3) Awb (supra, footnote 727) states that violations can be committed by both 
legal and natural persons. Cf. point 3 in the explanatory memorandum of the Act for amending the penalty 
system for financial legislation: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-31458-3.html (both last visited 22 
June 2015); Bierman et al. (2015), p. 433. 
742 Art. 1:81(2) Wft in combination with art. 10 Besluit bestuurlijke boetes financiële sector. 
743 Art. 1:83 Wft. 
744 Art. 1:87 Wft. 
745 Art. 1:87(1) Wft. The ECB may apply this measure, insofar as it is the competent to exercise supervision 
pursuant to art. 4 and 6 Regulation 1024/2013.  
746 Art. 1:76(1) Wft. 
747 Art. 1:76(2)(c) Wft. The legislator acknowledges the far-reaching impact of a custodian. The legislative 
history shows that supervisors must use proportionate enforcement instruments, and that a custodian thus 
must only be appointed if the necessary goal cannot sufficiently be achieved with an instruction, order for 
incremental penalty payments or an administrative fine (see Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 29708, pp. 410-411, as 
cited in De Vries (2013), p. 285).   
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operations or its financial situation.748 This last sanction is not directly related to violating capital 
requirements, but to the operations or the financial situation of a bank in general. For credit 
institutions DNB can only propose to the ECB to withdraw authorisation; for other financial institutions, 
DNB is competent to withdraw authorisation.749  
 
In principle, since 2016 any administrative sanction is published after it became irreversible.750 Prior to 
2016, this was only the case for of a fines of the third category and an incremental penalty payments 
which are forfeited.751 These two sanctions are still published earlier, namely after five days.752 
However, DNB can opt for delaying a publication, abstaining from publication or for an anonymous 
publication if otherwise there would be disproportionate damage for the parties concerned, or the 
stability of the financial system would be endangered.753 DNB often opts for anonymous publication.754 
Publication is officially not a punitive sanction, but some argue that it has punitive elements, due to 
the intention to name and shame.755 Because publication is not an official sanction, it is not surrounded 
with the same legal procedural safeguards as a sanction. Still, it is possible to start a procedure to 
object to the publication.756 Moreover, the imposition of an administrative sanction that is being 
published is surrounded with safeguards. A supervisor can also name-and-shame a bank that breaches 
capital requirements by issuing a public warning pursuant to art. 1:94 Wft. A public warning is neither 
a sanction, nor meant to come in lieu of enforcement.757 If LTV requirements for covered bonds are 
breached, it can be mentioned in the register that the bonds do not comply with art. 129 CRR.758 
 
Criminal sanctions 
Apart from administrative sanctions, banks violating rules related to capital requirements can face 
criminal sanctions. Criminal sanctions are mainly intended as an ultimum remedium, for severe 
violations, in particular where the offender willingly and knowingly damages the integrity of the 
                                                          
748 Art. 1:77(1) Wft. 
749 Art. 14(5) Regulation 1024/2013. 
750 Art. 1:97(1)Wft and art. 1:98 Wft. A fine is irreversible if it cannot anymore be challenged for the court (for 
more on challenging administrative fines, see Voerman & Bast (2011), pp. 118-122). For more about procedural 
aspects of the administrative fine, see Hartmann (2013), p. 238.  
751 Cf. Russchen & Zwinkels (2017), pp. 291-293. 
752 Art. 1:97(3)-(4) and 1:99(1) Wft. 
753 Art. 1:98 Wft.  
754 Roth (2013), pp. 253-254; Mein (2015a), pp. 237,240-241, 278-279. Cf. Schermer (2012), pp. 466-468; Mein 
(2015b), pp. 273-274; Beijering-Beck (2012), p. 59. 
755 See e.g. Albers (2014), p. 59. Cf. Beijering-Beck (2012), pp. 63-68; Blomberg (2013), pp. 138-139. 
756 For a discussion of the existing procedural safeguards, as well as their shortcomings, see e.g. Beijering-Beck 
(2012), pp. 73-108; Aelen (2013).  
757 Cf. Roth (2006); Michiels (2007); Beijering-Beck (2012), p. 58. 
758 Art. 3:33a(3) Wft. Cf. Scheltema (2015), p. 184. 
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financial system.759 For other offences, administrative sanctions are considered more efficient, in terms 
of both time and costs.760 The so-called una via-principle prohibits imposing both an administrative 
and a criminal sanction for the same offence.761  
 
The Wet op de Economische Delicten (WED) (Act on Economic Offences) penalises breaches of a range 
of provisions of the Wft.762 These include art. 3:57 Wft, which requires banks to upheld the capital 
requirements of the CRR.763 It does not include provisions on covered bonds requirements. DNB can 
report a breach of these requirements to the Public Prosecution Service, which can start proceedings. 
If intent can be proven, the maximum sanction for breaching rules regarding capital requirements is 
imprisonment for two years, a community service, or a fine of € 82,000.764 If conducting this offence 
has become a habit, the maximum sanctions are imprisonment for four years, a community service, or 
a fine of € 820,000.765 If no intent can be proven, the maximum sanction is imprisonment for a year, a 
community service, or a fine of € 82,000.766 Other possible sanctions include taking away the benefits 
of the offence, closing the bank up to a year, or appointing an administrator for three years.767 
However, temporary closing a bank is only realistic if the bank is not systemically important. 
 
The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement 
Proportionate enforcement is possible, since a whole range of enforcement measures is available, 
from light to severe sanctions.768 So, the enforcement pyramid can be applied. However, Dutch law 
grants only some of the enforcement powers to the ECB, which lacks certain instruments in this 
pyramid, such as the order for incremental penalty payments. Nevertheless, in combination with its 
                                                          
759 Leliveld (2009), p. 219; Mein (2015c), p. 258. 
760 Hartmann & Kraaijveld (2013), pp. 52-53; Mein (2015c), pp. 257-258. 
761 Art. 5:44(1) Awb (supra, footnote 741). Cf. Bierman et al. (2015), p. 433. 
762 Art. 1(2) Wet op de Economische Delicten (WED), available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002063. For 
a discussion of the rationale behind the WED, see De Rijck (2016), and for a discussion of the choice between 
criminal and administrative sanctions for punishing violations, see Albers (2014) and Mein (2015a), pp. 72-92. 
763 Supra, footnotes 737 and 738. 
764 Art. 6(1) and 2(1) WED in combination with art. 23(4) and 23(9) Wetboek van Strafrecht (Criminal Code) 
(available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001854) and art. I of Besluit van 10 november 2015 tot wijziging 
van de bedragen van de categorieën, bedoeld in artikel 23, vierde lid, van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, available 
at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2015-420.html. The initial maximum fine of 20,500 can be 
raised till € 82,000, if the bank profited more than € 5,125 from the offence.  
765 Ibidem. The initial maximum fine of 82,000 can be raised till € 820,000, if the bank profited more than € 
20,500 from the offence. 
766 Supra, footnote 765. 
767 Art. 7-8 WED. 
768 Whether sanctions will be imposed proportionately in individual cases is another question. According to 
Mein (2015a), DNB takes the severity of the violations into account when deciding to impose a fine, as well as 
when deciding the magnitude of the fine (pp. 255-277).  
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powers as granted under EU law, such as the possibility to impose periodic penalty payments, the ECB 
has almost all enforcement powers at its disposal when supervising Dutch banks, including the 
possibility to sanction individuals.   
 
Dissuasive enforcement is an option as well, because all conditions are reasonably fulfilled: (1) the 
most severe sanctions are threatening, (2) financial penalties up to several million euros and up to 10% 
of annual turnover can be imposed, (3) publication of sanctions, including the administrative fine, is 
mandatory and (4) both the banks and the individuals can be punished, and (5) the possibility of 
imprisonment as a sanction of last resort, at the top of the enforcement pyramid, adds to the 
dissuasiveness of the enforcement regime. Nevertheless, improvements are possible. Most 
importantly, requiring publication in a manner that reaches consumers will enhance its effectiveness 
as a naming-and-shaming device, which currently is sub-optimal.769 In addition, the system can be 
improved by obliging publication of all sanctions imposed for breaches of capital requirements. In its 
supervisory strategy of 2014-2018, DNB acknowledges that it can improve its transparency in the 
publication of sanctions in order to increase general prevention.770 Moreover, Mein (2015a), who 
investigated the practice of imposing fines by the two financial supervisors in the Netherlands, found 
that DNB is reluctant to impose administrative fines for violations of prudential requirements.771 
Generally, it prefers informal enforcements measures, out of fear to damage the working relation with 
the supervised banks. This reluctance means that the chance that banks actually face fines is relatively 
low, which might hurt the dissuasiveness of the regime. Nevertheless, according to several lawyers 
interviewed by Mein (2015a), it seems that the culture within DNB is changing, leading to a more 
stringent enforcement style.772 
 
3.2.2.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of capital- and funding-based 
instruments in Irish law 
The Irish competent authority, the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) can take Pillar 2 measures, such as 
restricting business, or requiring banks to hold additional capital, if a bank does not meet the capital 
requirements.773 If a bank does not meet the requirements of the CCB, it faces restrictions on the 
distribution of capital, and it must submit a capital conservation plan indicating how the requirements 
                                                          
769 Cf. Van Erp (2010), pp. 420, 427-429; Van Erp (2011), pp. 289-290, 296: Mein (2015a), pp. 143-144.  
770 De Nederlandsche Bank (2014a), p. 24. 
771 Mein (2015a), pp. 245-247. 
772 Ibidem, pp. 253-254. 
773 Regulation 92 S.I. 158/2014 (supra, footnote 595). 
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will be met, within five working days after identifying that it fails to meet these requirements.774 These 
measures are not sanctions, but put pressure on banks to comply with financial regulation.  
 
As is common in the Irish regulatory system, the Central Bank of Ireland possesses the power to impose 
administrative sanctions, but subject to some form of appeal to or review by a court.775 This 
construction was not without questions; it has been discussed whether imposing high administrative 
financial penalties – also called civil penalties or civil financial sanctions – by regulators is 
constitutionally allowed, or whether their seemingly punitive character would require infliction by a 
criminal court.776 However, the Supreme Court allows the imposition of civil penalties, unless certain 
indicia, which reveal the criminal character of the penalty, are fulfilled, and unless sanctions are 
excessive and disproportionate in relation to the administrative objective.777 Hence, administrative 
sanctions can be imposed by the Central Bank of Ireland, if they are proportionate. All administrative 
enforcement powers that have been granted to the Central Bank of Ireland, can be exercised as well 
by the ECB, insofar necessary for performing its function within the SSM.778  
 
The Central Bank Act 1942 allows imposing various sanctions on a regulated financial service provider 
which is committing or has committed a prescribed contravention, such as not complying with capital 
requirements and LTV limits related to covered bonds.779 Instead of imposing sanctions, the Central 
Bank Act 1942 also permits settlement by means of a written agreement.780 The terms of the 
                                                          
774 Regulations 129-130 S.I. 158/2014. 
775 Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2016), p. 19. Decisions of the CBI can be appealed to the Appeals 
Tribunal and subsequently to the High Court (sections 33AW and Part VIIA of the Central Bank Act 1942). A 
consolidated version of the Central Bank Act 1942 is available at 
http://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/1942/act/22/front/revised/en/html. 
776 Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2016), pp. 19, 22-24. 
777 Ibidem. Cf. McGrath (2015), pp. 19-22. On the indicia, see the case McLoughlin v. Tuite [1989] IR 82, 
referring to the indicia as identified in Melling v. Ó Mathgamhna [1962] IR 1. These cumulative indicia are that 
(1) an offence is treated as committed against the community rather than particular individuals, (2) a sanction 
is inflicted and (3) an element of intention or knowledge (mens rea) was demanded. On the required 
proportionality, see Registrar of Companies v. Judge David Anderson [2004] IESC 103.  
778 Art. 3 S.I. 495/2014, available at: http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2014/en/si/0495.html (last visited 22 July 
2015). 
779 According to section 33AQ Central Bank Act 1942, sanctions can be imposed for prescribed contraventions 
(cf. art. 33AN Central Bank Act 1942) of designated enactments, including the statutory instruments based 
upon these enactments (section 2 Central Bank Act 1942), and designated statutory instruments. The CRR 
qualifies as a designated enactment (section 2(2A)(f) Central Bank Act 1942). S.I. 158/2014, which implements 
the CRD IV, is a designated Statutory Instrument (Schedule 2, Part 2 of the Central Bank Act 1942). The Asset 
Covered Securities Act 2001 is a designated enactment too (Schedule 2, Part 1 of the Central Bank Act 1942). 
Imposing sanctions is only possible after an inquiry, or after a regulated financial service provider 
acknowledged committing the prescribed contravention (sections 33AQ and 33AR Central Bank Act 1942).   
780 Section 33AV Central Bank Act 1942. 
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settlement agreement may include the imposition of the sanctions provided for in the act.781 This 
agreement is binding for both the CBI and the offender.782 
 
This act provides for light sanctions such as cautions and reprimands, and the obligation to refund the 
sum charged for the provision of a service.783 Also monetary penalties can be imposed; up to € 1 
million, if the financial service provider is a natural person, and the greatest of either € 10 million or 
10% of the turnover, if the financial service provider is a body corporate or an unincorporated body.784 
Another severe sanction is the suspension of authorisation for up to one year or even a withdrawal of 
its authorisation.785 For credit institutions, the CBI can only propose to the ECB to withdraw 
authorisation, while for other financial institutions, the CBI is competent to withdraw authorisation.786 
The Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 added new enforcement measures to the 
arsenal of the CBI, inter alia wide powers to issue a direction in writing to a financial service provider 
which has failed to comply with, is failing to comply with or is likely to fail to comply with financial 
services legislation, in order to require certain actions.787 The act provides a limitative, but 
comprehensive, list of actions, which the CBI may require a financial service provider to take. This 
includes the suspension of the provision of any financial service up to 12 months, raising capital or 
modifying business practices.788  
 
                                                          
781 Section 33AV(2) Central Bank Act 1942. Cf. Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2016), pp. 29-31; sub-section 
3.3.3. 
782 Section 33AV(2) Central Bank Act 1942. Cf. Murphy (2013), p. 257. 
783 Section 33AQ(3)(a)-(b) Central Bank Act 1942.  
784 Section 33AQ(3)(c) and 33AQ(4) Central Bank Act 1942. However, it is not allowed to impose a sanction that 
likely causes the financial service provider to cease business (section 33AS(1) Central Bank Act 1942).  
785 Section 33AQ(ca)-(cd) Central Bank Act 1942. Note that a specific measure for enforcing the LTV ratios for 
covered bonds is asking the High Court to prohibit a person to breach these ratios, or oblige a person to comply 
with these ratios, under the conditions which the High Court deems necessary (section 96 Asset Covered 
Securities Act 2001).  
786 Art. 14(5) Regulation 1024/2013. 
787 Section 45(1) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2013/en/act/pub/0026/index.html, and a consolidated version at 
http://revisedacts.lawreform.ie/eli/2013/act/26/front/revised/en/html. This act not only introduced some new 
enforcement powers, but also significantly changed some existing powers, that are included in the Central Bank 
Act 1942. Cf. Murphy (2013), pp. 255-256. Financial services legislation includes the CRR (section 3(1) Central 
Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 in combination with section 2(2A)(f) Central Bank Act 1942). 
Moreover, section 47(1) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 allows the CBI to apply to the 
High Court for an order to restrain a natural or legal person from engaging in the conduct that does not comply 
with financial services legislation. 
788 Section 45(3) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. Some far-reaching directions require 
prior approval of the High Court, but this is not the case in any of the examples mentioned in the main text, or 
any direction which is directly relevant for ensuring compliance with capital requirements (section 46 Central 
Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013). 
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Besides sanctions for banks, the Central Bank Act 1942 provides for the imposition of sanctions on 
persons in the management of the financial service providers, if they participated in the breach. This 
includes a caution or reprimand, but also a monetary penalty of maximum € 1 million, and a 
disqualification from being concerned in the management of a regulated financial service provider for 
a certain period.789  
 
Publication of administrative sanctions is mandatory. Regulation 56 Statutory Instrument (S.I.) 
158/2014, which implements the CRD IV, repeats – almost literally – art. 68(1) Directive 2013/36.790 
Hence, publication of any administrative penalty imposed for violating of capital requirements need to 
be published under the conditions mentioned in that provision, without undue delay after the offender 
is informed of those sanctions.791 The Central Bank of Ireland must publish details of violations of LTV 
limits related to covered bonds which it encounters in an inquiry as well as details of imposed sanctions 
in a form and manner which it considers appropriate.792 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the measures to enforce capital requirement enable proportionate 
enforcement by either the CBI or the ECB, because the enforcement pyramid can duly be applied with 
a range of measures available, from light sanctions as cautions and reprimands, to severe sanctions 
like fines and the suspension of the right to provide loans.793 Even though criminal enforcement is not 
possible for violations of capital requirements, dissuasive enforcement is achievable, since all four 
conditions for administrative sanctions are largely fulfilled. Indeed, the IMF judges as well that the CBI 
‘is equipped with sufficient discretionary enforcement powers to address areas of weaknesses in banks 
or their non-compliance with applicable laws, regulations or supervisory instructions.’794  
 
3.2.2.3. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of capital- and funding-based 
instruments in German law 
In Germany, the powers to enforce financial regulation have been included in the Gesetz über das 
Kreditwesen (KWG) (Banking Act).795 Besides its legal powers, BaFin uses informal contacts and moral 
                                                          
789 Section 33AQ(5) Central Bank Act 1942. However, it is not allowed to impose a sanction that likely causes 
the person to be adjudicated bankrupt. (section 33AS(2) Central Bank Act 1942). 
790 Supra, footnote 595. 
791 Regulation 56(1) S.I. 158/2014. Note that the sanction itself takes effect only after it becomes final (section 
33AW Central Bank Act 1942). 
792 Section 33BC Central Bank Act 1942. 
793 Whether sanctions will be imposed proportionately in individual cases is another question. 
794 International Monetary Fund (2014a), p. 17. 
795 For online access to the KWG, see footnote 212. 
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suasion as first steps before employing formal and more severe enforcement measures.796 Also, the 
KWG provides BaFin, the German competent authority, with several powers to enforce compliance 
with capital requirements before sanctions are applied. A bank which does not meet the requirements 
of the combined requirements of the CCB and other capital buffers faces restrictions regarding the 
distribution of capital, and must submit a capital conservation plan indicating how the requirements 
will be met, within five working days (with the possibility of an extention to 10 working days) after 
identifying that it fails to meet these requirements.797 BaFin can approve this plan, or impose 
restrictions on the distribution of capital.798 The KWG also enables BaFin to use Pillar 2 powers to 
require banks to hold additional capital.799 Furthermore, according to § 45(1) KWG, a bank can be 
ordered to take certain measures – mainly prohibitions and limitations – to improve its capital 
adequacy if its financial position or profitability justifies the assumption that the capital requirements 
prescribed in art. 92-386 CRR or the imposed Pillar 2 measures will not be met.800 Imposing such 
prohibitions or limitations is only possible after the bank has received sufficient time to remedy the 
shortcomings, unless a foreseeable short-term deterioration of capital must be prevented.801  
 
In general, the KWG allows for the use of both administrative and criminal sanctions, but none of the 
available sanctions for violations of capital- and funding-based instruments are of a criminal nature.802 
None of the sanctions have explicitly been granted to the ECB. The KWG creates a layered system for 
enforcing the rules for assigning risk-weights to household loans. Firstly, § 6(3) KWG allows BaFin to 
issue orders to banks and their senior management that are appropriate and necessary to stop 
violations of regulatory requirements. Secondly, BaFin can impose administrative fines for violations 
of rules of the KWG and the CRR, albeit not directly for a breach of the specific provisions in the CRR 
that set forth risk-weights – art. 124 and 164 CRR – or the provision implementing the power to impose 
Pillar 2 measures – § 10(3) KWG.803 Instead, an intentional or negligent violation of an order pursuant 
to § 45(1)-(2) KWG, as described in the previous paragraph, is punishable with a fine (but neglecting 
an order pursuant to § 6(3) KWG is not).804 The maximum fine is € 200.000, but it can be raised if 
                                                          
796 As indicated in an interview with an official of BaFin. 
797 § 10i(6) KWG. Cf. art. 142 Directive 2013/36. 
798 § 10i(7)-(8) KWG. 
799 § 10(3) KWG. 
800 § 45(1) KWG. 
801 § 45(5) KWG. 
802 For example, §§ 54-55b KWG provide for criminal sanctions. 
803 Cf. § 56(5) KWG. 
804 § 56(2)(3)(j) KWG. For a brief comment on the required intent or negligence, see Kirchhartz (2013), p. 398. 
Aside, the English translation of the KWG does not show that intent or negligence is required for a breach.  
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necessary in order in order to ensure rthat the fine surpasses the benefit of the offence.805 For legal 
persons it can be increased to 10% of annual net turnover in the year before the offence or twice the 
amount of the benefit.806 Orders and fines that are imposed and legally enforceable, ought to be 
published without delay on the website of BaFin.807  
 
Imposing these fines upon banks is, however, not straightforward, because ‘German law, including 
German banking regulatory law, is based on the concept of sanctioning natural persons for their 
individual intentional or negligent misconduct.’808 Although obligations of the KWG address banks, 
legal entities only can receive fines in a limited number of cases, if evidence suggests misconduct by 
managing directors or very high-level employees. Relevant for the attribution of breaches of regulatory 
law to the bank, its owner, representatives and managing directors are the triad of §§ 9, 30 and 130 of 
the Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (OWiG) (Act on Regulatory Offences).809 § 130 OWiG, in 
combination with § 9 OWiG, enables imposing fines on the owner(s), representatives and managing 
directors of a bank for not taking sufficient internal measures to ensure compliance with the regulatory 
requirements.810 § 30 OWiG enables the attribution of the misconduct of representatives, managing 
directors, and other employees with controlling powers, such as compliance officers, to the legal 
entity.811 The maximum fine for the legal person to which a certain regulatory offence is attributed, is 
the maximum fine of the regulatory offence (if this is not a criminal offence).812 The attribution of 
violations conducted by “normal” employees to a bank can be more difficult.813 Hence, both the bank 
itself and its managing directors can receive high fines, but imposing a fine upon a bank might not be 
                                                          
805 § 56(7) KWG and § 17(4) and § 30(3) OWiG (infra, footnote 809). 
806 § 56(7) KWG. 
807 § 60b(1) KWG. Uwer & Rademacher (2015) argue that systemic interpretation of this provision in the 
context of the KWG leads to the conclusion that this publication needs to be seen as punishment, despite its 
preventive aim, because it is included in the part of the KWG about sanctions (p. 147). They also discuss the 
question of whether § 60b KWG is in conformity with German constitutional law. 
808 Schneider (2014), p. 22. Cf. Reichling (2013), p. 2233. 
809 Cf. Moosmayer (2012), p. 3014. OWiG, BGBl. I, 1987, 602, is available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/owig_1968/ and last amended at 18 July 2017. 
810 See the discussion of §§ 9 and 130 OWiG in the handbook of Bohnert et al. (2016). Cf. Engelhart (2012), pp. 
403-408). 
811 Schneider (2014), p. 22; Engelhart (2012), pp. 376-378, 390-395; Reichling (2013), p. 2233. See also the 
discussion of § 30 OWiG in the handbook of Bohnert et al. (2016). Note that culpability is a nessarary condition 
for a regulatory offence, according to § 1(1) OWiG. Cf. § 10 OWiG. The concept vorwerfbar in § 1(1) OWiG is 
similar to the criminal law concept of schuldfähig (Engelhart, 2012, pp. 330). In § 30 OWiG, the intent or 
negligence of the naturel person is attributed to the legal entity: Engelhart, (2012), pp. 376-378. § 59 KWG also 
applies § 30 OWiG to banks which are established in another member state of the European Economic Area 
and which provide services in Germany through branches or across borders.   
812 § 30(2) OWiG. 
813 Schneider (2014), p. 22. 
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easy if the breaches cannot be attributed to senior representatives of the bank. In case of widespread 
breaches, this will probably not be a problem. 
 
The KWG creates non-pecuniary enforcements measures as well. A special representative can be 
appointed for taking suitable measures to set up and safeguard a proper business organisation, and 
for monitoring compliance with orders of BaFin.814 Ultimately, the senior managers responsible for the 
violations of the rules on risk-weighted capital requirements can be removed, or the authorisation of 
a bank can be revoked.815 A revocation of authorisation is published in the Federal Gazette.816 
 
In view of the available sanctions, it can be concluded that proportionate sanctions can be imposed in 
Germany. It is even required to start with light sanctions before imposing more severe sanctions. 
Nevertheless, although inducing compliance by means of using the enforcement pyramid is possible 
the menu of potential sanctions is limited, compared to the Netherlands and Ireland. In addition, 
escalation is impossible if an order pursuant to § 6(3) KWG is neglected. Hence, there is room to 
improve the working of the enforcement pyramid. Dissuasive enforcement is possible, since deterrent 
fines can be imposed, both on individuals and banks, and ultimately the authorisation of a bank can be 
revoked. Moreover, many sanctions will be published. However, as explained above, inflicting a fine 
upon a bank migh not be easy in certain instances, which somewhat decreases its deterring effect. 
 
The measures for ensuring compliance with the LTV limit determining eligibility of mortgage loans as 
cover assets for Pfandbriefe, are included in the PfandBG. Firstly, appropriate and necessary 
instructions can be given.817 In addition, in certain situations, among other things, if deficiencies in the 
assessment of the mortgage lending value are present, a Pfandbrief issuer can be obliged to meet 
higher requirements than the standard requirements for the cover pool.818 Moreover, violations of the 
LTV limit determining eligibility of mortgage loans as cover assets for Pfandbriefe, are a criminal 
offence, punishable with imprisonment up to a year or a fine.819 The maximum fine is € 1,000 if the 
violation is committed by a natural person, and € 10 million if committed by a legal person.820 As 
                                                          
814 § 45c(2)(5)-(6) KWG. 
815 §§ 35(2)(6), 36(1) and 36(2) KWG. For credit institutions, BaFin can only propose to the ECB to revoke 
authorisation; for other financial institutions, BaFin is competent to withdraw authorisation (art. 14(5) 
Regulation 1024/2013). 
816 § 38(3) KWG. 
817 § 3(1) PfandBG. 
818 § 4(3b) PfandBG. 
819 § 4(7) in combination with § 38 PfandBG. Smola (2014), p. 186; Quirk (2010), p. 1336. 
820 § 17(1) and 30(1)-(2) OWiG. 
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explained above, managing directors can be fined as well, based on §§ 130 and 9 OWiG. A fine must 
surpass the benefit of the offence and must, if necessary, be raised above these maximum amounts.821 
If a fine of more than € 200 is imposed upon a bank in a criminal procedure, it is published in the central 
trade register.822  
 
All in all, it is possible to enforce the LTV limit determining eligibility of mortgage loans as cover assets 
for Pfandbriefe proportionately, with sanctions ranging from instructions to large fines. Still, the 
sanction menu is somewhat limited, in light of the enforcement pyramid. Dissuasive sanctions can be 
imposed, because large fines are available, managing directors can be fined, fines imposed upon banks 
are published, and criminal prosecution is possible.  
 
3.3. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of capital- and 
funding-based instruments 
This section analyses to what extent capital- and funding-based instruments can be applied, enforced 
and amended independently, and to what extent rules foster the ability and willingness of a supervisor 
to act. Since supervisors have no powers to adjust LTV ratios for covered bonds, the application of this 
instrument does not require discussion. The future leverage ratio is not discussed either, because it is 
not yet known how it will be applied. 
 
All capital-based instruments have a clear legal basis in the CRR or the national legislation 
implementing the CRD IV, but their policy objectives are not always crystal-clear. Uncertainty about its 
objective may hamper a swift use of an instrument, among other things, by facilitating inaction and 
resistance. Art. 124 and 164 CRR have both microprudential and macroprudential aims, and an 
increase of the risk-weights may be motivated by both microprudential and macroprudential reasons. 
Yet, the mentioned reasons for increasing risk-weights – loss experience on mortgage loans in the 
member state, forward-looking immovable property markets developments, financial stability 
considerations – suggest a primarily macroprudential focus, although some of them can be interpreted 
microprudentially.823 For Pillar 2 measures, there is a debate whether it is desirable to take them for 
macroprudential purposes, which resulted in the proposal to use them only for microprudential 
                                                          
821 §§ 17(4) and 30(2) OWiG. 
822 § 149 Gewerbeordnung (Industrial Code), BGBl. I, 1999, 202, available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/gewo/. Cf. Reichling (2013), pp. 2233-2234.  
823 Art. 124(2) and 164(5) Regulation 575/2013. 
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reasons.824 The policy objective for national flexibility measures – mitigating intensifying systemic risks 
– is clear, except for its broadness. Finally, it is beyond doubt that the CCB is meant to address systemic 
risks resulting from excessive credit growth.  
 
The objectives of the instruments correspond with the mandate of the supervisors in charge with 
applying them, especially in case of DNB, the CBI and the ECB. In the Netherlands and Ireland, the 
central bank is in charge of increasing the risk-weights and setting the CCB, while BaFin has this 
responsibility in Germany.825 The ECB is considered the competent and designated authority as well, 
for the purpose of exercising its micro and macroprudential tasks within the SSM.826 Both the ECB and 
the Dutch and Irish central banks have a mandate that explicitly includes contributing to financial 
stability.827 In Germany, the Bundesbank has the main responsibility of monitoring financial stability.828 
BaFin’s mandate for banking supervision does not explicitly differentiate between micro- and 
macroprudential tasks, but the wording of the mandate encompasses macroprudential supervision. 829 
However, an explicit macroprudential mandate might help to ensure commitment, if BaFin would be 
confronted with pressure when implementing macroprudential measures. 
 
Of the various discussed capital-based instruments, the room to act is only constrained for national 
flexibility measures, because a range of conditions needs to be fulfilled when using this option to raise 
risk-weights.830 Firstly, the supervisor intending to increase risk-weights must submit – to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the ESRB and EBA – quantitative or qualitative evidence 
showing changes in the intensity of a systemic risk, which pose a threat to national financial stability.831 
Furthermore, it must justify why this risk cannot adequately be addressed by means of (1) the 
procedures of art. 124 and 164 CRR, (2) Pillar 2 measures and (3) a countercyclical capital buffer.832 So, 
                                                          
824 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1.2. 
825 For the Netherlands, see art. 1:24, 3:66 and 3:111a Wft. For Ireland, see regulations 4(1), 85, 91 and 92 S.I. 
158/2014 and regulation 3 S.I. 159/2014. Fore Germany, see sections 6(1), 10(3) and 10d(3)-(9) KWG. These 
three supervisors are both the competent and designated authority. According to the CRR and CRD IV, the 
competent authority decides on increasing the risk-weights by means of art. 124 and 164 CRR and on Pillar 2 
measures, while either the competent or the designated authority decides on national flexibility measures, and 
the designated authority decides on the countercyclical capital buffer. 
826 Art. 9(1) Regulation 1024/2013. For a discussion of the working of the SSM, see sub-section 3.2.1.2.  
827 ECB: art. 127(5) TFEU and art. 1 Regulation 1024/2013. DNB and CBI: see sub-section 1.3.4.2. 
828 Cf. sub-section 1.3.4.2. 
829 § 6(2) and 6(4) KWG. 
830 Art. 458(2) Regulation 575/2013. 
831 Art. 458(2)(a)-(b) Regulation 575/2013. 
832 Art. 458(2)(c) Regulation 575/2013. It also needs to justify why the systemic risk buffer cannot adequately 
address this risk, but that buffer is not relevant in this example, since it is not meant for targeting excessive 
credit growth, but for ‘long term non-cyclical systemic or macroprudential risks’ (art. 133(1) Directive 2013/36).  
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there is a hierarchy between options granted in the CRR and CRD IV for increasing risk-weights.833 In 
addition, the authority must demonstrate that the increased risk-weights are ‘suitable, effective and 
proportionate to address the situation’.834 Finally, an assessment of the impact of the increased risk-
weights on the internal market must be included.835 By creating obstacles for using national flexibility 
measures, thes conditions included in art. 458 CRR diminish the room to opt for the possibility to raise 
risk-weights by means of art. 458 CRR (and reduce the administrative discretion in strict sense). 
Simultaneously, these conditions create an accountability mechanism between the supervisors on the 
one hand and EU institutons and bodies on the other hand, especially since the Council can oppose 
the proposed measures, on a proposal of the Commission, while taking utmost account of the opinions 
of the EBA and the ESRB.836 
 
3.3.1. Operational independence: general issues 
The independence of the supervisors to take decisions to use the discussed instruments differs per 
supervisor and instrument. Nationally, limitations to this independence are mainly related to the role 
of the government and, in particular, the Minister of Finance. DNB’s operational independence with 
respect to macroprudential policy is impaired, at least formally. DNB is managed by its Governing 
Board, consisting of the President and three Executive Directors. They are appointed by the 
government, and can only be dismissed if no longer fulfilling the requirements for the performance of 
their duties or if being guilty of serious misconduct.837 For its supervisory tasks, DNB is a non-
departmental administrative body, meaning that it is not hierarchically subject to a minister.838 The 
Minister of Finance is allowed to ask DNB for information which it needs to assess how DNB applies 
the Wft.839 This facilitates holding DNB to account.840 The minister cannot annul DNB’s supervisory 
                                                          
833 Cf. European Banking Authority (2014b), pp. 20-21, 56; European Systemic Risk Board (2014b), pp. 7-8, 14-
16. 
834 Art. 458(2)(e) Regulation 575/2013. 
835 Art. 458(2)(f) Regulation 575/2013. 
836 See further sub-section 3.3.2.2. 
837 Art. 12 Bankwet 1998. Cf. art. 6 Statuten van de Nederlandsche Bank N.V., available at 
http://www.dnb.nl/over-dnb/organisatie/organisatievorm/index.jsp (last visited 16 July 2016). Since DNB is 
joint-stock company with the Dutch state as only shareholder, it is not only governed by laws, but also by its 
statutes.  
838 Art. 1:30 Wft. For more on non- departmental administrative bodies, see Van Wijk et al. (2014), pp. 63-65. 
839 Art. 1:42 Wft; art. 14 Bankwet 1998.  
840 The Minister of Finance uses this information to assess DNB’s supervision. Every five years, he must send a 
report to the parliament for the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the functioning of DNB and 
the AFM (art. 39 Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen). Moreover, if DNB seriously neglects its tasks, the 
minister can take the necessary measures (art. 1:23 Wft). For a general discussion of the powers of the Ministry 
of Finance vis-à-vis AFM and DNB, see 
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decisions, nor has the general power to issue policy rules to DNB.841 However, the minister can issue 
policy rules on general and institutional issues, like tasks of and cooperation among supervisors.842 This 
may indirectly affect decisions on DNB. Moreover, if DNB adopts generally binding regulations 
(algemeen verbindende voorschriften) which are based on a provision in the Wft, the Minister of 
Finance has an override mechanism at his disposal.843 The Minister of Finance is allowed to ask DNB to 
change these generally binding regulations, if they result in an unreasonable burden for the financial 
markets. It is not further defined when a burden is unreasonable. If DNB does not change them, the 
Minister is allowed to replace them by means of a ministerial decree or even repeal them. If DNB uses 
the macroprudential capital-based instruments of the CRR and CRD IV, this will be in the form of 
generally binding regulations based on the Wft.844 As no further conditions or specifications are 
attached to this power of the Minister of Finance, the use of this override-mechanism is not rule-based. 
It reduces the operational independence of DNB to decide about the use of these macroprudential 
instruments. This override-mechanism is one-sided too, meaning that it only can be used if generally 
binding regulations of DNB are deemed too burdensome, and not if these are too light. This mechanism 
may increase accountability, by stimulating DNB to justify its actions, and by enabling correction of 
DNB’s actions. However, it may also increase the inaction bias. Until now, there is no actual 
interference with the regulatory powers of DNB, since the Minister of Finance has never used this 
override-mechanism.  
 
In Ireland, decisions on increasing risk-weights and setting the CCB are made by the Central Bank 
Commission, the decision-making body of the CBI.845 Examining how independent the Central Bank of 
                                                          
http://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9tvgajcovz8izf_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vjinnc15qs
oz/f=/blg312906.pdf (last visited 15 February 2017). 
841 Art. 21 and 22 Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen (Framework act for non-departmental administrative 
bodies) allow ministers to do this, but these are not applicable to DNB (art. 1:30 Wft). The Kaderwet 
zelfstandige bestuursorganen is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020495.   
842 Art. 1:25b(1) Wft. This provision was introduced in 2012, because the Minister of Finance desired to 
improve its supervision on the system of financial supervision. (Ministerie van Financiën (2011), pp. 1, 12-16). 
According to the explanatory memorandum (https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32782-3.html), the 
minister must consult the financial supervisors before issuing policy rules, and may not use the provision to 
deal with individual cases or to change open norms in the Wft. The Council of State criticised the introduction 
of this provision, because of its effects on the independence of the financial supervisors. It stated that the 
constraining clauses mentioned in the explanatory memorandum, should at least be incorporated in the Wft 
itself (https://www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/zoeken-in-adviezen/tekst-advies.html?id=9718 (both last visited 
23 April 2015). Until now, no policy rules have been issued by the Minister of Finance based on this provision. 
843 Art. 1:29 Wft. 
844 See chapters 2-3 Regeling specifieke bepalingen CRD IV en CRR (Regulation specific provisions CRD IV and 
CRR), available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0034435/2015-10-15, and the Explanatory Memorandum to 
chapter 3 of this regulation, published in the Staatscourant, 19 december 2013, Nr. 35423, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2013-35423.pdf (both last visited at 22 April 2017).  
845 Section 18B(1) Central Bank Act 1942.  
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Ireland can exercise its powers is certainly an exercise of more than only theoretical relevance. Prior 
to the crisis, Irish financial supervision was characterised by a light-touch approach, without much 
interference with banks.846 The supervisory regime during this period has been described in several 
reports and articles as extremely weak and ineffective, while enforcement was weak as well.847 
Basically, according to Honohan (2010), the Central Bank of Ireland was captured.848 An extensive 
inquiry by a Committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas, the Irish parliament, confirmed all these 
findings.849 Other authors point as well at capture of the government by interest groups, and the close 
relationships between the Department of Finance and the CBI.850 A broad range of reforms has been 
undertaken, affecting the structure, culture and approach of financial regulation and supervision.851 In 
response to the concerns about capture, a deliberate choice was made to appoint “outsiders” to key 
posts within the CBI concerned with financial regulation.852 Furthermore, the previously existing 
mandate of the CBI to promote the financial service industry, which could result in conflicts with its 
role of supervisor, has been removed.853 Despite these reforms, the independence of the Central Bank 
Commission is somewhat impaired, among other things by its composition. Firstly, the Secretary 
General of the Department for Finance is part of the Central Bank Commission.854 Secondly, one of the 
grounds for dismissal of members of this body is relatively vague.855 The Minister for Finance has the 
right to do so if he is of opinion that this is necessary or desirable for enabling the Central Bank 
Commission to function effectively.856 The resulting influence of the Minister for Finance on the 
decisions of the Central Bank of Ireland may impede its independence, as also signalled by the IMF – 
which however did not (yet) observe actual political interference.857 
 
                                                          
846 Whelan (2014), p. 431. Cf. O’Donovan (2016); Scott (2012), p. 63. 
847 Connor et al. (2012), p. 73; Honohan (2010), para 4.36-4.38, 4.46. Cf. Collins (2011); O’Donovan (2016); 
McGrath (2015), pp. 150, 162. 
848 Honohan (2010), para 1.13. Cf. Regling & Watson (2010), pp. 37-39; Scott (2014), pp. 355-356.  
849 Houses of the Oireachtas (2016), pp. 10-12, 109-147, 158-160.  
850 Byrne (2012), pp. 201-202; Westrup (2012), pp. 72, 77. Cf. Ross & Webb (2012), pp. 15-16; McGrath (2015), 
p. 110. 
851 For an overview of all the reforms, see Appendix 11 in Houses of the Oireachtas (2016). Cf. O’Sullivan and 
Kinsella (2013), pp. 12-13. 
852 Scott (2012), p. 71. 
853 Houses of the Oireachtas (2016), pp. 143-146, 433; Collins (2011).  
854 Section 18CA(a) Central Bank Act 1942. The Secretary General is the highest official of the Department of 
Finance. 
855 This concerns the six to eight other members of this Commission – with in total ten to twelve members – 
which are appointed and can be dismissed by the Minister for Finance (sections 18CA(b), 24 and 25(3) Central 
Bank Act 1942). The Governor of the Central Bank is appointed by the Irish President on advice of the 
government (section 19(1)). The Heads of Central Banking and Financial Regulation are appointed by the 
Central Bank Commission itself, and require consent of the Minister of Finance (section 25(3)(b)). 
856 Section 25(3)(b) Central Bank Act 1942. 
857 International Monetary Fund (2014a), p. 13. 
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The independence of BaFin is significantly circumscribed by the legal and technical oversight that the 
Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF) (Federal Ministry of Finance) exercises.858 This means that it 
‘can formally decide on every single organisational or supervisory operation and every policy-making 
activity of BaFin.’859 Specifically, legal oversight means that the BMF can examine the legality of BaFin’s 
decisions, whereas technical oversight entails that the BMF can review whether decisions are 
appropriate.860 This legal and technical oversight has been restricted by several principles; lastly 
revised in 2013.861 These principles show that providing information is an important aspect of the 
relationship between BaFin and the BMF. The ministry needs to receive draft versions of regulations 
and decrees which BaFin intends to issue.862 In addition, BaFin needs to inform the BMF if it intends to 
publish a circular (Rundschreiben), a non-binding interpretation of law, on an individual regulatory 
issue which is not at par with regulations, in terms of content and impact. BaFin can only publish it if 
the BMF does not object within five working days.863 When intending to change its administrative 
practice – i.e. the manner of applying financial legislation – in the application of particularly significant 
supervisory rules, BaFin must notify the BMF; consent can be assumed in the absence of an objection 
within ten working days.864 Hence, the BMF is empowered to exercise control over certain important 
aspects BaFin’s work, but it will not be involved in individual supervisory decisions. BMF will not be 
involved as long as BaFin’s announcements on raising risk-weighted capital requirements are on par 
with regulations, and its supervisory practice is not significantly overhauled.  
 
In practice the oversight by the Ministry of Finance is much less intrusive, due to lack of capabilities, in 
particular (qualified) staff, as the research of Handke (2012) shows.865 The IMF concludes that BaFin in 
                                                          
858 § 2 Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (FinDAG) (Act Establishing the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority), BGBl. I, 2002, 1310, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/findag/, 
and an English translation at 
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Aufsichtsrecht/Gesetz/findag_aktuell_en.html 
(both last visited 30 July 2016). There are no issues with appointing and dismissing BaFin Executive Board that 
might hamper its independence. Its members, the President and four Chief Executive Directors, are appointed 
by the German federal president, on proposal of the government, and can be discharged similarly, but only for 
an important reason (‘aus wichtigem Grund’) (§§ 6(1) and 9 FinDAG). 
859 Handke (2012), p. 239. 
860 Forkel (2011), p. 101. 
861 These principles (including an English translation) are available at: 
http://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Aufsichtsrecht/Satzung/aufsicht_bmf_bafin.html 
(last visited 30 July 2016). 
862 Principle IV(1)(a). 
863 Principle IV(1)(b). 
864 Principle IV(1)(c). 
865 Handke (2012), pp. 239-242. 
3. Capital- and funding-based regulatory instruments 
145 
 
practice is sufficiently independent, and that evidence of interference of BMF with BaFin’s supervisory 
tasks is absent.866  
 
Nevertheless, an intervention by the BMF in BaFin’s policy cannot completely be excluded under the 
current legal regime. Dechent (2015) even argues that BaFin’s lack of independence is in conflict with 
requirements in EU law, such as those included in art. 4(4) Directive 2013/36 and art. 19(1) Regulation 
1024/2013.867 Meanwhile, these arrangements also mean that BaFin is hold to account for its actions. 
Although limited by the aforementioned principles, there still is room for intervention by the BMF, 
without the need to always offer a justification. Therefore, this mechanism might be improved if the 
BMF would be required to justify intervention in light of BaFin’s mandate and the objective of the 
proposed action. This will reduce the risk of inappropriate interventions by BMF. 
  
There is another actor involved in deciding about using macroprudential capital-based instruments: 
BaFin will normally only take major macroprudential decisions after a discussion of the issues in the 
Financial Stability Committee (see Box 3.2 below), although BaFin can act independently from it.868 
§48t KWG even explicitly states that BaFin can take the national flexibility measures when the Financial 
Stability Committee has identified changes in the intensity of systemic risks.  
 
The involvement of the Financial Stability Committee in the decision-making process on increasing risk-
weights and setting the CCB may increase BaFin’s attention for systemic risk and may improve 
acceptance of macroprudential measures. According to the IMF, FSB and the BIS, the power of 
macroprudential authorities like the German Financial Stability Committee to issue recommendations 
with a  
 
‘‘comply or explain’ mechanism can increase the chance of action being taken and ensures 
transparency and accountability of the relevant actors, while at the same time maintaining 
the operational independence of the recipient authority. (…) [It] may also help the recipient 
authorities to overcome industry opposition or political pressure.’869  
 
                                                          
866 International Monetary Fund (2011c), pp. 18, 42-43; International Monetary Fund (2016b), pp. 30-31. 
867 Dechent (2015), pp. 769-771. Forkel (2011) is critical as well on the lack of independence of BaFin, albeit 
from another perspective: he observes a conflict of interest for the BMF, which simultaneously is involved in 
overseeing BaFin’s supervision of the financial sector and borrowing from that financial sector (pp. 101-102). 
This specific conflict of interests is, however, not particularly relevant for this study on taking regulatory and 
supervisory measures to restrict lending to households. 
868 As indicated in an interview with an official of BaFin. 
869 International Monetary Fund, Financial Stability Board and Bank for International Settlements (2016), p. 8. 
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In principle, this is true, but it depends on the design of the ‘comply or explain’ mechanism. Since 
decisions in the German Financial Stability Committee about warnings and recommendations require 
unanimity, the Ministry of Finance can block them. This does not help to overcome political pressure. 
In a worst-case scenario, the inaction bias may even increase, if BaFin waits for a recommendation of 
the Financial Stability Committee to act.  
 
Box 3.2. The German Financial Stability Committee 
Tasks and powers of the Financial Stability Committee 
The Financial Stability Committee has been created at the end of 2012 by the adoption of the 
FinStabG.870 Its tasks include (1) discussing the factors relevant to financial stability, (2) 
strengthening the cooperation between the BMF, the Bundesbank and BaFin in the event of a 
financial crisis, (3) deliberating on the handling of ESRB warnings and recommendations, and (4) 
issuing warnings and recommendations on risks which may impair financial stability, as well as 
measures which it deems suitable and necessary to implement in order to avert these risks.871 Its 
warnings and recommendations can be addressed to the federal government, BaFin, or a public 
agency.872 Recommendations may be published, and are subject to a comply-or-explain principle. 
Non-compliance must be must substantiated in detail. 
 
Decision-making in the Financial Stability Committee 
The Committee has nine voting members, three representatives of the BMF, the Bundesbank and 
BaFin, and is chaired by BMF.873 Decisions on warnings and recommendations and their publication 
have to be taken unanimously.874 Since the Bundesbank is responsible for monitoring financial 
stability and identifying systemic risks, it is allotted the tasks of making proposals to the Financial 
Stability Committee to issue warnings and recommendations, and evaluating the implementation 
of the recommendations of the FSC.875  
 
The operational independence of the ECB, when performing its functions within the SSM, is guaranteed 
by the institutional setup of the SSM. With respect to its tasks within the SSM, the Supervisory Board 
is the key actor for taking decisions, albeit that the Governing Council can object to decisions. The 
                                                          
870 Supra, footnote 212 
871 § 2 FinStabG. 
872 § 3 FinStabG. 
873 § 2(3) FinStabG.  
874 § 2(5) FinStabG. 
875 § 1 FinStabG. 
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Supervisory Board consists of a Chair, a Vice-Chair, four ECB-representatives and representatives of 
national supervisory authorities.876 It decides with simple majority, with one vote per member.877 
Consequently, member states’ representatives can dominate decision-making.878 While Supervisory 
Board members are required to act independently and objectively in the interest of the EU as a 
whole,879 the question remains to what extent national interests influence decisions. Still, the final say 
is not for the Supervisory Board: it prepares complete draft decisions, which shall be deemed adopted, 
unless the Governing Council of the ECB objects within 10 days.880 Voting within the Governing Council 
is based on a system with rotating voting rights.881 The ECB, national central banks, and members of 
the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council may neither take instructions from EU institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies, nor from any government of a member state or from any other body.882 In 
turn, these actors must respect this.  
 
For its tasks within the SSM, the ECB has reporting obligations towards the European Parliament, the 
Commission, the Council and the Euro Group, and must respond to questions of the European 
Parliament and the Euro Group, orally or in writing.883 The Chair of the Supervisory Board can be 
requested to participate in hearings op the European Parliament. National parliaments also receive 
the ECB’s annual report, and may pose questions to the ECB. They also ‘may invite the Chair or a 
member of the Supervisory Board to participate in an exchange of views in relation to the supervision 
of credit institutions in that Member State together with a representative of the national competent 
authority.’884 Participation of the ECB in this exchange of views with national parliaments is not 
mandatory. These mechanisms improve the accountability of the ECB, but do not allow for attaching 
consequences to its (in)action. Procedures for dismissal of members of the Supervisory Board and the 
Governing Council which are appointed at EU level are sufficient to ensure independence.885 Yet, the 
                                                          
876 Art. 26(1) Regulation 1024/2013. The Chair is a full-time professional with no office at national supervisory 
authorities, while the Vice-Chair is a member of the Executive Board of the ECB (art. 26(3)). 
877 Art. 26(6) Regulation 1024/2013. In case of a draw, the Chair has a casting vote. 
878 Cf. Tröger (2014), pp. 478-479. 
879 Art. 19 Regulation 1024/2013. 
880 Art. 26(8) Regulation 1024/2013. 
881 Art. 10(2) Protocol 4 On the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank and Decision 2008/29 of the European Central Bank of 18 December 2008, OJ 2009, L3/4. 
882 Art. 130 TFEU, art. 7 Protocol Protocol 4 On the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank, and art. 19 Regulation 1024/2013. 
883 Art. 20 Regulation 1024/2013, and the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament and 
the European Central Bank on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability and 
oversight over the exercise of the tasks conferred on the ECB within the framework of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, OJ 2013, L 320/1. 
884 Art. 21 Regulation 1024/2013. 
885 Cf. art. 11(4) Protocol 4 On the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank, and art. 26(4) Regulation 1024/2013. 
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involvement of the Governing Council means that it is not safeguarded that decisions will always be 
purely taken in the interest of financial stability, since it may object to decisions for monetary policy 
concerns.886  
 
3.3.2. Decision-making procedures, operational independence, and guided discretion  
An analysis of the specific decision-making procedures for the instruments will reveal whether the 
operational independence of supervisors is further restricted, and to what extent guided discretion is 
used. 
  
3.3.2.1. Ex ante restrictions on the supervisory discretion 
The EU legislator, the Commission, the EBA, and the ESRB have issued various rules, technical 
standards, recommendations, and guidelines that guide decision-making on applying the discussed 
capital-based instruments.  
 
Guided discretion for increasing risk-weights  
A few rules restrict and steer the supervisory discretion to use art. 124 and 164 CRR and Pillar 2 
measures to increase risk-weights. These rules help to reduce inaction. Firstly, competent authorities 
must at least annually assess whether risk-weights or LGD values are appropriate, based on (1) loss 
experience (only mentioned in art. 124 CRR), (2) forward-looking markets developments, and (3) 
financial stability considerations.887 This obligation warrants that supervisors take the relevant risks 
into account. Yet, these factors are still rather general, even if further specified by the regulatory 
                                                          
886 Cf. Art. 26(8) Regulation 1024/2013; Tröger (2014), pp. 478-479. The merits and demerits of the 
involvement of the Governing Council have been intensely discussed (see e.g. Beck & Gros (2012), Goodhart 
(2015); Tridimas (2016), pp. 103-105). Often financial stability – the objective of macroprudential policy – and 
price stability – the main objective of monetary policy – will coincide. For instance, excessive credit growth is 
dangerous for both financial and price stability. Since macroprudential and monetary policy can be 
complementary or mutually reinforcing, their coordination is beneficial to internalise potential spillovers (cf. 
European Central Bank (2013), p. 107; Constâncio (2014); Galati & Moessner (2013), p. 863). However, 
objectives can also conflict, for example, when the Governing Council pursues an expansionary monetary 
policy, but macroprudential policy needs to be restrictive. Then, there is a risk that monetary policy motivations 
collide with and trump financial stability motivations (cf. Ferran & Babis (2013), p. 266). Note that the ECB has 
created a platform for the Supervisory Board and the Governing Council to discuss macroprudential issues, the 
Macroprudential Forum, which unites all members of both bodies (Angeloni, 2016). Also note that an aspect 
favouring the independence of decision-making by the ECB, compared to decision-making at national level, is 
the greater difficulty for local interests to capture the ECB (Tröger (2014), p. 495). 
887 Art. 124(2) and art. 164(5) Regulation 575/2013.  
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technical standards of the EBA, which are currently under consultation.888 This creates the risk that 
they will turn out to be meaningless. Nonetheless, the proposed regulatory technical standards will 
restrict the (administrative and subsuming) discretion of competent authorities somewhat, which 
helps to avoid inaction and improve the quality of decision-making. Secondly, the supervisor’s 
administrative discretion in strict sense is further restricted by the obligation to raise risk-weights for 
banks using the Standardised Approach, if the assessment shows that the standard risk-weight of 35% 
does not reflect the actual risks in one or more property segments.889 Despite its vagueness, this 
obligation reduces the inaction bias. However, art. 124 and 164 CRR do not provide for a specific forum 
to which supervisors have to present their annual analysis and justify their subsequent decision. 
 
For Pillar 2 measures, there is one restriction on the supervisor’s administrative discretion in strict 
sense, namely the obligation that additional capital requirements must be imposed in certain 
situations, for instance when risks or elements of risks are not covered by capital requirements or 
capital buffers, or when risks ‘are likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable 
requirements’.890 Despite its imperative character, this provision is worded in a general manner and is, 
thus, hardly intrusive for the discretion of the competent authorities. For national flexibility measures, 
there are restrictions that limit the room for action, as discussed above, but no rules that help to reduce 
inaction.  
 
  
                                                          
888 Art. 124(4) and 164(6) Regulation 575/2013; European Banking Authority (2015a). According to the 
standards, financial stability is deemed to be at risk when refraining from increasing risk-weights or minimum 
LGD values could result in ‘a significant decline in the resilience of the financial system or a material disruption 
in the flow of lending to the economy’ (art. 3(1(a), 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(c) proposed regulatory technical standards). 
Furthermore, for both the Standardised Approach and the IRB Approach, loss expectations must be based upon 
various factors, including the evolution of the market, actual LTV and DSTI ratios, and taxation systems (art. 
2(2) and 5(2)). Under the Standardised Approach, the loss experience must in particular be determined by the 
ratio of losses stemming from loans up to the 80% LTV ratio over losses stemming from loans up to the 100% 
LTV ratio (art. 2(1)(a) proposed regulatory technical standards in combination with art. 101(1)(a) and 101(1)(c) 
CRR). Also, notably, for increasing risk-weights under the Standardised Approach for one or more property 
segments, competent authorities are required to take certain benchmark percentages regarding the loss 
expectation into account (art. 4(3) proposed regulatory technical standards). 
889 Art. 124(2) Regulation 575/2013. 
890 Art. 104(2)(e) Directive 2013/36. Moreover, art. 97(1)(b) Directive 2013/36 instructs competent authorities 
to take into account criteria for identifying and measuring systemic risks. These criteria are either developed by 
the EBA in consultation with the ESRB, or based on ESRB recommendations (cf. art. 23 Regulation 1093/2010). 
Currently, these criteria have not yet been developed. Art. 103(2) Directive 2013/36 instructs the EBA to issue 
guidelines on assessing risks for a group of banks and imposing measures on them, but these have not yet been 
developed either (if developed, they are only subject to a comply-or-explain principle). 
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Guided discretion for setting the countercyclical capital buffer 
The provisions of the CRD IV, as well as an ESRB recommendation, create guidance for setting the 
countercyclical capital buffer rate.891 Decisions on setting the rate of the CCB must be made every 
quarter, and be based upon an assessment of three aspects:892 
1. The calculated buffer guide, which is the benchmark buffer rate, a calculated indicator serving 
as a common starting reference point for taking buffer decisions;893 
2. Guidance and recommendations of the ESRB; 
3. Other relevant variables. 
 
The buffer guide must ‘be based on the deviation of the ratio of credit-to-GDP from its long-term trend, 
taking into account, inter alia’894 indicators measuring credit growth and changes in the credit-to-GDP 
ratio. Recommendation 2014/1 of the ESRB leaves supervisors with the choice to calculate the buffer 
guide in accordance with the guidance of the BCBS, or in accordance with their own methodology.895 
This choice is offered, because the indicator as calculated according to the methods of the BCBS does 
not perform well in every member state.896 The ESRB recommendation lists various variables that 
supervisors must at least use for monitoring whether credit growth is excessive.897 This includes 
measures of the private sector debt burden. Moreover, the ESRB recommends supervisors to use 
indicators for deciding on the rate of the CCB. These must include measures of stress in bank funding 
markets and general systemic stress.898 
 
Although all these indicators must guide the decision-making process of the supervisory authorities, 
decisions must never be taken automatic, as is also stressed by the ESRB.899 The indicators need to be 
assessed and evaluated. The term “guided discretion” is coined to describe this construction, which 
especially restricts the administrative discretion in strict sense and the subsuming discretion. The latter 
is restricted by guiding the process of classifying a certain situation as “excessive credit growth” and 
“a systemic risk”. The former is restricted by using the buffer guide as a starting point for decisions on 
                                                          
891 Art. 135 Directive 2013/36 empowers the ESRB to issue recommendations on various aspects of the CCB, 
whereas art. 136(2)(b) and 136(3)(b) instruct the designated authorities to take this guidance into account.  
892 Art. 136(3) Directive 2013/36. 
893 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), pp. 2-3 and Annex 1; European Systemic Risk Board 
Recommendation 2014/1, Section 1, Recommendation B4 and Section 2, 1(1)(c).  
894 Art. 136(2) Directive 2013/36. 
895 Section 1, Recommendation B4 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1. 
896 Recital 14 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1. 
897 Recommendation C of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1. 
898 Recommendation D of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1. 
899 Recital 7 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1. Cf. art. 136(3) Directive 2013/36. 
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setting the CCB rate. The provisions in the CRD IV and the ESRB recommendations are relatively 
general, but provide some direction to supervisors, and thus limit their discretion. These rule-based 
restrictions can certainly improve the effectiveness of the CCB, by reducing the room for capture, 
forbearance and inaction. Still, McDonnell (2013) argues that a supervisor possesses too much 
discretion when applying the countercyclical capital buffer, due to the many indicators to choose from 
for guiding its decisions and the extensive room for judgment.900 This creates possibilities to concede 
to pressure.901 He advocates a more rule-based manner of applying the CCB: its rate shall in principle 
be determined by the buffer guide and supervisors can only deviate from it if their decision is 
accompanied by a public justification.902 If the buffer guide performs accurately, this will indeed 
improve the effectiveness of the design. 
 
Publication requirements for the supervisors are in place, and likely add to the effectiveness of the 
framework of the countercyclical capital buffer. The quarterly set rate of the CCB shall be announced 
on the website of the supervisor, accompanied with, among other things, its justification, ‘the relevant 
credit-to-GDP ratio and its deviation from the long-term trend’, the buffer guide and, if the rate 
increased, the date at which banks need to comply with the increased date.903 In addition, the ESRB 
recommends publishing at least one of the indicators for monitoring whether systemic risk is built up 
and one of the indicators for deciding on the rate of the CCB.904 These publication requirements 
increase the transparency of the decision-making process and may contribute to more effective rules, 
by limiting the room for unobserved pressure and increasing certainty in the market. 
 
The further use of guided discretion 
It varies by supervisor whether a guided discretion mechanism is used on top of the aforementioned 
required use. DNB monitors several indicators, but does, currently, not use a guided discretion 
                                                          
900 McDonnell (2013), pp. 132-134. McDonnell (2013) discusses the design of the CCB in the Basel standards 
and its implementation in the US. Nevertheless, his arguments can be applied mutatis mutandis to the EU, 
since the EU rules are based upon the same Basel standards and the issues discussed by McDonnell are largely 
comparable to the issues in EU member states. However, a crucial difference is the ESRB guidance and 
recommendations, which are lacking in the US situation and which restrict the discretion of the supervisory 
authorities in the EU. 
901 Ibidem, pp. 126, 139. 
902 Ibidem, p. 134. 
903 Art. 136(7) Directive 20136/36. Other information which needs to be published are, if this is the case, the 
exceptional circumstances for requiring banks to comply earlier than within 12 months with an increased CCB 
rate and, if the CCB rate is decreased, an indicative period in which no increase is expected, accompanied with 
a justification. According to recommendation B6 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1, 
supervisors shall publically explain any deviation from their selected methods. 
904 Recommendations C3 and D4 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2014/1.  
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mechanism with indicators with predefined thresholds that trigger action or require explanation for 
taking decisions related to other macroprudential instruments than the CCB.905 To facilitate 
macroprudential decision-making, the Central Bank of Ireland uses many indicators, some with 
thresholds as a warning signal, but it is not publically known which indicators and thresholds are 
used.906 Moreover, exceeding the thresholds does not mean that action needs to be taken or inaction 
must be explained.907 For the time being, BaFin relies to a minor extent on guided discretion 
mechanisms. Currently, BaFin uses numerous indicators, and mostly qualitative analysis to ensure 
consistent decision-making. Macroprudential decisions are discussed in the German Financial Stability 
Committee. Whenever possible, this committee intends to use guided discretion mechanisms to 
decide about taking action: it is developing empirical indicators that steer decision-making, in order to 
make its decisions understandable and predictable, while retaining the mandatory discretion to act 
flexibly whenever necessary.908 However, it is not publically known which indicators and thresholds 
are used by BaFin and the German Financial Stability Committee. The ECB relies predominantly on 
model-based analyses to decide about taking macroprudential action.909 It is unknown whether any 
predefined outcomes of these models, for instance, certain significance levels related to risks, will 
trigger action.910  
 
3.3.2.2. Restrictions on the supervisory discretion during the decision-making process 
The discretion of supervisors to opt for a particular decision can be restricted as a result of the 
involvement of other actors, for instance, if their approval is required. The involvement of these other 
actors may either increase or decrease the inaction bias. One of these actors is the European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB). It is able to restrict the freedom of supervisors to decide about using 
macroprudential instruments, because it can issue warnings and recommendations for remedial action 
in case of significant systemic risks arising from developments within the financial system.911 These can 
be addressed to the EU as a whole, to member states, to the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, to national 
                                                          
905 Cf. De Nederlandsche Bank (2016), pp. 17, 23. Within DNB, various internal bodies are involved in 
macroprudential decision-making, with a view of reducing group-think in decision-making.   
906 As indicated in an interview with an official of the CBI. 
907 Ibidem. 
908 Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2014), pp. 27, 45, 52. 
909 European Central Bank (2016), p. 10. The ECB is working as well on macroprudential stress-testing 
(Constâncio, 2016, pp. 60-61). 
910 This will be difficult anyhow, because the outcome of economic models can easily be sensitive to the precise 
set up and use of statistical techniques, or the inclusion or exclusion of certain variables. 
911 Art. 3 and 16-17 Regulation 1092/2010. For a more detailed discussion of the ESRB, see Ferran & Alexander 
(2010), pp. 764-775. 
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supervisors, or to the Commission.912 The ECB is not mentioned as a potential recipient.913 Warnings 
and recommendations are not legally binding and enforceable, but subject to a comply-or-explain 
principle: its recipient must communicate to the ESRB and the Council whether action has been 
undertaken, and must adequately justify inaction.914 The ESRB can decide that a recommendation has 
not been followed up, or that the justification for inaction is inadequate.915 On a case-by-case basis, it 
can decide to make a warning public.916 So, although recommendations of the ESRB are not binding, 
the recipient is under pressure to comply with them, which decreases the inaction bias. Box 3.3 
explains the decision-making within the ESRB.  
 
Box 3.3: Decision-making within the ESRB 
The ESRB’s decision-making body is the General Board, with as voting members the Chair and the 
first Vice-Chair (respectively the president and a General Council member of the ECB), the governors 
of the national central banks, the Chairs of the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA, a member of the Commission, 
the Chair and two Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee and the Chair of the Advisory 
Technical Committee.917 Each voting member has one vote; and a two-thirds majority is required for 
issuing a recommendation.918 Several Working Groups and Experts Group have been established at 
the ESRB, reporting to the Advisory Technical Committee and the Advisory Scientific Committee.919 
Some of these groups prepare opinions on national macroprudential measures.  
 
  
                                                          
912 Art. 16(2) Regulation 1092/2010. Note that ESMA stands for European Securities and Markets Authority and 
EIOPA for European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. 
913 It had no supervisory role at the moment of adopting Regulation 1092/2010 and the regulation is not 
amended to correct this. 
914 Art. 17(1) Regulation 1092/2010. 
915 Art. 17(2) Regulation 1092/2010. 
916 Art. 18 Regulation 1092/2010. 
917 Art. 6 Regulation 1092/2010. The Advisory Scientific Committee consists of experts from academia and 
other sectors, representing a wide range of skills and experiences (art. 12 Regulation 1092/2010). The Advisory 
Technical Committee is composed of representatives of the national central banks, competent national 
supervisory authorities, the ESAs, the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee (art. 13(1) 
Regulation 1092/2010). Both Committees shall provide advice and assistance to the ESRB at request of the 
Chair of the ESRB (art. 12(3) and 13(3) Regulation 1092/2010). Non-voting members of the General Board are 
high-level representatives of the NSAs and the president of the Economic and Financial Committee join. See 
art. 134 and 135 TFEU for more information about the Economic and Financial Committee. 
918 Art. 10 Regulation 1092/2010. A simple majority is required for issuing a warning. 
919 See the organisational chart of the ESRB, available at 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/about/orga/html/index.en.html (last visited 9 March 2016). 
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Restrictions on the supervisory discretion when increasing risk-weights and setting the CCB 
There are few restrictions arising from the involvement of other actors in case supervisors intend to 
increase risk-weights by means of art. 124 and 164 CRR and Pillar 2 measures, or intend to change the 
CCB rate. Competent authorities must consult the EBA about changing risk-weights and criteria for 
banks using the Standardised Approach. They have to notify the EBA when setting a higher minimum 
LGD value for banks using the IRB Approach, and when imposing Pillar 2 measures on a group of 
banks.920 Each quarter, they must notify the ESRB about the CCB rate.921 BaFin must also take into 
account any recommendations made by the German Financial Stability Committee when setting the 
rate of the CCB.922 Whereas notification requirements only serve transparency, mandatory 
consultation might increase the quality of decision-making by demanding explanation.  
 
In contrast, there are considerable restrictions on the discretion of competent or designated 
authorities which intend to use national flexibility measures to increase risk-weights. These may 
increase the inaction bias. Draft measures based on art. 458 CRR can be rejected by a qualified majority 
in the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, which has to take utmost account of opinions of 
the ESRB and the EBA.923 However, the use of this power is limited by several conditions. The 
Commission can only propose a rejection if ‘there is robust, strong and detailed evidence that the 
measure will have a negative impact on the internal market that outweighs the financial stability 
benefits’.924 The Council can only reject a draft measure if (a) there are no changes in systemic risk that 
threaten the national financial stability, or (b) the risks can be adequately addressed by means of art. 
124 and 164 CRR, Pillar 2 measures or the CCB, or (c) the draft measures are less suitable to address 
the risk or have disproportionate adverse effects on the financial system in the EU or other member 
states, or (d) the risk concerns more than one member state, or (e) the risk is already addressed by 
other measures in the CRR or CRD IV.925 A member state is allowed to increase risk-weights for up to 
                                                          
920 Art. 124(2) and 164(5) Regulation 575/2013 and art. 103(2) Directive 2013/36. When Pillar 2 measures are 
directed at individual banks, even notification is not required. 
921 Art. 136(7) Directive 2013/36. The ESRB received also a role in recommending a CCB rate for exposures in 
third countries (art. 138 Directive 2013/36). 
922 § 10d(3) KWG. 
923 Art. 458(4) Regulation 575/2013. The ESRB and the EBA have to provide an opinion within a month after 
notification of a draft measure, and also the Commission has to submit its proposal to the Council within a 
month after this notification. The Council has a month to decide on the Commission proposal. 
924 Art. 458(4) Regulation 575/2013.  
925 Ibidem. The Council shall also take the opinions of the ESRB and EBA into account. 
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two years, in the absence of a Commission proposal within a month or in the absence of a Council 
rejection within a month after receiving that proposal.926  
 
Moreover, notwithstanding this procedure, it is always allowed to increase the risk-weights up to 25% 
above the rules of the CRR, provided that the conditions and notification requirements of art. 458(2) 
Regulation 575/2013 are met.927 In the Netherlands, an additional restriction is present in the 
application of national flexibility measures: DNB must take these measures in consultation with (in 
overleg met) the Minister of Finance.928 These specific Dutch words mean that the minister needs to 
agree with the measures. This requirement is absent when the ECB applies these national flexibility 
measures in the Netherlands.929 If DNB exercises the power of art. 458 CRR or one of the other capital-
based macroprudential instruments, it must also consult (raadplegen) a representation of the 
sector.930 
 
These conditions and requirements seek to strike a balance between ensuring the unity of the single 
market and the need to effectively conduct macroprudential policy. It is only for valid reasons allowed 
to use art. 458 CRR to deviate from the basic microprudential rules, which are similar for all banks in 
the EU.931 The aforementioned conditions under which the Commission can propose a rejection, and 
the Council can reject a measure, help to prevent that macroprudential measures are rejected easily 
(but also that they are adopted for protectionist reasons). Meanwhile, the procedure can be an 
additional hurdle to adopt macroprudential measures, and thus increase the inaction bias. Moreover, 
the fact that a systemic risk concerns more than one member state should only be invoked to reject a 
measure if this risk is being addressed at a supranational level. These conditions, as well as the 
hierarchy between the various options to increase risk-weights, show that art. 458 CRR bears the 
character of a provision of last resort. Nevertheless, if a threatening systemic risk exists, the conditions 
can certainly be fulfilled, and will not pose an unsurmountable barrier. Moreover, a fast increase of 
the risk-weights with 25% is possible, in case of urgency, without the need to enter the procedure. The 
involvement of the Council in the procedure creates the risk that decisions are politicised.  
 
                                                          
926 Ibidem. If the systemic risk underlying the measure ceases sooner sooner than after 2 years, the measure 
shall also be discontinued. Measures can be renewed, using the same procedure, each time for a period of one 
year (art. 458(9) Regulation 575/2013).  
927 Art. 458(10) Reguatlion 575/2013. 
928 Art. 3:66(1) Wft. 
929 Art. 3:66(2) Wft. 
930 Art. 1:28 Wft. Raadplegen does not mean that the sector must agree with the rules. 
931 Identical rules for all banks in the EU facilitate the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
establishment. However, the stability of internal market benefits from allowing national differences in 
macroprudential policy, tailored to the specific circumstances in the member state concerned. 
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3.3.2.3. Ex post restrictions on the supervisory discretion 
Besides the override-mechanism by which the Dutch Minster of Finance can replace a generally binding 
regulation of DNB with a ministerial decree, there is no other override mechanism by which the 
executive in one of the examined jurisdictions can alter, annul or suspend a decision on the use of the 
discussed instruments. Nevertheless, a quasi-override mechanism is present due to the fact that both 
national supervisory authorities and the ECB can take these macroprudential measures, although 
national authorities are – in principle – the first to act. They cannot annul each other’s measures, but 
can “top them up”.932 A likely result is that the risk of leniency or inaction decreases, since multiple 
actors can act. However, it is also possible that actors start looking towards each other, with inaction 
as a result. This latter outcome is less likely, since the national authorities and the ECB might be more 
eager to increase their influence than to wait for the other to act. Hence, this quasi-override 
mechanism decreases forbearance and inaction. Moreover, it functions as an accountability 
mechanism between supervisors, since they have to explain and justify why they do (not) take action. 
Explaining or justifying one’s actions lies at the heart of accountability.933 However, it is a form of 
accountability towards peers, not towards the legislature.  
 
3.3.3. Restrictions when enforcing capital- and funding-based instruments 
The enforcement of the capital-based instruments is a task of competent authorities, including the ECB 
within the Single Supervisory Mechanism.934 Within the SSM, the ECB is in the driver seat for ensuring 
compliance with risk-weighted capital requirements and the countercyclical capital buffer. For 
significant banks, the ECB is in charge of enforcing applicable rules, whereas national authorities do 
this for the less significant banks, but under guidance of the ECB.935 Yet, with respect to significant 
banks, the ECB can still ask national supervisory authorities to prepare draft decisions for enforcing 
risk-weighted capital requirements or assist otherwise in the supervisory process.936 For enforcing risk-
weighted capital requirements and the CCB, the ECB can either use the Pillar 2 powers as provided for 
in art. 16(2) Regulation 1024/2013, or inflict a fine in accordance with art. 18 of that regulation.937 
Moreover, the European Central Bank is allowed to require national supervisors to impose penalties, 
                                                          
932 Art. 5 Regulation 1024/2013. 
933 Cf. Amtenbrink & Lastra (2008), pp. 127-128. 
934 Art. 4(1)(d) Regulation 1024/2013. 
935 Art. 4(1)(b), 4(3) and 6 Regulation 1024/2013. For the supervision of significant banks, the ECB forms joint 
supervisory teams (art. 3-6 Regulation 468/2014). 
936 Art. 90-91 Regulation 468/2014. 
937 Art. 4(3) Regulation 2014/2013. Cf. art. 120-133 Regulation 468/2014 and section 2 of chapter on 
enforcement measures. 
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to the extent necessary for performing its tasks, when such powers have not been conferred on the 
ECB.938 So, the ECB can independently decide on enforcement, but may in practice be partly dependent 
on cooperation with national supervisors.  
 
Ireland has taken some extra steps to ensure independent enforcement of financial regulation, after 
its recent history revealed that it was rarely enforced, because the supervisor was captured.939 To 
reduce the risk of capture, a deliberate choice was made to appoint “outsiders” to key posts within 
the CBI.940 This creates more behavioural distance between the supervisor on the one hand and the 
regulatees (and politicians) on the other hand.941 
 
Both EU and national law include provisions to guide supervisors towards proportionate and dissuasive 
enforcement of violations. The ECB is obliged to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions.942 In turn, member states must ensure that the type of sanction and the level of pecuniary 
sanctions fulfil some requirements related to proportionality and dissuasiveness, by requiring that 
competent authorities take the gravity and duration of the breach into account, as well as, among 
other things, the losses caused by the breach, the financial strength of the offender, and recidivism.943 
These requirements have been implemented differently in each member state. Irish and Dutch 
legislation instructs the supervisor to take these circumstances into account, although Dutch legislation 
only mentions this in the context of fines and not in case of other penalties.944 Yet, in the Netherlands, 
the proportionality principle applies to all enforcement, due to its codification in the Awb.945 German 
legislation does not explicitly mention the circumstances of art. 70 Directive 2013/36, but requires that 
a fine must be larger than the obtained financial benefit.946 BaFin has broad discretion when 
determining the magnitude of a fine, since ‘there are hardly any rules to govern the quantum of 
penalties’.947 This lack of guidance decreases legal certainty, and the broad discretion has as downside 
that BaFin is not steered towards proportionate and dissuasive enforcement. All in all, the 
requirements in these jurisdictions may contribute to avoiding too soft enforcement. Nevertheless, 
they are quite vague, which hampers their guidance.  
                                                          
938 Art. 9(1) and 18(5) Regulation 1024/2013. 
939 Sub-section 4.2.3 dicusses this issue in more detail. 
940 Scott (2012), p. 71. 
941 On behavioural distance, see Black (1976), pp. 40-48. 
942 Art. 18(3) Regulation 1024/2013. 
943 Art. 70 Directive 2013/36. 
944 IE: Regulation 58 S.I. 158/2014. NL: art. 4 and 4a Besluit bestuurlijke boetes financiële sector. 
945 Art. 5:46 Awb, supra sub-section 3.2.2.1 and footnotes 727-728. 
946 Section 56(7) and 60 KWG. 
947 Schneider (2014), p. 22. 
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The Central Bank of Ireland has an additional choice when enforcing: it can opt for settlement or 
imposing sanctions. It has full discretion to decide whether and how – i.e. under which terms – to 
settle.948 However, the CBI has limited its own discretion by publishing Inquiry guidelines, pursuant to 
section 33BD Central Bank Act 1942. These guidelines include the settlement and sanctioning policy, 
which is followed, unless this is inappropriate in light of the circumstances of the individual case.949 
The Inquiry guidelines list a range of factors which can be taken into account when determining the 
appropriate sanction.950 To further clarify its policy, the CBI published an Outline of the Administrative 
Sanctions Procedure, a document without legal status. It inter alia states that the details of a 
settlement agreement will always be published and that a maximum discount of 30% for monetary 
penalties can be obtained by settling.951 All in all, these guidelines are worded in a way that provides 
an indication of how the Central Bank of Ireland reaches its decisions, but without ever really limiting 
its discretion. Still, its self-selected transparency will probably help the CBI to avoid overly soft 
enforcement, because its guidance directs it towards penalties of a certain kind and magnitude. 
 
3.3.4. Independent amendment of capital- and funding-based instruments 
Since 2010, binding financial legislation is adopted at two levels in the EU.952 Level 1 legislation 
concerns legal acts, such as the CRR and CRD IV, which are adopted by the EU legislator. Level 2 
legislation consist of technical standards, which are drafted by the European Supervisory Authorities – 
the EBA, ESMA and EIOPA – and adopted by the Commission, and takes the form of delegated and 
implementing acts.953 As the conditions for increasing risk-weights by means of art. 124 and 164 CRR, 
and the criteria for determining the mortgage lending value are set by regulatory technical standards 
the EBA is involved in drafting and amending rules on these issues. The EBA has a multifaceted, but 
specific mandate.954 Its objectives overlap with the aims of the aforementioned regulatory standards, 
and provide the EBA with direction when drafting these standards. 
                                                          
948 Central Bank of Ireland (2014d), p. 21. 
949 Central Bank of Ireland (2014c), para. 1.2. For more on these guidelines, see Murphy (2013), pp. 253, 258-
261; Murphy (2014), p. 15. 
950 Ibidem, para. 5.9. 
951 Central Bank of Ireland (2014d), pp. 20, 23 
952 See e.g. Raptis (2012), pp. 61-64; House of Lords (2015), p. 35; Enria (2015).  
953 Cf. art. 290-291 TFEU. The process of adopting the technical standards is discussed later in this sub-section. 
954 Its mandate includes ‘(a) improving the functioning of the internal market, including, in particular, a sound, 
effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision, (b) ensuring the integrity (…) and orderly 
functioning of financial markets, (…) (d) preventing regulatory arbitrage (…), (e) ensuring the taking of credit 
and other risks are appropriately regulated and supervised, and (f) enhancing customer protection.’Art. 1(5) 
Regulation 1093/2010. 
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The EBA is required to carry out it tasks independently, objectively and in the interest of the EU alone. 
Also the members of the Board of Supervisors, the decision-making body of the EBA, are obliged to act 
independently and in the interest of the EU.955 Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the heads of 
the national competent authorities, who are voting members of the Board of Supervisors, vote with 
national interests in mind.956 Moreover, the independence of the EBA is significantly restrained during 
the process of adopting technical standards, because it only develops draft regulatory technical 
standards, which only are binding after adoption by the Commission.957 The Commission must decide 
within three months after submission whether to endorse draft regulatory technical standards.958 If 
the EU interest so requires, it can partly endorse or amend them.959 The regulatory technical standards 
become final after endorsement by the Commission, unless the Council or the European Parliament 
object within three months, for which they must give reasons.960 The Meroni and Romano doctrines, 
developed by the CJEU, are the reason that technical standards are drafted by the EBA, but adopted 
by the Commission. In Meroni, the Court ruled that an EU institution can only delegate clearly defined 
executive powers, without a wide margin of discretion.961 The CJEU ruled in Romano that the adoption 
of ‘acts having the force of law’ cannot be delegated to bodies which are not attributed those powers 
by the treaties.962 The unavoidable involvement of these EU institutions significantly impairs the 
operational independence of the EBA. Instead, together with some consultation requirements, this 
increases the accountability of the EBA.963 
 
                                                          
955 According to art. 42 Regulation 1093/2010, the chairperson and voting members are instructed to ‘act 
independently and objectively in the sole interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other 
public or private body.’ In turn, these actors must refrain from seeking to influence the members of the Board 
of Supervisors in the performance of their tasks. The requirement to act independently from EU institutions is 
at odds with the fact that the Commission needs to adopt the regulatory technical standards and the Council 
and European Parliament can disapprove them (Lavrijssen & Ottow (2012), pp. 441-445). 
956 See art. 40, 43(1)-(2) and 44 Regulation 1093/2010 on the composition, tasks, and voting. 
957 Artt. 8(2), 10-15 Regulation 1093/2010. 
958 Art. 10(1) Regulation 1093/2010. 
959 The Commission has to give reasons to the EBA in these cases, as well as in the case of non-endorsement. 
Then, the EBA receives six weeks to amend the technical standards (art. 10(1) Regulation 1093/2010). 
960 Art. 13 Regulation 1093/2010. 
961 Supra, footnote 169. 
962 Case 98/80 Romano v Institut National d’Assurance Maladie-Invalidité [1981] ECR 1241. Cf. Griller & Orator 
(2010, pp 18-19. 
963 Open public consultations shall be conducted, unless this is disproportionate in relation to the scope and 
impact of the draft regulatory technical standards, and the Banking Stakeholder Group shall be consulted (art. 
10(1) and 37(1) Regulation 1093/2010). This body within EBA has 30 members representing inter alia the 
financial industry, consumers, and academia. 
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In none of the jurisdictions LTV ratios in covered bonds legislation can be amended by a regulator or 
supervisor.964 Consequently, there is no need to discuss their operational independence in this respect. 
 
3.3.5. Overview of restrictions when applying and enforcing capital-based instruments 
This section shows the complexity, especially in case of the capital-based instruments, of the 
relationships between the various factors which influence to what extent decisions are made 
independently and the ability and willingness to act is fostered. Therefore, figure 3.4 provides an 
overview of the relevant factors and actors that (may) restrict the discretion of the actor deciding on 
increasing risk-weighted capital requirements, taking the perspective of a national supervisor.965 
Firstly, it shows the ex ante restrictions on the supervisory discretion of all three options to increase 
risk-weights; restrictions which were already present before the decision-making process starts. 
Secondly, it illustrates restrictions arising from the involvement of other actors during the decision-
making process. Thirdly, it displays how the ex post involvement of other actors, through an override 
mechanism or enforcement, may influence to what extent supervisory decisions take full effect.  
 
Figure 3.4 shows that most restrictions on the discretion of the deciding actor are the results of either 
(1) ex ante rules which steer the supervisor towards action or, (2) of the involvement of other 
independent actors. In both situations interventions are positive. This is the case for interventions by 
independent actors, because they are less likely driven by political or industry interests. Furthermore, 
the figure reveals the potential clashes between national supervisors and the ECB, both in the phase 
of deciding about increasing risk-weights and in the phase of enforcing these risk-weights. 
Nevertheless, in the end the ECB is able to prevail when it comes to determining the risk-weights of 
capital-requirements.966 This means that the Governing Council of the ECB is the ultimate decision-
maker on increasing risk-weighted capital requirements, since it can reject decisions of the Supervisory 
Board (still, the Governing Council cannot propose decisions on its own initiative). 
                                                          
964 At EU level, the LTV requirements for covered bonds are part of the CRR. Consequently, changes need to be 
initiated by the EU legislator. In the Netherlands, the provision prescribing the LTV ratio is included in a general 
implementing decree, which is a form of delegation from the legislator to the government. Hence, basically, the 
government decides on possible changes of this ratio. The Irish LTV ratio for covered bonds is included in an 
act. So, the legislator is in charge of changing it, but the act allows the Minister for Finance to change the LTV 
ratio as well, by means of a notification in the Irish official journal (section 32(14) Asset Covered Securities Act 
2001). The LTV limit of 60% for covered bonds in Germany is part of an act, and thus needs to be changed by 
the legislator. Some valuation rules can be changed by the Ministry of Finance, in consultation with the 
Ministry of Justice (section 16(4) PfandBG). 
965 This figure can as well be presented from the perspective of the ECB, with some differences as a result. 
However, national supervisors are first in line to decide on taking macroprudential measures. 
966 A national supervisor cannot block or undo an increase of risk-weights by the ECB and vice versa. However, 
the ECB can de facto undo an increase in risk-weights by a national supervisor by not enforcing them. 
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Figure 3.4: Restrictions on the supervisory discretion to apply and enforce capital-based instruments  
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3.4. Concluding and comparative remarks 
The qualitative analysis of this chapter has been summarised in table 3.3. This chapter has shown that 
the use LTV ratios in covered bond legislation cannot effectively help to limit borrowing by households, 
but helps to prevent that the consequences of a default of a borrower spread to the holders of covered 
bonds.967 This chapter also reveals strengths and weaknesses of using capital-based instruments to 
address high household debt levels. Some conditions governing risk-weights under the Standardised 
Approach are vaguely worded. Adopting the proposals of the BCBS would reduce possibilities to 
circumvent higher risk-weights set under art.  124 CRR, and make capital requirements more sensitive 
to actual risks. The rules governing the assignment of risk-weights under the IRB Approach are too 
general and vague. Furthermore, the possibility to raise risk-weights through increasing the LGD value 
suffers from gaps. The LGD value is namely only one factor determining the risk weights; other factors 
are still determined by the highly criticised internal models of banks. Therefore, a possibility to impose 
output floors under the IRB Approach, as suggested by the BCBS, might be helpful.968 
 
For these reasons, Pillar 2 measures and national flexibility measures are better fit for increasing risk-
weights, if it were not for the fact that they are not subject to mandatory reciprocity.969 If the EU 
legislator changes this, these measures can be more effective, by reducing the risk of leakage. It 
depends on the home supervisor of a foreign bank whether macroprudential measures are 
reciprocated, while host supervisors ‘should have the ultimate say in ensuring that these tools are 
applied effectively and adequately address the risk of that country.’970 The countercyclical capital 
buffer – already subject to mandatory reciprocity up to a rate of 2.5% – can be employed to lean against 
the build-up of excessive credit, if there is a general credit boom, which is not limited to the household 
sector. The CCB builds on system of risk-weights as well, and might be ineffective if not accompanied 
with minimum risk-weight floors.971 Moreover, a problem of the CCB and all other capital-based 
measures is that their effects can leak away through various ways, most importantly to the non-
banking sector, where lenders are subject to lower or no capital requirements.972 This flaw needs to 
be repaired by broadening the scope of macroprudential capital measures to all financial institutions  
 
  
                                                          
967 Cf. sub-section 3.1.3.2. 
968 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1.1. 
969 An additional disadvantage of the national flexibility measures is the demanding procedure for using them. 
970 Alexander (2012), p. 341. 
971 Cf. sub-section 3.1.2.1. 
972 Cf. sub-sections 3.1.1.3 and 3.1.2.1. 
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Table 3.3: Summary of the analysis of capital- and funding-based instruments 
Determinacy and 
completeness 
Possibility proportionate and 
dissuasive enforcement 
Room for independent application, 
enforcement and amendment 
Qualitative evaluation, from high to low: yes, mostly, partly, barely, no 
Determinacy:  
 
 Standardised Approach: 
partly (rules on risk-weights 
partly vague) 
 IRB Approach: barely (rules 
vague) 
 CCB and LTV ratios for 
covered bonds: yes 
 
Completeness:  
 
Encompassing scope:  
 Capital-based instruments: 
partly (only credit institutions 
and investment firms, only 
capital)  
 LTV ratios for covered bonds: 
no (only one funding type)  
 
Absence gaps and silence:  
 124 CRR: mostly (ineffective 
above 75%) 
 164 CRR: barely (silent on PD) 
 Pillar 2 and national flexibility 
measures: partly (no 
mandatory reciprocity) 
 CCB: mostly (above 2.5% no 
mandatory reciprocity) 
 LTV ratios for covered bonds: 
barely (part above threshold 
can be funded differently) 
 
Exceptions are subject to clear 
and protective conditions: 
 All instruments: yes  
  
Proportionate enforcement:  
 
Availability whole range of 
sanctions, from light to severe:  
 EU (ECB): mostly (some only 
via national supervisors) 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: mostly 
 
Dissuasive enforcement: 
Availability high administrative 
fines: 
 EU, NL, IE, DE: yes 
 
Mandatory publication of 
sanctions, apart from specific 
exceptions: 
 EU, IE, DE: yes 
 NL: yes, but exception seems 
to be often used 
 
Possibility to sanction 
individuals: 
 EU: only via national 
supervisors 
 NL, IE, DE: yes 
 
Availability threatening 
sanctions, like withdrawal 
licence: 
 EU, NL, IE, DE: yes, but 
cooperation needed for 
withdrawal 
 
Possibility criminal conviction: 
 EU, DE, IE: no 
 NL: yes 
Ability and willingness to act:  
Instrument has clear legal basis: 
 All instruments: yes 
 
Well-defined policy objectives: 
 National flexibility measures and 
CCB: yes 
 124/164 & Pillar 2: partly (both 
micro and macroprudential) 
 
Corresponds to clear mandate 
supervisor: 
 ECB, DNB, CBI: yes 
 BaFin: mostly (macroprudential 
mandate is not explicit) 
 
Framework provides room for action: 
 124/164 CRR, Pillar 2 measures, 
CCB: yes 
 National flexibility measures: partly 
(various constraints) 
 
Operational independence: 
 ECB: yes 
 DNB: partly (Minister of Finance 
can override macroprudential 
powers) 
 CBI: mostly (Minister for Finance 
can exert influence) 
 BaFin: barely/partly (constrained 
by legal and technical oversight 
BMF) 
 All: “top-up” mechanism  
 
Use of guided discretion: 
 124/164 CRR: partly 
 Pillar 2 measures: hardly 
 National flexibility measures: no 
 CCB: mostly 
 
Accountability mechanism: 
 124 CRR: barely (consultation EBA) 
 National flexibility measures: yes 
(justification towards EU 
institutions, ESRB, EBA) 
 CCB: partly (publication rate and 
justification on website) 
 BaFin: mostly (information 
requirements towards BMF, 
relationship with FSC) 
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that are subject to capital requirements, and subjecting more financial institutions to capital 
requirements.973 
 
For enforcing capital-based measures, the ECB has proportionate and dissuasive enforcement 
measures at its disposal, but is dependent on the cooperation of national supervisors for imposing 
non-pecuniary sanctions, including sanctions on individuals, and for enforcing national law which 
transposes the CRD IV, such as the provisions on the CCB and national Pillar 2 measures. Time will tell 
how this works out in practice. To discover this, further research may be called for in a number of 
years. In the Netherlands and Ireland, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement measures are 
available, but in Germany the sanctioning menu is somewhat limited, while inflicting a fine upon a bank 
might not always be easy, which decreases its deterring effect.  
 
Especially the ECB is protected against negative encroachments on its independence to take 
macroprudential decisions in the best interest of financial stability. In contrast, the power of the Dutch 
Minister of Finance to override macroprudential decisions of DNB, if these result in an unreasonable 
burden for the financial markets, restricts the operational independence of the Dutch central bank in 
its macroprudential capacity, although the minister has not yet used this power. Furthermore, DNB 
cannot independently take national flexibility measures, since agreement of the minister is required. 
The risk that the Irish Minister for Finance influences the Central Bank of Ireland cannot completely be 
excluded, but measures have been taken to create more behavourial distance between these two 
actors.974 In addition, the possibility of the German Minister of Finance to exercise technical oversight 
over BaFin can impede its supervisory independence. In theory, the possibility of the German Financial 
Stability Committee to recommend BaFin, subject to a comply-or-explain principle, to use a 
macroprudential instrument, increases BaFin’s willingness to act – by helping it to overcome political 
and industry pressure – without hurting its independence. However, since unanimity within the 
Financial Stability Committee is required to issue a recommendation, the Ministry of Finance can still 
block a recommendation, and the inaction bias may not decrease.  
 
Positive restrictions on the supervisory discretion, in the form of rules or guidelines that steer 
supervisors towards taking adequate action, are partly present, but differ significantly between 
instruments. Guidance for using art. 124 and 164 CRR to increase risk-weights is being developed, while 
                                                          
973 The ESRB has recently published a strategy paper which stresses the need to apply macroprudential 
requirements to all types of credit: European Systemic Risk Board (2016b), pp. 3, 5-6, 16. 
974 Cf. sub-section 3.3.3. 
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the use of CCB is subject to guided discretion, although even this mechanism is criticised for not 
steering supervisors enough towards adequate action.975 Guided discretion mechanisms can be 
improved by making them more specific.  
 
Already now, the risk of inaction is limited due to the possibility for the ECB to top up national 
macroprudential capital measures. This top-up possibility also functions as an accountability 
mechanism among peers, since supervisors have to explain and justify their decisions. The extent to 
which supervisors are accountable towards the legislature, executive or the public at large when using 
an instrument, differs significantly per instrument. Justification towards EU institutions, the ESRB, and 
the EBA is required for using national flexibility measures – not for refraining from using them. Every 
quarterly decision on the CCB requires justification to the public at large. While art. 124 and 164 CRR 
require an annual analysis, they do not provide for a specific forum to which supervisors are 
accountable for their subsequent (in)action. Hence, there is room to make accountability requirements 
more comparable, and to improve them by requiring public justification, both for using and refraining 
from using an instrument.   
                                                          
975 Cf. sub-section 3.3.2.1. 
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4. Credit-based regulatory instruments 
 
In recent years many member states have adopted borrower-based caps, i.e. direct maximum LTV, DTI, 
LTI and DSTI ratios, applying immediately to borrowers, independently of capital requirements or 
eligibility of loans for certain types of funding. Table 4.1 shows the use of borrower-based caps in EU 
member states. 
 
Table 4.1: The use of borrower-based caps by EU member states 
Member state Current LTV limit Current DSTI and LTI limits In force since B 
Austria 
 
  
Belgium 
 
  
Bulgaria    
Croatia 75% A DSTI: 100% A 2006 
Cyprus 80% DSTI: 80% of net disposable income 2003 
Czech Republic 90% C  2015 
Denmark 95%  2015 
Estonia 85-90% D  DSTI: 50% 2015 
Finland 90-95% E  2016 
France 
 
  
Germany 
 
  
Greece  DSTI: 30-40% A 2005 
Hungary 35-85% F  DSTI: 10-60% 2015 
Italy 80-100% A  <1995 
Ireland 80-90% G  LTI: 3.5 G 2015 
Latvia 90-95%  2007 
Lithuania 85% DSTI: 40% of net income 2011 
Luxembourg 
 
  
Malta    
Netherlands 101% (2017) H  DSTI: 9.5-43.5% (2017) 2013 H 
Poland 80-90%   2014 
Portugal 
 
  
Romania 60-95%  2011 
Slovakia 100% I  80% of disposable income 2017 I 
Slovenia 80% C DSTI: between 50% and 67% C 2016 
Spain 
 
  
Sweden 85%   2010 
United Kingdom  LTI: 4.5 J  2014 
A Based on Shim et al. (2013). Other information in this table is based on an overview provided by the ESRB: 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/shared/pdf/overview_macroprudential_measures.xlsx (retrieved 
11 February 2017). B This refers to the year at which the caps came into force; the maximum limit may have been 
changed afterwards. C This is a recommendation. D Per quarter, 15% of the amount of housing loans may breach 
the requirements. E The Finnish supervisor may reduce the LTV ratio with maximum 10 percentage points. F 
Hungary also set LTV ratios of 30-75% for vehicle loans. G 5-20% of the value of yearly supplied mortgage loans 
may exceed the LTV and LTI limits. H The LTV limit is reduced to 100% in 2018; prior to 2013, LTV and DSTI limits 
have been based on self-regulation. I Moreover, only 10% of the share of the loans may have a LTV ratio of >90%, 
and only 40% a LTV ratio of >80%. Between 2014 and 2017, limits had the form of a recommendation. J 15% of 
the value of yearly supplied mortgage loans may exceed this limit. Cf. Bank of England, 2014, p. 3vv. 
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This table reveals some of the heterogeneity of the use of borrower-based caps by member states, 
which partly results from the absence of harmonising EU legislation on this topic.976 However, table 
4.1 does not show the substantial legal differences between the design of LTV, DSTI, LTI and DTI ratios 
in different member states. These differences crucially affect the potential effectiveness of these 
instruments.977 The next sections discuss the borrower-based caps in respectively the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Germany. Each section focusses on (1) their determinacy and completeness, (2) the 
proportionality and dissuasiveness of the measures to enforce them and (3) the independence in 
applying, enforcing and amending them.978  
 
4.1. Direct DSTI, LTI and LTV limits in the Netherlands 
The basis of borrower-based caps in the Netherlands is a provision on preventing an overextension of 
credit: art. 4:34 Wet op het financieel toezicht (Wft) (Act on Financial Supervision).979 The Wft includes 
prudential and conduct-of-business requirements. Art. 4:34 Wft is part of the ongoing conduct-of-
business requirements for credit supply. The Wft regulates credit-related products and services, and 
governs, in principle, all credit supplied to consumers, including commodities credit, meaning 
supplying goods or services that have to be repaid later.980 Some specific forms of credit are excluded 
from the rules of the Wft, such as student loans, as well as credit which has to be redeemed within 
three months and for which only negligible costs are charged.981 Most rules of the Wft, including those 
of art. 4:34 Wft, are not applicable to overdraft facilities that have to be redeemed within a month.982 
The scope of the Wft is encompassing in terms of governed (legal and natural) persons: its provisions 
apply to all credit supplied in the pursuit of a profession or business983 – a phrase which is not 
                                                          
976 Note that, in 2016, the ESRB issued a recommendation on monitoring risks arising from the real estate 
sector, including definitions of indicators, such as LTV and LTI ratios, to be monitored: European Systemic Risk 
Board Recommendation 2016/14 of 31 October 2016, OJ 2016, C 31/1 
977 See sub-section 2.3.1.2 for a discussion of the promising empirical results regarding the effectiveness of 
borrower-based caps. 
978 Sub-sections 4.1.1, 4.1.3, 4.2.1 and 4.2.3 are partly based upon Van ’t Hof (2016). 
979 Wet op het financieel toezicht, Staatsblad 2006, 475. The Wft is available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020368.  
980 See the definition of credit in art. 1:1 Wft. For more about the types of credit falling under the scope of the 
Wft, see Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 2-16, 22-32; Van den Ing (2012), pp. 76-78, 113-117. 
981 For the other exceptions, see art. 1:20(1) Wft. Cf. Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 22-32. The excepted types of 
credit are not relevant for this research, since they will likely not lead to over-indebtedness.  
982 Art. 1:20(2) Wft. 
983 See art. 1:1 Wft for this phrase. See pages 18-22 in Van Poelgeest (2015) for a further discussion of this and 
some other conditions – which are less relevant for this study and are thus not discussed. Borrowing via a peer-
to-peer platform would, in principle, fall outside the scope of this phrase, but this will not be further discussed, 
since households tend not to use these types of funding on a significant scale. Cf. Leloux (2013). 
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interpreted restrictively by courts – to consumers984 in the Netherlands, whether the supplier is a Dutch 
business or professional or not.985 However, credit which is offered via internet by an undertaking 
established in another member state, is not subject to the rules of the Wft.986 Instead, it is governed 
by the rules of the country of origin, as a result of the implementation of the E-Commerce Directive.987 
 
The responsibility to prevent overextension of credit 
Art. 4:34(1)-(2) Wft imposes the responsibility to prevent overextending credit to consumers on credit 
providers.988 They are prohibited from entering into a credit agreement or increasing the total amount 
of credit if it turns out that this would be irresponsible in the light of overextension of credit.989 
Furthermore, credit providers are obliged to obtain and evaluate information about the financial 
position of the consumer in advance.990 These obligations are detailed by means of secondary 
legislation: art. 115 of the Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële ondernemingen Wft (Bgfo) (Decree on 
Conduct of Business Supervision of Financial Undertakings under the Wft) obliges credit providers to 
                                                          
984 A consumer is defined as a natural person, acting outside his trade, business or profession (art. 1:1 Wft), a 
definition which originates from EU consumer law (see e.g. art. 3(a) Directive 2008/48). The CJEU interprets 
this concept of a consumer objectively, by considering whether someone acts outside his trade, business or 
profession, irrespective of his concrete knowledge, even if he is not a weak party due to this knowledge (Case 
C‑110/14 Horațiu Ovidiu Costea v. SC Volksbank România SA [not yet published], para. 18-27). 
985 Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 33-35; Bierman et al. (2015), p. 308. The rules of part 4 of the Wft apply to all 
persons allowed to supply credit in the Netherlands (art. 4:1 Wft). Supplying credit is prohibited without a 
license of the AFM, DNB, or another EU banking or insurance supervisor (art. 2:60-2:62 in combination with 
2:11-2:54f Wft). Although these rules pose restrictions on the freedom to provide financial services, they are, in 
principle, justified for reasons of protecting consumers, i.e. if pursuing a legitimate interest, and if 
proportionate in relation to the objective pursued. After the adoption of the Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) 
and Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD), provisions on assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness were integrated 
into art. 4:34 Wft and associated legislation (cf. section 5.1.2). In case of the CCD, the principle of mutual 
recognition was intentionally not included in the final version in order to grant the consumer the benefit of 
protection of home country laws (Rott, 2009, pp. 185-186). Art. 2(1) MCD explicitly allows member states to 
maintain or introduce more stringent provisions than those provided for in the Directive into national law (cf. 
art. 32(4)).  
986 Art. 1:16 Wft in combination with art. 3:15d(3) of the Dutch civil code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005291. 
987 Art. 3(1)-(3) Directive 2000/31 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000, OJ 2000, L 
178/1. Cf. Van Poelgeest (2015), p. 34. See Hellner (2004, pp. 196-198) for an explanation of art. 3 of this 
directive. 
988 The Dutch word used in the Wft for overextension of credit is overkreditering. Several authors have noticed 
a trend of shifting the responsibility of preventing over-indebtedness from consumers to credit suppliers (e.g. 
Brosens et al., 2008, p. 61; Van Poelgeest, 2015, p. 74). This can be seen as a result of acknowledging findings 
from behavioural economics concerning people’s limitations when making financial decisions (sub-section 
2.1.2.2). The legislative history of the predecessors of art. 4:34 Wft, in previous acts, shows that there was no 
intention to take a borrower’s own responsibility away (cf. Broekhuizen & Labeur (2006), p. 251). 
989 Art. 4:34(2) Wft. Before 2011, these rules only applied when entering into a credit agreement. Due to the 
implementation of art. 8(2) CCD, it also applies when significantly increasing the total amount of credit. The 
amendment is published in: Staatsblad 2011, 246, available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-
2011-246.html (last visited 5 December 2014).   
990 Art. 4:34(1) Wft.  
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document and apply criteria for assessing a credit application, in order to prevent overextension of 
credit.991 For consumer credit, this obligation is the only further specification of art. 4:34(3) Wft. Before 
the regulatory LTV, DSTI and LTI caps came into force on 1 January 2013, after some paragraphs have 
been added to art. 115 Bgfo, this was also the case for mortgage credit (this study uses the term 
“consumer credit” to denote credit supplied to consumers, not secured on residential property, and 
the term “mortgage credit” for credit supplied to consumers, which is secured on residential 
property).992 “Overextension of credit” is nowhere defined in the Wft, the Bgfo and preceding or 
related legislation, and until 2012 this regulatory system contained no substantial rules on what 
amounts responsible credit provision.993 The intention was to establish an open norm, to be further 
detailed by the credit suppliers and the sector itself, and to be monitored by the AFM.994 Indeed, the 
sector regulated itself by adopting codes of conduct, which include a system of borrower-based 
caps.995  
 
Obtaining information about the financial position of a consumer and the credit registry 
Reliable information about income and existing debt is a prerequisite for determining LTV or DTI ratios, 
and enabling responsible lending, i.e. lending while taking the interests of borrowers, in particular their 
repayment capabilities, into account.996 Art. 4:34(1) Wft, further detailed by art. 113-114 Bgfo, requires 
lenders to obtain information about the financial position of consumers applying for a loan. Art. 113 
Bgfo prohibits a credit supplier to extend a loan of more than € 1000 without written or other durable 
recorded information on the financial position of the consumer.997 With respect to income, this can be 
a payslip, for example. Art. 114 Bgfo obliges a credit supplier to check the information about existing 
                                                          
991 Art. 4:34(3) Wft in combination with art. 115(1) Bgfo. The amendments since 2012 will be discussed below. 
The Bgfo is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020421. 
992 This is in line with the use of the name Consumer Credit Directive for Directive 2008/48, governing 
unsecured consumer credit, in contrast with the Mortgage Credit Directive, Directive 2014/17, governing 
mortgage credit. Art. 1:1 Wft defines mortgage credit, in short, as a credit agreement with a consumer 
concerning credit secured on real estate, where the lender holds a first lien over the property. 
993 Van Tuyll (2012), p. 31.  
994 See e.g. Brosens et al. (2008), pp. 61-63; Van Tuyll (2012), pp. 30-32; Claassen & Snijders (2014), pp. 188-
190. This is also very clearly stated in, the following letter from the Minister of Finance to the Dutch parliament, 
in 2009: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2009/05/18/antwoorden-op-
kamervragen-kamerlid-sap-hypotheken-dsb-bank.html (last visited 28 July 2016). 
995 The earliest versions of some of those codes of conducts are already some decades old. 
996 Campbell (2012), p. 18. According to European Commission (2009c) ‘[r]esponsible lending means that credit 
products are appropriate for consumers’ needs and are tailored to their ability to repay.’ (p. 3). Cf. footnote 
1368.  
997 Art. 113(2) and 113(3) Bgfo exclude credit meant to obtain securities under certain circumstances from this 
obligation, as well as overdraft facilities if the overdraft has to be repaid within three months and the limit is 
not higher than the monthly income received on the bank account.  
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credit at the credit registry before entering into a credit agreement of more than € 250. All this 
information and the credit agreement have to be documented and maintained for at least five years.998 
 
Every credit supplier is obliged to participate in the system of credit registration.999 The amount and 
duration of consumer credit, if the duration is at least three months and the amount at least € 250, is 
recorded at the credit registry, as well as information on limits on overdraft facilities and credit cards, 
and information on arrears which exceed two months.1000 Information on mortgage debt is not 
registered, unless mortgage arrears longer than 120 days are present. Neither is data recorded on 
income, student loans or debt resulting from arrears on energy payments or rent.1001 So, lenders have 
to rely partly on information provided by the borrower. In April 2016, a Dutch newspaper reported 
that almost half of the people is silent or even lies about existing student debt, because it would affect 
their borrowing capacity. Still, there was no political willingness to require registration of student loans 
in the credit registry, because of their favourable repayment conditions.1002 
 
4.1.1. Determinacy and completeness of the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits  
4.1.1.1. The DSTI and LTI limits for consumer credit 
The three codes of conduct for consumer credit have been each drafted by a different association. Two 
of them apply to consumer credit in general and will be discussed together, because they exhibit 
considerable similarities. The third code of conducts only deals with commodities credit. After their 
description, the determinacy and completeness of the rules in the three codes of conduct is analysed.  
 
DSTI and LTI limits in the VFN and NVB codes of conduct 
The two codes of conduct applying to general credit are those of the Vereniging van 
Financieringsondernemingen in Nederland (VFN) (Union of Finance Companies), a union of non-bank 
credit providers, and of the Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken (NVB) (Dutch Banking Association), 
representing nearly all active banks in the Netherlands.1003 Both codes of conducts contain – almost 
                                                          
998 Art. 33 Bgfo. 
999 Art. 4:32 Wft. 
1000 See Van Poelgeest (2015), p. 58; https://www.bkr.nl/veelgestelde-vragen/welke-leningen-en-kredieten-
worden-geregistreerd/ (last visited 11 February 2017). 
1001 Ibidem. However, data on mobile phone contracts and possible arrears on it, are registered, as such 
contract are considered as a form of credit under Dutch law (see the following case: Hoge Raad 13 June 2014, 
NL:PHR:2014:76 and NL:HR:2014:1385, JOR 2014/206). 
1002 De Groot & Keultjes (2016). 
1003 The VFN code of conduct, applicable since January 2014, as well as an explanation to it, can be found via 
http://www.vfn.nl/nl/normen-en-gedragscodes/gedragscodes.The NVB code of conduct, applicable since 2012, 
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identical – rules for determining a household’s monthly borrowing capacity. Since providing credit is 
not allowed when there is no borrowing capacity, this is in fact a DSTI limit.1004 The monthly borrowing 
capacity is (1) the actual net income minus (2) the lending standard minus (3) the actual recurring 
expenses.1005 These three concepts require further explanation: 
1. Income must be calculated excluding holiday bonuses and allowances. According to the NVB code 
of conduct, only income from sources with a durable character may be taken into account.1006 
2. The lending standard is an amount which households should have at their disposal to cover living 
expenses. It distinguishes between four types of households, and is derived from a norm on 
required minimum living expenses, yearly set by the VFN and NVB for their respective codes of 
conducts, based upon reference values of Nibud, the Nationaal Instituut voor Budgetvoorlichting 
(National Institute for Family Finance Information).1007  
3. Recurring expenses are housing costs, existing credit costs and, if applicable, alimony.1008 Instead 
of taking real costs of existing credit into account, VFN members may assume them to be at least 
2% of the credit sum.1009 Members of the NVB must take them into account for at least 2% of the 
credit sum or limit.1010 According to the judgment of the District Court of Amsterdam in a recent 
civil case, banks are not obliged to take higher existing credit costs than 2% of the credit sum into 
account, even if they know that the real existing credit costs are higher.1011  
 
Both codes of conduct also include – partly different – provisions that lead to LTI caps, insofar the debt 
results from consumer credit. The VFN code of conduct sets the credit limit for revolving credit or 
overdraft facilities at 50 times the monthly borrowing capacity, due to the duty to assume a monthly 
                                                          
as well as the actual minimum standards, can be found via https://www.nvb.nl/publicaties-
standpunten/publicaties/1743/gedragscode-en-normen-consumptief-krediet.html (last visited 28 July 2016).   
1004 Art. 6c VFN Code of conduct. 
1005 Art. 4-5 VFN code of conduct and art. 5-6 NVB code of conduct. 
1006 Art. 8 NVB Code of conduct. 
1007 Art. 4-5 VFN code of conduct and its explanation, and art. 5-6 NVB code of conduct and the document with 
its minimum standards. The four household types are a single, a single with children, a couple and a couple 
with children. The minimum standard (the norm on required minimum living expenses) increases above certain 
income thresholds, since households with more income usually spend more. The lending standard is calculated 
as: minimum standard + 0,15*(actual net income -/- minimum required costs for housing -/- minimum 
standard). The minimum required cost for housing is a standard set by Nibud. 
1008 Art. 5 VFN code of conduct and its explanation, page 2 of the NVB document with the minimum standards. 
1009 See the explanation to art. 6 VFN Code of conduct. 
1010 Art. 7 NVB Code of conduct. Furthermore, both codes of conduct prescribe two possible calculation 
methods for taking tax advantages resulting from mortgage interest deductibility into account for calculating 
the existing net monthly mortgage credit costs. The first allowed method is reducing the gross monthly costs 
with 25% or 30%, depending on the borrower’s income, as a fictitious tax advantage. Alternatively, the net 
monthly costs of a 30 year annuity amortisation scheme can be used (art. 6a VFN Code of conduct and the 
explanation on art. 5 and 6 VFN Code of conduct and art. 7 NVB Code of conduct). 
1011 Rb Amsterdam 31 December 2014, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:9091, para. 4.8. 
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burden of at least 2% of the total credit amount for calculating the repayment capacity.1012 For 
instalment credit, the maximum credit sum is 50 or up to 96 times the monthly borrowing capacity, 
depending on the calculation method which credit providers choose.1013 The rules of the NVB code of 
conduct lead to a credit limit or maximum credit sum of 50 times the borrowing capacity.1014 
 
The codes of conduct apply to the members of the respective organisations. VFN members can be 
expulsed in case of structural non-compliance.1015 Furthermore, both codes of conduct require credit 
providers to agree with their intermediaries on paper that the latter will uphold the code of 
conduct.1016 When an intermediary systemically violates the code of conduct, the credit provider must 
exclude the intermediary from acting on its behalf.1017  
 
The scope of both codes of conducts is credit supplied to consumers, other than credit for purchasing, 
remodelling or refinancing an own residence, secured by collateral through establishing a 
mortgage.1018 Moreover, they prohibit providing unsecured credit for purchasing an own residence, if 
this violates the norms of the code of conduct for mortgage credit (so, providing unsecured credit for 
e.g. remodelling an own residence is allowed).1019 The scope of the NVB code of conduct has additional 
limitations: it only applies to consumer credit with a sum between € 1.000 and € 75.000.1020 Also, it 
excludes some types of credit from the scope of the articles dealing with the DSTI and thus the LTI 
norms, including credit for which the application of those norms would be burdensome for consumers, 
provided that (1) the consumer shows the bank that he has enough income and/or capital, (2) the 
methods of this code of conduct are difficult to apply to this credit, and (3) the bank motivates the 
non-application of the norms sufficiently and documents this motivation.1021 
                                                          
1012 Art. 6a VFN Code of conduct. Cf. pages 3-4 of the explanation of the VFN Code of conduct. 
1013 See art. 6a VFN Code of conduct Instalment credit is credit which has to be redeemed in fixed terms. 
1014 Art. 7 NVB Code of conduct. This is the case for both revolving and instalment credit. 
1015 Art. 1 VFN code of conduct.   
1016 Many Dutch households use services of an intermediary when taking out a mortgage loan. 
1017 Art. 8 VFN code of conduct and art. 13 NVB code of conduct. 
1018 Art. 1 VFN code of conduct. 
1019 Art. 1 and the explanation of the VFN code of conduct. 
1020 Art. 3 and 10 NVB code of conduct. 
1021 Art. 4 NVB code of conduct. Among the other excluded types are (1) credit secured by collateral on 
belongings of consumers, if the consumer is able to pay the credit costs out of the credit received from the 
bank, (2) credit with a duration of maximum three months and a limit not higher than the monthly income 
received on the bank account, (3) credit secured by collateral on belongings of consumers which are able to 
generate revenues and (4) student loans. Some provisions of the NVB code of conduct still apply to these 
exemptions, such as the prohibition to supply credit for acquiring an own house if then the norms of the code 
of conduct for mortgage credit would be violated. Also the VFN code of conduct includes an exemption: art. 6e 
allows exceeding the DSTI ratio for refinancing loans, if this is in the interest of the consumer, which is at least 
the case if the new interest rate is lower. 
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DSTI limits in the NTO code of conduct 
The third code of conduct applying to consumer credit is that of the Nederlandse Thuiswinkel 
Organisatie (NTO) (Dutch Homeshop Organisation), an organisation representing the interests of web 
shops. According to the NTO, more than 70% of all online consumer sales are handled by their 
members.1022 Members of the organisation are obliged to apply their code of conduct.1023 The NTO 
code of conduct deals with hire purchase credit, and applies to loans between € 250 and € 5000.1024 
 
The NTO code of conduct, also called income and expenses test, consists of a system for calculating 
the maximum amount of credit that can be extended, based upon income and expenses. The 
calculation of the borrowing capacity differs slightly from to the other two codes of conduct. It is based 
on actual net income and actual housing costs, as reported by the consumer, while the magnitude of 
the other expenses is derived from the minimum references values, as calculated by Nibud.1025 The 
buffer for disposable income is lower than under the other two codes of conduct, and thus offers less 
protection. Existing credit must be taken into account, with assumed monthly costs of 2% of the total 
outstanding credit sum, as recorded in the credit registry.1026 So, these rules create maximum DSTI 
ratios as well. Yet, if no borrowing capacity exists, credit can still be extended if it can be justified by 
the individual circumstances of the consumer, which needs to be substantiated.1027  
 
Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of the DSTI and LTI limits for consumer credit 
This system of an open norm in the Wft, with the codes of conducts as further specification, is 
completer than one would suspect at first sight. The scope of the codes of conduct concerning 
consumer credit is restricted to members of the respective organisations, of which many, but not all 
of the credit suppliers, are member. This suggests that the scope of the DSTI limits is limited. However, 
the protective influence of the codes of conduct reaches beyond their own scope. The AFM namely 
takes the view that these codes of conduct are a minimal interpretation of art. 4:34 Wft. Consequently, 
it verifies whether own criteria of lenders not subject to a code of conduct, would at least provide the 
                                                          
1022 See https://www.thuiswinkel.org/over-ons (last visited 28 July 2016). Membership of the NTO is 
voluntarily, but web shops have an incentive to become member, since the NTO-label signals credibility to their 
customers. The code of conduct is available at 
https://www.thuiswinkel.org/bedrijven/lidmaatschap/voorwaarden/inkomens-en-lastentoets-voor-
kredietverstrekkende-webshops  (last visited 5 December 2014). 
1023 See https://www.thuiswinkel.org/bedrijven/lidmaatschap/voorwaarden (last visited 28 July 2016). 
1024 Art. 2 and 15 NTO code of conduct. 
1025 Art. 3, 6-11 NTO code of conduct. The consumer must be pointed at his own responsibility for reporting the 
correct income and housing costs (art. 3). Income includes allowances (art. 11). 
1026 Art. 3, 11 and 15 NTO code of conduct. 
1027 Art. 12 NTO code of conduct. 
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same degree of protection to overextension of credit as the codes of conduct. In a lawsuit, a lender 
argued that this stance of the AFM violated the lex certa principle, since the Wft itself did not indicate 
that the norms of a code of conduct would function as minimum norm.1028 However, both the District 
Court of Rotterdam and the court of last instance judged that this principle was not violated, because 
the AFM communicated its stance in advance to credit providers.1029 So, the overall scope of the degree 
of protection achieved by the DSTI caps is encompassing.   
 
These judgments and the lex certa principle automatically provoke the question of whether this system 
is determinate. The open norm of art. 4:34 Wft itself is vague and general, and thus indeterminate. It 
requires further specification to enable enforcement.1030 The codes of conduct function as this further 
specification. Their provisions are relatively complex and technical, but they are quite specific. For 
professionals, like lenders, this complexity is no problem. This evaluation corresponds with the 
judgments of the courts that the norms are sufficiently clear and determinate.1031 However, in 
judgments concerning the code of conduct for mortgage credit, both the District Court of Rotterdam 
and the court of last instance held that a violation of this code is not necessarily a violation of art. 4:34 
Wft.1032 Analogically, this applies as well to the codes of conduct for consumer credit. This diminishes 
the determinacy of the total framework, despite the fact that the norms in the codes of conduct are 
sufficiently clear and determinate. Furthermore, the differences between the codes of conduct might 
hamper their functioning as a yardstick for the required minimal required degree of protection against 
overextension of credit, because it may be unclear which rules and exceptions determine the desired 
level of protection. Nevertheless, since large deviations from codes of conduct by lenders will likely be 
a violation of art. 4:34 Wft, this lack of clarity does not decisively impair the effectiveness of the rules.  
 
                                                          
1028 Rb Rotterdam 4 May 2011, NL:RBROT:2011:BQ3835, JONDR 2011/148, para. 2.10. 
1029 Ibidem; CBb 28 November 2013, NL:CBB:2013:260, JOR 2014/41, para. 5.5. The College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven (CBb) (Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal), the court of last instance in these kinds of cases, also 
ruled that art. 115(1) Bgfo must not be interpreted as stipulating that the criteria of the lenders should always 
prevent an overextension of credit. Nonetheless, since art. 115(1) Bgfo mentions this as the aim of the criteria, 
the own criteria should at least not be unsuitable for serving that goal, according to the CBb (para 5.1). Also in 
cases about the code of conduct for mortgage credit, in the period before the regulation on mortgage credit 
was in force, the District Court of Rotterdam and the CBb both ruled that this code of conduct could be taken 
as a valid minimum interpretation of the open norm of art. 4:34 Wft, and that this does not violate the 
principles of legal certainty and lex certa: Rb Rotterdam 20 May 2010, NL:RBROT:2010:BM5231, JOR 2010/196, 
para. 2.10-2.12; CBb 19 July 2013, NL:CBB:2013:69, JOR 2013/280, para. 5.2. 
1030 Cf. Van Tuyll (2012), p. 32. 
1031 See e.g. CBb 28 November 2013, NL:CBB:2013:260, JOR 2014/41, para. 5.5. 
1032 Rb Rotterdam 20 May 2010, NL:RBROT:2010:BM5231, JOR 2010/196, para. 2.13; CBb 19 July 2013, 
NL:CBB:2013:69, JOR 2013/280, para. 5.2. 
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The codes of conduct are relatively complete with respect to preventing possibilities to circumvent 
their rules, but there are gaps. All three codes of conduct require lenders to take existing loans into 
account when calculating the maximum DSTI ratios. However, this requirement does not cover debt 
resulting from arrears on energy payments or rent, since it is no credit (in addition, it cannot be verified 
without relying on information provided by the consumer, because it is not recorded in the credit 
registry). The fact that banks are allowed to take debt-service costs of existing loans into account for 
2% of the credit sum, even if they know that they are substantially higher, constitutes another gap.1033 
Other loopholes might be created through the exceptions to the codes of conduct. The NVB code of 
conduct allows for more exceptions than the VFN code of conduct.  
 
So, there is room for leakage in the rules of the codes of conduct concerning consumer credit. Still, the 
open norm itself functions as a safety net to prevent widespread and large deviations from the norms 
of the codes of conduct, since it is general and applies always. Furthermore, borrowers and lenders 
themselves have incentives to avoid an overextension of credit. Nevertheless, lenders can be under 
pressure due to competition or conflicting incentives from sales targets of fees. In addition, they might 
rely on a risky business strategy – for instance, to increase market share.1034 
 
4.1.1.2. The DSTI, LTI and LTV limits for mortgage credit 
Self-regulation was the major means of shaping responsible mortgage credit supply and preventing 
overextension of credit since 1990, when the first code of conduct for mortgage credit had been 
adopted, until 1 January 2013, when the regulatory income and LTV limits came into force. The code 
of conduct for mortgage credit includes a system for calculating DSTI and LTI limits that is very similar 
to the current regulatory system, and, since the revision of 2011, a LTV limit of effectively 106%.1035 
Before that, LTV limits were only used in the national mortgage guarantee scheme, the Nationale 
Hypotheek Garantie (NHG), existing since 1995. The NHG is briefly discussed in box 4.1.  
                                                          
1033 Supra, footnote 1011. 
1034 Cf. Grace et al. (2015), p. 92; Fitzgerald (2013), p. 357. 
1035 See art. 6-7 code of conduct for mortgage credit. A Dutch and English version of this code of conduct and 
an explanation accompanying it (only in Dutch) are available at https://www.nvb.nl/publicaties-
standpunten/publicaties/1671/gedragscode-hypothecaire-financieringen.html (last visited on 9 January 2015). 
With the revision of the code of conduct for mortgage credit in 2011, a LTV cap was introduced and possibilities 
to use exceptions to the DSTI norms were reduced. This has been the result of pressure from the Minister of 
Finance, who threatened to introduce regulatory LTV and LTI limits, and the AFM, which observed that 
mortgage lenders exceeded the maximum lending norms regularly, for instance by assuming, without any 
substantiation, that the income of the borrower would rise (Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 80-81; Van Boom (2012), 
p. 271). For some lenders this was even the default option. 
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Box 4.1: DSTI and LTV limits in the Dutch national mortgage guarantee scheme, the NHG 
In the Netherlands, mortgage guarantees are provided by a private foundation, backed by the 
government for its financial commitments.1036 In turn for a fee, paid by the borrower, this foundation 
provides a guarantee to the lender in case the borrower would be unable to meet his payments 
obligations. Irrespective of the type of loan, the guarantee decreases monthly with the amount 
which would be redeemed under an annuity mortgage with a duration of 30 years.1037 Moreover, 
for loans taken out since 1 January 2014, banks bear 10% of the risk of a loss.1038 Due to this 
guarantee, mortgage lenders face lower risk and offer lower interest rates to borrowers with a 
guaranteed loan. In fact, banks sometimes do not lend without a guarantee. Furthermore, under 
certain circumstances, the residual debt of a borrower after a forced sale can be cancelled.1039 So, 
the NHG leads to advantages for both borrowers and lenders. 
Conditions and norms apply to borrowers participating in the mortgage guarantee scheme, 
including LTV and DSTI limits.1040 Households are only eligible for a guarantee if both the mortgage 
amount and the house value are below a certain threshold.1041 This amount is based on the average 
selling price of a house in the Netherlands, and has risen substantially over the years.1042 Since 2013, 
the regulatory LTV cap is incorporated in the NHG norms, but until 2011 the LTV limit was effectively 
112% of the lowest of either the price paid for the house, or the market value according to an 
appraisal report, plus some other costs, most importantly costs for improving the quality of the 
house.1043 The NHG norms include a system of DSTI limits, which are yearly adopted based on advice 
of Nibud, after approval by the Minister of Internal Affairs.1044 LTI limits can be derived from the DSTI 
limits. Substantially, this system is similar to the current regulatory regime.  
                                                          
1036 This is the Stichting Waarborgfonds Eigen Woningen (Foundation Homeownership Guarantee Fund). See 
https://www.nhg.nl/Over-NHG/Stichting-WEW (last visited 28 July 2016); Priemus (2013), pp. 353-354.  
1037 Art. A1(2.a) of the conditions and norms of the NHG, available at https://www.nhg.nl/V-N/Voorwaarden-
Normen-2017-3. An archive with all conditions and norms since 1995 is available at https://www.nhg.nl/V-
N/Archief-Voorwaarden-en-Normen (both last visited 18 February 2017). 
1038 Art. B13(2)-(3) of the conditions and norms of the NHG. 
1039 See https://www.nhg.nl/Consument/Voorwaarden-voor-kwijtschelding (last visited 17 September 2016). 
1040 Supra, footnote 1037.  
1041 See e.g. https://www.nhg.nl/Consument/NHG-afsluiten/Voorwaarden-bij-aankoop (last visited 28 July 
2016). Note that a fixed percentage of additional costs (currently 6%) should be subtracted from the threshold 
value to obtain the maximum allowed value of the house. 
1042 The NHG itself might have contributed to the rising threshold value, as Kerste et al. (2011, p. 98) concluded 
that it had raised house prices. During the crisis, the threshold was temporarily decoupled from the average 
selling price. 
1043 This LTV limit can be derived by combining norms 5.1 and 2.2 (2.3. for new houses, where the LTV limit was 
effectively 108% until 2011). In 2012, the LTV limit was effectively 108% for all houses.   
1044 See chapter 6-7 of the NHG norms, and, on approval by the Minister of Internal Affairs, art. 4(1) and art. 
13(2)-(3) of the statutes of the Stichting Waarborgfonds Eigen Woningen, available at 
https://www.nhg.nl/Over-NHG/Stichting-WEW/Statuten (last visited 28 July 2016). 
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The basis of the regulatory DSTI and LTV limits has been laid by adding some paragraphs to art. 115 
Bgfo.1045 Art. 115(3) Bgfo states the norms regarding income and the relationship between mortgage 
credit and the value of the house – so, DSTI and LTV limits – are determined by ministerial decree. This 
is the Tijdelijke regeling hypothecair krediet (Trhk) (Temporary regulation of mortgage credit).1046 
Subsequently, art. 115(4)-(5) Bgfo oblige mortgage lenders to apply these income criteria, in addition 
to their own criteria, when assessing an application for credit, and to take into account the LTV cap. 
So, their own criteria and the code of conduct for mortgage credit, which partly determines and 
restricts these own criteria, remain applicable. Finally, paragraphs six and seven of art. 115 Bgfo 
prescribe methods for valuing the house when determining the LTV ratio.  
 
DSTI and LTI limits in the Tijdelijke regeling hypothecair krediet 
The Trhk sets a limit for the financing costs – all the necessary costs for financing a mortgage loan, i.e. 
the DSTI ratio – which is differentiated to both the income level and the interest costs.1047 Higher DSTI 
percentages are allowed for higher income levels, and for higher interest rates. The latter seems 
counterintuitive, but with lower interest rates, there is a higher risk of sharply rising interest rates, for 
instance, after the termination of the fixed-rate period.1048 This may lead to over-indebtedness. If 
mortgage interest is not tax deductible, the DSTI limits are much lower.1049 The allowed DSTI 
percentages in 2017 range between 9.5% and 43.5%. This leads to LTI ratios of 2 to 2.5 for the lowest 
income categories, 4-5 for middle-income categories, and up to 5.5 for the highest income 
categories.1050 Basically, the DSTI limits are a household’s income minus the portion of income which 
it needs for other expenses than servicing its housing debt. This portion is calculated by taking half of 
the difference between the actual average expenditures of Dutch households with a similar income, 
as measured by a continuous budget survey of the Dutch statistical agency, and the required minimum 
living expenses, and adding this to the required minimum living expenses.1051 This method is subject 
to various criticisms. Some consider it arbitrary (households might want to spend more than 50% of 
                                                          
1045 Wijzigingsbesluit financiële markten 2013, Staatsblad 2012, 695, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2012-695.html. In later years, the paragraphs about the valuation 
of the home have been amended twice. Art. 115 Bgfo is available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020421/Hoofdstuk10/Afdeling102/1022/Artikel115. 
1046 The Tijdelijke regeling hypothecair krediet is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0032503. 
1047 Art. 3(1), 3(5) and the first attachment of the Trhk. 
1048 See also the Explanatory Memorandum to art. 3 Trhk in Staatscourant, 20 December 2012, Nr. 26433 (p. 8). 
1049 Tables 3-4 of the first attachment of the Trhk. 
1050 See https://www.nibud.nl/wp-content/uploads/voorbeeldhuishoudens-verschil-maximale-hypotheek-
2016-en-2017.pdf (last visited 18 February 2017). 
1051 As of 2015, the required minimum living expenses include a buffer. For an extensive explanation of the 
methods used by Nibud, the institute which calculates these ratios, see Nibud (2015), pp. 15-25. 
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their free disposable income on housing) and undifferentiated (it is based on a two-person household 
with a single income).1052 The AFM is aware of the risks of norms which are based on one household 
type, and monitors what their effects are on other household types, to ensure that vulnerable people 
remain protected.1053 Previously, it has proposed differentiation in household types.1054 The Financial 
Stability Committee has also warned against procyclical elements in the calculation of the DSTI 
limits.1055 Recently, some elements in the calculation have been changed to make the norms less 
procyclical.1056 
 
The detailed rules on the income which may be taken into account for calculating the DSTI ratio try to 
balance protection and flexibility. In principle, only current fixed and durable gross income counts, 
which is salary, including fixed bonuses and allowances, governmental allowances and pensions, and 
other durable, long-term sources of income.1057 However, if the borrower had no fixed income, his 
average income of the last three calendar years can be used for the calculation.1058 This is intended for 
people working as entrepreneur, freelancer or via a temporary employment agency.1059 Also, two 
future streams of income may be taken into account: (1) future available income from disposable 
capital, if it can be reasonably expected and (2) an expected future structural increase of income within 
a reasonably term. This term could be up to several years and has to be substantiated, like the grounds 
for expecting increasing income.1060 The restrictions for taking future income into account are looser 
than those of the code of conduct for mortgage credit to provide more flexibility.1061 Yet, in 2011, 
conditions in the code of conduct were tightened for the very reason that mortgage lenders exceeded 
                                                          
1052 See e.g. Rietdijk (2014), Battes (2015a), Boelhouwer & Schiffer (2015), pp. 5-6, 12-14.  
1053 Cf. https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/professionals/nieuws/2016/jul/eenverdieners-hypotheek (last visited 27 
September 2016). 
1054 This differentiation was proposed at the time that the norms were still part of the code of conduct for mortgage 
credit. Cf.https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2010/04/21/brief-inzake-aanscherping-regels-
hypothecaire-kredietverlening (last visited 9 September 2016). Boelhouwer & Schiffer (2015) have also proposed 
differentiated norms, which take the household type and life-stage into account (p. 17).  
1055 See the accounts of the meeting of 12 November 2013 (supra, footnote 1166). 
1056 Nibud (2016), pp. 18, 46-47. 
1057 Art. 2(1) Trhk. The list of allowed types of income is identical to that in the explanation to art. 6(3) code of 
conduct for mortgage credit. 
1058 Art. 2(2) Trhk. 
1059 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Trhk, published in the Staatscourant, 20 December 2012, Nr. 
26433, p. 7, available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2012-26433.html (last visited 28 July 
2016). These provisions have been loosened compared to the code of conduct for mortgage credit of 2011, in 
which averaging the income over three years only applied to entrepreneurs, while for other people without 
fixed income, the fixed and durable part of the income had to be determined and had to serve as basis for the 
calculation (art. 6(3) and the explanation to this article of the code of conduct for mortgage credit). 
1060 Explanatory Memorandum to art. 2 to art. 5 Trhk (supra, footnote 1059). 
1061 According to art. 6(3)(b) the code of conduct for mortgage credit, future income could only be taken into 
account if it was unconditionally and written assured by the employer, and would take effect within six months. 
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the maximum norms regularly, for example, by assuming, without any substantiation, that the income 
of the borrower would rise.1062 According to letters of the Ministers of Finance and Housing, objective 
information proving the expected increase is now required.1063 However, this is not clear from the text; 
the current conditions are a bit vague and, thus, create room for circumvention. 
 
Various rules ensure a prudent calculation of the actual DSTI percentages. A protective condition is 
that financing costs should always be calculated using gross financing costs, and an annuity scheme of 
30 years or the real term of the mortgage, if that is shorter than 30 years.1064 This means that it is not 
possible to artificially reduce debt-servicing costs by assuming a very long maturity. Other paragraphs 
of art. 3 Trhk settle issues related to the calculating the maximum financing costs, such as summing up 
the income of dual earners, and regulating the interest rates that should be used for the calculation.1065 
Finally, art. 3(11) Trhk requires mortgage lenders to take the costs of other loans of consumers into 
account, by either adding them to the actual financing costs or deducting them from the maximum 
allowed financing costs. This concerns previously supplied consumer or mortgage credit, as well as 
student loans.1066 The financing costs of existing credit are assumed to be 2% of the total credit 
amount, but for student loans a percentage of 0.75% or 0.45% is used, because of their low interest 
rates and other favourable conditions.1067  
 
To grant lenders and borrowers flexibility, the Trhk provides for exceptions to the DSTI caps. Three of 
them are geared towards specific situations, namely (1) refinancing one mortgage loan with another, 
while staying in the same house, (2) taking energy saving measures and (3) credit for bridging the 
period in which a new house is already bought, but the old house is not yet sold. Protective and mostly 
precise conditions are attached to these exceptions.1068 Yet, although an increase of the DSTI limit in 
                                                          
1062 Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 80-81; Van Boom (2012), p. 271. 
1063 See letter of the Minister of Finance, 14 December 2012, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/32847/kst-32847-37 and letter of the Minister for Housing, 7 
February 2013, available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/32847/kst-32847-41 (both last 
visited 28 July 2016). 
1064 Art. 3(2) Trhk. Art. 3(3) Trhk provides one exception to this rule, which can be used if it is justified in light of 
the conditions of the mortgage and the personal circumstances of the borrower.  
1065 See art. 3(7)-(9) Trhk). The rules on interest rates prevent that lenders use a very low interest rate in their 
calculation in order to increase the allowed loan amount. 
1066 See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Trhk, p. 8 (supra, footnote 1059). 
1067 See the letter of the Minister for Housing of 30 May 2016 and the attached letter of Nibud, at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-32847-243.html and https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-
759718 (both last visited 28 July 2016). Moreover, if a student loan is almost redeemed, a lender may assume a 
future income increase, in order to account for the fact that the associated credit costs will soon end. 
1068 A condition in the first situation is that the new principal of the mortgage loan is not larger than the 
amount of the old loan together with the costs of redeeming the old loan and taking out the new loan (art. 4(2) 
Trhk). Several precise conditions are attached to the second situation, e.g. that the consumer’s income is at 
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case of energy saving measures can be justified by the lower monthly costs for borrowers as a result 
of these measures, the actual savings depend on the behaviour of the borrower. The Trhk also created 
a general possibility to extend credit which exceeds the DSTI limit, if motivated and substantiated by 
documents and calculations which show that this is justified.1069 Furthermore, the credit provider must 
be able to show that he verified that the reason underlying the deviation is durable.1070 The text of art. 
4(1) Trhk does not exclude the possibility that banks use generic characteristics of consumers as a basis 
for using the exception clause, as long as the conditions are fulfilled.1071 These conditions help to 
minimise circumvention and overextension of credit to consumers. 
 
The LTV limit and valuation rules in the Tijdelijke regeling hypothecair krediet 
The maximum LTV ratio will be 100% as of 1 January 2018, after the gradual reduction of one 
percentage point per year, starting with 105% in 2013 (hence, it is 101% in 2017).1072 Several exceptions 
to this LTV cap have been created. Similarly to the exceptions to the DSTI ratios, it is allowed to exceed 
the maximum ratio for refinancing one mortgage loan with another, and for taking energy saving 
measures.1073 In the latter case, it is allowed to finance the costs for taking energy saving measures 
with the mortgage loan, up to a LTV ratio of 106% (apparently, these measures are supposed to be not 
value-enhancing, which is a bit puzzling). Furthermore, a borrower with residual debt from selling his 
previous house is allowed to refinance this, without taking it into account when calculating the LTV 
ratio.1074 Protective and mostly precise conditions have been attached to these exceptions.1075 Apart 
from three exceptions for specific situations, there is one general option to exceed the LTV cap, namely 
if the actual financing costs are substantially lower than the maximum allowed financing costs.1076 The 
                                                          
least € 33.000 (art. 4(3) Trhk). Only for the third exception some criteria are less precise, due to the use of a 
phrase like a reasonable period (art. 4(4) Trhk). These exceptions were already included in art. 6(6) code of 
conduct for mortgage credit. 
1069 Art. 4(1)(a)-(b) Trhk. 
1070 Art. 4(1)(c)-(d) Trhk. 
1071 The 2007-version of the code of conduct for mortgage credit contained a general exception clause (art. 
6(6)), contrary to the 2011-version. Under that regime, the court of last instance allowed banks to base the use 
of this clause on generic characteristics of consumers, as long as the bank used own criteria for responsible 
lending, as required under art. 4:34 Wft (CBb 19 July 2013, NL:CBB:2013:69, JOR 2013, para. 5.4 and 5.9-5.10). 
1072 Art. 5(1)-(2) Trhk. In 2012 the LTV ratio limit 106%, due to the code of conduct for mortgage credit. 
1073 Respectively art. 5(5)(a) and 5(4) Trhk. The conditions for using the exception of art. 5(5)(a) are identical to 
those for using the same exception to exceed the DSTI norms.  
1074 Art. 5(3) Trhk. 
1075 In January 2016, it was reported in the Dutch news that some lenders granted borrowers thousands of 
euros above the LTV limit owing to very small energy saving measures, sometimes costing no more than € 100 
(Stikkelorum, 2016). This suggests that this exception is vaguely worded and facilitates creative compliance, but 
this is not the case: the rules are precisely defined, but have been violated. 
1076 Art. 5(5)(b)-(e) Trhk. One of these specific exceptions allows exceeding the LTV limit to finance necessary 
improvements for the house, if the LTV ratio will decrease. The Explanatory Memorandum clarifies that this 
exception is meant for houses which decreased in value, and need improvement to ensure their safety, for 
4. Credit-based regulatory instruments 
181 
 
reasoning behind this exception is that consumers with relatively low debt-service costs, and thus a 
relatively low LTI ratio, should easily be able to repay their debt.1077 Consequently, risks for the lender 
are much lower when exceeding the LTV cap. This exception is slightly vague, since it is not defined 
when a DSTI is “substantially lower”.  
 
Art. 115(6)-(7) Bgfo provide the methods allowed for valuing the house for determining the loan-to-
value ratio, with some safeguards to guarantee the reliability of these values. The value of the house 
is either determined by (1) its building costs, (2) its market value, (3) model-based valuation, or (4) the 
most recent official appraisal value based on to the Wet waardering onroerende zaken (Wet WOZ, Act 
on Real Estate Valuation).1078 The market value must be determined by an appraisal expert and the 
appraisal report may not be older than a year at moment of entering into the mortgage agreement.1079 
If model-based valuation or the WOZ value is used, only a LTV ratio of 90% is allowed, in order to 
reduce the risk of overextending credit.1080 These valuation methods are namely based upon objective 
criteria of the house, like its size and the location, but they can overrate the true value of the house, if 
it is in poor shape.1081 These latter valuation methods have been introduced in July 2016, with the 
transposition of the Mortgage Credit Directive, in order to offer consumers a cheap valuation method 
instead of the repealed option to use the price paid for the house as its value.1082 The most recent 
official appraisal value based upon the Wet WOZ can also be used without the 90% LTV limit, if the 
house is already wholly or partly owned by the borrower, or if he will inherit it wholly or partly.1083 This 
option was created to avoid unnecessary taxation costs for homeowners who want to increase the 
credit sum or switch to another mortgage lender.1084 Nevertheless, it comes with the small risk that 
the WOZ value is higher than the market value (usually it is the other way around).1085 Removing this 
option will create more consistency.1086   
                                                          
instance concerning the foundation or the roof (https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2016-
56566.html, last visited 21 February 2017). 
1077 Explanatory Memorandum to art. 5 Trhk (supra, footnote 1059). 
1078 The Wet WOZ is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0007119.   
1079 Art. 115(6)(2) Bgfo.   
1080 Art. 115(6)(3) Bgfo. 
1081 See page 34 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the AMvB amending the Bgfo, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2016-266.html (Cf. pages 5 and 8-11 of the minutes of a written 
discussion between the Minister of Finance and the parliament: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-
34292-13 (both last visited 29 July 2016). 
1082 The latter option was repealed, because it was considered incompatible with art. 19 Directive 2014/17. 
1083 Art. 115(7) Bgfo. 
1084 See Wijzigingsbesluit financiële markten 2014, Staatsblad 2013, 537, pp. 35 & 49, available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2013-537.html (last visited 29 July 2016). 
1085 Het Financieele Dagblad (2014a) drew attention to this risk, after finding out that banks are often unaware 
of the actual market value of the house, when extending these kind of mortgage loans. 
1086 Art. 115(6)(3) and 115(7) Bgfo are conceptually incoherent. 
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Scope of the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits  
The regulatory framework establishing DSTI, LTI and LTV limits applies to all mortgage credit supplied 
in the Netherlands, due to the wide scope of the Wft.1087 Banks, insurers, and other financial 
institutions are bound by it. This is certainly desirable in the light of the recommendation of Jeanne 
and Korinek (2014) to move macroprudential policy beyond banking regulation.1088 This wide scope 
limits the possibilities of circumventing the maximum DSTI, LTI and LTV ratios.  
 
However, the reasoning of a judgment on the scope of art. 4:34 Wft, delivered in April 2014, in an 
urgency procedure, increased the risk of circumventing the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits.1089 According to 
the reasoning of the court, in a situation where a homeowner moves to another house and does not 
substantially increase the credit sum, a bank may treat the situation as a replacement of collateral for 
an already existing agreement, instead of a new credit application.1090 Consequently, art. 4:34 Wft, and 
thus the Trhk, does not apply. When following this intriguing reasoning, banks can circumvent the DSTI, 
LTI and LTV requirements in cases that borrowers move and do not substantially increase the credit 
sum. Although the outstanding amount of debt will not increase in these cases, DSTI, LTI or LTV ratios 
might alter, if consumers earn less, interest rates have increased, or the value of the new house is 
lower than that of the old. 
 
Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of the regulation of mortgage credit 
Art. 4:34 Wft has been created as an open norm, but with respect to mortgage credit this norm has 
been made specific by further rules and requirements, coming into force as of 1 January 2013. Since 
then, a vague and indeterminate open norm is history. Violating a code of conduct does not necessarily 
establish a violation of art. 4:34 Wft, according to the courts,1091 which diminishes the determinacy of 
                                                          
1087 As discussed at the beginning of section 4.1. 
1088 Jeanne & Korinek (2014), pp. 167-168. 
1089 Rb Amsterdam 14 April 2014, NL:RBAMS:2014:2404, RVR 2014/78. In July 2016, this was the only published 
judgment concerning the Trhk.  
1090 Ibidem, para. 4.4-4.5. The case concerned a homeowner who already borrowed mortgage credit from a 
bank, and who wanted to move to a cheaper house. He asked the bank whether he could directly switch the 
mortgage loan to the new house under the existing conditions, which the bank confirmed (para. 2.1-2.2, 4.3). 
However, when the consumer later lodged the credit application, the bank treated it as a new application, and 
refused to offer the loan. The reasons for refusal were that (1) the LTI limit would be exceeded, due to existing 
consumer loans, and (2) uncertainty about selling the old house and the resulting revenue (para. 3.2, 4.3). The 
consumer argued, however, that it would repay the consumer credit with the money obtained from the price 
differential between the old and the new house. In addition, he argued that there was no new credit 
application, but only a replacement of collateral for an already existing agreement (para. 4.2). The court 
confirmed the uncertainty about the moment of selling the old house, but judged that it can at least be 
reasonably expected that the total amount of debt will decrease (para. 4.4). Also, it agreed with the argument 
on the replacement of collateral (para. 4.5).    
1091 As discussed in 4.1.1.1. 
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the self-regulatory system. This problem is absent with a system of regulatory DSTI, LTI and LTV limits. 
As is the case with the rules in the codes of conducts, the rules and requirements in the Trhk are 
technical and specific, but clear and thus determinate. 
 
The Trhk is reasonably complete. Firstly, all mortgage credit suppliers subject to the Wft are covered 
by it. The biggest limitation to its scope is that it does not apply when the credit sum is not significantly 
increased, which creates certain risks and possibilities for circumvention, as discussed above. Secondly, 
the conditions attached to the exceptions to the DSTI, LTI and LTV caps do not completely exclude the 
risk of abuse, but nevertheless minimise it. Some exceptions have been loosened compared to those 
under the latest version of the code of conduct for mortgage credit, such as the increased freedom to 
expect rising income and expect income from capital. This creates more possibilities to deliver tailor-
made solutions, but also adds some extra risks. Thirdly, when determining DSTI and LTI limits, 
mortgage lenders are required to take into account other financial commitments, including consumer 
credit and other loans. The method for calculating this is not prescribed, which suggests that real costs 
should be used, but for consumer credit the debt-service costs must be set at at least 2% of the credit 
sum or credit limit, according to the code of conduct for mortgage credit, which still applies.1092 As 
discussed before, this leaves some room for circumvention. 
 
Meanwhile, the completeness of the entire system to prevent overextension of credit is hampered by 
the incoherence of the various sets of rules. While the Trhk and the three codes of conducts share the 
overall idea of calculating a household’s borrowing capacity – which can be expressed as a DSTI ratio 
– by means of deducting already existing expenses from its income, the implementation is different 
for each set of rules, as shown in table 4.2. Although these inconsistencies do not decisively impair the 
effectiveness of the current system, they hamper the alignment of the various rules, and make it 
difficult to ascertain the actual level of protection of a consumer. Some differences stem from the 
different subject matter of each set of rules – consumer credit, hire purchase credit, or mortgage 
credit. Insofar as this is not the case, it is recommended to remove inconsistencies, by aligning 
methods. 
 
Finally, the completeness of borrower-based caps depends on the transmission channels of their 
effects. These are shown in figure 4.1. This reveals that the risk of leakage is relatively small, especially 
since (1) other credit has to be taken into account when calculating DSTI limits for mortgage credit, 
and (2) DSTI limits also apply to most lenders of consumer credit.  
                                                          
1092 Art. 6(11) code of conduct for mortgage credit. 
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Table 4.2: Main characteristics regarding the calculation of the borrowing capacity (DSTI ratio) 
 VFN code of conduct 
NVB code of 
conduct 
NTO code of conduct Trhk 
Income net income net income 
gross income (incl. 
potential increase) 
Deduct from 
income: 
minimum 
living 
expenses 
minimum required living expenses 
“super-minimum”1093  
required living 
expenses 
minimum required 
living expenses 
(incl. buffer) 
Deduct from 
income: 
buffer 
buffer of 15% of free disposable income1094 
buffer of 10% of 
“super-minimum” 
required living 
expenses 
buffer of 50% of 
assumed free 
disposable 
income1095 
Deduct from 
income: 
housing 
costs 
gross financing costs 
minus estimated 
deduction MID, or net 
costs of an annuity 
mortgage of 30 years 
actual financing 
costs or gross 
financing costs 
minus estimated 
deduction MID   
actual housing costs  
Deduct from 
income: 
existing 
credit costs 
existing credit costs à 
2% of credit limit, or 
real costs 
existing credit costs à 2% of credit sum/limit 
Material 
scope 
consumer credit 
consumer credit 
between € 1,000 
- € 75,000 
hire purchase credit 
between € 250 - €5,000 
mortgage credit 
Exceptions specific general & specific general general & specific 
Benchmark 
household  
four types: a single, a single with children, a couple, a couple with 
children 
a couple with one 
income 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that, from a systemic perspective, the risks appear contained, despite the 
room for using exceptions, and some room for circumvention of the regime establishing DSTI, LTI and 
LTV limits for mortgage credit. Abusing exceptions and circumvention can lead to very negative 
consequences for the consumer concerned, but it seems unlikely that it can happen on such a large 
scale that it results in systemic fragility, due to the conditions and the determinate rules. Of course, 
this is an interim conclusion, not taking enforcement and decision-making issues into consideration.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1093 This are the minimum required living expenses, minus some avoidable costs, such as part of the assumed 
budget for clothing, inventory and maintenance of garden & house (art. 9 NTO code of conduct). 
1094 The free disposable income is the actual net income, minus the minimum required costs for housing, and 
minus the minimum required living expenses. 
1095 The assumed free disposable income is the difference between the actual average expenditures of Dutch 
households with a similar income and the minimal required living expenses. 
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Figure 4.1: Transmission channels of the DSTI, LTI an LTV limits in the Netherlands 
 
 
4.1.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of the LTV, DSTI and LTI 
limits 
4.1.2.1. The powers to enforce maximum LTV, DSTI and LTI ratios 
While DNB is responsible for enforcing the risk-weighted capital requirements, the AFM is responsible 
for enforcing the LTV, DSTI and LTI limits. It does not only enforce the regulatory caps on mortgage 
credit, but also the DSTI and LTI limits for consumer credit, which are part of codes of conducts, based 
on the open norm of art. 4:34 Wft. The discussed case law shows that this open norm is indeed 
enforced by the AFM. The courts agreed with the conduct of business supervisor, that the codes of 
conduct can rightfully be taken as a minimal interpretation of this open norm.1096 The AFM and DNB 
have declared, in the published general principles underlying the enforcement policies, that they will 
                                                          
1096 See the discussion on the scope of these codes of conduct, at the end of section 4.1.1.1. 
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take action if a violation is signalled, no matter whether a norm is open or closed.1097 However, they 
acknowledge that demonstrating a violation of an open norm requires more motivation.1098 An 
important reason for this is that also the regulatees subject to an open norm possess a certain degree 
of freedom regarding its interpretation.1099 The case law reflects this: courts have judged in some cases 
that the non-compliance with a code of conduct does not automatically establish a violation of the 
norm of preventing an overextension of credit.1100 As the AFM should honour this freedom, this 
reduces the effectiveness of enforcement. The AFM does not face this hurdle when enforcing the 
regulatory DSTI, LTI and LTV limits. 
 
The measures available for enforcing the maximum LTV, DSTI and LTI ratios are largely similar to those 
available for enforcing the risk-weighted capital requirements, since the Wft underlies enforcement in 
both cases. The AFM uses the same informal enforcement measures as DNB, and like DNB, it can issue 
an instruction to adhere to a particular line of conduct within a reasonable term, can impose an order 
for incremental penalty payments, and a fine of the third category.1101 Also the AFM can sanction the 
manager who was responsible for the breach, appoint a custodian, or withdraw authorisation, at least 
if the authorisation was granted by the AFM.1102 However, criminal prosecution for violations of LTV, 
DSTI and LTI limits is not possible. According to Mein (2015a), enforcement differs between the AFM 
and DNB. Firstly, the AFM actively uses its formal enforcement powers, not least when art. 4:34 Wft 
and associated rules are violated.1103 This follows from its strategy to prioritise certain themes and, 
subsequently, to stringently enforce in these areas in order to signal that it is actively supervising, and 
non-compliance is punished.1104 In that way, the AFM seeks to influence behaviour of lenders, and to 
improve compliance. Secondly, unlike DNB, the AFM normally publishes the imposition of 
administrative fines on its website, often accompanied with a press release.1105  
 
                                                          
1097 About these principles, see Voerman & Bast (2011), p. 114; Van Es & Verrest (2013), pp. 99-104. The 
original enforcement policy from 2008 (Handhavingsbeleid van de Autoriteit Financiële Markten en De 
Nederlandsche Bank) is available at 
http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Handhavingsbeleid%20AFM%20en%20DNB%20ondertekening%2010%20juli%202
008_tcm46-184090.pdf, while additional clarification was published in 2011: hhttps://www.afm.nl/nl-
nl/nieuws/2011/mei/handhavingsbeleid-afm-dnb. For the official notification of the policy in 2008, see 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2008-132-p30-SC86677.html (all last visited 19 July 2016). 
1098 Handhavingsbeleid van de Autoriteit Financiële Markten en De Nederlandsche Bank, p. 4. 
1099 Cf. Van Tuyll (2012), p. 30; Claasssen & Snijders (2014), p. 189. 
1100 Supra, sub-section 4.1.1.1 and footnote 1032. 
1101 Cf. sub-section 3.2.2.1. 
1102 Cf. sub-section 3.2.2.1. 
1103 Mein (2015a), pp. 149, 155, 159-160. 
1104 Ibidem, pp. 149-153, 160-163. 
1105 Ibidem, pp. 141, 154. 
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Therefore, the arsenal of enforcement instruments at the disposal of the AFM is wide enough and 
includes deterring measures, like large administrative fines. The dissuasiveness of the available 
sanctions is confirmed by anecdotal evidence: according to an expert, banks tend to stay significantly 
under the maximum allowed ratios when lending out of fear for publicised sanctions by the AFM.1106 
Mein (2015a, 2015b) has examined the proportionality of fines imposed by the AFM, and concludes 
that their proportionality depends more on the severity of the violation in abstracto – meaning the 
legal classification of a violation, e.g. punishable with a fine of the third category – than on the severity 
in concreto.1107 If the concrete violation is not very severe, the AFM may mitigate the magnitude of the 
fine, but it is less willing to abstain from imposing it altogether.1108 With a reduced fine, the AFM can 
namely still publish its imposition, which is often feared most.1109 All in all, it is fair to conclude that the 
DSTI, LTI and LTV caps are backed by a credible threat, especially since existing case law shows that the 
AFM dares to use its powers.1110 
 
4.1.2.2. Private enforcement by borrowers 
Also borrowers are able to put pressure on lenders to comply with the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits, as not 
only public, but also private law influences the extension of credit to consumers.1111 The crucial concept 
in this regard is the ‘duty of care’, existing both in public and private law. In the Wft – part of public 
law – this concept has recently been codified in art. 4:24a for the provision of financial services, 
prescribing a supplier of a financial service to carefully take the legitimate interests of the consumer 
into account.1112 Under private law, the concept already had a history, with as the essence of the 
special duty of care that lenders and their intermediaries are obliged to act as professional partners 
who take the interest of consumers into account.1113 The essence of the duty of care under public and 
private law is the same.1114 This duty of care does not take the own responsibility of the consumer 
                                                          
1106 Mulder (2015). 
1107 Mein (2015a), pp. 177-179, 196-199. Cf. Mein (2015b), pp. 275-276. 
1108 Mein (2015a), p. 216. 
1109 Ibidem. 
1110 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1. It is true that the AFM mainly imposed low fines, but this is partly explained by the 
lower maximum amounts at that time. 
1111 For a general discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of private enforcement, see section 5.2. 
1112 This provision is in force since 1 January 2014, but already earlier specific obligations resulting from a duty 
of care were incorporated in the Wft. For the introduction of this article, see: Wijzigingswet financiële markten 
2014, Staatsblad, 2013, 487. It is available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2013-487.html (last 
visited 24 February 2015). A long list of examples of such specific obligations is provided in Hartmann & 
Keupink (2011), p. 98. 
1113 Cf. Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 207-208; Broekhuizen (2017), p. 336. 
1114 Broekhuizen & Du Perron (2012), p. 169; Van den Berg (2013), p. 312. 
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away.1115 Especially in financial law, public and private norms influence each other.1116 The content of 
this duty of care in private law is consequently influenced by public norms, although the violation of a 
norm from administrative law – e.g. DSTI caps – does not automatically lead to a violation of the duty 
of care.1117 For the latter also an impairment of the consumer’s interest is required.1118 The 
introduction of a public duty of care, makes it easier for consumers to claim damages. If a lender 
breaches his duty of care, the consumer can namely claim a tortious act.1119 
 
The threat of court cases on lenders crucially depends on the likelihood that courts honour the 
pleading of borrowers. Therefore, the case law requires attention. According to this, the special duty 
of care inter alia entails that the creditworthiness of consumers has to be verified sufficiently by the 
lender.1120 However, it means more than that. Firstly, to avoid breaching their duty of care, lenders 
and their intermediaries have to thoroughly verify reported debt-service costs for already existing 
loans, and to signal whether interest rates would possibly rise, in case they seem unreasonably low.1121 
If interest rates of the existing loans can be expected to increase, this rise should be discounted in the 
calculation of the maximum allowed DSTI ratios.1122 What is more, courts have established a breach of 
the duty of care if lenders did not take into account a risk of unemployment that was not 
unforeseeable,1123 or an income drop after retirement for an old borrower.1124 In other cases, it was 
held against the lender or the intermediary that they did not verify whether bonuses were 
structural,1125 or whether sufficient grounds were present for expecting a certain amount of income 
from a Bed & Breakfast.1126 Meanwhile, courts have judged in several cases that lenders did not breach 
their duty of care when supplying mortgage loan with a LTV ratio above 100%, as long as they warned 
                                                          
1115 Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 216-217. Cf. Van den Berg (2013), p. 312. With the introduction of the provision, 
the Council of State criticised the explanation to the introduction of the duty of care in public law, which 
presumably introduced a responsibility for the lender to ensure that a fully informed, but possibly non-rational 
consumer takes the appropriate decisions. In reaction, the Minister of Finance added that a lender is not 
responsible to protect a consumer for all irrational decisions (cf. Broekhuizen (2016), pp. 174-176). 
1116 Bierens (2013), p. 18. 
1117 Cortenraad (2012), pp. 704-706. See e.g. Rb Den Haag, 1 June 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:5961, para. 4.5. 
1118 Cortenraad (2012), p. 706. 
1119 Van den Berg (2013), p. 312. See e.g. Hoge Raad 16 June 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:1107, para. 3.2.3 en 4.3. Cf. 
art. 6:162 Burgerlijk Wetboek (supra, footnote 986). 
1120 See e.g. Rb Leeuwarden 27 April 2011, NL:RBLEE:2011:BQ3459. Cf. Van Poelgeest (2015), pp. 217-213. 
1121 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 17 September 2013, NL:GHARL:2013:6826, JOR 2013/313, para. 2.14. In this case 
the interest rate on the existing loan was very low and the intermediary, being a professional party, had to 
realise this and verify whether it was correct. In fact, in this case, it turned out to be temporary low.  
1122 Ibidem. Interest costs over the amount of too much extended credit were considered as damages and 
should be paid by the intermediary in that case (para. 2.18). 
1123 Rb 's-Gravenhage 10 August 2011, RBSGR:2011:BU3314, RF 2012/26, para. 4.13-4.15. 
1124 Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 26 May 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:3705, para. 4.6. 
1125 Hof Amsterdam 2 February 2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:355, NTHR 2016/2, para. 3.1-3.5 
1126 Rb Utrecht 6 April 2011, NL:RBUTR:2011:BP9469, NJF 2011/298, para. 4.11. 
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for the risk of residual debt.1127 This reveals the delicacy of balancing a lender’s duty of care and a 
borrower’s own responsibility, especially since courts consider a credit agreement as a relatively 
simple agreement.1128  All in all, these cases show that lenders cannot mechanically apply the rules and 
can expect to get away with negative consequences. They must carefully act, think ahead in the 
interests of the consumer, and thoroughly verify reported income. Meanwhile, Cherednychenko and 
Meindertsma (2014) point at inconsistencies in this body of case law, as well as the indistinctness of 
the role of regulatory norms in relation to the duty of care.1129 This might hinder private enforcement, 
by discouraging borrowers to start a legal procedure.   
 
Borrowers can also start proceedings against a lender via an independent arbitration institute, KiFid 
(Klachteninstituut Financiële Dienstverlening, Financial Services Complaints Tribunal).1130 This is often 
faster and cheaper than proceeding before a court. Lenders are obliged by law to be affiliated with 
KiFid; and most of them have agreed to accept its decisions as binding.1131 The outcome of existing 
decisions of KiFiD on overextension of credit varies.1132 It shows that a lender is not blamed if credit is 
extended within the norms.1133 On the contrary, lenders can be held responsible for the overextension 
when they violated certain rules or principles of the code of conducts. This could result in paying 
damages – either part of or all of the damages – or lead to converting a loan into another loan with 
different conditions.1134 However, extending credit beyond the income criteria in the code of conduct 
                                                          
1127 Rb Amsterdam 15 June 2016, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2016:3464, para. 4.1-4.5; Hof Amsterdam 31 May 2016, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:2028, JOR 2016/201, para. 3.4, 3.8. 
1128 Rb Noord-Holland 9 April 2014, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2014:8140, NJF 2015/10, para. 4.2; Hof Amsterdam 31 May 
2016, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2016:2028, JOR 2016/201, para. 3.4. 
1129 Cherednychenko & Meindertsma (2014), pp. 186-191. 
1130 http://kifid.nl/ (last visited 20 July 2016). 
1131 Art. 4:17 Wft, art. 16 Implementatiewet buitengerechtelijke geschillenbeslechting consumenten (Act on out- 
of-court settlement of consumer disputes; available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0036550) and art. 1(a) 
Besluit aanwijzing geschilleninstanties Wft (Ministerial decree designating settlement bodies Wft; available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0036800). Already before this obligation existed, the NVB code of conduct, 
the NTO code of conduct and the code of conduct for mortgage credit provide consumers with the possibility 
to go to the KiFiD with complaints (art. 14 NVB Code of conduct; Art. 10 NTO Code of conduct; Art. 18 code of 
conduct for mortgage credit). 
1132 Decisions of the KiFiD are available at http://kifid.nl/consumenten/uitspraken (last visited 20 July 2016). 
Sometimes they are published in journals that publish case law, such as JOR. 
1133 See e.g. decision 2014-004 of 28 January 2014.  
1134 For instance, in decision 2010-216 of 29 December 2010, it was decided that the lender had to bear the 
costs of overextension of credit, meaning redeeming residual debt, because it had to inform the young 
consumer better. In decision 2012-14 of 21 June 2012 KiFiD’s Commission of Appeal decided that extending a 
loan was never allowed, according to the income criteria of the VFN Code of conduct, but that the damages 
had to be shared between borrower and lender with respectively 40% and 60%, because the borrower is 
responsible too. In decision 2011-68 of 1 April 2011, the lender was ordered to convert a loan into another loan 
with different conditions, because the borrower could not bear the monthly costs, and lender was deemed 
responsible for extending too much credit, in violation of the norms of the code of conduct for mortgage credit 
(note that the annotation in JOR 2011/222 was highly critical on the reasoning in this decision). 
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for mortgage credit does not automatically qualify as an overextension of credit.1135 Like courts, KiFiD 
generally concludes that lenders do not violate their duty of care if they warned consumers of the risks 
which are involved with extending credit above the norms.1136 Verdicts of KiFiD are contradictory 
regarding the question of whether a lender can rely on declared income by the consumer, or whether 
expected income from an own business must be verified and examined.1137 Concluding, the risk of 
arbitration cases or civil proceedings, which both may result in paying damages, is another pressure 
on lenders to abide by the DSTI, LTI and LTV ratios, although the decisions still reveal inconsistencies. 
 
All in all, enough reasons exist for credit providers, especially mortgage lenders, to comply with the 
DSTI, LTI and LTV caps, because enforcement options are good and credible. The possibility for 
consumers to arbitrate or litigate further strengthens incentives to comply. Hence, this precondition 
for effectiveness is sufficiently fulfilled in the Netherlands. 
 
4.1.3. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits 
The ability and willingness of actors to apply and enforce the borrower-based caps is fostered if the 
caps have a clear legal basis, well-defined policy objectives, which correspond with the actors’ 
mandate, and if there is a framework which provides the actors with room to act.1138 All the DSTI, LTI 
and LTV limits, both for consumer and mortgage credit, are an elaboration of the obligation of art. 4:34 
Wft for credit providers to prevent an overextension of credit. While the codes of conduct, drafted by 
the representative organisations of these credit providers, have no legal basis in the Wft or Bgfo, courts 
have accepted the stance of the AFM that they function as a minimum interpretation of the open norm 
of art. 4:34 Wft.1139 The regulatory borrower-based caps have a clear legal basis, art. 115 Bgfo. Since 
all the borrower-based caps are aimed at preventing an overextension of credit to consumers, their 
main purpose is consumer protection. This is confirmed by their position in the chapter 4 of the Wft, 
which contains conduct-of-business requirements. Nevertheless, the legislative history shows that the 
                                                          
1135 See e.g. decision no. 2014-167 of 17 April 2014. In this case, the lender extended more credit than allowed 
under the income criteria of the code of conduct for mortgage credit, but mentioned this on the fifth page of 
the contract in a clause that states that the borrower agrees with it (para 3.2.). The then applicable version of 
the code of conduct for mortgage credit allowed exceptions from the income criteria in special circumstances, 
under condition that the borrower knew it and agreed in writing with it (art. 6(6) of the 2007-version). The 
tribunal considers that a consumer can be expected to read the contract before signing (para. 5.3). Surprisingly, 
the decision does not discuss whether any special circumstances were present. 
1136 Decision 2015-132 of 29 April 2015, para. 5.6; Decision no. 2015-394 of 18 December 2015, para. 5.3. 
1137 See respectively decision 2015-389 of 17 December 2015, para. 4.5, and decision 2016-009 of 22 March 
2016, para. 4.4-4.5. 
1138 Cf. sub-section 1.4.4.1. 
1139 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.1. 
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regulatory DSTI, LTI and LTV limits have been introduced for other purposes as well. An important 
reason behind the decision to adopt regulatory and reduced LTV and LTI limits was preventing the 
uncertainty which emanated from a statement of the AFM. The AFM namely announced that the DSTI 
percentages of 2012, as developed by Nibud and included in the code of conduct for mortgage credit, 
were too wide for consumers in some income categories. Therefore, it would not necessarily consider 
all lending to those consumers as responsible, even if banks abided by the code of conduct for 
mortgage credit.1140 Subsequently, regulatory LTV and LTI caps were adopted as result of a motion of 
parliament and a budget agreement between several political parties in spring 2012.1141 However, 
other reasons were avoiding the risk of residual debt, and facilitating cheaper financing of mortgage 
portfolios.1142 In a letter of the Ministry of Finance, these issues have been explicitly linked to financial 
stability in the Netherlands.1143 So, the regulatory borrower-based caps are meant to protect 
consumers, and also to contribute to financial stability.  
 
The AFM possesses the task to enforce all borrower-based caps, which it can do operationally 
independently from the government and the Ministry of Finance. The AFM is namely subject to the 
same or similar provisions as DNB for the issues discussed before.1144 One of the aims of AFM’s 
conduct-of-business supervision is ensuring that customers are treated carefully, among others things, 
in the interest of financial stability.1145 So, the objectives of the borrower-based caps correspond with 
its mandate. However, neither the AFM, nor DNB, which has the main responsibility for financial 
stability, has received the power to use the borrower-based caps as an instrument. Instead, every year, 
the Minister of Finance adopts the maximum DSTI percentages by means of a ministerial decree, based 
                                                          
1140 See http://www.afm.nl/nl/nieuws/2012/jan/verruiming-leencapaciteit-tweeverdieners.aspx (last visited 28 
July 2016). 
1141 The motion asked for for governmental action to avoid fines of the AFM for banks abiding by the norms 
(see https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/32847/kst-32847-20. For one of the letters to the 
parliament explaining that the regulatory LTV caps were a result of the mentioned motion, see 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/32847/kst-32847-32. For the agreement between the 
political parties, see http://old.findinet.nl/~uploads/newsModule/lenteakkoord.pdf (see p. 10 about LTV caps) 
and for the formal budget resulting from it http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-
publicaties/kamerstukken/2012/05/25/voorjaarsnota-2012.html (see pp. 23-24 about LTV caps). For a letter 
linking the LTV caps to this agreement, see https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33000-V.html.  
1142 Wijzigingsbesluit financiële markten 2013, Staatsblad 2012, 695, p. 97 (supra, footnote 1045).  
1143 See https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2012/05/25/visie-
toekomstbestendigheid-hypotheekrenteaftrek-reactie-motie-kuiper-c-s/visie-toekomstbestendigheid-
hypotheekrenteaftrek-reactie-motie-kuiper-c-s.pdf (last visited 25 February 2017). 
1144 These provisions have been discussed in sub-section 3.3.1. All the discussed provisions of the Wft also apply 
to the AFM. The grounds for dismissal of members of the Board of the AFM are the same as those for dismissal 
of members of the Governing Board of DNB, but included in another provision, art. 1:26(2) Wft. Also, there are 
a few procedural differences. 
1145 Art. 1:25(1) Wft. 
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on advice of Nibud. The minister also has the power to amend the LTV limit. The mandate of the 
Ministry of Finance, insofar as it concerns financial markets, is making rules for a well-functioning 
financial system, and contributing to a solid economic structure that is founded in an economically and 
financially sound Europe.1146 Arguably, this includes making rules to ensure the stability of the financial 
system, but not to protect consumers.  
 
4.1.3.1. Decision-making and guided discretion regarding the application, enforcement and amendment 
of DSTI and LTI limits for consumer credit 
The norms in the three codes of conduct concerning consumer credit are an interpretation of the open 
norm of art. 4:34 Wft, which is a form of principle-based regulation. The open norm leaves 
considerable discretion – especially administrative discretion in a strict sense and interpretative 
discretion – to credit providers to develop their own criteria to prevent an overextension of credit. This 
is only limited by a few requirements. The risk of self-regulation based on imposed principles is that 
regulatees may get away with the minimum required level of protection.1147 The VFN, NVB and NTO 
have chosen to use a system for determining borrowing capacity, which is based upon minimum 
reference values of Nibud. Still, they possess discretion to adopt these values with or without 
adjustments. Likewise, discretion exists for deriving the maximum DSTI and LTI norms from these 
minimum reference values. This discretion is indeed reflected in the differences between the codes of 
conduct. So, in practice, this system resembles some features of a guided discretion mechanism. 
However, the formally unlimited discretion of the VFN, NVB, and NTO leads to the legitimate question 
of whether there are enough safeguards against the risk that the rules in the codes of conduct are set 
at a level which offers insufficient protection. 
 
Nonetheless, their discretion is de facto not unlimited, since the AFM can put pressure on the sector. 
Currently the AFM has taken the stance that it considers the codes of conduct as a minimal 
interpretation of the open norm of art. 4:34 Wft. However, it is conceivable that the AFM would 
abandon this point of view if the codes of conduct would be loosened, or if the sector would choose 
to deviate substantially from the reference values of Nibud. As a matter of fact, the AFM showed 
already once that it does not necessarily take self-regulatory norms – at that moment more specifically 
the maximum financing costs set by Nibud – as a good interpretation of the open norm.1148 If the sector 
would substantially loosen the rules in its codes of conducts, the AFM has to decide whether it 
                                                          
1146 Art. 2 Organisatie- en mandaatbesluit Ministerie van Financiën 2015 (Decree on the organisation and 
mandate of the Ministry of Finance), available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0037135). 
1147 Black (2008), p. 426. 
1148 This concerned the code of conduct for mortgage credit and led to the regulation of LTI and LTV norms. 
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considers them still a good interpretation of the open norm of art. 4:34 Wft. The threat of sanctions 
imposed by the AFM can influence the choices of VFN, NVB and NTO for the maximum DSTI ratios. The 
literature calls this the shadow of hierarchy, and has found that self-regulation can be effective under 
the threat of adopting regulation.1149 Then, the threat of sanctions or the adoption of regulation must 
be credible.  
 
However, this threat is only credible if courts accept the stance of the AFM. In Dutch administrative 
law, courts have to be reticent when reviewing supervisory discretion.1150 So, courts are unlikely to 
quickly disagree with such a stance of the AFM. However, as Van Tuyll (2012) rightly argues, it is 
conceivable that supervisor and supervised come in fairness to a different interpretation of an open 
norm.1151 A court will grant the sector a certain degree of interpretative discretion, because art. 4:34 
Wft is an open norm.1152 The case law reflects such freedom of interpretation, since courts judged in 
some cases that non-compliance with a code of conduct does not automatically establish a violation 
of art. 4:34 Wft.1153 Hence, the legal situation that art. 4:34 established an open norm, as well as the 
case law of courts about this system, restrict the discretion of AFM. So, de facto neither the sector, nor 
the AFM has unlimited discretion to determine when credit supply is irresponsible. The decision-
making process in this situation of principle-based regulation does not minimise the risk of 
overindebtedness.  
 
4.1.3.2. Decision-making and guided discretion regarding the application, enforcement and amendment 
of DSTI, LTI & LTV limits for mortgage credit 
The Minister of Finance is the main decision-maker for determining the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits for 
mortgage credit. Except for the gradual reduction to 100%, the LTV ratio is not intended to be regularly 
adjusted. The maximum allowed DSTI ratios are yearly adopted with a ministerial decree, based on 
advice of Nibud. Higher law does not impose ex ante restrictions on the content of this ministerial 
decree. So, the discretion of the minister is not restricted or guided in that respect.  
 
                                                          
1149 Héritier & Lehmkuhl (2008), p. 3; Fredriksson et al. (2012), pp. 54, 59-60 
1150 For an example of a case in which the Supreme Court confirmed this with respect to the AFM, see Hoge 
Raad, 21 November 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3349, NJB 2014/2162, para. 3.4.3, 3.5.2, 3.5.3. 
1151 Van Tuyll (2012), p. 30. Cf. De Vries (2013), p. 349. 
1152 Cf. Claassen & Snijders (2014), who state that credit providers indeed deserve a certain degree of freedom 
regarding the interpretation of the open norm (p. 189). With respect to another open norm, the court has 
explicitly judged that the addressee has a certain degree of freedom to interpret the open norm (CBb 10 
September 2013, ECLI:NL:CBB:2013:104, JOR 2013/312, para. 5.3). Cf. De Vries (2013), pp. 351-352. 
1153 Supra, sub-section 4.1.1.1 and footnote 1032. 
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Various actors are involved in the process of adopting the DSTI ratios. De facto, this creates a form of 
guided discretion, while it also contributes to the accountability of the Minister of Finance. The tables 
with the DSTI limits are developed by Nibud, an independent foundation, which investigates 
households’ financial behaviour, and keeps track of price and other relevant developments affecting 
their budgets. Nibud has a pivotal role in the determination of the DSTI and LTI ratios, providing input 
for both the caps on consumer and mortgage credit. One of the reasons for using the input of Nibud 
in the process of adopting the DSTI limits for mortgage loans, is to avoid that decisions are mainly 
driven by political considerations.1154 However, the proposed ratios are not binding for the Minister of 
Finance: Nibud is nowhere mentioned in the Trhk, so its advice has no formal status. Still, its advice is 
authoritative, because Nibud is an expert organisation. Also, since Nibud’s advice and explanation for 
the DSTI limits was published online for the first time in October 2015, it becomes visible if the minister 
deviates from it.1155 AFM, DBN, and the Minister for Housing are consulted before adopting the caps, 
although this is no formal requirement.1156 The Financial Stability Committee (see Box 4.1) is not 
consulted in the process of adopting the DSTI ratios.1157 The NVB provides input as well, again without 
a formal role. Regularly, discussions take place between the Minister of Finance, the AFM and the NVB. 
So, although the sector itself clearly lost influence compared to the situation of self-regulation, it still 
has influence. In 2016, for the first time a public consultation was held for the yearly changes of the 
Trhk.1158 Reactions will be published if the contributor grants permission for publication. Public 
consultation creates transparency, which may contribute to holding the minister to account.  
 
While the Minister of Finance is does not face formal ex ante and ongoing restrictions limiting his 
discretion, there are a few ex post restrictions. A ministerial decree is a form of sub-delegation from 
the government to a minister, which is neither discussed in the Council of Ministers, nor requires 
advice of the Council of State. Parliamentary discussion is not required for adopting ministerial 
decrees, but they are often sent to the parliament before adoption, to give it the opportunity to discuss 
it.1159 The yearly adopted ministerial decrees determining the DSTI caps and amending the rules of the 
                                                          
1154 As indicated in an interview with an official of the Ministry of Finance.  
1155 Nibud (2015). 
1156 Yet, in 2012, the Minister of Finance has written to the parliament that he considers it important that the 
vision of both the AFM and DNB are structurally taken into account: see 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/ah-tk-20112012-1419.html (last visited 30 July 2016). 
1157 However, all actors involved in the Financial Stability Committee are involved in the process of adopting the 
DSTI ratios.  
1158 https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/regelinghypothecairkrediet2017 (last visited 16 August 2016). 
1159 Van der Pot (2014), pp. 682-690. 
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Trhk, are indeed sent to the parliament, which is thus able to discuss the matter with the Minister of 
Finance. Consequently, the legislator can control the Minister of Finance, and hold him to account.  
 
Box 4.3. The Dutch Financial Stability Committee 
Tasks and powers of the Financial Stability Committee 
The Financial Stability Committee has been created at the end of 2012 by a ministerial decree of the 
Minister of Finance, without a legal basis in higher law.1160 Therefore, the committee lacks powers 
to create legal consequences (rechtsgevolgen) for other parties, i.e. to change their rights and 
obligations. The Committee is meant to reinforce and structure the consultations between DNB, the 
AFM and the Ministry of Finance on risks threatening financial stability, and to ensure remaining 
attention for these risks, also in prosperous economic times.1161 Its tasks include identifying systemic 
risks, making recommendations to deal with them, aligning and coordinating the Dutch response to 
warnings and recommendations of the ESRB, and discussing possible actions to mitigate systemic 
risks, including the options for reinforcing the legal instruments that DNB, the AFM and the Minister 
of Finance have at their disposal.1162 The Financial Stability Committee is precluded from interfering 
with the execution of legal powers of DNB, the AFM, or the Minister of Finance.1163 Its warnings and 
recommendations are non-binding, but, according to the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
ministerial decree establishing it, it is reasonable that DNB, the AFM and the Ministry of Finance 
provide an explanation if they deviate from them.1164  
 
The Financial Stability Board (2014), an international body to promote financial stability, and the 
International Monetary Fund (2017) have recommended the Dutch authorities (1) to embed the role 
and institutional standing of the Financial Stability Committee in primary legislation in order to 
improve its effectiveness and enhance its credibility, and (2) to introduce a comply-or-explain 
principle regarding its recommendations.1165 In 2014, the Committee itself considered the two 
recommendations respectively not necessary in the short term, and not necessary.1166 
                                                          
1160 See Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité, Staatscourant, 6 November 2012, Nr. 22730, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2012-22730.html. The website of the Financial Stability 
Committee is http://www.financieelstabiliteitscomite.nl/.  
1161 Explanatory Memorandum to the Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité (supra, footnote 1160). 
1162 Art. 4 Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité. 
1163 Art. 4(4) Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité. 
1164 Supra, footnote 1160. 
1165 Financial Stability Board (2014), pp. 15-15, 24; International Monetary Fund (2017), pp. 
1166 See account of the meeting of 4 November 2014. Accounts of the meetings of the Financial Stability 
Committee are published on its website: http://www.financieelstabiliteitscomite.nl/nl/publicaties (last visited 
25 February 2015).  
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Decision-making in the Financial Stability Committee 
The Committee consists of three representatives of DNB, two of the AFM, and two of the Ministry 
of Finance.1167 The director of the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis joins as an 
external member, without voting rights.1168 The representatives of the Ministry of Finance do not 
take part in the decision-making on warnings and recommendations: on the one hand to guarantee 
the committee’s independent focus on financial stability, uncompromised by any policy concerns, 
and on the other hand to assure the freedom of the Ministry of Finance to take its own policy 
decisions, considering more aspects than financial stability.1169  
 
The recommendation to gradually reduce the LTV limit to 90% 
The Committee has actively discussed LTV – and to a lesser extent LTI – limits, and considers them 
as important macroprudential instruments, since they counteract overextension of credit and 
reduce imbalances.1170 In May 2015, the Committee recommended the next government to further 
reduce the LTV limit with one percent point per year to 90%.1171 The objectives of this lower limit 
are reducing vulnerabilities to house price shocks, the risk of residual debt, and banks’ difficulties 
with funding their mortgage portfolios. The recommendation fits in with earlier recommendations 
of the IMF and a Dutch independent committee of experts, which both recommended a gradual 
reduction of the LTV limit to 80%.1172  
 
                                                          
1167 Art. 3 Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité. 
1168 Cf. art. 5 Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité. 
1169 Art. 6(2) and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Instellingsbesluit Financieel Stabiliteitscomité. 
1170 See accounts of the meetings of 17 December 2012, 30 May 2013, 12 November 2013, 20 May 2014, 4 
November 2014. 
1171 This recommendation is available at 
http://www.financieelstabiliteitscomite.nl/media/58/29/272341/29/aanbeveling_van_het_financieel_stabilitei
tscomit_over_de_ltv-limiet_na_2018.pdf (last visited 9 August 2016). 
1172 The International Monetary Fund (2014c) suggested this, because it should reduce vulnerabilities to shocks 
and address the household debt overhang, which, according to the IMF, is the centre of the Dutch weak 
economy by constraining consumption (pp. 11-12, 19). The Commissie Structuur Nederlandse Banken (2013) 
proposed the lower LTV limit in order to reduce households’ vulnerabilities to economic shocks and to 
decrease house prices and banks’ difficulties with funding their mortgage portfolios (pp. 22-23). The Financial 
Stability Committee also refers to studies of DNB and the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
about the effects of reducing the LTV limit. The Centraal Planbureau (2015) questions the effectiveness of the 
LTV limit and suggests that reducing mortgage interest deductibility targets the problems more directly, 
whereas LTI limits are more effective in addressing housing booms. It points at the distortive effects of a lower 
LTV limit for the housing market, and the need for additional savings by first time buyers in order to be able to 
buy a house (pp. 2-5, 14-16, 26-33). The study of De Nederlandsche Bank (2015) quantifies issues like the risk of 
residual debt in light of the frequency of crises, and the need and room for additional savings by first time 
buyers if the LTV limit would be 90%. It points at the advantages of a lower LTV limit as later have been 
mentioned by the Financial Stability Committee as reasons for recommending a LTV limit of 90%. 
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The enforcement strategy of the AFM also influences to what extent DSTI, LTI and LTV limits will be 
respected. Its own principles steer the AFM towards action, namely to enforce quickly, instead of 
tolerating violations, and to choose the most effective instrument.1173 This published enforcement 
strategy of the AFM is – intentionally – vague, and provides little guidance in deciding whether and 
how to enforce.1174 However, in June 2017, the court ordered the AFM to publish its internal policy for 
determining the magnitude of fines.1175 The published document reveals a step-by-step plan to 
determine the magnitude of the fine, but also leaves discretion to adjust the fine, if this is suitable.1176 
Since 2015, the AFM has the policy that every fine exceeds the advantage obtained by the offence. In 
recent years, the AFM has acted actively against violations of rules on responsible lending.1177 
Generally, it uses formal sanctions as final step.1178 
 
All in all, in the current system with regulatory DSTI, LTI and LTV ratio, the influence of the mortgage 
lenders on the determination of the level of the caps seems rather limited. In that sense, it can be 
expected that protective caps can effectively be established. This conclusion gains strengths by 
pointing at to the involvement of various types of experts in their adoption – the AFM as conduct of 
business supervisor, DNB as macroprudential supervisor, and Nibud as household finance expert.  
Despite their involvement, the Minister of Finance decides about the ratios, with a lot of discretion, 
and without much formal checks. Especially in light of the large societal impact of these rules, the 
Ministry of Finance considers itself best suited for balancing the interests of on the one hand creating 
protective rules, and on the other hand avoiding overly restrictive rules, which may remove the 
responsibilities of market parties themselves.1179 It fears that a supervisor, if it would receive powers 
to set DSTI and LTV caps, will not sufficiently consider the societal costs of strict rules, since that is not 
part of the supervisor’s mandate.1180  
 
                                                          
1173 Supra, footnote 1097. 
1174 Cf. Mein (2015a), p. 177. Note that the AFM also published guidance about complying with the norms on 
mortgage credit, and used a dashboard to measure compliance (https://www.afm.nl/nl-
nl/professionals/doelgroepen/adviseurs-bemiddelaars/advies-bemiddeling/leidraden and 
https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/over-afm/prioriteiten/oud-thema/kbc/dashboard/hypotheekadvies-en-beheer (last 
visited 30 July 2016)). This may help the AFM to overcome inaction when detecting violations. 
1175 CBb 15 June 2017, ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:223. 
1176 The document is available at https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/over-
afm/werkzaamheden/maatregelen/boetehoogte (last visited 22 August 2017). 
1177 Mein (2015a), pp. 159-163. 
1178 As indicated in an interview by an official of the AFM. 
1179 As indicated by an official of the Ministry of Finance in an interview.  
1180 Ibidem. 
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Although, currently there seem to be no major problems with this role for the Ministry of Finance, it 
has clear downsides that the actors who pursue objectives aimed at guaranteeing consumer protection 
and financial stability – AFM and DNB respectively – lack a formal role in the process of adopting and 
amending LTV, DSTI and LTI ratios. Firstly, based on political interests, the Minister of Finance may try 
to avoid measures with short-term costs, but long-term benefits for financial stability or consumer 
protection. This might especially become problematic if pressure to abstain from lowering limits 
increases, for instance during a boom. This is the very reason that independent supervisory agencies 
exist.1181 Secondly, the absence of formal guidance for the discretionary powers of the Minister of 
Finance and limited formal duties to explain decisions decrease the transparency of the process of 
adopting the caps, and leave room for representatives of particular interests to influence the decision-
making process. Nevertheless, in recent years the transparency has been improved by the publication 
of Nibud’s advice and the public consultation for the DSTI ratios for 2017. This contributes to reducing 
room for capture. 
 
In light of these conclusions, a first recommendation is to assign a formal role to Nibud, DNB, the AFM, 
or the Financial Stability Committee in the process of adopting and amending the LTV, DSTI and LTI 
ratios. The second recommendation is to provide formal ex ante guidance for the setting of the DSTI 
limits, in order to reduce the room for capture and inaction, and to further increase transparency and 
legal certainty. One option to increase guidance is to formalise the input of Nibud, the AFM and DNB, 
and to allow the Minister of Finance to amend or neglect this input only for a limited number of 
reasons.1182 
 
A more far-reaching option is to give one of the supervisors decisive powers. Yet, assigning the leading 
role to either of the supervisors has its drawbacks. Assigning it to the AFM fits best with the fact that 
the provisions on overextension of credit were historically introduced for the sake of consumer 
protection, and not for macroprudential aims. However, then DNB continues to lack important 
macroprudential instruments in its toolbox as designated authority. On the contrary, assigning the 
leading role to DNB is at odds with the current design of the Wft, and results in less attention for 
consumer protection compared to financial stability. Another option is to separate the task of setting 
DSTI and LTV caps, and to assign the power to set a LTV limit to DNB. Then, DSTI limits could be set by 
the AFM or the Ministry of Finance.1183 The merits of this idea will be further discussed in sub-section 
                                                          
1181 Cf. sub-section 1.4.4. 
1182 An example would be avoiding a demonstrably disproportionate and significantly negative impact on a 
subset of households. Then, recalibration might be desirable. 
1183 This makes it a bit more difficult to align DSTI and LTV limits and their respective exceptions, but this is 
certainly not impossible.  
4. Credit-based regulatory instruments 
199 
 
7.1.3.1. In all cases, far-reaching instruments with impact on a political sensitive area as household 
finance are put in the hands of unelected experts. However, this concern is softened, since the Minister 
of Finance already has an override mechanism at his disposal for such a situation. If DNB or the AFM 
would receive the power to set LTV, DSTI and LTI limits, the rules will likely have the form of generally 
binding regulations. The possibility of the Minister of Finance to replace such regulations with a 
ministerial decree, if they constitute an unreasonable burden for the financial markets, has already 
been discussed in sub-section 3.3.1.1184 Moreover, if one of the supervisors is given a decisive role, its 
discretion must be guided by means of rules or guidelines, adopted by the legislature, in order to 
reduce concerns about democratic legitimacy and room for capture. 
 
4.2. Direct LTI and LTV limits in Ireland 
4.2.1. Determinacy and completeness of the LTI and LTV limits for housing loans 
In October 2014, the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) proposed to establish LTI and LTV ratios for housing 
loans, by publishing a consultation paper with draft regulations for residential mortgage lending.1185 
The primary objective of these regulations is to improve the resilience of the banking and household 
sectors to financial shocks.1186 The secondary aim is dampening the pro-cyclical dynamics between 
property lending and housing prices by limiting the room for loosening lending standards during 
upswings.1187 The CBI considered the use of other instruments, such as capital-requirements, but these 
were deemed less effective, and they do not increase the resilience of households.1188 The CBI views 
LTI and LTV caps as complementary achieving these objectives, since the LTV limit addresses the wealth 
aspect and the LTI cap the income aspect of the same risk.1189 In other words, a LTI ratio deals with the 
affordability for the borrower, whereas a LTV cap addresses the scale of potential losses of the lender 
if a borrower would be unable to service the debt. In addition, a LTI cap is more protective when house 
prices rise during an upswing.1190 
                                                          
1184 Then, the Minister of Finance has to argue that the borrower-based caps constitute an unreasonable 
burden for households which are active in the market for household finance. 
1185 Central Bank of Ireland (2014e). Note that the OECD already in 2011 recommended Ireland to establish LTV 
and LTI ratios, because of the large role of property loans in the crisis (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (2011), pp. 26-27. In 2013, the OECD concluded that no action was taken regarding its 
recommendation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013), p. 45). 
1186 Central Bank of Ireland (2014e), pp. 2, 4-5. Cf. Hallissey et al. (2014), who show a strong correlation 
between high LTV and LTI levels and default rates in Ireland, using loan-level data. 
1187 Central Bank of Ireland (2014e), pp. 2, 4-5. Cf. Cassidey & Hallissey (2016), pp. 272-280. 
1188 Cf. Central Bank of Ireland (2014e), pp. 5-13. 
1189 Ibidem, p. 11. 
1190 Ibidem. Cf. Hallissey et al. (2014). 
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Based on an analysis of actual LTI and LTV data and an international comparison, the Central Bank of 
Ireland initially proposed a “proportionate” LTI limit of 3.5 and a “proportionate” LTV limit of 80%.1191 
The term “proportionate” means that a certain proportion of all the loans supplied by a lender in a 
certain time-interval is allowed to exceed the limit.1192 This design follows the example of the UK’s 
Prudential Regulation Authority, which introduced a proportionate LTI limit in 2014.1193 The rationale 
behind proportionate limits is providing flexibility, whilst still ensuring prudent standards.1194 
Moreover, as explained by the Chief Economist of the Central Bank of Ireland, the limits have been 
introduced for macroprudential reasons and do not target individual banks or loans, but the stability 
of the whole system:  
 
‘It is not that every loan above a particular threshold is risky, but that too many high LTV or LTI 
loans can destabilise the system as a whole. Hence, the rules are necessarily broad-brushed and 
one can imagine many circumstances in which it makes sense to make use of the leeway.’1195 
 
The consultation on the proposed LTI and LTV ratios led to numerous submissions, as well as opinion 
pieces and discussions in leading Irish newspapers.1196 Most of the concerns regard the ceiling of the 
LTV ratio, in particular the negative effects which the proposed 80% limit might have on first-time 
buyers.1197 This led to an adjustment of the LTV ratio for first-time buyers in the final regulations.1198  
 
In February 2015, the Central Bank of Ireland established the LTI and LTV caps by means of the 
adoption of Statutory Instrument 47/2015, officially referred to as Central Bank (Supervision and 
Enforcement) Act 2013 (Section 48) (Housing Loan Requirements) Regulations 2015.1199 It came into 
force immediately after its official publication on 10 February 2015, in order to avoid uncertainty or 
                                                          
1191 Central Bank of Ireland (2014e), pp. 2, 4-5. 
1192 Ibidem, pp. 2, 19-22. 
1193 Central Bank of Ireland (2014e), pp. 13, 18-19. Cf. Prudential Regulation Authority (2014). In the UK the LTI 
limit is 4.5, while exceeding this limit is allowed for 15% of the total number of new mortgage loans. 
1194 Central Bank of Ireland (2014e), pp. 19, 22. 
1195 Address by Lars Frisell to Irish Economy Conference. See EPN Newswire (2015). 
1196 The Central Bank of Ireland (2015a) published a feedback statement on the received submissions. It 
mentions 157 submission (p. 4). Also newspaper articles voiced concerns, for some articles see Beesley (2014), 
Blaney (2014), Hancock (2014), The Irish Times (2014), Keenan (2014) and Reddan (2014, 2015). 
1197 Central Bank of Ireland (2015a), pp. 6-9; Blaney (2014), Hancock (2014), Reddan (2014).  
1198 Central Bank of Ireland (2015a).  
1199 For S.I. 47/2015, see http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2015/en/si/0047.html (last visited 6 March 2015). S.I. 
47/2015 is amended by S.I. No. 568/2016, Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (Section 48) 
(Housing Loan Requirements) (Amendment) Regulations 2016, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/si/568/made/en/print. 
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frontloading of mortgage applications.1200 In November 2016, the CBI published its review of the LTI 
and LTV caps, and announced some amendments, which took effect on 1 January 2017.1201 
 
4.2.1.1. The LTI and LTV limits and the valuation rules 
S.I. 47/2015 prescribes a maximum loan-to-income ratio of 3.5 for housing loans supplied for owner-
occupied residential property, i.e. primary dwellings.1202 Income is defined as a borrower’s total gross 
annual income, before tax and other deductions.1203 In contrast to the Dutch rules, it is not further 
defined what counts as income. In each calendar year, for each regulated financial service provider the 
amount of newly supplied loans with a LTI limit higher than 3.5 is allowed to be maximum 20% of the 
total monetary amount of all newly supplied loans.1204 So, up to 20% of the supplied loans may be non-
compliant with the LTI limit. However, on average, the limit cannot be exceeded. 
 
The maximum LTV ratio for owner-occupied residential property is different for first-time buyers and 
non-first-time buyers, namely 90% and 80%, respectively.1205 A higher LTV limit is set for first-time 
buyers than for non-first-time buyers in order to meet the concerns that first-time buyers loose access 
to mortgage finance and would be unable to buy a house.1206 In each calendar year, for each lender, 
the value of newly supplied loans to first-time buyers with a higher LTV ratio than the limit may not be 
                                                          
1200 Central Bank of Ireland (2015a), pp. 26-27 
1201 Information related to the review is available at https://www.centralbank.ie/financial-system/financial-
stability/macro-prudential-policy/mortgage-measures (last visited 29 April 2017). Cf. footnote 1199. 
1202 Regulation 5 in combination with regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015. Buy-to-let mortgages – borrowing to buy a 
house for renting purposes – are intentionally not covered by the LTI ratio, since comparing the borrowed sum 
with borrower’s income instead of the rental income is not considered a suitable metric for measuring 
affordability for this type of lending (Central Bank of Ireland, 2015a, pp. 17-18). 
1203 Regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015. 
1204 Regulation 5 S.I. 47/2015. 
1205 Regulation 6(1) S.I. 47/2015. First-time buyers are borrowers to whom never a housing loan has been 
advanced. If the loan is advanced to more than one person – for instance a couple – all of them must be a first-
time buyer in order to qualify together as first-time buyer (regulation 2(1)-(2) S.I. 47/2015). Before 1 January 
2017, the LTV limit for first-time buyers was 90% up to a house value of € 220,000 and 80% above this value. 
the maximum house value of € 220,000 was applied to this 90% LTV limit for first time buyers to ensure that 
the aim of dampening pro-cyclicality could still be achieved (Central Bank of Ireland (2015a), pp. 8-9; Central 
Bank of Ireland (2015b), p. 5). In the consultation process of the review of the measures in 2016, a lot of 
submissions suggested to increase the limit of € 220,000 (Central Bank of Ireland, 2016b, pp. 10-13). The CBI 
has decided to remove this limit, because rising house prices, in particular in Dublin, mean that the LTV limit 
effectively tightens, and thus must be updated yearly, while the LTV limit is not intended to have a short-term 
orientation (Central Bank of Ireland, 2016c, pp. 4-5).  
1206 Central Bank of Ireland (2015a), pp. 8-9. Note that researchers from the CBI have shown empirically that 
first-time-buyers are less likely to default than second and subsequent buyers, after controlling for various 
factors (Kelly et al. (2015)). This might justify differences in the LTV and LTI limits between these groups of 
borrowers. However, Duffy & O’Hanlon (2014) showed that – in their research period from 2005-2012 – first-
time buyers were much more likely to receive loans with a high LTV ratio, and thus to have negative equity 
after the crisis hit Ireland (Duffy & O’Hanlon (2014), pp. 328-329). 
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more than 5% of the total value of newly supplied loans. This percentage is 20% for loans supplied to 
non-first-time buyers.1207  
 
One specific exemption to the LTV ratio exists, as it does not apply when advancing a new housing loan 
to borrowers with negative equity, i.e. borrowers for whom the amount of their existing housing loan 
– including interest and arrears – exceeds the value of the house for which that loan was granted.1208 
This exception was introduced to avoid that borrowers with negative equity would be trapped in their 
house.1209 
 
S.I. 47/2015 also prescribes the methods for valuing the house. Its value for purposes of calculating 
the LTV ratio is the lowest of either the market value of the property, or the price agreed in the contract 
– excluding associated costs for sale, such as legal fees and stamp duty.1210 In case a borrower has 
already secured a housing loan on the residential property, the market value of that property must 
always be used for valuation purposes.1211 This rule covers the situation that a borrower applies for 
increasing the amount of an already existing housing loan. Then, the purchasing price of the house 
might not be a meaningful indicator of its real value anymore. Furthermore, in case a housing loan is 
supplied for constructing a house, or acquiring land and constructing a house on it, the market value 
of the land plus the estimated construction costs count together as the value for calculating the LTV 
ratio.1212  
 
The Statutory Instrument further regulates the assessment of the market value, which is the estimated 
amount for which the house should exchange on the valuation date between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller in an arm’s-length transaction – meaning that the parties are independent and unrelated, 
for instance, not being family members – after proper marketing and assuming that parties would act 
knowledgeably and prudently, without pressure.1213 In order to ensure an impartial and objective 
valuation, the market value should be determined by a professionally competent appraiser, who is 
                                                          
1207 Regulation 6(2)-(2A) S.I. 47/2015. For non-primary dwellings the LTV cap is 70%, with the option for lenders 
to provide maximum 10% of the monetary amount of the yearly supplied loans above this limit (regulation 
6(3)-(4) S.I. 47/2015). 
1208 Regulation 6(5) in combination with regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015. The exemption also applies if the loan is 
advanced to more than one person – for instance a couple – and only one of them has negative equity 
(regulation 2(3) S.I. 47/2015). 
1209 Cassidey & Hallissey (2016), pp. 288-289. 
1210 Regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015. 
1211 Ibidem. 
1212 Ibidem. 
1213 Ibidem.  
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sufficiently independent from the process of underwriting the housing loan.1214 The date of the 
valuation is not allowed to be more than four months before the date at which the loan is advanced.1215 
The market value, including its calculation and the used methodology, must be documented in a clear 
and transparent manner, and recorded on a durable medium.1216 The lender must receive and maintain 
a copy of this information.1217 These valuation requirements are comparable to those included in the 
CRR and contain several protective elements.  
 
4.2.1.2. The scope of the LTI and LTV limits 
All regulated financial service providers are subject to S.I. 47/2015.1218 A regulated financial service 
provider is defined as a person, body corporate or unincorporated body carrying on a business of 
providing one or more financial services or products, which is under regulation of either the Central 
Bank of Ireland, a similar regulator in another EU member state or the ECB.1219 Thus, not only credit 
institutions, but all kind of financial service providers are subject to these regulations.1220 Almost all 
mortgage lenders are regulated financial service providers, except for local authorities that provide 
mortgage loans. Subject to some conditions, these local authorities provide loans to households which 
are not able to obtain a loan from a bank or building society.1221 These loans are available for people 
with a maximum gross income of € 50,000 (€ 75,000 for couples), and cannot exceed € 200,000 and 
97% of the market value of the house.1222 While low-income households are particular vulnerable, and 
their situation deserves ongoing attention, the fact that local authorities are not subject to S.I. 47/2015 
is no major problem from a macroprudential perspective, as their share in the total amount of 
outstanding mortgage loans is only about 1%. 
 
                                                          
1214 Regulation 7(2)(a) S.I. 47/2015. 
1215 Regulation 7(3)-(4) S.I. 47/2015. 
1216 Regulation 7(2)(b)-(c) S.I. 47/2015. 
1217 Regulation 7(2)(d) and 7(5) S.I. 47/2015. 
1218 See the definition of “lender” in regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015.  
1219 See section 2(1) of the consolidated version of Central Bank Act 1942 (supra footnote 775) and section 
18(c) of Interpretation Act 2005, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2005/act/23/enacted/en/html 
(last visited 3 March 2017).   
1220 This link provides a list of types of regulated financial service providers: 
https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation (last visited 29 April 2017). 
1221 Cf. 
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/housing/owning_a_home/help_with_buying_a_home/local_authority_
mortgages.html (last visited 1 August 2016). 
1222 Regulations 2, 4-6 S.I. 408/2012 Housing (Local Authority Loans) Regulations 2012), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2012/si/408/made/en/print (last visited 1 August 2016). 
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The scope of S.I. 47/2015 is further limited to a loan being or to be secured on residential property in 
Ireland, and supplied to a natural person who acts for purposes outside his trade, business or 
profession, or to a small company.1223 However, there are some exemptions to this scope. Firstly, it 
does not apply to a refinancing loan, if the secured house is the same, and if the amount of the new 
loan does not exceed the outstanding amount of the existing loan.1224 Then, the amount of debt does 
not increase.1225 Secondly, S.I. 47/2015 does not apply to existing housing loan agreements.1226 Thirdly, 
housing loans provided with the purpose of addressing arrears, or the reasonable prospect of arrears, 
are excluded from the scope of S.I. 47/2015,1227 as the CBI does not want to interfere with attempts to 
restructure loans.1228 
 
4.2.1.3. Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of the maximum LTI and LTV ratios 
The new LTI and LTV limits are controversial in Ireland. Several researchers express regret that the 
limits are not applied in a rule-based countercyclical manner.1229 More often, the caps have been 
criticised for restricting access for first-time buyers to the expensive Dublin housing market and 
pushing them to other areas or the rental market.1230 Others argue that such restrictions are the very 
aim of the regulations and thus desirable, like the resulting easing of the rising house prices in 
Dublin.1231 Cassidy and Hallissey (2016) report that the annual growth rate of house prices in Ireland 
fell from 16.3% in Q4 2014 to 6.6% in Q4 2015, and in Dublin even from 22.3% to 2.6%.1232 While this 
does not prove causality, it may be the result of the borrower-based caps. The shortage of housing 
supply, especially in Dublin,1233 can explain high house prices and shows that LTI and LTV limits alone 
                                                          
1223 Regulations 2(1) and 3(1) of S.I. 47/2015. Regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015 defines a housing loan as ‘the amount 
advanced or the total sum of amounts advanced by a lender to a borrower which are or are to be secured on a 
residential property’. Residential property is also defined in this regulation as ‘(a) a building or part of a 
building, and land on which a building is to be constructed which at the date the conveyance or lease is 
executed, was used, or it is the intention of the borrower that the building or part of the building would be 
used, as a dwelling or would have a dwelling constructed on it; and (b) the building, or part of the building, 
does not have or will not have a commercial use on a primary basis’. 
1224 Regulation 4(1)(a) S.I. 47/2015. Arrangement fees, professional fees and costs or administration costs 
related to the new housing loan need not to be taken into account.  
1225 Cassidy & Hallissey (2016), pp. 273-274. 
1226 Regulation 4(1)(b) S.I. 47/2015.  
1227 Regulation 4(1)(c)-(d) S.I. 47/2015. 
1228 Cassidy & Hallissey (2016), p. 274. 
1229 Duffy et al. (2015), p. 22. 
1230 Irish Examiner (2015), Taylor (2015), The Irish Times (2016), Weston (2016), Brady (2016), McCartney 
(2016) 
1231 Taylor (2015), Pope (2016), McCartney (2016). Cf. Lyons (2016).  
1232 Cassidy & Hallissey (2016), p. 294. 
1233 Research reveals this shortage: Duffy et al. (2014); Lyons (2015), p. 153; Barrett et al. (2015), Lyons (2016), 
Morgenroth (2016).  
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are not the answer. Research of the CBI shows that the introduced measures had, apparently, limited 
effect on actual LTI and LTV ratios.1234 The central bank also published that in 2015, in the period after 
the introduction of the caps, the value of loans exceeding the LTI limit was 17% of the total value of 
loans.1235 The value of the loans exceeding the LTV cap was 13% of the total value, while the value of 
the loans surpassing both limits was 2.5% of the total value of loans.  
 
The rules on the LTI and LTV ratios are technical, but determinate: they are not vague, ambiguous or 
general. In addition, their scope is wide, beyond bank lending, which helps to limit circumvention: they 
apply to all regulated financial service providers when supplying housing loans that are secured or to 
be secured on residential property in Ireland. Only mortgages provided by local authorities are 
excluded.  
 
However, several other aspects of the regulations hinder preventing circumvention. Most notably, the 
effectiveness of the regulations is undermined by the absence of a DTI limit or a requirement to take 
other loans into account. Consequently, consumers might choose to resort to risky and more expensive 
types of unsecured borrowing.1236 The Central Bank of Ireland acknowledges that a DTI limit would be 
more appropriate than a LTI limit, but considers it premature to establish enforceable rules on total 
debt levels, since the credit registry is not yet operational.1237 Currently, there is a private credit bureau 
in Ireland, but many lenders do not register information, resulting in incomplete and inaccurate 
information.1238 At the end of 2013, the Credit Reporting Act 2013 was enacted, providing for the 
establishment, maintenance and operation of a central credit register by the Central Bank of 
Ireland.1239 This act obliges lenders to report information about credit applications exceeding an 
amount of € 500. In addition, they must assess the credit register in case of handling a credit application 
                                                          
1234 Kinghan et al. (2016).  
1235 Keenan et al. (2016), p. 5. At that moment, the proportionate limits of the LTI and LTV caps were 20% and 
15%, respectively. An examination performed by a journalist in January 2016 shows that it depends on the 
circumstances whether people actually could borrow less than in June 2014, seven months before the 
introduction of the LTI and LTV limits. It seems that banks tend to use the proportionate margin only for 
borrowers who have a certain amount of income left after mortgage repayment and have a good savings 
history. Banks normally allow a borrower only to exceed either the LTI limit of 3.5 or the LTV limit of 80%/90% 
(McBride, 2016). The risk is that this practice might change substantially during a boom. 
1236 Central Bank of Ireland (2015a), p. 28. 
1237 Central Bank of Ireland (2015a), p. 9. 
1238 The website of the Irish Credit Bureau is http://www.icb.ie/. Cf. 
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/personal_finance/loans_and_credit/irish_credit_burea
u.html (both last visited 24 March 2015). On the problems, see Hancock (2014b). 
1239 See in particular section 5(1) of the Credit Reporting Act 2013, which is available via 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2013/en/act/pub/0045/index.html. See also the related S.I. 19/2014, available 
via http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2014/en/si/0019.html (both last visited 24 March 2015). For an 
introduction to this act, see Kane (2013). 
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exceeding an amount of € 2,000.1240 Consumers applying for credit are obliged to report their 
outstanding amount of debt to the lender, if it exceeds € 5,000 and results from a credit agreement. 
In turn, the lender should provide this information to the Central Bank of Ireland.1241 It is expected that 
the part of the credit register related to consumers is operational from 31 December 2017.1242 Once 
the credit register is operational, it is possible to establish a DTI cap or a requirement to take other 
loans into account. 
 
In order to reduce the room for circumvention, the Central Bank of Ireland established that ‘a lender 
shall not engage in a practice, enter into an arrangement or transaction, execute a document or 
structure or restructure a loan for the purpose or having the effect (…) of avoiding the obligations 
under’1243 S.I. 47/2015, irrespective of the issue whether avoiding the rules is the sole or primary 
intention or effect or not. This requirement can prevent a considerable degree of circumvention, such 
as a situation where a lender offers secured housing loans up to the LTV or LTI limit and unsecured 
loans besides it. However, it cannot prevent that another lender provides an unsecured loan alongside 
the housing loan. Although any lender is obliged by the Consumer Protection Code 2012 to gather 
information on debt and financial commitments of the borrower, and shall abstain from offering a loan 
if the consumer refuses to provide the information,1244 this obligation does not sufficiently cover the 
situation where a consumer simultaneously applies for a mortgage and an unsecured loan. In such a 
situation there is not yet an outstanding amount of mortgage debt, which is supposed to be known by 
the lender. Even if the lender providing the unsecured loan would be aware of the application for a 
mortgage loan, this would be difficult to prove and thus to enforce. More importantly, the lending 
activities of a credit provider supplying only an unsecured loan fall outside the scope of the LTV and 
LTI caps, because S.I. 47/2015 defines a lender as a regulated financial service provider that supplies 
                                                          
1240 See respectively sections 11, in particular 11(5)-(6), and 14, in particular 14(5)-(6) of the Credit Reporting 
Act 2013.  
1241 Section 14 of the Credit Reporting Act 2013.  
1242 Hancock (2014b); Regulation 1(2) S.I. 486/2016 Credit Reporting Act 2013 (Section 11) (Provision of 
Information for Central Credit Register) Regulations 2016, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/si/486/made/en/pdf; Regulation 1(2) S.I. 487/2016 Credit Reporting 
Act 2013 (Section 17) (Access to Central Credit Register) Regulations 2016, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/si/487/made/en/pdf; Regulation 1(3) S.I. 488/2016 Credit Reporting 
Act 2013 (Section 20) (Verification of Identity of Credit Information Subjects) Regulations 2016, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/si/488/made/en/pdf.  
1243 Central Bank of Ireland (2016a), pp. 8-10. However, this excludes information on loans provided by licensed 
moneylenders (on these, see sub-section 5.1.3) and local authorities. This information should be ready for use 
at 30 June 2018.  
1244 Provisions 5.1 and 5.4 Consumer Protection Code 2012, as further discussed in sub-section 5.1.3.2. 
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loans which are or are to be secured on residential property.1245 Until the central credit register is 
operational, this is the largest loophole in the system, undermining its effectiveness. 
Due to the aforementioned rules of the Consumer Protection Code 2012, it would have been possible 
to prohibit all lenders to supply unsecured loans that are meant for financing a house, or to establish 
a DTI limit.1246 However, then iit is more difficult to objectively ascertain existing debt levels, and to 
demonstrate that a lender knowingly supplied too much credit, if that would be the case. This hinders 
enforcement. Moreover, the absence of reliable data on unsecured credit makes the calibration of DTI 
limits difficult for the CBI.1247 
 
Another loophole is the exclusion of borrowers with negative equity from the LTV ratio, which excludes 
many households from the cap. Duffy and O’Hanlon (2014) estimate that approximately 37% of all 
households have negative equity.1248 More specifically, 64% of all the mortgage loans for primary 
dwellings taken out in the period 2005-2012 are under water, mostly younger people and first-time 
buyers.1249 Cassidy and Hallissey (2016) report that 40% of the households had negative equity at the 
moment that the consultation for the LTV and LTI limits took place.1250 The rules could also have been 
constructed as in the Dutch situation, where only the residual debt itself is not taken into account for 
calculating the LTV ratio, but the remainder of the loan has to comply with the rules. Admittedly, this 
adds some complexity to the rules.1251 Nonetheless, the risk of this loophole are limited, since 
households with negative equity will probably have become cautious when applying for a new loan, 
while also lenders can be expected to take care.  
 
The transmission channels of the LTV and LTV limits are shown in figure 4.2. This shows how the LTI 
and LTV limits can reduce credit demand and supply, but also how effects can leak away, especially by 
resorting to unsecured borrowing.  
 
 
                                                          
1245 Regulation 2 S.I. 47/2015. Note that the regulations can apply to multiple lenders, as long as they supply 
housing loans, because they require a lender to ensure that the total amount of loans that are or are to be 
secured on residential property advanced to a borrower should comply with the rules (regulations 2, 5 and 6). 
1246 As discussed in sub-section 4.1.1.1, in the Netherlands, the codes of conduct prohibit to supply unsecured 
credit which is meant for financing a house, if violating the rules of the code of conduct on mortgage credit. 
1247 As indicated in an interview with an official of the CBI. 
1248 Duffy & O’Hanlon (2014), p. 328. 
1249 Ibidem, pp. 333-337.  
1250 Cassidy & Hallissey (2016), p. 288. 
1251 Note that the CBI considered several options for designing the rules on negative equity, but decided that 
the increase in complexity was outweighed by the positive effects (Cassidy & Hallissey (2016), p. 289). 
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Figure 4.2: Transmission channels of the LTI and LTV limits in Ireland 
 
 
4.2.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of the LTI and LTV limits for 
housing loans 
The powers to enforce the maximum LTI and LTV ratios are almost identical to those for enforcing risk-
weighted capital requirements, including the possibility to settle. Hence, only relevant differences will 
be discussed, which, in fact, are predominantly related to the publication of sanctions. This is governed 
by section 33BC Central Bank Act 1942, which provides the CBI with more freedom to decide on the 
publication of sanctions than regulation 56 S.I. 158/2014 does.1252 This section obliges the Central Bank 
of Ireland to publish details of violations of LTI and LTV limits which it encounters in an inquiry, as well 
as details of imposed sanctions, but in the form and manner which it considers appropriate.1253 
 
                                                          
1252 These differences are a result of the fact that the provisions of the CRD IV apply for violations of risk-
weighted capital requirements, contrary to violations of LTI and LTV ratios.  
1253 Cf. section 45(8) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
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Another measure to enforce LTI and LTV caps is that the CBI can require financial service providers to 
make appropriate redress to their customers if they have suffered, are suffering, or will suffer loss or 
damage due to widespread or regular (1) violations of LTI and LTV limits or (2) provision of unsuitable 
loans to consumers.1254 This redress cannot ‘exceed the amount of the loss suffered or anticipated to 
be suffered, together (where appropriate) with interest at such rate as is so specified.’1255 Moreover, 
the customer who suffers losses or damages due to a violation of LTI and LTV caps by a bank, can start 
a procedure for damages.1256 These measures create additional incentives to comply with the caps. 
Yet, it might be difficult to calculate the damage incurred by consumers.  
 
Like capital requirements, LTI and LTV limits in Ireland can be enforced with proportionate and 
dissuasive administrative measures.1257 These enforcement measures are strong enough to deter. 
Moreover, the obligatory publication of details of violations and sanctions – albeit with discretionary 
choices about the form and manner – adds to the deterring effect by being a form of naming-and-
shaming. Furthermore, the directions can be exercised precautionary, if a lender is likely to violate the 
LTI and LTV requirements. Therefore, there are sufficient enforcement possibilities. 
 
4.2.3. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of the LTI and LTV limits 
S.I. 47/2015 has a broad, but clear legal basis that allows the CBI to adopt regulations applying to 
regulated financial service providers.1258 The macroprudential aim of the borrower-based caps is clear, 
and corresponds to the mandate of the central bank.1259 The CBI can make its decisions relatively 
independently, but the Department of Finance may be able to influence these decisions, as discussed 
in sub-section 3.3.1. Pressure of the Minister for Finance on the CBI is not just a figment of the 
imagination. In September 2015, after a meeting with representatives of the construction industry, the 
Minister for Finance publically expressed the opinion that LTI and LTV caps should be loosened, while 
                                                          
1254 Respectively section 43(1)(f) and 43(1)(c) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. Although 
this measure can be applied as well in case of violations of rules on risk-weighted capital requirements, it is 
difficult to prove that customers suffered from low risk-weighted capital requirements. Therefore, this measure 
is ill-suited for enforcing these capital requirements. 
1255 Section 43(3) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1256 Section 44 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. This is also possible if a customer suffers 
losses due to violations of capital requirements, but it is unlikely to demonstrate such a loss, unless a bank goes 
bankrupt.  
1257 Cf. sub-section 3.2.2.2. 
1258 According to section 48(1) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 (supra, footnote 787), the 
CBI ‘may make regulations for the proper and effective regulation of regulated financial service providers.’ 
Section 48(2) continues with listing the provisions that may be made by the regulations referred to in section 
48(1). See in particular section 48(2)(l). 
1259 Cf. sub-sections 3.3 and 4.2.1. 
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he was at the same time involved in the procedure for selecting the new governor of the Central 
Bank.1260 Other ministers joined in criticising the CBI for these regulations on LTI and LTV limits.1261 
Nevertheless, the Central Bank insisted in not changing the regulations, until after a review, which was 
finished in November 2016.1262 The former governor of the CBI, who stepped down in November 2015, 
has been praised for ensuring independence and firmly standing against government pressure.1263 The 
Irish Examiner (2015a) writes that experts say that the major challenge of the new governor, Philip 
Lane, ‘will be to face down the waves of industry and political pressure for the Central Bank to loosen 
its mortgage lending restrictions’. It seems that he more or less succeeded in doing this: after the 
review, rules were only loosened to a minor extent.1264  
 
There is little that restricts or guides the use of discretion by the Central Bank of Ireland when deciding 
about applying, enforcing, or amending the borrower-based caps. There is only one requirement which 
restricts and guides the CBI when using its competence to make (and amend) regulations applying to 
regulated financial service providers: regulations must be ‘effective and proportionate having regard 
to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of regulated financial service providers or the class 
or classes of regulated financial service provider to whom the regulations apply.’1265 This provision 
leaves ample room for interpretation for the Central Bank of Ireland. Also, in principle, the choice for 
particular instruments is free. So, the CBI enjoys wide administrative discretion in a strict sense, as well 
as interpretative discretion. The Central Bank of Ireland has published its process of macroprudential 
decision-making.1266  Although clarity about this process can help the CBI in taking a decision, there is 
no guided discretion mechanism with selected indicators and thresholds, like with the countercyclical 
capital buffer.1267 More guidance might help to reduce the inaction bias. 
 
                                                          
1260 Beesley (2015). 
1261 Taylor (2015), Irish Examiner (2015b). 
1262 Beesley & Bardon (2015), Irish Examiner (2016) 
1263 Taylor (2015), Irish Independent (2015). 
1264 Since 1 January 2017, the LTV limit for first-time buyers is 90%, while 5% of the total monetary amount of 
the supplied loans may have a higher ratio. Before 1 January 2017, the LTV limit was 90% up to a house value of 
€ 220,000 and 80% above this value, while 15% of the total monetary amount of the supplied loans was 
allowed to exceed these limits. For second and subsequent borrowers the LTV limit remained 80%, but 20% 
instead of 15% of the total monetary amount of the supplied loans may have a higher LTV ratio. 
1265 Section 50 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1266 Central Bank of Ireland (2014b), pp. 9-12. The process starts with risk assessments, based upon statistical 
analyses and the biannual Macro-Financial Review. If there is evidence of systemic risk, appropriate 
instruments are selected, taking into account a range of economic and legal factors, including the risks of 
leakage and the scope of the instruments. The calibration of the instruments will be based on a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative analyses and judgment. Subsequently, the instruments are implemented, with 
timing as an important consideration. Finally, their effectiveness is monitored and evaluated. 
1267 Cf. sub-section 3.3.2.1 
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The CBI does not need approval by another actor when using its power of adopting regulations 
applying to regulated financial service providers, but it must consult the Minister for Finance and 
provide the minister with a draft proposal of the ratios.1268 The CBI may consult with such other persons 
as it considers appropriate.1269 Irish law does not attach formal consequences to the outcome of these 
consultations.  
 
The various central bank acts do not create a mechanism to override decisions of the Central Bank of 
Ireland by the Minister for Finance or the Houses of the Oireachtas. This creates a shield against too 
much political interference. Still, regulations adopted by the CBI based on this power ‘shall be laid 
before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after they are made.’1270 In general, laying 
Statutory Instruments before the Houses of the Oireachtas is meant to enable the legislature to annul 
them, in order to protect their prerogatives.1271 However, section 51(2) Central Bank (Supervision and 
Enforcement) Act 2013 does not attach consequences to this laying before the Houses of the 
Oireachtas, contrary to provisions elsewhere which explicitly enable annulment within 21 sitting 
days.1272 So, this requirement is no impediment to the independence of the Central Bank of Ireland, 
while it increases its transparency, and facilitates holding it to account. 
 
Yet, the role of the Houses of the Oireachtas might change in the future, as a member of the Irish lower 
house has introduced a Bill to amend provisions related to this regulatory power of the CBI. The 
proposed provisions prohibit the CBI to proceed with draft regulations, unless written views and 
proposed amendments of both the Minister for Finance and the relevant Joint Committee of the 
Houses of the Oireachtas have been received, considered and responded to in detail.1273 The 
Explanatory Memorandum to this Bill reveals that the member of the Irish lower house proposed the 
amendments, because he views the adopted LTV and LTI limits as disproportionate for certain 
homeowners, and seeks to ensure that the central bank ‘engage[s] more fruitfully with both the 
Minister for Finance, and the relevant Joint Committee of Houses of the Oireachtas on’1274 the effects 
on and needs of society, while maintaining its independence. As long as it is ensured that regulations 
of the CBI cannot be obstructed – for instance, by endlessly delaying the response – the proposed 
                                                          
1268 Section 49(1)(a) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1269 Section 49(1)(c) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1270 Section 51(2) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1271 Hunt (2010), p. 82. 
1272 Cf. sections 61C-61D Central Bank Act 1942. 
1273 Potential new section 49(1) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) 2013, as proposed by the Central 
Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) (Amendment) Bill 2016, available at 
https://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2016/2516/b2516d.pdf (last visited 4 March 2017). 
1274 Ibidem.  
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amendments have to be welcomed, since the independence of the CBI remains protected, while duties 
to explain action are reinforced.  
 
4.3. Direct LTV limits in Germany 
The German banking sector consists of three main pillars: private banks, public banks, which are, to a 
large extent, savings banks (Sparkassen), and cooperative banks.1275 Besides these actors, several other 
types of banks exist, including Bausparkassen (building and loan associations).1276 Currently, a LTV limit 
only applies to lending by Bausparkassen, but a legal basis for a LTV limit with a broader scope of 
application has been created in March 2017.1277 In the Bauspar system, households ‘make regular 
contractual savings contributions over many years, and when the contract matures, they receive not 
only the accumulated capital plus interest, but also a mortgage loan at a fixed rate.’1278 Traditionally, 
in Germany, people finance their home by mortgage credit from a bank (50-60%), a Bauspar mortgage 
loan (20-30%), and with own savings (20-30%).1279 In this construction, the Bauspar loan is subordinate 
to the loan from the primary mortgage lender.1280 Currently, the business model of Bausparkassen is 
under pressure. The incentive to enter into a Bauspar contract has diminished, as saving has become 
unattractive due to the low interest rates in combination with fixed fees.1281  
 
4.3.1. Determinacy and completeness of LTV limits in Germany 
4.3.1.1. The LTV limit for Bausparkassen  
The Bausparkassen are regulated by the Bausparkassengesetz (BauSparkG) (Act on building and loan 
associations), and the Bausparkassen-Verordnung (BausparkV) (Regulation on building and loan 
associations).1282 Bausparkassen are not only allowed to grant loans to borrowers after they have fully 
accumulated their savings, but also prior to that time, and beyond the amount of accumulated 
                                                          
1275 Gilquin (2014), p. 420. 
1276 Ibidem. 
1277 Cf. Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), pp. 8-10. 
1278 Kofner (2014), p. 272. Cf. section 1(1) of the Bausparkassengesetz (BauSparkG), BGBl. I, 1991, 454, available 
at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bausparkg/. 
1279 Verband der Privaten Bausparkassen (2014), p. 15; http://www.housing-finance-
network.org/index.php?id=338 (last visited 23 July 2015). 
1280 Verband der Privaten Bausparkassen (2014), p. 15. 
1281 Cf. Immobilien & Finanzierung (2016). 
1282 The BausparkV, BGBl. I, 2015, 2576, is available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bausparkv_2015/index.html. For English translations of the BauSparkG and the BausparkV, see 
http://www.bausparkassen.de/index.php?id=101 (both last visited 10 February 2016).  
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savings.1283 These loans can only be provided under certain conditions, which include a LTV limit.1284 In 
particular, section 7(1) BauSparkG requires that loans, insofar they are not backed by savings, are 
secured by a mortgage with a maximum LTV ratio of 100%, unless additional guarantees are provided. 
Until December 2015 this LTV ratio was 80%. The increase of the LTV limit was part of a broader reform 
of the BauSparkG, which intended to enable the Bausparkassen to cope with the low-interest 
environment which endangered their profits.1285 The increase was proposed by the industry.1286 The 
BauSparkG includes a provision on collateral valuation, which stipulates that the value shall only be 
determined by lasting qualities of the house, and shall be lower than the market value.1287 
 
The BauSparkG creates three exceptions for granting an unsecured loan to a household, meaning that 
the LTV limit does not apply, if: 
1. The borrower provides sufficient alternative collateral;1288  
2. The loan amount does not exceed € 30,000, and the borrower agrees not to hinder a future 
establishment of a mortgage on the house by selling the house or providing someone else with a 
lien (so, the Bausparkasse must be able to secure the loan in the future, if necessary);1289  
3. Providing a secured loan seems not necessary due to the small amount of the loan (≤ € 30,000).1290  
A Bausparkasse may grant not more than 30% of all the loans using these last two exceptions, and not 
more than 45% using any of the three exceptions.1291   
 
The provision containing the LTV limit of 100% is determinate. On the contrary, the wording of the first 
exception to the LTV limit lacks determinacy, since it is vague what counts as sufficient alternative 
collateral. Still, the three exceptions are accompanied with relative protective conditions, such as the 
maximum amounts. This is an indication of completeness. Also, the rules apply to all Bausparkassen. 
                                                          
1283 § 4(1)-(2) BauSparkG. 
1284 For these requirements, see sections 4(2) and 7 BauSparkG and §§ 1, 6 and 6a BausparkV. 
1285 See e.g. Börsen-Zeitung (2015); Wefers (2015). Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2015), pp. 36-39; Yildirim (2015), 
pp. 258-259. 
1286 The original proposal for the reform (available at 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/064/1806418.pdf) did not provide for an increase of the LTV cap: this 
was included after the industry argued in favour of it. The various contributions are available at 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/064/1806418.pdf. The adopted act is published in the 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 2015, Teil I, Nr. 54, p. 2399 (available online at 
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl115s2399.pdf). Cf. 
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw48-pa-finanzen/395592 (all last visited 10 February 
2016). 
1287 § 7(7) BauSparkG. 
1288 § 7(3) BauSparkG. 
1289 § 7(4)(1) BauSparkG and § 12(1) BausparkV. 
1290 § 7(4)(2) BauSparkG and § 12(1) BausparkV. 
1291 § 12(2) and 13 BausparkV. 
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However, currently credit supply by other banks is not subject to borrower-based caps. This creates 
risks, even though practices in the German mortgage lending market are relatively conservative.1292 
Figure 4.3 shows the transmission channels of the LTV limit for Bausparkassen. It reveals that the LTV 
cap can contribute to constraining lending, but that circumvention is easy, either by taking mortgage 
loans from other lenders, or by resorting to unsecured loans.  
 
Figure 4.3: Transmission channels of the LTV limit for Bausparkassen in Germany 
 
 
  
                                                          
1292 On the culture of German housing finance: Hamm (2008), pp. 47-48; Kofner (2014), pp. 270-272. But see 
Immobilien Zeitung (2015), which indicates that some lenders are adopting less conservative practices. 
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4.3.1.2. The macroprudential LTV limit 
Because of the limitations to conduct macroprudential policy with capital-based instruments, and the 
absence of other suitable macroprudential instruments, while systemic risk can arise in the real estate 
sector, the Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (Financial Stability Committee, see Box 3.2) on 30 June 2015 
recommended to create the legal framework for LTV, DSTI and DTI caps, together with the possibility 
to restrict the maturity of loans.1293 Much later,1294 in October 2016, a legislative proposal was 
published.1295 This proposal was largely in line with the recommendation. In March 2017, the 
Bundestag adopted the act supplementary act on financial supervision law (the 
Finanzaufsichtsrechtergänzungsgesetz), which amends several other acts.1296 However, compared to 
the recommendation and the legislative proposal, the act has been watered down considerably, 
apparently inter alia due to pressure from the financial sector.1297 It does not anymore include the 
possibility to set DSTI and DTI limits. The legal framework for the LTV limit has not been established to 
activate the LTV limit directly after its creation, but to enable BaFin to activate it immediately when 
necessary.1298  
 
The legal framework for the LTV limit  
The Finanzaufsichtsrechtergänzungsgesetz contains the legal framework for two – instead of the 
envisaged four – instruments, namely the LTV limit and the restrictions on the maturity of loans. 
Barring exceptions, the LTV limit governs the combined debt resulting from a residential real estate 
financing transaction.1299 This is not limited to secured debt. When valuing the house for calculating 
the LTV ratio, the market value at the time of the transaction needs to be used. § 194 Baugesetzbuch 
(Federal Building Act) defines the market value as the price of the property, in the ordinary course of 
business, in accordance with the legal situation and actual characteristics of the property, without 
                                                          
1293 Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), pp. 1-5, 8-11 (references to the page numbers in the German version, 
but there is also an English translation of the recommendation). 
1294 Since a recommendation of the Financial Stability Committee is subject to a comply-or-explain principle (§ 
3(2) and 3(4) FinStabG (supra, footnote 212)), the federal government was asked to notify by 31 December 
2015 whether and how it intends to implement the recommendation, and to create the legal foundations for 
the caps by 31 March 2016 (Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), p. 20).  
1295 For the legislative proposal and subsequent amendments, see: 
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP18/788/78822.html (last visited 4 April 2017). 
1296 Ibidem. For the press release of the Bundestag, see: 
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2017/kw13-de-finanzaufsicht/499918  (last visited 4 April 
2017). 
1297 The amendments made by the Bundestag are largely in line with the opinion of the German association of 
banks, which is available at https://bankenverband.de/fachthemen/bankenaufsicht-und-
bilanzierung/stellungnahme-zum-finanzaufsichtsrechterganzungsgesetz/ (last visited 4 April 2017). 
1298 Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), p. 5. Cf. Berlin (2015), Maurer (2015).  
1299 § 48u(2)(1) KWG. 
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consideration of unusual or personal circumstances.1300 Since the market value is based on the current 
price of a house, it offers less protection against boom dynamics than the mortgage lending value. The 
act also creates the possibility to impose various restrictions on the loan maturity. A maximum term 
can be set for loans which are completely redeemed at maturity.1301 For other types of loans it can be 
required that a certain fraction of the loan must be repaid in a given period. This reduces the 
indebtedness of households over time.1302  
 
If BaFin uses these instruments, it must announce at which moment lenders have to comply with the 
restrictions. They must be granted a reasonable period to comply.1303 Simultaneously, BaFin has to set 
the parameters for four exemptions, which determine which loans will not be covered by the 
restrictions. These exemptions are: 
1. An excess quota, meaning that every lender is allowed to supply a certain percentage of non-
compliant loans.1304 BaFin must set this percentage. The excess quota may vary over time. The 
excess quota is similar to the Irish proportionate margin. Although the exact design may turn out to 
be different in the relevant details;1305 
2. A de minimus threshold, meaning that one or more of the restrictions do not apply to loans below 
a certain amount.1306 According to the Explanatory Memorandum, this exemption is justified 
because these small loans probably cause few losses for commercial lenders, and the impact on 
financial stability is thus limited.1307 Meanwhile, in order to avoid circumvention – e.g. by offering 
several small loans which individually are below the threshold, but together above it – there must 
be a maximum to volume of mortgage loans which a lender, in a given period, may supply while 
using this exemption. BaFin must determine the de minimus threshold. Yet, during the process of 
                                                          
1300 The Baugesetzbuch, BGBl. I, 2004, 2414, is available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bbaug/index.html. The market value is further regulated in the Verordnung über die Grundsätze für 
die Ermittlung der Verkehrswerte von Grundstücken (Regulation on the principles for the determination of the 
market value of property), BGBl. I, 2010, 639, available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/immowertv/ 
(both last visited 27 August 2016). 
1301 § 48u(2)(2) KWG. 
1302 These restrictions were also intended to limit the possibilities for circumventing the DSTI cap, but that 
function is redundant now BaFin cannot to set DSTI limits. Cf. Ausschuss für Finanzstabilität (2015), p. 12. 
1303 § 48u(2)(5) KWG. 
1304 § 48u(3)(1) KWG. 
1305 The Irish proportionate margin means that a certain percentage of the total monetary amount of newly 
supplied loans may be non-compliant loans. Because it is a percentage of the value, effectively the amount 
above the restrictions is restricted as well. If the German excess quota would allow a certain percentage of the 
number of newly supplied loans to exceed the LTV limit, there is no restriction on the amount above the limit. 
1306 § 48u(3)(2) KWG. 
1307 Supra, footnote 1295). 
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adopting the act, the Bundestag added a provision which obliges BaFin to set the value of the de 
minimus threshold at minimally € 50,000 (and also added the next two exemptions);1308  
3. If the LTV ratio does not exceed 80%, and the mortgage loans do not exceed an amount set by 
BaFin, the restrictions do not apply. BaFin must set this amount at minimally € 200,000. Since this 
exemption contains a LTV limit, it is mainly relevant as an exemption to the restrictions on loan 
maturity. De facto, BaFin cannot require debt reduction below € 200,000 (€ 160,000 for houses that 
are € 200,000). Also, it restricts the ability of BaFin to set a LTV limit which is lower than 80%; 
4. If the LTV ratio does not exceed 60%, and the loans do not exceed an amount set by BaFin, the 
restrictions do not apply. BaFin must set this amount at minimally € 400,000. 
 
The restrictions, but not the exceptions, must be reviewed at least every six months.1309 Their 
determinacy depends on more concrete definitions, which are currently unknown. These will be 
adopted by means of secondary law, as will be further discussed in sub-section 4.3.3.2. 1310  
 
Scope of the proposed LTV, DSTI and DTI limits 
§ 48u KWG authorises BaFin to impose the aforementioned restrictions upon credit institutions for the 
supply of loans for acquiring or building residential real estate which is located in Germany.1311 An 
amendment of § 53b KWG ensures that the restrictions apply as well to branches of banks established 
in the European Economic Area, and to cross-border lending.1312 This contributes to the completeness 
of the LTV cap. However, besides the aforementioned variable exemptions, several types of loans are 
excluded from the scope of the restrictions:1313 
1. Loans for extending, rebuilding or renovating residential property which is already owned by the 
borrower; 
2. Loans for social housing projects; 
                                                          
1308 § 48u(3) KWG. 
1309 § 48u(4) KWG. 
1310 § 48u(5) KWG. The Explanatory Memorandum adds that the definitions in these detailed regulations should 
be informed by EU and international standards (p. 32). 
1311 § 48u(1) KWG. 
1312 Pages 24-25 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the legislative proposal (cf. footnote 1295). Proposed § 
48u(7) KWG authorises BaFin to recognise borrower-based caps for secured loans in other countries. This can 
help to apply foreign measures to, for instance, branches of German banks (pp. 23-24). However, this is not 
directly relevant for ensuring the effectiveness of German, but of foreign, measures. 
1313 § 48u(3) KWG; page 15 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the legislative proposal (cf. footnote 1295). 
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3. Follow-up financing of loans which have been granted before the restrictions were enacted, 
provided that their total amount does not exceed the previously agreed loan amount minus the 
repayments which have already been made;1314 
4. Loans for debt restructuring of non-performing loans. 
Further rules on these exceptions can be created by regulations. BaFin may allow more exceptions.  
 
Yet, the potential scope of the restrictions is much broader, because other acts have been amended 
as well. Firstly, § 5(8a) Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB) (Capital Investment Act) authorises BaFin to 
impose the LTV and loan maturity restrictions upon companies which manage alternative investment 
funds.1315 This does exclude some investment funds, in particular undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities.1316 However, the latter are not allowed to supply loans 
anyway.1317 Secondly, § 308b Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetzes (VAG) (Act on the Supervision of 
Insurance Undertakings) authorises BaFin and the supervisors at the state level – which oversee 
smaller insurers – to impose the same restrictions upon insurers and pension funds.1318 It also allows 
the Minister of Finance to impose these restrictions upon insurers and pension funds which are not 
subject to supervision.  
 
Data access 
Data protection turned out to be a hot potato in the process of creating the borrower-based caps. In 
order to identify risks and to calibrate effective caps – especially for income-related caps – the 
supervisor needs to have access to reliable loan-level data.1319 However, supervisors lacked access to 
such data for two reasons. Firstly, Germany has no public credit registry, but only a private credit 
bureau, Schufa. This bureau stores a lot of data, but does not include early arrears.1320 Moreover, 
lenders are neither required to provide data to this bureau, nor to consult it.1321 Secondly, Germany 
                                                          
1314 § 48u(3)(3) KWG. 
1315 The KAGB, BGBl. I, 2013, 1981, is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/kagb/ (last visited 17 
December 2016). The KAGB implements Directive 2009/65 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
July 2009, OJ 2009, L302/32 (UCITS Directive), as later amended by Directive 2014/91 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014, OJ 2014, L 257/186, as well as Directive 2011/61 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011, OJ 2011, L 174/1 (AIFM Directive). 
1316 §§ 17 and 1(2)-(3) KAGB. 
1317 Art. 88(1) Directive 2009/65. 
1318 See §1 VAG for its scope. The VAG, BGBl. I, 2015, 434, is available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/vag_2016/ (last visited 17 December 2016). Pension funds are one of the several types of voluntary 
occupational pension schemes. 
1319 Cf. International Monetary Fund (2016a), p. 33; International Monetary Fund (2016c), p. 18. 
1320 Pyykkö (2013), p. 28. 
1321 Rothemund & Gerhard (2011), p. 8. 
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has stringent data protection laws, which limit data access by supervisors.1322 Despite these limitations, 
the act does not include additional supervisory powers to access data or to collect data from credit 
institutions (for insurers and pension funds it does).1323 Yet, the data issues are less relevant now the 
German federal legislator did not create the possibility to set DSTI and DTI limits. 
 
Determinacy and completeness of the macroprudential LTV limit 
Since the act only contains the legal basis for the restrictions on the LTV ratio and the maturity loans, 
the determinacy of the measures itself cannot be evaluated. However, the completeness of the rules 
can largely be assessed. 
 
Some aspects of the new macroprudential rules contribute to their completeness. Firstly, many lenders 
are covered by the rules. Secondly, the LTV limit covers all debt-financing of a house. This contributes 
to reducing possibilities for taking out unsecured loans on top of secured loans. Yet, it might be difficult 
to prove that an unsecured loan is taken out to finance a house. Preventing additional unsecured 
borrowing would have been much easier with DTI and DSTI caps. Generally, such caps are also more 
protective than a LTV cap during a boom, since house prices are more procyclical than income. The use 
of the market value instead of the mortgage lending value also reduces protection against 
overindebtedness in boom-bust cycles. 
 
The scope of the instruments suffers from various other significant drawbacks as well. With eight 
exceptions and exemptions, a substantial number of loans will not be covered by the rules. Depending 
on the exact design, the excess quota may result in a total exemption of a certain share of the loans 
                                                          
1322 The most important act at federal level is the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Data Protection Act), BGBl. 
I, 2003, 66, available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bdsg_1990/ (last visited 30 July 2016). For an 
introduction to this act, see e.g. Jentzsch (2007), pp. 144-149. 
1323 With respect to credit institutions, BaFin and the Bundesbank have to rely on the existing powers of § 44 
KWG and § 6 FinstabG. § 44 KWG allows BaFin to request information from banks, related to all their business 
affairs, as long as the request is proportionate and within the scope of BaFin’s regulatory objectives (cf. the 
discussion of § 44 KWG in Boos et al. (2016)). § 6 FinstabG authorises the Bundesbank to collect additional 
information, including personal data, from all German corporations involved in financial intermediation and 
auxiliary financial activities, insofar imperatively necessary (zwingend erforderlich) for performing its financial 
stability functions, and insofar the data cannot be obtained through the exchange of information with other 
authorities (§ 6 FinStabG in combination with paragraphs 2.32 to 2.67 of Annex A, chapter 2 of Council 
Regulation 2223/96 of 25 June 1996, OJ 1996, L 310/1). Indeed, BaFin and the Bundesbank may share this 
information with each other, if necessary for performing their functions (§ 7 KWG and § 5 FinStabG). § 43a VAG 
allows BaFin to request information from insurers and pension funds, if necessary to perform its functions 
related to financial stability. However, the data must either be aggregated, or lack personal references. So, 
while it is possible to gather personal data for calibrating the caps, especially due to the encompassing scope of 
§ 6 FinstabG. However, triggering this provision might be difficult, since the Bundesbank must show that it 
imperatively needs the requested information. 
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from a lender from the rules. Then, the riskiest loans could be supplied using this exception. Also, since 
existing homeowners who wish to borrow to improve their house are excluded from the scope of the 
rules, they are not protected against overindebtedness which could result from boom-bust dynamics. 
 
4.3.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of the LTV, DSTI and DTI 
limits in Germany 
The BauSparkG has created various sanctions for violations of provisions of the act. If a Bausparkasse 
provides loans in violation of the LTV limit, instructions can be given to reconcile its business operations 
with the rules on the LTV limit.1324 Furthermore, a manager responsible for violating the LTV limit may 
be dismissed.1325 Another enforcement measure is the appointment of a special representative for 
taking suitable measures to set up and safeguard a proper business organisation and monitor the 
compliance with orders of BaFin.1326 The ultimate possible sanction is revoking the license of a 
Bausparkasse.1327 The BauSparkG and the KWG do no directly enable the imposition of a fine for a 
violation of the LTV limit that applies to Bauspar loans. This means that an important penalty is missing 
in the enforcement pyramid, reducing the possibilities to impose proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions. 
 
With the creation of a legal basis for setting LTV caps, provisions about enforcement have been 
amended as well. By adding a sentence to § 56(2) KWG, the usual system of administrative fines, as 
discussed in chapter 3, applies to violations of the new rules by credit institutions.1328  
For investment funds, a few amendments of the KAGB ensure enforceability. These entail that 
intentionally or negligently providing a loan in breach of the restriction is an administrative offence, 
punishable with a fine up to € 1 million. On top of this fixed maximum, the fine can be increased up to 
2% of annual turnover, for a legal person or association of persons.1329 Moreover, a fine can be 
increased to twice the amount of economic advantage of the violation.1330 After fines have become 
                                                          
1324 § 3(1) BauSparkG. 
1325 § 11 BauSparkG; § 36(2) KWG. 
1326 § 45c(2)(5)-(6) KWG. Since Bausparkassen are credit institutions, they are subject to the KWG, like other 
credit institutions (§ 1(1) BauSparkG and § 1(1) KWG). 
1327 § 8 BauSparkG. 
1328 § 56(2)(17a) KWG. 
1329 § 340(2)(1a) and 340(7)(2) KAGB. 
1330 § 340(9) KAGB. With reference to § 30 OWiG, this provision also ensures that investment funds established 
in another member state of the European Economic Area, but providing services in Germany through a branch 
or across borders, can be fined if violating the restrictions. The provision also states that violations are barred 
after three years. 
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irreversible, BaFin can publish the violation and imposition of the fine on its website, unless some 
exceptions apply.1331 So, unlike credit institutions, investment funds can defer publication by appealing 
the decision to impose a fine. As ultimate sanction, withdrawal of authorisation is possible.1332 BaFin 
can also prohibit the responsible manager to exercise its function.1333 
 
Insurers and pension funds will face fines up to € 100,000, if intentionally or negligently providing a 
loan in breach of the restrictions.1334 BaFin can warn a manager who is responsible for violation of the 
VAG.1335 It can require the dismissal of a manager who intentionally or negligently keeps acting against 
the VAG, despite previous warnings.1336 In case of serious violations of the VAG, the authorisation of 
an insurer or pension fund can be revoked.1337 BaFin shall publish the imposition of these sanctions – 
together with information about the violation – with undue delay on its website, after they have 
become irreversible.1338 
 
Therefore, proportionate enforcement is possible, although the availability of different sanctions in 
the enforcement pyramid is somewhat limited. The preconditions for dissuasive enforcement are 
generally met too, except for the possibility of criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the maximum fine 
for insurers and pension funds is rather low in comparison with the maximum fines for banks and 
investment funds, as well as compared to the fines applicable in the Netherlands and Ireland.  
 
4.3.3. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of LTV, DSTI and DTI limits in 
Germany 
4.3.3.1. Independent enforcement and amendment of the LTV limit for Bausparkassen  
The LTV limit for Bausparkassen is static, and not intended to be adjusted regularly. The most 
important rules regarding this LTV cap are part of the BauSparkG, and thus need to be adjusted by the 
legislature. The BausparkV contains some conditions for the three exceptions to the duty to provide 
secured loans the borrowers. The power to adopt – and thus to amend – the BausparkV is delegated 
                                                          
1331 § 341a KAGB. 
1332 § 39(3) KAGB. 
1333 § 40(1) KAGB. 
1334 § 332(3)(7) and 332(5) VAG. 
1335 § 303(1) VAG. 
1336 § 303(2)(2) VAG. 
1337 § 304(3)(2) VAG. 
1338 § 319 VAG. 
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to the BMF, which is obliged to consult BaFin and the German federal central bank.1339 Apart from this 
consultation requirement, which spells out no formal consequences of negative opinions of BaFin or 
the Bundesbank, no further restrictions or guidance exist for the Minister of Finance. Hence, there are 
few guarantees to prevent that rules are not aimed at the general interest.  
 
Since the maximum LTV ratio is static, no application of the instruments is required, apart from its 
enforcement. BaFin is responsible for enforcing the LTV limit.1340 The influence which the Federal 
Minister of Finance is allowed to exert on supervisory policies of BaFin has been discussed in sub-
section 3.3.1. This is the largest limitation to BaFin’s independence in enforcing the LTV cap, since the 
BauSparkG itself provides BaFin with a relative independent role and thus creates no limitations.1341  
 
4.3.3.2. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of the macroprudential LTV limit 
The legal basis and the policy objective of the macroprudential LTV limit are clear. This objective is 
counteracting rising macroprudential risks of strongly increasing house prices or mortgage credit 
supply, if these threaten financial stability.1342 BaFin is envisaged to activate and apply the LTV limit. 
The objectives correspond with BaFin’s mandate. However, for none of the three sectors which BaFin 
supervises (banks, insurers & pension funds, and investment firms) BaFin’s mandate includes an 
explicit macroprudential focus.1343 Adding this would a better fit with its new tasks, and may increase 
BaFin’s ability and willingness to act.1344 Some of the restrictions on the LTV cap confine the room of 
BaFin to act; for instance, to set the level of the LTV cap below 80%.1345  
 
Substantial pressure can be expected when BaFin intends to activate the LTV limit, like in the lengthy 
process of creating the legal basis for this limit, which resulted in the watering down of the legislative 
proposal. The institutional and procedural aspects of the process of activating the LTV limit are not 
optimally designed from the perspective of facilitating the ability and willingness to establish a LTV 
                                                          
1339 § 10 BauSparkG, in particular § 10(4)-(6) for the rules on the exceptions to the LTV limit. 
1340 § 3 BauSparkG. 
1341 See in particular § 3(1) and § 3(3) BauSparkG. 
1342 § 48u(1) KWG. 
1343 With respect to banking supervision, its mandate does not explicitly differentiate between micro- and 
macroprudential tasks, but includes macroprudential supervision (§ 6(2) and 6(4) KWG). Cf. sub-section 3.3. For 
investment funds, BaFin is instructed to conduct supervision in accordance with the KAGB, while no 
overarching objective is defined (cf. § 5 KAGB). For insurers and pension funds, BaFin’s mandate is primarily 
framed in microprudential terms, but includes macroprudential objectives as well (§ 294(1)-(2) VAG). 
1344 §§ 1-2 FinStabG mainly entrust the task of contributing to financial stability to the Bundesbank and the 
Financial Stability Committee. 
1345 Cf. sub-section 4.3.1.2. 
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limit in face of substantial pressure. Firstly, BaFin is not completely institutionally independent, as 
discussed in sub-section 3.3.1. Secondly, some procedural aspects facilitate, but others hamper the 
ability and willingness of the involved actors to establish a LTV limit, as explained in the next 
paragraphs. 
 
The first step in the process of establishing a LTV cap, is the adoption of more detailed regulations on 
(1) the definitions of loans and houses, (2) the concrete calculation and definition of the ceilings and 
periods and other relevant variables of § 48u(2) KWG, (3) the exceptions, (4) the periodic review of the 
restrictions, and (5) details on cooperation and data exchange between BaFin and the Bundesbank.1346 
This task is mainly entrusted to political actors, which may be more sensitive to pressure than an 
independent actor. The Federal Ministry of Finance has been authorised to adopt these regulations, in 
agreement with the Bundesbank and three other federal ministries (Justice and Consumer Protection, 
Economic Affairs and Energy, and Environment, Nature, Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety). 
This does not require consent of the Bundestag and Bundesrat.1347 Consultation of the financial sector 
is required.  
 
While BaFin is empowered to activate the LTV limit and/or the restrictions on the loan maturity, the 
Bundesbank and the BMF are also involved in the decision-making process, according to the 
Explanatory Memorandum (but this is not enshrined in the law itself).1348 The Memorandum states 
that BaFin must rely on the analysis and expertise of the Bundesbank for determining to what extent 
there is a threat to financial stability. The normal procedure is that the Bundesbank informs BaFin and 
the BMF if it identifies a potential credit bubble. If BaFin considers that the use of the LTV limit is 
necessary and proportionate to mitigate these risks, a concrete proposal is discussed in the German 
Financial Stability Committee (the specificities of the cooperation between BaFin and the Bundesbank 
may change, after the rules on this cooperation will be adopted). This division of tasks has both upsides 
and downsides. On the one hand, it ensures that financial stability is on the agenda of several 
authorities. On the other hand, the risk of inaction is increased, because the authority with the primary 
financial stability mandate, the Bundesbank, does not decide about activating the caps. Also, since the 
Financial Stability Committee decides with unanimity about recommendations, every actor within this 
committee has a veto right. This makes it more difficult for BaFin to exercise its powers.1349 
                                                          
1346 § 48u(5) KWG. The Explanatory Memorandum adds that the definitions in these detailed regulations should 
be informed by EU and international standards (p. 32). 
1347 § 48u(5) KWG (cf. § 80 Grundgesetz (Basic Law), available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/gg/index.html).  
1348 Page 30 of the Explanatory Memorandum. 
1349 Cf. sub-section 3.3.1. 
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Furthermore, § 48u(6) KWG obliges BaFin to consult the three aforementioned federal ministries and 
several associations of the industry before it adopts or amends the LTV limit. Moreover, at least six 
weeks before the restrictions are adopted, the BMF must explain the reasons for adopting or amending 
the LTV limit before the committee on financial supervision of the Bundestag. The fact that the BMF, 
which is politically responsible for BaFin, has to explain these reasons, presupposes a close cooperation 
between BaFin and the BMF in these matters, or at least that BaFin firstly has justified its actions 
towards the BMF. These requirements increase the accountability of BaFin. Simultaneously, they might 
become an additional hurdle to adopt a LTV limit, especially since the relatively low independence of 
BaFin makes it more difficult to resist the substantial pressure that it would face if it intends to activate 
or lower the LTV. It also seems relatively unlikely that BaFin would activate a LTV limit which the BMF 
is not willing to defend before the committee on financial supervision of the Bundestag. 
 
The Financial Stability Committee recommended guiding decisions on activation and deactivation of 
the caps by indicators.1350 To this end, suitable indicators need to be identified, and learning effects 
over time must be incorporated.1351 § 48u(1) KWG provides some general guidance for BaFin, which 
restricts and partly steers its decisions on activating the LTV limit. BaFin can only do this if and insofar 
as this is necessary to prevent a (1) disruption of the German financial system or a (2) threat to the 
financial stability in Germany. This is especially the case if house prices, mortgage credit supply, or LTV 
ratios of new loans strongly increase.1352 If the detailed rules which will be adopted provided for more 
concrete guided discretion, the decision-making process will improve, by being geared towards action. 
 
All in all, the involvement of all these actors increases the hurdles for imposing effective restrictions. 
Developing a guided discretion mechanism may mitigate this concern, by steering the process toward 
action if risks are increasing. The fact that primary law points to three concrete developments that may 
trigger the activation of the LTV limit is already a start of a guided discretion mechanism. 
 
  
                                                          
1350 Ibidem, pp. 16-18. 
1351 Ibidem. 
1352 § 48u(1) KWG. 
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4.4. Concluding and comparative remarks on credit-based instruments   
The Netherlands, Ireland and Germany have opted for different approaches of establishing DSTI, LTI 
and LTV caps. While the Irish and German approaches are somewhat comparable, the Dutch approach 
is noticeably different. In Ireland and Germany, the borrower-based caps are macroprudential; in the 
Netherlands they are part of conduct of business regulation. The risk of a macroprudential approach 
is that certain vulnerable individual consumers are protected insufficiently, whereas the downside a 
conduct of business approach is that neglecting the financial or housing cycle leaves consumers more 
vulnerable than borrowers and lenders believe. These dissimilar approaches also lead to different 
outcomes with respect to the fulfilment of the preconditions for effectiveness, as summarised in table 
4.3 below. The Netherlands has implemented some aspects of EU consumer protection in the area of 
financial services into its conduct of business rules, and has built the LTV, DSTI and LTI caps upon this 
implemented legislation.1353 Consequently, the Dutch caps benefit from the wide scope of consumer 
protection law, but cannot be applied to areas where EU consumer law granted exceptions to the 
scope of its rules. In most cases, these exceptions are not particularly relevant for LTV, DSTI and LTI 
limits, but monitoring risks in these areas is recommended. The scope of the Irish and German 
borrower-based caps is wide as well. 
 
Design choices for the LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI limits in the three member states have implications for 
the balance between ensuring protection, and avoiding overregulation and unnecessary restrictions. 
In the Netherlands, DSTI, LTI and LTV caps are binding for individual borrowers, but exceeding the caps 
is allowed, if certain conditions are fulfilled. In Ireland, exceeding the maximum ratios for individual 
consumers is allowed, subject to a proportionate margin. If the LTV cap will be activated in Germany, 
also a certain share of the loans may exceed the limit. The Irish broad-brushed instead of detailed 
approach leaves more responsibility for borrowers and lenders, which has both its merits and 
demerits. On the one hand, credit providers are induced to internalise responsible lending 
behaviour.1354 Very detailed rules can eliminate the sense of responsibility and stimulate creative 
compliance. Indeed, in the Netherlands, lenders sometimes seem to simply follow the rules. On the 
other hand, this comes with the risk of abuse of the leeway, which might result in irresponsible lending. 
In particular, this risk can materialise with the Irish undifferentiated LTI cap of 3.5. This limit may not 
only be too restrictive for some categories of households, but as well too lax for low-income borrowers, 
                                                          
1353 Cf. footnote 985 and sub-section 5.1.2. 
1354 There are similarities with self-regulation, although discretion is much more limited in this situation than 
under self-regulation. Nonetheless, one of the rationales for self-regulation is that regulatee might perceive its 
own rules as more reasonable than those imposed by the regulator, which might lead to more compliance (see 
e.g. Coglianese & Mendelson (2012), p. 152). 
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who usually are only able to spend a relatively small share of their income on housing. In the 
Netherlands DSTI and thus LTI caps are lower for low-income categories of households, and hence 
more protective for these vulnerable people. The Dutch rules are also more specific about what counts 
as income, which functions as safeguard against stretching the concept. However, in contrast, they 
allow taking future income into account, which reduces protection. In both member states, lending 
can be accommodated to the needs of individual borrowers. In the Netherlands, this requires explicit 
justification, which increases the protection of borrowers. In Ireland, the regulatory burden is probably 
lighter, since the rules are less complex and less prescriptive. 
 
In Ireland, mortgage lenders are not required to take other credit into account. In Germany, both 
secured and unsecured debt resulting from a residential real estate financing transaction is restricted 
by the LTV cap, which helps to limit circumvention. However, it might be difficult to enforce the rules 
for unsecured credit. DSTI and DTI caps would be better able to prevent circumvention. In the 
Netherlands lenders have to factor in existing credit costs (but no debt resulting from arrears on e.g. 
energy payments).1355 Dutch subscribers to the VFN and NVB codes of conduct on consumer credit 
have to apply the norms of the code of conduct for mortgage credit when supplying unsecured credit 
that is meant to finance a house.1356 However, a gap is created by the fact that these codes of conduct 
refer to the code of conduct for mortgage credit, instead of to the regulatory norms. The regulatory 
rules are sometimes different from those in the code of conduct for mortgage credit. The latter, for 
instance, allows a LTV ratio of 106%.1357 
 
The three member states have granted regulatory and supervisory powers to enact and apply 
borrower-based caps to different actors. This has implications for their effectiveness and the degree 
of accountability. In Ireland, both regulatory and supervisory powers are possessed by the central 
bank, only subject to consultation requirements. Independence is high, but accountability 
requirements are relatively low. In Germany, the legislature has created the legal basis for LTV cap, 
which will be applied by BaFin, probably subject to a form of guided discretion. The adoption of the 
legal basis by the legislature provides for democratic legitimacy of the measures, and ex ante control 
on BaFin, since the act includes a range of restrictions. Because a supervisor activates the cap, in theory 
this combines in the best way the demands of independence, accountability, and guided discretion. 
Accountability is also relatively high, because parliamentary discussion is required before the LTV cap 
will be activated or amended. However, due to the limitations to BaFin’s independence, this creates 
                                                          
1355 Cf. sub-sections 4.1, 4.2.1, 4.3.1.  
1356 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.1. 
1357 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.2. 
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the risk that activating the LTV limit will be difficult. Simultaneously, this construction shows the high 
interest which politics attaches to being involved in the process of activating macroprudential 
measures. This is confirmed by the fact that also in Ireland, a member of the lower house has proposed 
an act which requires the central bank to actively respond to the parliament before using its regulatory 
powers. 
 
In the Netherlands, the government has adopted the legal basis for the borrower-based caps, and the 
Minister of Finance applies them, based upon input of an expert body, Nibud, and after consultation 
with the supervisory authorities, but without being legally bound by any input. This approach involves 
risks with respect to ensuring an adequate level of the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits, especially if political 
and industry pressure increases. Irish recent history shows that financial stability may suffer if an actor 
is not only responsible for ensuring financial stability, but also for promoting the financial service 
industry.1358 Entrusting the task of setting DSTI and LTV limits – primarily in the interest of consumer 
protection, but secondary also to ensure financial stability – to a political institution like the Ministry 
of Finance carries a similar risk, as this ministry has comparable conflicting interests as the Central 
Bank of Ireland previously had. Section 7.3 will further discuss how to reconcile independence, 
accountability and a willingness to act for macroprudential authorities.  
 
 
  
                                                          
1358 Cf. sub-section 4.2.3. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of the analysis of borrower-based caps 
Determinacy and 
completeness 
Possibility 
proportionate and 
dissuasive 
enforcement 
Room for independent application, enforcement 
and amendment 
Qualitative evaluation, from high to low: yes, mostly, partly, barely, no 
Determinacy:  
 
 NL: rules on consumer 
credit: mostly (yet, a 
breach of a rule in a code 
of conduct is not 
necessarily a breach of 
art. 4:34 Wft); rules on 
mortgage credit: yes 
 IE: yes 
 DE: to be seen 
 
Completeness:  
 
Encompassing scope:  
 NL: rules on consumer 
credit: mostly (due to 
minimum norm); rules on 
mortgage credit: yes 
 IE: mostly 
 DE: partly (many lenders 
and not only secured 
credit, however lot of 
exceptions, no DSTI & DTI 
limits) 
 
Absence gaps and silence:  
 NL: mostly (but 
differences between rules 
for consumer and 
mortgage credit) 
 IE: barely (circumvention 
via unsecured loans) 
 DE: partly (risky loans 
supplied via excess quota, 
use market value, difficult 
to prevent unsecured 
borrowing) 
  
Exceptions are subject to 
clear and protective 
conditions: 
 NL: yes 
 IE: mostly (exception for 
borrowers with negative 
equity could be more 
protective) 
 DE: to be seen 
  
Proportionate 
enforcement:  
 
Availability whole 
range of sanctions, 
from light to severe:  
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: mostly 
 
Dissuasive 
enforcement: 
Availability high 
administrative fines: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: yes (but 
maximum fine for 
insurers and 
pension funds is 
rather low in 
comparison with 
those for banks) 
 
Mandatory 
publication of 
sanctions, apart from 
specific exceptions: 
 NL, IE, DE: yes 
 
Possibility to sanction 
individuals: 
 NL, IE, DE: yes 
 
Availability 
threatening 
sanctions, like 
withdrawal licence: 
 NL, IE, DE: yes 
 
Possibility criminal 
conviction: 
 NL, IE, DE: no 
Ability and willingness to act:  
Instrument has clear legal basis: 
 NL: codes of conduct: barely; Trhk: yes 
 IE: yes 
 DE: yes 
 
Well-defined policy objectives: 
 NL: codes of conduct: mostly; Trhk: partly 
(relationship consumer protection and financial 
stability not entirely clear) 
 IE: yes 
 DE: yes 
 
Corresponds to clear mandate supervisor: 
 NL: barely (Minister of Finance has no mandate 
for consumer protection, and implicitly for 
financial stability); AFM: yes 
 IE: yes 
 DE: mostly (macroprudential mandate is not 
explicit) 
 
Framework provides room for action: 
 NL: for Minister of Finance: yes; for DNB and the 
AFM: barely. 
 IE: yes 
 DE: partly 
 
Operational independence: 
 DNB, AFM: yes 
 CBI: mostly (Minister for Finance can exert 
influence) 
 BaFin: barely/partly (constrained by legal and 
technical oversight BMF) 
 
Use of guided discretion: 
 NL: partly (de facto, not de jure) 
 IE: barely 
 DE: partly 
 
Accountability mechanism: 
 NL: Minister: mostly (towards parliament); NVB, 
VFN, NTO: barely (but de facto to AFM and 
Minister); AFM: barely (not specifically for 
enforcing these rules) 
 IE: partly (consultation Minister for Finance, 
public) 
 DE (BaFin): yes (information requirements 
towards BMF, relationship with FSC, 
parliamentary discussion, consultation) 
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5. Lending restrictions in consumer law 
 
Rules for influencing the amount of money that households can borrow are not only created within 
the ambit of financial regulation, but also within the domain of consumer law. In historical and 
theoretical perspective, this is quite remarkable. Consumer law is namely part of private law, which 
governs the relationships between private parties. Traditionally, the starting point of private law is the 
freedom of contract: parties can agree among themselves under what terms they form contracts.1359 
Consumer law lays down restrictions on this freedom in order to protect the consumer, which is 
perceived as the weaker party. This weakness may be caused by an array of factors, including the 
consumer’s lack of bargaining power, knowledge and experience compared to the professional 
party.1360 For some time, behavioural deficiencies have been considered relevant as well. In past 
decades, the dominant rationale underlying this government intervention was the presence of market 
failures like asymmetric information.1361 Simplified, the idea was that mandatory disclosure brings the 
consumer on equal footing with the professional. Apart from that, the consumer was considered 
capable of entering into agreements. The underlying rationale is different when a government 
prohibits certain (credit) agreements, because some conditions are (not) met or a threshold is 
exceeded, even if both parties – in this case the lender and the borrower – would like to conclude the 
agreement. Then, the consumer is protected against his own shortcomings. This paternalistic approach 
means a departure from neoclassical economic assumptions to a behavioural economic perspective. 
Acknowledging behavioural deficiencies is probably realistic.1362 Still, such prohibitions have a far-
reaching nature. 
 
When examining the lending restrictions in consumer law, this chapter follows the structure of the 
analytical framework chosen for this study. The subsections discuss (1) the determinacy and 
completeness of the rules, (2) the proportionality and dissuasiveness of the enforcement measures 
and (3) the independence in applying, enforcing and amending these lending restrictions, respectively. 
Each subsection commences with examining the EU law aspects of the topic under consideration and 
continues with analysing the Dutch, Irish and German legal situation.  
                                                          
1359 Cf. Reifner et al. (2010), pp. 91-95. 
1360 Cf. sub-section 2.3.3.1; Reich (2016), section II(C).  
1361 In addition, several EU directives granted consumers a right to withdrawal for various situations or 
products. This started with Council Directive 85/577 of 20 December 1985, OJ 1985, L 372/31. Eidenmüller 
(2011) lists the directives which in 2011 included this right (p. 3), and further discusses this right and the 
possible underlying rationale. 
1362 Cf. sub-section 2.1.2.2. 
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5.1. Determinacy and completeness of lending restrictions in consumer law  
5.1.1. Lending restrictions in EU consumer law 
Two EU directives are directly concerned with the supply of credit to households: the so-called 
Consumer Credit Directive (CCD) and the Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD), adopted in 2008 and 2014 
respectively.1363 Both directives contain provisions to protect and increase the capabilities of 
consumers who borrow, such as rules on mandatory disclosure and minimum contractual rights. 
However, there are significant differences between the two directives, inter alia regarding the 
provisions on assessing the creditworthiness of a consumer, and the consequences of this assessment. 
These differences mainly stem from the fact that the MCD has been adopted in the post-crisis era.1364 
Whereas EU consumer legislation historically predominantly aimed at fostering the internal market 
and protecting consumers, preventing financial instability became an important additional objective 
after the crisis.1365 This led to stricter and more protective rules regarding credit supply. Still, both 
directives have been adopted based on what is currently art. 114 TFEU, which allows for the adoption 
of measures to establish or improve the functioning of the internal market.1366 Arguably, financial 
stability and a high and equivalent level of consumer protection contribute indeed to the integration 
of credit markets.1367  
 
Both directives use the concept of responsible lending – albeit that the final version of the CCD 
mentions it only once, in recital 26 – without defining it. This concept is closely linked to preventing 
over-indebtedness and can be understood as lending while taking into account the interests of 
                                                          
1363 Supra, footnote 55. Directive 2008/48 has repealed the previous directive on consumer credit, Council 
Directive 87/102 of 22 December 1986, OJ 1986, L 42/48. 
1364 Compare recitals 3-9 of the preamble of Directive 2008/48 with recitals 2-7 of the preamble of Directive 
2014/17. 
1365 Mak (2013b), pp. 179-180. 
1366 Interestingly, neither directive explicitly refers to art. 169 TFEU, which can be a legal basis for EU legal acts 
aimed at consumer protection, either in conjuction with art. 114 TFEU or not. 
1367 Schäfer (2014) discusses some questions about the use of art. 114 TFEU as a legal basis for the MCD (pp. 
211-212). He rebuts the argument that a common market in mortgage credit is almost lacking, since only 1% of 
the transactions crosses borders, arguing that harmonisation might contribute to establishing such a market. 
He moreover responds to the argument that the MCD will mainly improve the functioning of national credit 
markets, that, even if this would be the case, this will nonetheless contribute to the stability of the whole 
internal market. Jørgensen (2015) doubts whether the internal market will be achieved for consumer and 
mortage credit, especially due to the low appetite to borrow abroad. She also questions the use of art. 114 
TFEU as legal basis for the MCD, because this directive seems mainly targeted at financial stability and is a 
minimum harmonisation directive, which does not help to remove obstacles to free trade (pp. 760-762). Some 
scholars argue that maximum harmonisation directives in the field of consumer protection are actually more 
aimed at fostering the internal market and helping suppliers, than protecting consumers (Cf. Donnelly & White 
(2013), pp. 9-10; Brown (2015), pp. 569-570). 
5. Lending restrictions in consumer law 
231 
 
borrowers, in particular their repayment capabilities.1368 This concept has some (implicit) assumptions 
about borrowers and lenders. Firstly, it presumes that borrowers are not fully able to avoid 
overborrowing. So, consumers are considered vulnerable to making wrong decisions.1369 In the context 
of borrowing, this is a realistic point of departure in light of the findings of behavioural economic 
research and the literature on over-indebtedness.1370 Still, not every consumer is equally vulnerable. 
Secondly, the concept of responsible lending assumes that lenders supply loans to consumers who lack 
repayment capabilities. Normally, this is not in the lenders’ own interest, but lenders might have 
distorted incentives due to competitive pressure, conflicting incentives coming from their sales targets, 
fees or possibilities to pass on risks.1371 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that competitive pressure 
led to lower lending standards in Ireland, prior to the crisis.1372 In addition, lenders might provide credit 
that can be paid back, but strangles households. It is thus realistic to assume that lenders not always 
lend responsible, as also revealed during the crisis. Ergo, policies to protect consumers against 
themselves are certainly valuable. 
  
5.1.1.1. Lending restrictions in the Consumer Credit Directive 
The Consumer Credit Directive stipulates rules governing the credit supply by a creditor, being 
someone granting credit in the course of his trade, business or profession, to a consumer, meaning a 
natural person, acting outside his trade, business or profession.1373 Barring certain exceptions, the rules 
only apply to credit agreements involving a total amount of minimum € 200 and maximum € 75,000, 
provided that the credit is not secured by immovable property.1374 Excluded are, among others, 
overdraft facilities where credit has to be repaid within a month, and credit which is granted free of 
interest and other charges. In addition, the rules of the CCD apply to unsecured credit agreements for 
the renovation of a residential immovable property, even if the total amount of credit exceeds € 
75,000.1375 Therefore, although a wide range of credit types is covered, there are certain gaps. Whether 
these gaps create important risks or allow for circumvention depends a lot on national practices. It 
                                                          
1368 Elsewhere, the European Commission (2009c) states that ‘[r]esponsible lending means that credit products 
are appropriate for consumers’ needs and are tailored to their ability to repay.’ (p. 3). On the responsible 
lending concept and the absence of a definition: World Bank (2013), pp. 3-4; Riefa (2014), p. 48; FInCoNet 
(2014), p. 15; Kalamees et al. (2015), pp. 29-30; Mak (2015), pp. 411-413; Ferretti et al. (2016), pp. 65-66. 
1369 See e.g. Reich (2016) on the vulnerable consumer. 
1370 Cf. sub-sections 2.1.2.2 and 2.1.2.4. 
1371 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.1; Kalamees et al. (2015), p. 30. 
1372 Honohan (2010), para. 6.9 and 6.39. Cf. Norris & Coates (2014), pp. 304-305. 
1373 Art. 3(a)-(b) Directive 2008/48. 
1374 Art. 2(1), 2(2)(a) and 2(2)(c) Directive 2008/48. 
1375 Art. 2(2a) Directive 2008/48, as added by art. 46 Directive 2014/17. 
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matters how frequently credit of the excluded types is provided. For instance, in Germany, many 
consumer credit stems from hire purchase agreements, free of interest.1376 
 
Art. 8 CCD instructs member states to ensure that a creditor assesses the creditworthiness of a 
consumer, before concluding a credit agreement and before significantly increasing the amount 
borrowed. According to art. 8(2) CCD, member states must ensure that a creditor is obliged to update 
the financial information about the consumer if the amount of credit is changed. However, the CCD 
attaches no consequences to this undefined and undetermined creditworthiness assessment.1377 
There is no obligation to abstain from lending in certain situations or if certain conditions are met. In 
other words: the CCD does not impose lending restrictions.  
 
This creditworthiness assessment must be based on ‘sufficient information’, where appropriate 
received from the consumer, and where necessary obtained from a credit registry or credit bureau. 
According to the CJEU, the creditor must assess whether the available information is adequate for 
verifying the creditworthiness, but retains the freedom to decide whether it is necessary to scrutinise 
the veracity of information supplied by the consumer.1378 Consequently, there is no obligation to verify 
in every case whether the supplied information is correct. Neither is it prescribed how a 
creditworthiness assessment must be conducted – by means of a sophisticated credit scoring model 
or not – and which information must be used in the assessment. This is a sign of incompleteness; these 
rules neglect that it matters which factors are taking into account in a credit-scoring model.1379  
 
In the first Commission proposal for the CCD, in 2002, the obligations for lenders went further than in 
the final version of the CCD. A lender was obliged to assess ‘by any means at his disposal, whether the 
consumer (…) can reasonably be expected to discharge [his] obligations under the agreement.’1380 So, 
in the proposal, lenders were obliged to use all possible information, instead of sufficient information. 
Moreover, according to this proposal, the lender should advice the consumer on the most appropriate 
type and total amount of credit, taking inter alia his financial situation into account.1381 However, these 
two expressions of responsible lending were watered down and removed respectively, under pressure 
                                                          
1376 Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (2015), p. 32. 
1377 Cf. Ferretti (2015), pp. 363-364; Rott (2014a), p. 220. 
1378 Case C-449/13 CA Consumer Finance SA v. Bakkaus and Bonato [2015], para. 36-39. 
1379 Cf. sub-section 2.3.3.2. 
1380 Art. 9 of the proposal for the CCD: see Commission (2002). Italics added.  
1381 Art. 6(3) of the proposal for the CCD: see Commission (2002). 
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of mainly the financial industry, but also also a result of privacy concerns raised by a consumer 
organisation.1382 
 
Because of the absence of mandatory consequences of the creditworthiness assessment, and the 
watering down and removal of the aforementioned expressions of responsible lending, some criticise 
the CCD ‘for insisting on relying on the ability of informed, confident and rational consumers as drivers 
of economic efficiency but not caring about the socially and financially vulnerable consumers such as 
those who become over-indebted.’1383 This is indeed true, since vulnerable households are barely 
protected against themselves, even though this might be necessary, as explained above. Consequently, 
this undefined and vague obligation to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness, with several incomplete 
rules and no attached consequences, is neither fish nor fowl: the directive refers to the responsible 
lending concept, but does not (consistently) incorporate it in its rules.  
 
Therefore, due to the vagueness of the obligation to verify a consumer’s creditworthiness, the actual 
impact of this provision largely depends on the national transposition of the CCD.1384 For that reason, 
the question is to what extent member states are allowed to adopt more stringent rules on verifying a 
consumer’s creditworthiness. In principle, the CCD aims at full harmonisation.1385 Within the scope of 
the Directive, member states are thus not allowed to introduce national provisions other than those 
provided for by this directive. However, not all areas are subject to full harmonisation, according to 
art. 22(1) CCD.1386 In the literature, this feature of partial full harmonisation is coined targeted 
harmonisation.1387 The provision regarding the creditworthiness assessment explicitly allows a stricter 
rule, namely requiring lenders to consult a credit registry or bureau for assessing the creditworthiness 
of consumers.1388 Arguably, member states are also allowed to include in national legislation a duty to 
deny credit in case of a negative outcome of a creditworthiness assessment: since the CCD does not 
                                                          
1382 Niemi (2009), p. 96; Franken (2009), pp. 134-141; Rott (2014b), p. 688. The financial industry expressed 
worries about the costs and the nature of its responsibilities, arguing that it was responsible for providing the 
consumer with information about the characteristics of the credit, but not for advicing him about the most 
appropriate credit. The privacy concerns of the consumer organisation were related to the obligation to check 
the credit registry/bureau.  
1383 Ferretti (2015), p. 364; Ferretti et al. (2016), p. 66. Note that there is a large literature on the image of the 
consumer in EU legislation and the case-law of the CJEU. See e.g. Unberath & Johnston (2007), pp. 1250-1251; 
Mak (2012, 2013c), Domurath (2013), Reich (2016). 
1384 Cf. Ramsay (2011), p. 348. 
1385 Art. 22 and recitals 9-10 of the preamble of Directive 2008/48 and para. 38 of Case C-602/10 Volksbank 
România [2012], ECLI:EU:C:2012:443. 
1386 Cf. Case C-565/12 LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v. Kalhan [2014], para. 42. 
1387 Ramsay (2011), p. 347; Reich & Micklitz (2014), p. 41. 
1388 Art. 8(1) and 22 Directive 2008/48. Cf. recitals 9-10 of its preamble. 
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include any the details on the creditworthiness assessment, and is silent about attaching consequences 
to it, member states have some room for choosing the form and methods to implement this provision, 
as long as it contributes to achieving the objective of the directive.1389 One of the objectives is 
preventing irresponsible lending.1390 The vague terms applied by art. 8 CCD, such as ‘sufficient 
information’ and ‘any significant increase’ provide member states with some freedom in the 
implementation of the directive as well, namely by specifying what is sufficient and significant, as long 
as it does not lead to stricter rules within the scope of fully harmonised rules.1391 
 
5.1.1.2. Lending restrictions in the Mortgage Credit Directive 
The MCD aims at fostering the internal market and restoring financial stability, as well as ensuring 
responsible lending.1392 It is more protective than the CCD, reflecting the post-crisis emphasis on 
responsible lending, and the larger influence of consumer groups in the process of drafting this 
directive.1393 Directive 2014/17 applies to credit which is secured by a mortgage on residential 
immovable property, and is supplied by a natural or legal person acting in the course of his trade, 
business or profession to a consumer.1394 However, some forms of secured credit agreements have 
been excluded from its scope.1395 This includes several types of equity release credit agreements, which 
are consequently neither covered by the MCD, nor by the CCD.1396 An equity release credit agreement 
allows a borrower to receive a lump sum or periodic payments, which has to repaid by a sum deriving 
from the future sale of the house, usually after the borrower’s death. Still, consumers can face 
repayment problems with equity release credit agreements. Member states may choose to exclude 
                                                          
1389 Mak (2013a) also discusses this issue: ‘Some Member States, such as the Netherlands and Belgium, had 
already introduced duties to deny credit in such cases before the adoption of the 2008 Consumer Credit 
Directive. There has been some discussion in both Member States as to whether such a strict duty fits with the 
regime of the Directive and, importantly, its full harmonisation character. Since the Directive does not stipulate 
the consequences of a negative creditworthiness assessment, Member States may be allowed to maintain their 
own legislation on this point. Nevertheless, the Netherlands and Belgium remain exceptions.’ (p. 40). Biemans 
(2012) argues that the CCD intentionally did not set rules for all aspects of a credit agreement, leaving member 
states with room to regulate other aspects, which are not dealt with in the CCD. Wösthoff (2010) argues that 
art. 8 CCD is too imprecise to be a maximum harmonisation provision, because this imprecise character can 
lead to differences between various member states regarding the implementing legislation and hence the 
criteria (p. 91). 
1390 Recital 26 of the preamble of Directive 2008/48. 
1391 Actually, a study on the implementation of the CCD, ordered by the Commission, explicitly assessed 
whether member states clarified these vague concepts: Risk and Policy Analysts Limited (2013), pp. 101-105. 
1392 Recitals 3-7 of the preamble of Directive 2014/17. 
1393 Ramsay (2016), pp. 159-161. 
1394 Art. 3(1)(a) and 4(1)-(2) Directive 2014/17. The MCD uses the same definition of a consumer as the CCD. 
1395 Art. 3(2) Directive 2014/17. 
1396 Art. 3(2)(a) Directive 2014/17 and art. 2(2)(a) Directive 2008/48. 
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bridging loans from the scope of the MCD.1397 Therefore, the scope of these rules is quite complete, 
but there are certain gaps. This might create risks for consumers. 
 
The substantial rules on the creditworthiness assessment 
Like the CCD, the MCD instructs the member states to ensure that a creditor assesses the 
creditworthiness of a consumer before concluding a credit agreement. A lender must assess a 
consumer’s creditworthiness again when the credit sum is significantly increased, based upon updated 
information.1398 However, this obligation is more detailed, and goes much further than under the CCD. 
In addition, unlike the CCD, the MCD defines what a creditworthiness assessment is, namely ‘the 
evaluation of the prospect for the debt obligation resulting from the credit agreement to be met.’1399  
 
Mid-2015, the EBA issued guidelines on the creditworthiness assessment, which took effect after the 
transposition deadline of the MCD (21 March 2016).1400 These (non-binding) guidelines further specify 
some aspects of the rules on the creditworthiness assessment and will be discussed below, together 
with the rules of the MCD itself. Box 5.1 below explains why the EBA can issue these guidelines, and to 
whom they are directed. 
 
According to art. 18(1) MCD, the credit assessment must be thorough, and take appropriate account 
of all relevant factors. The information on which the assessment is based, must at least include the 
consumer’s income and expenses, as well as other relevant financial and economic circumstances.1401 
Recital 55 of the preamble of the MCD adds that reasonable consideration must be given to possible 
future negative income shocks. The EBA guidelines further specify that a lender should make prudent 
allowances for potential negative scenarios in the future, such as reduced income due to retirement, 
increased interest rates, and large repayment sums in the final term(s).1402 Elsewhere, the EBA 
guidelines state that retirement must be taken into account when the loan term extends beyond the 
expected retirement age of the borrower.1403 The expenses which need to be taken into account 
                                                          
1397 Art. 3(3)(d) Directive 2014/17. For the definition of a bridging loan, see art. 4(23) Directive 2014/17. 
1398 Art. 18(6) Directive 2014/17. 
1399 Art. 4(17) Directive 2014/17. Cf. art. 18(1) Directive 2014/17. 
1400 The EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment are available at 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/consumer-protection-and-financial-innovation/guidelines-
on-creditworthiness-assessment/ (last visited 8 March 2017). 
1401 Art. 20(1) Directive 2014/17. Regarding the expenses, guideline 5 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness 
assessment states that the lender ‘should make reasonable allowances for committed and other non-
discretionary expenditures, such as the consumer‘s actual obligations, including appropriate substantiation and 
consideration of the living expenses of the consumer.’ 
1402 Guideline 6 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
1403 Guideline 4.3 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
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according to the EBA guidelines are the committed and other non-discretionary expenditures, like 
actual obligations, including appropriate substantiation and consideration of living expenses.1404 Note 
that the original Commission proposal imposed more detailed obligations, namely to include at least 
‘the consumer’s income, savings, debts and other financial commitments’ into the assessment.1405 
However, the final version of the MCD does not require taking existing debt and savings into account, 
but gives member states or lenders the freedom to decide how to assess the creditworthiness.1406 Still, 
the EBA guidelines mention some factors that may be included, such as the outstanding amount of 
debt and evidence on missed payments.1407  
 
Box 5.1: The basis and addressees of the EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment 
The EBA is allowed to issue the Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment, because it is bestowed 
with certain tasks in the area of consumer protection and financial activities, and may issue 
guidelines and recommendations in the exercise of this task.1408 However, the EBA can only issue 
guidelines which are directed towards competent authorities in the sense of the CRR, and financial 
institutions, which are credit institutions, investment firms and financial conglomerates as defined 
in the EU legislation about financial regulation and supervision.1409 These competent authorities and 
financial institutions must make every effort to comply with these guidelines, whereas the former 
are also obliged to explain non-compliance.1410 For these reasons, the guidelines on 
creditworthiness assessment are addressed to these competent authorities, insofar as they are 
empowered to ensure application and enforcement of (parts of the) MCD, and to financial 
institutions.1411 However, the EBA tries to extend the scope of these guidelines by demanding the 
competent authorities to inform other authorities which are responsible for applying and enforcing 
(parts of the) MCD about these guidelines, and ask them to consider to comply with these 
guidelines.1412  
 
                                                          
1404 Guideline 5 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
1405 Art. 14(1) of the proposal for a Directive: see European Commission (2011b). 
1406 In the public consultation process, both financial services industry federations and member states 
expressed the opinion that lenders should be free to decide which factors are taken into account in the 
creditworthiness assessment (European Commission, 2009d, pp. 10-11). 
1407 Guideline 4.1 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
1408 Art. 9(2) Regulation 1093/2010. 
1409 Art. 4 and 16(1) Regulation 1093/2010. 
1410 Art. 16(3) Regulation 1093/2010. 
1411 Art. 6 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
1412 Art. 7(a)-(b) EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
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The MCD does not specify how a creditworthiness assessment has to be conducted. A lender might 
use any method or model, from a full-fledged credit-scoring model to an indicator of debt to disposable 
income.1413 The requirement to take income and expenses into account in the creditworthiness 
assessment is positive in light of the findings of the literature review in sub-section 2.3.3.2. The MCD 
demands too that other relevant financial and economic circumstances are included in the assessment. 
If this means that existing debt and general economic conditions are considered, this requirement 
suffices. Yet, this is not necessarily the case. It is telling that the explicit requirement to take existing 
debt into account has not been included in the final text of the MCD. In addition, a lender can interpret 
the phrase ‘relevant economic circumstances’ in a manner that does not include general economic 
conditions. This is unfortunate, as the literature on credit scoring clearly concludes that the biggest 
flaw of the credit-scoring models is that general economic conditions have not been considered.1414 
Hence, the requirements of the MCD on information which has to be taken into account in a 
creditworthiness assessment fall short of including all necessary factors. The current rules, after being 
watered down, leave some room to lenders to only take certain factors into account in the assessment. 
Nevertheless, a supervisor can require lenders to include all these factors, by persisting that they are 
relevant.1415 
 
Art. 18(3) MCD requires that a creditworthiness assessment must not predominantly rely on the fact 
that the LTV ratio is lower than 100%, or the assumption that the value of the house will rise, unless 
the loan is meant for building or renovating the house. So, a LTI ratio is considered more important 
than a LTV ratio for assessing the creditworthiness of a consumer. It is indeed true that a LTI ratio is 
more relevant for determining whether a household is able to pay the monthly financing costs of a 
loan.1416  
 
The MCD attaches consequences to the credit assessment: a creditor is only allowed to lend when the 
assessment indicates that the consumer will likely meet the obligations of the credit agreement, in the 
manner required under that agreement.1417 Again, repayment capability is considered the key factor; 
not the LTV ratio. There are several reasons for requiring lenders to assess a consumers’ 
                                                          
1413 Only a debt-to-income ratio will not suffice, since expenses need to be taken into account. 
1414 It is true that this would require advanced and sophisticated models, which smaller lenders possibly cannot 
afford, like smaller banks use the Standardised Approach and not the IRB Approach for assessing credit risk (cf. 
sub-section 3.1.1) 
1415 Cf. section 5.3. 
1416 Cf. sub-section 2.3.1.2. In the public consultations, representatives of consumer organisations also argued 
this (European Commission, 2009d, pp. 9-10). 
1417 Art. 18(5)(a) Directive 2014/17. 
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creditworthiness and oblige them to deny credit if the consumer is likely unable to repay the credit. 
Firstly, the Commission fears that consumers will make wrong choices, out of “short-termism”.1418 
Secondly, it worries that lenders may lend carelessly, due to inter alia possibilities to transfer the risks 
to third parties, competitive pressure on underwriting standards, or reliance of the value of the house 
instead of on repayment capabilities.1419 Indeed, these risks are real. 
 
The duty to deny credit contributes to reducing these risks, which is why the inclusion of this duty in 
the MCD has to be welcomed. Still, it cannot prevent all circumvention. This is the case, because 
phrases like ‘are likely to be met’ and ‘shall not rely predominantly on’ are imprecise and inherently 
vague. Therefore, it depends a lot on the national implementation of the MCD what this duty to deny 
credit will mean in practice.1420 If this implementation does not give more clues, its meaning will 
depend on the interpretation by lenders and supervisors. Then, the vagueness can enable lenders to 
choose a favourable interpretation, or to disagree with supervisors about the interpretation. This 
might undermine the purpose of these rules and can lead to creative compliance. Nevertheless, a 
certain degree of vagueness in this principle-like rule cannot be avoided. Not all the relevant factors 
and circumstances can a priori be detailed and delineated; certainly not in a directive at EU level. 
Therefore, the practice of lenders and supervisors will further detail these obligations. Moreover, 
circumvention of the requirements is possible by supplying unsecured credit alongside secured credit, 
because the CCD attaches fewer conditions and no consequences to the creditworthiness assessment. 
 
Procedural conditions, property valuation, and minimum harmonisation 
Apart from these requirements about the substance of the creditworthiness assessment, the MCD 
imposes procedural conditions. The information on which the credit assessment is based, must be 
obtained from relevant sources, including the consumer himself and, if applicable, the credit 
intermediary.1421 Appropriate verification of the information is required, if necessary by reference to 
independently verifiable information.1422 The guidelines of the EBA add that a lender must take 
                                                          
1418 European Commission (2011d), p. 203. 
1419 Ibidem; European Commission (2011c), p. 15. 
1420 Ferretti (2015) evaluates the nature of the duty to deny credit as ‘far from clear’, meaning that it is unclear 
whether the obligation is public or private, and what the consequences are of violating it (p. 366). This depends 
on the national implementation, since member states can choose to transpose some provisions of the MCD by 
means of, for example, prudential law and others through, for instance, civil or criminal law (recital 83 of the 
preamble of the MCD). Member states are free to adopt rules on the type of sanctions imposed for violations, 
as long as they are effective, proportionate and dissuasive (art. 38 MCD) (cf. section 5.2). 
1421 Art. 20(1) Directive 2014/17. Member states must also ensure that credit intermediaries accurately submit 
the necessary information provided by the consumer to the relevant lender (art. 20(2) Directive 2014/17). 
1422 Art. 20(1) Directive 2014/17. 
5. Lending restrictions in consumer law 
239 
 
reasonable steps to verify ‘the consumer's underlying income capacity, the consumer's income history 
and any variability over time’ and also adds some requirements about consumers with irregular 
income.1423 
 
Lenders must clearly and straightforwardly specify to consumers which information they need to 
supply, whereas member states must ensure that consumers are aware of the need to supply correct 
information.1424 Lenders must document and maintain the procedures and information on which the 
credit assessment is based.1425 The EBA guidelines add that this information must be maintained for at 
least the duration of the credit agreement and must be readily available for the authorities.1426 
However, member states are not required to ensure that lenders use appropriate processes, as was 
stipulated in the Commission proposal for the MCD.1427 
 
Finally, art. 19 MCD contains rules about property valuation. Member states must ensure that 
valuation standards are reliable and that using these standards is obligatory. Moreover, sufficient 
independence of the appraisers must be ensured in order to enable an impartial and objective 
valuation. According to recital 26 of the preamble of the MCD, these valuation standards can be 
complied with by law, but also by self-regulation. These valuation requirements are very general, and 
do thus not necessarily ensure prudent valuation. 
 
The provisions on the creditworthiness assessment are subject to minimum harmonisation, so member 
states have the right to adopt more stringent rules in this regard.1428 Member states have the freedom 
to choose the types of law, regulations and administrative provisions for transposing these provisions, 
and they may choose different types of laws for different provisions; for example, prudential law for 
one provision and consumer law for another.1429 All in all, a lot of the actual details in the obligations 
of these provisions depend on their transposition in national law and whether or not the EBA guidelines 
are respected. 
                                                          
1423 Guideline 1.1 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. In addition, guideline 1.2 adds that ‘[i]n the 
case of consumers that are self-employed or have seasonal or other irregular income, the [lender] should make 
reasonable enquiries and take reasonable steps to verify information that is related to the consumer's ability to 
meet his/her obligations under the credit agreement, including profit capacity and third-party verification 
documenting such income.’ 
1424 Art. 20(3)-(4) Directive 2014/17. 
1425 Art. 18(2) Directive 2014/17. 
1426 Guidelines 2.1 and 2.2 EBA Guidelines on creditworthiness assessment. 
1427 Supra, footnote 1405. 
1428 Art. 2 Directive 2014/17. Cf. recital 55 of the preamble of the MCD, which explicitly states that member 
states should be able to set e.g. LTV and LTI caps, and which encourages them to implement the FSB Principles 
for Sound Residential Mortgage Underwriting Practices of the Financial Stability Board (2012).  
1429 Art. 42 and recital 83 of the preamble of Directive 2014/17. 
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5.1.2. Determinacy and completeness of lending restrictions in Dutch consumer law 
In the Netherlands, the duty to conduct a creditworthiness assessment is included in art. 4:34 Wft, the 
legislation based upon it, as well as in the associated codes of conduct, as discussed in section 4.1. This 
provision contains a duty to deny credit if providing credit would be irresponsible in the light of 
overextension of credit. This duty concerns not only mortgage credit, but also consumer credit. 
Therefore, it goes further than required in the CCD. Lenders have to establish their own criteria for 
preventing an overextension of credit to consumers. The law does not substantiate any further 
requirements for these own criteria. However, for consumer credit several codes of conduct function 
as minimum requirements.1430 For mortgage credit, lenders have to apply regulatory DSTI, LTI and LTV 
limits.1431 So, in the Netherlands the obligations of the CCD and MCD, which are relevant for this study, 
have been transposed into financial law, rather than consumer law.1432 Apart from a few remarks in 
the next paragraph, reference is made to section 4.1 of this study for the discussion of these rules. 
That section concluded that, overall, the rules are relatively determinate and complete, although there 
is room for some improvements.  
 
Already before the adoption of the MCD, the Dutch rules on assessing the creditworthiness of 
consumers were largely compliant with the rules of the MCD on these issues. Henceforth, only minor 
amendments of the Dutch regime were required to incorporate these rules.1433 Nevertheless, the 
Dutch rules did – and still do – not contain a duty to take the possibility of future income decreases 
into account, as recital 55 of the preamble of the MCD and the EBA guidelines require.1434 The Dutch 
rules on documentation require that information about the consumer and his situations needs to be 
documented and maintained for at least five years.1435 In addition, the criteria for assessing the 
creditworthiness must be documented and maintained.1436 Arguably, this fulfils the documentation 
requirement of art. 18(2) MCD, which does not mention a term for maintaining the information. 
However, it does not meet the EBA guidelines, which specify that the information must be maintained 
for the duration of the credit agreement.  
 
                                                          
1430 This stance of the AFM, the Dutch conduct of business supervisor, is accepted by courts. Cf. sub-section 
4.1.1.1. 
1431 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.2. 
1432 For a discussion of other aspects of the Dutch transposition of the CCD, see e.g. Biemans (2013). For more 
information on the transposition of the MCD, see e.g. Giphart (2014) and Braspenning & Mak (2015). 
1433 Cf. Giphart (2014), pp. 140-141; Mak (2015), pp. 425-428; Braspenning & Mak (2015), p. 81. 
1434 Braspenning & Mak (2015), p. 81. 
1435 Art. 33 Bgfo. 
1436 See art. 4:34(1) Wft and art. 4(1)(b) Trhk. 
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5.1.3. Determinacy and completeness of lending restrictions in Irish consumer law 
In Ireland, there are four pieces of legislation that contain rules on assessing a consumer’s 
creditworthiness in order to ensure that a consumer only borrows as much as he is able to repay. These 
are the Statutory Instruments 281/2010 and 142/2016, which implement the CCD and MCD 
respectively, as well as the Consumer Protection Code 2012 (CPC 2012), and finally, the Consumer 
Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders.1437 In addition, there was judicial consideration of the 
question of whether the tort – i.e. non-contractual civil wrongdoing – of reckless lending existed in the 
Irish civil system.1438 However, the High Court decided that this tort does not exist in Irish law.1439 
Hence, apart from the regulatory obligations discussed in the remainder of this sub-section, there is 
no duty in Irish law that requires abstaining from lending beyond a certain amount. 
 
5.1.3.1. The implementation of the CCD and the MCD in Irish law  
As is common in Irish implementation of secondary Union law, both the CCD and MCD have been 
transposed by adopting a new Statutory Instrument, which closely follows the wording of the 
respective directive. However, the new S.I.’s have not been integrated into the text of existing acts or 
Statutory Instruments.1440 Therefore, the discussion of the rules on creditworthiness assessment in 
these Statutory Instruments will be kept short, with reference to the CCD and MCD. 
 
Regulation 11 S.I. 281/2010 transposes art. 8 CCD into Irish law, by largely copying the wording of that 
provision of the directive. Regulation 11(1) of this S.I. states that a lender shall ‘assess the consumer’s 
creditworthiness on the basis of sufficient information, where appropriate obtained from the 
consumer and, where necessary, on the basis of a consultation of the relevant database’ before 
concluding a credit agreement. In addition, regulation 11(2) S.I. 281/2010 obliges lenders to assess the 
                                                          
1437 S.I. 281/2010 is available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/si/281/made/en/print, S.I. 142/2016 
via http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/si/142/made/en/print, the Consumer Protection Code 2012, its 
addendum and the Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders via 
https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/consumer-protection/other-codes-of-conduct. Statutory Instruments 
are a form of secondary legislation. Note that in primary legislation, the Consumer Credit Act 1995 aims to 
protect borrowing consumers, but it does not include provisions on assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness, 
nor lending restrictions. This act is available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1995/act/24/enacted/en/html (all last visited 29 April 2017). 
1438 Kenna & Lynch-Sally (2014), p. 306. 
1439 ICS Building Society v Grant [2010] IEHC 17, para. 6. Cf. Heslin (2014); Donnelly (2015), pp. 293-294; Breslin 
(2013), pp. 214-215. 
1440 Of course, the new S.I.’s refer to existing acts or S.I.’s, but they are not integrated in existing legal texts. This 
method of implementing directives does not support the clarity of the total legal framework, as also observed 
by Donnelly & White (2014), p. 406. 
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consumer’s creditworthiness if the credit sum will be significantly increased. The obligation in S.I. 
281/2010 to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness has almost the same scope as under the CCD, but 
is slightly widened in a specific area: unlike stipulated in the CCD, it applies also to a ‘credit agreement 
in the form of an overdraft facility where the credit has to be repaid on demand or within 3 months’.1441 
All natural and legal persons who grant or promise to grant credit in the course of their trade, business 
or profession are subject to the rules of S.I. 281/2010.1442 
 
Regulations 19-21 S.I. 142/2016 transpose art. 18-20 MCD into Irish law by repeating these provisions, 
almost verbatim. S.I. 142/2016 applies to same types of secured credit, and excludes the same types 
of equity release credit agreements as the MCD.1443 The Irish Department of Finance did not use the 
possibility to exclude bridging loans from the scope of this S.I., although this is allowed by the MCD.1444 
All natural and legal persons who grant or promise to grant credit in the course of their trade, business 
or profession are subject to the rules of S.I. 142/2016.1445 
 
The Irish implementation of the rules on creditworthiness assessment in the CCD and MCD does not 
provide additional clarity about the meaning of several vague phrases in these directives, because 
these phrases have simply been repeated. Henceforth, it will depend on the interpretation of lenders 
and the Central Bank of Ireland, as supervisor, and in the end on national courts and the CJEU, how 
these phrases are understood, and how protective they really are. It might be difficult to establish 
whether these kinds of vague obligations are breached.1446  
 
5.1.3.2. The Consumer Protection Codes 
Information requirements and suitability assessment in the Consumer Protection Code 2012 
In 2012, the Central Bank of Ireland adopted the Consumer Protection Code 2012, based upon its 
power to draw up codes of practice, which it received by means of, inter alia, section 117(1) Central 
Bank Act 1989 and section 8H(1)(f) Consumer Protection Act 1995.1447 It replaced the Consumer 
                                                          
1441 Regulation 3(2)(b) S.I. 281/2010 and art. 2(3) Directive 2008/48. 
1442 Regulation 6 S.I. 281/2010. 
1443 Regulation 5 S.I. 142/2016. 
1444 Art. 3(3)(d) Directive 2014/17. 
1445 Regulation 3 S.I. 142/2016. 
1446 Cf. Barrett (2011), p. 73. 
1447 See Chapter 1 CPC 2012. The Central Bank Act 1989 is available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1989/act/16/enacted/en/index.html and section 8H was inserted in the 
Consumer Credit Act by means of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act 2003, which 
is available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2003/act/12/enacted/en/html (all last visited 4 April 2016). 
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Protection Code 2006, which has been adopted to ‘develop a practical and coherent set of rules and 
guidance with the overriding objective of ensuring the protection of consumers when dealing with 
financial services providers.’1448 The CPC 2012 contains general principles, common requirements for 
all kinds of activities, and requirements for specific activities.1449 The general principles include, for 
instance, the obligation to act in the best interests of the customers, and to comply in letter and spirit 
with the Consumer Protection Code.1450 The fifth chapter of the CPC 2012 stipulates requirements for 
knowing the consumer and assessing the suitability of a financial product or service in general, and 
credit in particular. The latter includes an affordability check. The requirements in this fifth chapter are 
considerably more detailed than in the Consumer Protection Code 2006.1451 
 
Provision 5.1 CPC 2012 obliges a lender to gather and record sufficient information from the consumer, 
before offering, recommending, arranging or providing a loan, if this information is relevant for 
assessing the suitability of the loan. 1452 This gathered information should contain details about the 
consumer’s personal circumstances, such as employment status, dependents, and known future 
changes. Also details about the financial situation of the consumer, including his income, debts and 
financial commitments need to be compiled. A lender must gather and maintain a record of details of 
any material changes to a consumer’s circumstances before offering a subsequent loan to the 
consumer.1453 A lender must endeavour to have the consumer certify the accuracy of the provided 
information.1454 A lender cannot hide behind the argument that a consumer refuses to provide the 
information: in that case a lender is obliged to abstain from offering a loan.1455 Yet, this last provision 
does not apply to credit falling within the scope of the MCD.1456 
 
Under the heading of suitability requirements, chapter 5 of the CPC 2012 contains both specific 
provisions about assessing the affordability of credit, and general provisions about assessing the 
suitability of all kinds of financial products and services. The provisions on the affordability assessment 
are relatively detailed and practical. First of all, the compiled information must be taken into account. 
                                                          
1448 Loughlin & Murphy (2007), p. 15. Cf. the Introduction in Chapter 1 of the Consumer Protection Code 2012; 
Murphy & O’Halloran (2012), p. 93. 
1449 Cf. Loughlin & Murphy (2007), p. 15. 
1450 Provisions 2.2 and 2.12 CPC 2012 (supra, footnote 1437). 
1451 Donnelly & White (2014), p. 398. 
1452 Provision 5.1 CPC 2012. Note that the level of the information must be appropriate in relation to the nature 
and complexity of the product or service. 
1453 Provision 5.3 CPC 2012. 
1454 Provision 5.5 CPC 2012. 
1455 Provision 5.4 CPC 2012. 
1456 See the addendum to the CPC 2012, published in July 2016 (supra, footnote 1437). 
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Secondly, there are specific conditions for the calculations. For example, it should be assessed whether 
a consumer at minimum is able to repay the loan if the interest rate will increase with 2 percentage 
points.1457 However, this rule does not apply in case of a mortgage with a fixed-rate period of at least 
five years.1458 Instead, this obligation is further specified for interest-only mortgages, variable interest 
rate mortgages, and mortgages with an introductory interest rate.1459 The CPC 2012 does not impose 
quantitative limits for the amount that can be borrowed by a consumer, nor a duty to deny credit in 
case of a negative outcome of the assessment. Nevertheless, for credit which is not covered by the 
MCD, the lender ‘must take account of the result of the affordability assessment when deciding 
whether a personal consumer is likely to be able to repay the debt for that amount and duration in the 
manner required under the credit agreement.’1460  
 
Besides the affordability assessment, a lender must conduct a suitability assessment. It must at least 
be examined whether the credit fits into the consumer’s needs, objectives and risk profile and whether 
he is able to repay the debt in the required manner.1461 If the consumer is offered several types of 
credit to choose from, the most suitable range of options must be included.1462 Prior to providing the 
credit, a lender must give the consumer a written statement that explains why this loan is suitable, and 
even the most suitable option. This statement must fulfil a range of conditions.1463 
 
Hence, most requirements in the Consumer Protection Code 2012 go further than these in the MCD, 
but it is the other way around for some other rules. For instance, the CPC 2012 requires taking other 
debts and financial commitments into account, as well as known future changes in personal 
circumstances. Moreover, detailed information must be gathered, and a lender is not allowed to 
provide a loan if a consumer refuses to provide this information. However, the CPC 2012 does not 
require taking expenses into account, like the MCD does. In addition, the duty to verify the information 
by means of a check by the consumer lags behind the obligation in the MCD, which requires 
appropriate verification of the information, including through ‘including through reference to 
independently verifiable documentation when necessary’.1464 Neither the MCD, nor the CPC 2012 
signal the need to include general economic conditions in the assessment. These rules show that there 
                                                          
1457 See provisions 5.9-5.14 CPC 2012 
1458 Provision 5.9(b) CPC 2012 
1459 Provisions 5.9, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.14 CPC 2012. 
1460 Provision 5.13 CPC 2012, and the addendum of July 2016 to the CPC 2012 (supra, footnote 1437). 
1461 Provision 5.16 CPC 2012. 
1462 Provision 5.17 CPC 2012. 
1463 Provision 5.19-5.23 CPC 2012. 
1464 Art. 20(1) Directive 2014/17. 
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is a world to win for the MCD. Overall, the CPC 2012 is more detailed, less vague and thus more 
protective than the MCD, except for – most importantly – the absence of a duty to deny credit.  
 
Information requirements and suitability assessment in the Consumer Protection Code for Licensed 
Moneylenders 
Moneylenders are lenders who supply short-term, highly expensive loans.1465 They are subject to a 
distinct code of practice, the Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders (CPCLM). An 
examination of this code of practice is relevant, because moneylending is common: in 2005, 10% of 
the Irish people above 20 years had been customer of a moneylender, while repayment problems 
occurred in 16% of the cases.1466 The Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders contains 
general principles, similar to those included in the CPC 2012, as well as specific requirements, among 
other things, concerning knowing the consumer and suitability. 
 
The requirements concerning knowing the consumer and assessing its suitability in the CPCLM are 
comparable to those in the CPC 2012, but much less specific. A moneylender is obliged to gather and 
record sufficient information from the consumer before providing credit. ‘The level of information 
gathered should be appropriate to the nature and complexity of the product or service being sought 
by the consumer, but must be to a level that allows the moneylender to provide a professional 
service.’1467 Information about material changes must be gathered and recorded before providing a 
subsequent loan. The moneylender must endeavour to have the consumer certify the accuracy of the 
provided information.1468 This code, unlike the CPC 2012, contains neither rules on the required details 
of this information, nor the obligation to abstain from lending if the consumer refuses to provide 
information. A moneylender must ensure that credit offered to a consumer is suitable for that 
consumer, in light of the available information.1469 No further conditions are attached to the suitability 
assessment. Prior to providing the credit, a lender must give the consumer a written statement that 
explains why the loan is suitable.1470   
 
These rules reveal a weighing of the interests of consumer protection and avoiding overburdening the 
moneylender. Consequently, these provisions of the Consumer Protection Code for Licensed 
                                                          
1465 Donnelly (2011), p. 130. The formal definition of a moneylender can be found in section 2 of the Consumer 
Credit Act 1995. 
1466 Donnelly (2011), p. 131. 
1467 Provision 2.10 Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders. 
1468 Provision 2.13 Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders. 
1469 Provision 2.15 Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders. 
1470 Provision 2.16 Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders. 
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Moneylenders offer far less protection than those in the CPC 2012. The rules are not determinate and 
complete, due to their vagueness and their lack of detail. 
 
The scope of the duties in the Consumer Protection Codes 
The Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders has a specific scope: moneylenders. 
Instead, the Consumer Protection Code 2012 has a broad scope. All regulated financial service 
providers, except for credit unions, are subject to the Code when providing credit to consumers in 
Ireland, apart from certain exceptions.1471 However, the CPC 2012 neither applies to credit with an 
amount of less than € 200, nor to hire purchase or consumer purchase agreements, or moneylending. 
Chapter 5 of the CPC 2012 does not apply to agreements falling within the scope of S.I. 281/2010, 
which transposes the Consumer Credit Directive, because the CCD is a maximum harmonisation 
directive.1472 Therefore, consumer protection actually diminishes, because the CPC 2012 offers more 
protection than the CCD.1473 Loans falling within the scope of the MCD are not exempted. Therefore, 
such loans are subject to two partly different and overlapping regimes. All in all, the scope of the CPC 
2012 in terms of persons governed is broad. However, its scope in terms of governed credit types is 
more restricted, especially due to the unfortunate, but unavoidable exclusion of loans falling within 
the scope of S.I. 281/2010.1474  
 
Finally, there is another specific exception to the requirements of chapter 5 of the CPC 2012, which 
depends on the actual circumstances under which the loan is taken out. These requirements do not 
apply if a consumer specified both the product and the lender by name, has not received any assistance 
from the regulated entity, and the loan is non-mortgage credit of maximum € 75,000.1475 Similarly, the 
provisions concerning knowing the consumer and suitability assessment in the Consumer Protection 
Code for Licensed Moneylenders do not apply if a consumer ‘has specified both the product and the 
moneylender and has not received any advice.’1476 So, when a lender acts as a takeaway facility for 
loans, these aspects of consumer protection are not offered. Although it makes sense to avoid 
overburdening of lenders who have no active role in the lending process, this means that the consumer 
                                                          
1471 Chapter 1 and 12 of the CPC 2012. For the definition of a regulated financial service provider, see sub-
section 4.2.1 and footnote 1219. 
1472 See the section Application in Chapter 1, and the beginning of chapter 5 of the CPC 2012. 
1473 Cf. Donnelly & White (2013), pp. 9-10. 
1474 Exempting all hire purchase agreements from the scope of the CPC 2012 was avoidable. Most, but not all of 
these agreements will fall within the scope of S.I. 281/2010 (cf. art. 2(2)(d) Directive 2008/48). 
1475 Provision 5.24 CPC 2012. 
1476 Provisions 2.10, 2.15 and 2.16 of the Consumer Protection Code for Licensed Moneylenders. 
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lacks protection against over-indebtedness. It assumes that consumer act rationally, without 
behavioural biases, which may not necessarily be the case. 
 
5.1.4. Determinacy and completeness of lending restrictions in German consumer law 
The CCD and – especially – the MCD transform the traditional view in German contract law that each 
consumer is responsible for his own actions, even if acting irrationally.1477 This explains why some 
German academics observe a tendency to paternalism in the MCD, among other things, in the shape 
of the duty to deny credit in case of a negative outcome of the creditworthiness assessment.1478  
 
The provisions of the CCD and MCD about assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness are implemented 
in the German civil code, the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), as well as in the banking act, the KWG.1479 
This has consequences not only for enforcement and the involved authorities, but also for the 
completeness of the rules. The motive for implementing these provisions not only in the KWG, but also 
in the BGB, is ensuring adequate consumer protection.1480 Including the rules in the BGB namely 
extends their scope beyond the lenders subject to the public supervisory regime of the KWG. It also 
enables private enforcement of these rules.1481 Moreover, BaFin has no mandate for consumer 
protection, as a result of which implementation in public law only would not suffice to ensure 
protection of consumers.1482 Nevertheless, in the first instance, art. 8 CCD was primarily implemented 
in the KWG, and only to a small extent in § 509 BGB. This latter provision covered only non-gratuitous 
financial assistance – which means a postponement of payment or a similar construction – and 
excluded consumer credit.1483 This changed with the implementation of the MCD in March 2016. Then, 
§ 509 BGB was repealed, and all types of non- gratuitous consumer credit and financial assistance are 
now governed both by the BGB and the KWG, while gratuitous types are covered by the BGB only.1484 
                                                          
1477 Rott et al. (2011), p. 163. Cf. Hofmann (2010), p. 1783. 
1478 Buck-Heeb (2015), p. 186. 
1479 The BGB, BGBl. I, 2002,42, 2909; BGBl. I, 2003 I, 738, is available at https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bgb (last visited 27 July 2016). Since 2001, Germany integrated EU consumer law normally in the 
BGB, instead of implementing it in separate acts, in order to ensure the unity and doctrinal purity of German 
law (Rott, 2012, pp. 1354, 1362, 1367). 
1480 See pages 62 and 96-97 in the Explanatory Memorandum for the act for implementing the MCD, available 
at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/059/1805922.pdf (last visited 16 March 2016). 
1481 Cf. section 5.2. 
1482 Hofmann (2010), p. 1784; Rott et al. (2011), p. 163; Barta & Braune (2014), p. 329. 
1483 See pages 95-96 in the Explanatory Memorandum of the proposal for the act for implementing the CCD, 
available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/116/1611643.pdf (last visited 8 March 2016); Rott et al. 
(2011), p. 163; Wösthoff (2010), p. 146. 
1484 Art. 1(32) and 1(28) Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Wohnimmobilienkreditrichtlinie und zur Änderung 
handelsrechtlicher Vorschriften. This act is published in the BGBl. I, 2016, 396, available online at 
http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl116s0396.pdf (last 
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5.1.4.1. The implementation of the rules about the creditworthiness assessment in private law  
At the basis of the German implementation of the rules about assessing a consumer’s 
creditworthiness, as included by the CCD and MCD, in the BGB lies a distinction of two, mutually 
exclusive, categories of non-gratuitous consumer loans.1485 These are general (unsecured) consumer 
loans and (secured) mortgage loans, respectively. For both categories of consumer loans a 
creditworthiness assessment is mandatory – combined with a duty to deny credit, depending on its 
outcome – before advancing the loan, and before significantly increasing its amount.1486 Since March 
2016, German law regarding general consumer loans goes further than the CCD requires, as the 
directive does not impose a duty to deny credit. The German legislature attaches this binding 
consequence to the creditworthiness assessment in order to achieve the purpose of protecting a 
consumer against over-indebtedness and bankruptcy.1487  
 
More specifically, a lender is only allowed to provide general consumer credit (or significantly increase 
the amount of credit) if there is no substantial doubt (keine erheblichen Zweifel) that the borrower will 
meet the obligations related to the credit contract. For mortgage credit, a lender is allowed to supply 
the loan (or significantly increase its amount) if the borrower will likely (wahrscheinlich) meet the 
obligations related to the credit contract.1488 The German legislature opts for another degree of 
required certainty about the prospect that a borrower will meet his obligations for general consumer 
credit than for mortgage credit, because of differences between the CCD and MCD. A higher criterion 
for mortgage credit is chosen, since the MCD imposes more substantial conditions on the methods for 
assessing a borrower’s creditworthiness, which enable a lender to predict the likelihood of default 
better than for general consumer credit.1489  
 
§ 505b BGB sets requirements concerning the basis for the creditworthiness assessment. If necessary, 
a creditworthiness assessment for a general consumer loan can be based upon information from the 
consumer and credit registries, if necessary.1490 There are no further requirements about the 
                                                          
visited 16 March 2016). The German academic literature was highly critical about the situation that the 
obligation to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness was not included in the BGB until March 2016: see e.g. 
Hofmann (2010); Rott et al. (2011); Herresthal (2014); Barta & Braune (2014); Rott (2015), p. 11, 14. 
1485 § 491(2)-(3) BGB. Cf. pages 61 and 75-76 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the act for implementing the 
MCD: supra, footnote 1480. 
1486 § 505a BGB. 
1487 See § 505a(1) BGB and pages 97-98 in the Explanatory Memorandum of the act for implementing the MCD 
(supra, footnote 1480). 
1488 § 505a BGB. 
1489 See page 98 in the Explanatory Memorandum of the act for implementing the MCD (supra, footnote 1480). 
1490 § 505b(1) BGB. 
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information, or the situations when consulting a credit registry is necessary. This creates risks, and 
might hamper the ability of the rules to protect consumers. In case of a mortgage loan, the lender must 
assess the creditworthiness of a consumer by means of a detailed examination of necessary, sufficient 
and appropriate information about income, expenses and other financial and economic circumstances 
of the borrower.1491 In case of a mortgage loan, this information must be appropriately verified, 
documented and maintained.1492 The Explanatory Memorandum clarifies that this information must 
be maintained as long as claims can be brought against the lender for assessing the creditworthiness 
incorrectly. In case of incorrect or prematurely destroyed information, a presumption of proof for the 
borrower can arise. If the documentation requirement is violated, this can even result in shifting the 
burden of proof to the benefit of the borrower, since this indicates that no creditworthiness 
assessment is conducted. Then, the lender must prove that he nevertheless conducted a 
creditworthiness assessment.1493 The creditworthiness assessment may not mainly (hauptsächlich) be 
based on the assumption that the house value will rise, or on the fact that the LTV ratio is lower than 
100%, unless the loan is meant for financing the construction or renovation of the house.1494 All this 
correctly implements the requirements of art. 18 and 20(1) MCD. The requirements of art. 20(2)-(4) 
MCD have been implemented in another act, namely in the Einführungsgesetzes zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuche (Introductory Act to the Civil Code).1495  
 
§ 505c BGB implements art. 19 MCD on the requirements for property valuation. It requires lenders to 
use reliable standards for property valuation and to ensure that both internal and external valuers are 
professionally competent and independent of the lending process in order to enable an objective 
assessment of the house value. 
 
All in all, the German implementation of the rules on assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness before 
advancing a mortgage loan in the BGB closely follows the requirements of art. 18-20 Directive 2014/17, 
without substantial differences that lead to another level of protection than the rules of the MCD. 
However, the German duty to deny credit related to the general consumer loans goes further than the 
                                                          
1491 § 505b(2) BGB. 
1492 § 505b(4) BGB. 
1493 See pages 99-100 in the Explanatory Memorandum of the act for implementing the MCD (supra, footnote 
1480). 
1494 § 505b(2) BGB. 
1495 This act (BGBl. I, 1994, 2494; BGBl. I, 1997, 1061) is available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgbeg/. 
Art. 20(2) MCD is implemented in section 247(1) of that act, whereas art. 20(3)-(4) MCD is implemented in 
section 247(13b)(2) of that act (see art. 2(3)(a) and 2(3)(n) Gesetz zur Umsetzung der 
Wohnimmobilienkreditrichtlinie und zur Änderung handelsrechtlicher Vorschriften (supra, footnote 1484) and 
pages 111 and 119 of the Explanatory Memorandum of this act (supra, footnote 1480)). 
5. Lending restrictions in consumer law 
250 
 
CCD requires. Consequently, it provides additional consumer protection. Simultaneously, this reduces 
the room for replacing consumer credit for mortgage credit by exploiting the much lighter rules of the 
CCD. The Bundesrat was critical about vague (unbestimmten) legal concepts as “likely” (wahrscheinlich) 
and “mainly” (hauptsächlich), which might result in either inability to prevent certain risks or too 
restrictive interpretations.1496 However, since these concepts emanate from the MCD, they are still 
used in the final act. The German legislature neither further clarify or specify these concepts, nor other 
concepts like income and expenses. In the first year after their implementation, the vagueness of the 
rules indeed provoked questions about their interpretation and about the factors which have to be 
taken into account when assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness.1497 In order to increase legal 
certainty, the legislature added a new provision to the BGB. It allows the Federal Ministries of Finance 
and Justice & Consumer Protection to jointly issue a regulation that clarifies (1) which factors are 
relevant for the creditworthiness assessment, and (2) which procedures have to be followed and how 
information must be collected and examined.1498 This only applies to a creditworthiness assessment in 
case of an application for mortgage credit. In principle, increased determinacy due to this guidance 
will increase the effectiveness of the rules by limiting room for circumvention.  
 
The scope of rules on the creditworthiness assessment in the BGB is wider than required under the 
CCD and MCD, as it includes all non-gratuitous consumer loan agreements concluded between an 
entrepreneur and a consumer, barring a few exceptions.1499 In line with the CCD and MCD, an 
entrepreneur is a natural or legal person acting in exercise of his or its trade, business or profession 
and a consumer is a natural person who enters into a legal transaction for purposes that predominantly 
are outside his trade, business or profession.1500 Unlike the CCD, the rules apply to unsecured loans 
above € 75,000.1501 Furthermore, the rules for general consumer loans are extended to non-gratuitous 
financial assistance, i.e. a postponement of payment or a similar (hire purchase) construction.1502 In 
                                                          
1496 See pages 12-13 of the Stellungnahme des Bundesrates und Gegenäußerung der Bundesregierung, available 
at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/062/1806286.pdf (last visited 24 March 2016). These concepts are 
incorporated in§ 505a BGB and § 505b(2) BGB. 
1497 Explanatory Memorandum to art. 6 Finanzaufsichtsrechtergänzungsgesetz (pp. 40-41) (supra, footnote 
1295). 
1498 § 505e BGB. Cf. § 18a(10a) KWG.  
1499 § 491 BGB. These exceptions are listed in § 491(2)(5) BGB and the last two sentences of section 491(3) BGB. 
For example, loans with a total amount below € 200 and student loans are excluded from these rules (on the 
latter, see Heider (2014)). 
1500 § 13-14 BGB. For more on the definition of a consumer, which was changed in the BGB with the 
implementation of the CCD, see Tonner (2013), p. 446. 
1501 The CCD allows member states to extent the scope of its rules to loans above € 75,000 (art. 2(2)(c) and 
recital 10 of the preamble of the CCD). 
1502 § 506(1) BGB. 
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addition, the rules governing the creditworthiness assessment are mutatis mutandis applied to 
gratuitous loans and financial assistance to consumers – i.e. credit with zero interest – in order to 
protect these consumers as well against over-indebtedness.1503 This is important, since more than half 
of German consumer credit consists of these types of agreements.1504 The CCD and MCD exclude this 
type of credit from their scope.1505 In first instance, equity release agreements were covered by the 
rules of the BGB, but in 2017 the act was amended to explicitly exclude them.1506 All in all, the German 
legislature opted for creating an encompassing scope for these rules. 
 
5.1.4.2. The implementation of the rules about the creditworthiness assessment in public law  
With the transposition of the MCD into German law, a new provision has been added to the banking 
act: § 18a KWG, which implements the obligation to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness in public 
law. § 18(2) KWG, which has been added to the KWG when the CCD was transposed, has been 
repealed.1507 
 
Substantially, § 18a KWG is largely comparable to §§ 505a-505c BGB, often using identical phrases.1508 
Some notable differences exist between the BGB and KWG with respect to the obligation to assess a 
consumer’s creditworthiness. Firstly, in the KWG, the obligation to verify the information which 
underlies the creditworthiness assessment, applies to all non-gratuitous consumer loans, and not only 
to mortgage loans.1509 Secondly, the period for which the procedures and information on which the 
creditworthiness assessment is based must be recorded is now explicitely stated: at least five years.1510 
The most important differences concern two aspects of the scope of the rules. § 18a KWG only applies 
                                                          
1503 § 514(1) and § 515 BGB. Cf. pages 144-145 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the changes to the proposal 
for the act implementing the MCD, available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/075/1807584.pdf 
(last visited 24 March 2016). 
1504 See page 32 of the statement of the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (2015), a German consumer 
organisation, before the Bundestag. 
1505 Art. 3(2)(c) Directive 2014/17. 
1506 Art. 6 Finanzaufsichtsrechtergänzungsgesetz and pp. 38-40 of its Explanatory Memorandum (supra, 
footnote 1295). 
1507 Art. 12(1)-(3) Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Wohnimmobilienkreditrichtlinie und zur Änderung 
handelsrechtlicher Vorschriften (supra, footnote 1484). 
1508 Compare, for instance, § 18a(1)-(2) KWG with § 505a BGB, § 18a(3) KWG with § 505b(1) BGB, § 18a(4) KWG 
with § 505b(2) BGB and § 18a(7) with § 505c BGB. Note that § 18a(6) KWG implements parts of art. 9 MCD 
about knowledge and competence requirements for staff. This is important in the context of supplying credit, 
but not directly related to the creditworthiness assessment, and thus not further taken into account in this 
study. 
1509 § 18a(3) KWG. Cf. § 505b(3) BGB, which only applies to mortgage loans. 
1510 § 18a(5) in combination with section 25a, sixth sentence, number 2 KWG. Cf. § 505b(4) BGB. 
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to credit institutions.1511 In addition, while the rules of the KWG cover non-consumer credit and 
financial assistance, they are not extended to gratuitous consumer credit and financial assistance, 
contrary to the rules of the BGB.1512 
 
Additional conditions related to the creditworthiness assessment that follow from the EBA guidelines 
have not been enshrined in law, neither in the KWG, nor in the BGB. It was not considered necessary 
to mention them, since § 7(b)(1) KWG already instructs BaFin to comply with EBA guidelines or to 
explain deviations from them.1513 Currently, it is not clear whether BaFin and German banks will comply 
with these specific EBA guidelines, or whether they will choose to explain non-compliance. 
 
5.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of lending 
restrictions in consumer law 
Traditionally, consumer law is enforced by private actors, either by means of litigating or arbitrating. 
Yet, during the last decades, public means of enforcing consumer law have increasingly been 
introduced. Hence, the intertwinement of public and private enforcement of European consumer law 
has received attention of a growing academic literature, together with other new – private – means of 
enforcement, such as collective legal action and out-of-court settlement.1514 Enforcement cultures in 
consumer law differ substantially between member states. Rott (2007) provides an example: ‘Germany 
has traditionally emphasized private enforcement of consumer rights by individuals, complemented 
by collective action and has a culture of litigation, whereas alternative dispute resolution is much more 
important in the Netherlands.’1515 
 
Private and public means of enforcing consumer law have their own advantages and disadvantages, 
which matter for their potential dissuasive effect. Firstly, the possibilities to detect violations differ. A 
consumer may lack information that a rule is breached.1516 For instance, he might not know that a 
                                                          
1511 See e.g. § 18a(1) KWG. For a definition of credit institutions, see § 1(1) KWG. § 18a KWG applies as well to 
branches of credit institutions established in another member state (§ 53b(3)(3) KWG). 
1512 § 18a(1) and 18a(9) KWG. 
1513 See page 33 of the Stellungnahme des Bundesrates und Gegenäußerung der Bundesregierung (supra, 
footnote 1496).  
1514 See e.g. Micklitz & Stadler (2006), Van Boom & Loos (2007), Betlem (2007), Cafaggi & Micklitz (2008, 2009), 
Cherednychenko (2014a,b,c, 2015a,b), Cortés (2015), Micklitz (2015) and Verheij (2015). 
1515 Rott (2007), p. 305. 
1516 Van den Bergh & Visscher (2008), p. 14. Cf. Micklitz (2013), who argues that a civil system for enforcing of 
consumer rights assumes that a ‘consumer is aware of his rights and knows that the judicial system is open to 
him.’ (p. 334). 
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creditworthiness assessment is mandatory. The more complex rules are, the more this becomes a 
problem. Instead, a public authority is aware of the rules and, generally, has investigative powers to 
detect violations.1517 However, when a regime of public enforcement is in place, a consumer might lack 
incentives to report violations to the public authority, due to the absence of the opportunity to receive 
damages. All in all, information availability favours public enforcement. However, the strengths of 
public and private enforcement can be combined when allowing public authorities to grant 
compensation, or when enabling the use of publically gathered information in courts that award 
damages.1518 
 
Secondly, the incentives to act against violations differ, affecting the likelihood that lenders can get 
away with violations. In case of private enforcement, the consumer is incentivised to act by the 
prospect of receiving damages. However, required efforts, litigation fees, and the risk that the loser 
must pay all the litigation costs can provide strong reasons to refrain from starting a procedure.1519 
Some of these disadvantages can be tackled by allowing collective legal action, in which costs and 
efforts can be shared, or out-of-court settlement, which reduces costs and efforts.1520 However, free-
rider behaviour may occur: consumers might choose to wait until others act.1521 Costs are a smaller 
obstacle when a public authority is responsible for enforcement. However, this authority might be 
prone to regulatory capture, especially if enforcement powers are highly concentrated in one 
agency.1522 This can lead to inaction.1523 
 
Thirdly, the dissuasiveness of the available measures differs between private and public means of 
enforcement. Private enforcement procedures usually provide for remedies instead of sanctions. Rott 
(2007) characterises the difference between these two concepts: ‘Remedies deal with the 
enforcement of rights that are conferred on individuals (…). In contrast, sanctions look at the 
obligations or prohibitions imposed on a person or an entity [and] (…) aim to ensure that the violator 
is dissuaded from non-compliance.’1524 Normally, remedies are corrective and thus not higher than the 
                                                          
1517 Weber & Faure (2015), pp. 529-531. 
1518 Ibidem, p. 545. 
1519 Faure et al. (2009), pp. 172-173, 181; Cherednychenko (2014a), pp. 53-54; Weber & Faure (2015), p. 531. 
1520 Weber & Faure (2015), p. 531; Van den Bergh & Visscher (2008), pp. 14-19. 
1521 Van den Bergh & Visscher (2008), pp. 16, 21. 
1522 If enforcement powers are highly concentrated in one agency, regulatees need to target only one agency 
with their efforts to capture it.  
1523 Weber & Faure (2015), pp. 540-541; Cafaggi & Micklitz (2009), p. 406. 
1524 Rott (2007), p. 307. 
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suffered loss.1525 Then, a lender who violates certain provisions is never worse off. In contrast, 
administrative enforcement might enable the imposition of highly deterrent fines.1526 
 
Finally, public enforcement enables a wider range of moments to interfere with a lender’s behaviour: 
private enforcement takes place ex post, whereas public enforcement can be proactive too.1527 
 
Concluding, private enforcement by borrowers can put pressure on lenders to comply with their 
obligations, especially if collective legal action or out-of-court settlement is possible. Nevertheless, a 
system of public enforcement increases the probability of detecting and acting against violations of 
consumer law. Furthermore, sanctions are likely to be more deterrent than remedies. However, a lot 
depends on the actual legal details and, particularly, the extent to which capture can be prevented.  
 
5.2.1. The EU rules on enforcing lending restrictions in consumer law 
Both the CCD and MCD contain some rules on enforcement. Member states are required to lay down 
sanctions for infringements of the national provisions adopted on the basis of the directives. The 
directives demand that these sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, but leave it up to 
the member states which kind of penalties are available, and how they are imposed.1528 This reflects 
the principle of effectiveness and the system of decentralised enforcement of EU law, with procedural 
autonomy for the member states.1529 The CJEU further ruled that to this end, the principle of sincere 
cooperation requires that ‘Member States must ensure in particular that infringements of EU law are 
penalised under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable 
to infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance’.1530 This is the core of the principle 
of equivalence. Hence, the type of sanctions and their potential effectiveness may vary a lot among 
member states. Sanctions can be part of private, public or criminal law.1531 
 
                                                          
1525 Cherednychenko (2014a), p. 60. 
1526 Weber & Faure (2015), p. 535. 
1527 Cherednychenko (2014a), p. 53-54; Weber & Faure (2015), p. 534. 
1528 Art. 23 Directive 2008/48 and art. 38(1) Directive 2014/17. 
1529 Cf. Leczykiewicz (2012), pp. 51, 53-54; Reich (2014), pp.344-347. See also, supra, footnote 91. 
1530 Case C-565/12 LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v. Kalhan [2014], para. 44. In addition, the CJEU stated that ‘the 
severity of penalties must be commensurate with the seriousness of the infringements for which they are 
imposed, in particular by ensuring a genuinely dissuasive effect, while respecting the general principle of 
proportionality’ (para. 45). Cf. Case C-68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) [1989] ECR 2965, para. 24. 
1531 Rott (2007), pp. 317-318. 
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However, the MCD – contrary to the CCD – includes some other requirements related to the nature of 
the sanctions. Art. 5(1) of this directive instructs member states to designate public authorities or 
bodies – recognised or empowered by national law – for ensuring the application and enforcement of 
the MCD. Art. 5(5) Directive 2014/17 states that these authorities shall exercise their powers directly 
under their own authority, under the supervision of the judicial authorities, or by application to courts 
which are competent to grant the necessary decision. So, the MCD mainly opts for public enforcement, 
but enables enforcement through the system of private law as well, by creating the possibilities to 
exercise the enforcement powers under supervision of the judicial authorities or by application to 
courts.1532 Still, even then public authorities or bodies have a role. On top of that, the authorities that 
apply and enforce the MCD must have the right to publish the imposition of any administrative 
sanction.1533 This is a far-reaching right, since in most jurisdictions public disclosure is only possible for 
severe penalties, such as an administrative fine. 
 
In addition, both the CCD and MCD contain provisions that require member states to ensure that 
appropriate and effective complaints and redress procedures for the out-of-court settlement of 
consumer disputes are in place.1534 Out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes is (partly) governed 
by other EU legal acts as well, but analysing these legal acts goes beyond the scope of this study.1535 
Whether out-of-court settlement procedures need to be available when a lender violated his duty to 
assess a consumer’s creditworthiness, hinges on the fact whether a borrower can invoke a breach of 
this obligation against the lender. This depends on the national implementation of this duty in either 
private or public law. The CCD and MCD do, namely, not explicitly reveal whether the obligation to 
assess a consumer’s creditworthiness has a private or public law character.1536  
 
However, not everyone shares this last conclusion. The question of whether EU law gives a consumer 
the right to an individual private law remedy if the obligation to assess his creditworthiness is breached 
                                                          
1532 See recital 80 of the preamble of the MCD: ‘This could enable Member States, in particular where 
provisions of this Directive were transposed into civil law, to leave the enforcement of these provisions to the 
abovementioned bodies and the courts.’ 
1533 Art. 38(2) Directive 2014/17. This provision adds one exception to the general possibility of publishing the 
imposed sanction, namely ‘unless such disclosure would seriously jeopardise the financial markets or cause 
disproportionate damage to the parties involved.’ 
1534 Art. 24(1) Directive 2008/48 and art. 39(1) Directive 2014/17. 
1535 Cf. Micklitz (2015), who acknowledges their complexity (pp. 498, 508-509). The most relevant legal acts are 
those on online and alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, Regulation 524/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, OJ 2013, L 165/1 and Directive 2013/11/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, OJ 2013, L 165/63. For a discussion of these legal acts, 
see Reich (2014) and Cortés (2015). Cf. Wilman (2016). 
1536 Cf. Ferretti (2015), p. 366. 
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by the lender, was especially debated in the German academic literature after the transposition of the 
CCD.1537 On the one hand, among others, Rott et al. (2011) answer this question in the affirmative. 
They argue that the aim of the creditworthiness assessment is to provide legal protection of individual 
consumers.1538 Henceforth, a consumer needs to have the right of an individual remedy, even though 
the provisions on the creditworthiness assessment are only written in terms of a duty of the lender. 
On the other hand, several scholars argue that both directives leave it up to the member states how 
to enforce these obligations, as long as sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.1539 This 
view is supported by the fact that the decision of the CJEU in Case C-565/12 does not indicate 
otherwise, even though it confirms that the ‘creditor’s obligation (…) to assess the borrower’s 
creditworthiness is intended to protect consumers against the risks of over-indebtedness and 
bankruptcy’.1540 Moreover, recital 57 of the preamble of the MCD states that member states should 
be able to monitor compliance with this obligation by means of oversight by public authorities.1541 
Hence, this directive surely does not take private enforcement as the standard. Finally, ensuring the 
interests of consumers does not necessarily require and thus suppose a right to an individual remedy: 
this aim can be attained by public means as well. So, this discussion confirms that art. 8 CCD and art. 
18-20 MCD do not reveal whether they contain obligations of public or private nature, and that it is 
thus up to the member states to choose whether a consumer has a right to an individual remedy if 
these provisions are breached.  
 
5.2.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of lending restrictions in 
Dutch consumer law 
The sanctions which can be imposed in the Netherlands for a violation of art. 4:34 Wft and the 
legislation based upon this provision have already been examined in sub-sections 4.1.2 and 3.2.2.1 of 
this study. The rules are mainly enforced by administrative measures, but if a lender violates them, 
private enforcement is possible as well, based upon a breach of a duty of care. Consumers can both 
litigate or arbitrate. Dutch law provides for publication of an imposed administrative fine or a forfeited 
                                                          
1537 See e.g. Rott et al. (2011); Herresthal (2014); Barta & Braune (2014); Rott (2015), p. 11, 14; Buck-Heeb 
(2015), pp. 180-182; Olmor (2016). 
1538 For the CCD, they base this inter alia on recital 26 of its preamble and that the obligation to assess a 
consumer’s creditworthiness would be included in the Capital Requirements Directive, if it was a duty of 
prudential nature (Rott et al. (2011), pp. 165-168). 
1539 Herresthal (2014), p. 499; Buck-Heeb (2015), p. 181; Omlor (2016), pp. 5-8.   
1540 Case C-565/12 LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v. Kalhan [2014], para. 42. See further para. 43-45. 
1541 Omlor (2016), p. 6. Omlor also argues that a systemic approach shows that art. 18-20 MCD are part of 
another chapter than the chapter which confers rights on individuals. 
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incremental penalty payment.1542 It has been concluded in the aforementioned sub-sections that the 
available enforcement measures allow proportionate and dissuasive enforcement. 
 
5.2.3. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of lending restrictions in Irish 
consumer law 
5.2.3.1. Sanctions for violations of the implemented rules of the CCD and the MCD  
In Ireland, administrative, civil and criminal enforcement of the duty to assess a consumer’s 
creditworthiness is possible. The rules on penalties in S.I. 281/2010 and S.I. 142/2016, which 
implement the CCD and MCD, respectively, are largely similar and will, therefore, be discussed jointly. 
Firstly, the Central Bank of Ireland can use the same administrative penalties as it has at its disposal 
for enforcing the LTI and LTV limits.1543 These powers have already been discussed in sub-section 4.2.2, 
with a reference to sub-section 3.2.2.2.1544 Publication of imposed administrative sanctions is 
mandatory.1545  
 
Violations of the rules on creditworthiness assessment may have consequences under civil law for both 
lenders and consumers. The CBI can namely require financial service providers to make appropriate 
redress to their customers, if they have suffered, are suffering, or will suffer loss or damage due to 
widespread or regular (1) violations of the rules on creditworthiness assessment or (2) supply of 
unsuitable loans to consumers.1546 This redress cannot ‘exceed the amount of the loss suffered or 
anticipated to be suffered, together (where appropriate) with interest at such rate as is so 
specified.’1547 This can be multi-party redress, which fills a gap in the Irish system, because although 
multi-party court cases are possible, they are often cumbersome, and the judgment is non-binding for 
parties which were not involved.1548 
 
                                                          
1542 Supra, sub-section 3.2.2.1. 
1543 S.I. 281/2010 and S.I. 142/2016 have been added to the list of Statutory Instruments for which the CBI is 
allowed to use its sanctioning powers when their provisions are contravened (supra, footnote 779).  
1544 The adminstrative measures for penalising violations of the rules on creditworthiness assessment are 
identical to those for penalising violations of the LTI and LTI limits, with the same relevant differences 
compared to sanctions for penalising violations of the rules on capital requirements.  
1545 While regulation 39(6) S.I. 142/2016 suggest that the CBI is allowed to publically disclose any administrative 
sanction which it it imposes under the Central Bank Act 1942, section 33BC Central Bank Act 1942 obliges the 
CBI to disclose sanctions which it imposes, albeit in the form and manner which it considers appropriate. 
1546 Section 43 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013.  
1547 Section 43(3) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1548 Breslin (2015), pp. 15-16. Cf. Donnelly (2015), p. 80. 
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Moreover, section 44 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 enables a customer to 
start a procedure for damages, if he suffered losses or damages due to a violation of the rules on 
creditworthiness assessment.1549 This provision makes it easier for consumers to claim damages, as 
Breslin (2015) elucidates: ‘A plaintiff can (…) avoid the usual requirements in a professional negligence 
claim to have an expert report before serving a statement of claim. Furthermore, in particular cases a 
breach of regulatory duty may very well be easier to prove than a breach of a duty of care.’1550 The 
latter is particularly true regarding the assessment of a consumer’s creditworthiness, since Irish civil 
law does not impose the duty (of care) on a lender to advise a borrower about the prudence of taking 
out a loan, nor does it recognise a duty to act in the consumer’s best interest.1551 Furthermore, the tort 
of reckless lending does not exists in Ireland.1552 Only if a lender also acts as adviser, a duty arises to 
give advice with reasonable care.1553 It is thus difficult to claim damages for irresponsible lending by 
means of purely civil law. Due to this new enforcement mechanism, it is less likely that a lender can 
violate the duty to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness without having to pay damages afterwards. 
This enhances the dissuasiveness of private enforcement, and, consequently, adds an incentive for 
lenders to comply with the rules on creditworthiness assessment.  
 
Consumers can as well use out-of-court settlement procedures to claim damages. Regulation 40(1) S.I. 
142/2016 explicitly designates the task of settling disputes outside the court to the Financial Services 
Ombudsman.1554 As far as possible, the Financial Services Ombudsman must resolve complaints by 
mediation, but he can adjudicate otherwise.1555 The Central Bank Act 1942 allows the Financial Services 
Ombudsman to make a wide range of directions towards a lender who violated the rules on the 
creditworthiness assessment, including demanding a change of his conduct or a payment of 
compensation.1556 The maximum compensation which the Financial Services Ombudsman can direct is 
€ 250,000.1557 This certainly exceeds the benefits that a lender can obtain by breaching the rules on 
                                                          
1549 Section 44 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
1550 Breslin (2015), p. 16. 
1551 Donnelly (2015), pp. 225, 297; Breslin (2013), pp. 205-206. 
1552 Cf. sub-section 5.1.3, in particular footnote 1439. 
1553 Breslin (2013), pp. 205-207; Donnelly (2015), pp. 295-296.  
1554 The Financial Services Ombudsman possesses this power also without this regulation, based upon the 
Central Bank Act 1942, which allows handling consumer’ complaints related to any financial service provided by 
a financial service provicer. See in particular sections 57BB(a), 57BK(1)-(2) and 57BX(1) Central Bank Act 1942. 
1555 Sections 57CA and 57BB(a) Central Bank Act 1942. Cf. the judgment of the Supreme Court in J & E Davy v. 
Financial Services Ombudsman [2010] IESC 30. The provisions on the Financial Services Ombudsman are 
inserted in the Central Bank Act 1942 by the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Act 2004, 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2004/act/21/enacted/en/print.html.  
1556 Section 57CI(4) Central Bank Act 1942. 
1557 Regulation 3(b) S.I. 190/2005, which is available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2005/si/190/made/en/print.  
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creditworthiness when supplying credit to a consumer. The Financial Services Ombudsman enjoys a 
wide discretion in determining which sanction is appropriate, and hence proportionate.1558 The 
Financial Services Ombudsman cannot direct an order for collective redress.1559 
 
Finally, lenders who breach provisions regarding the creditworthiness assessment can face criminal 
sanctions, since both Statutory Instruments criminalise breaching these provisions, except for the 
valuation requirements in regulation 20 of the S.I. 142/2016.1560 The magnitude of a criminal penalty 
depends on the procedure in which the offender is convicted. The Irish system distinguishes between 
summary and indictable offences. Summary convictions are meant for minor offences, and are given 
in a court with a judge, but without a jury, whereas indictable convictions are given by a court with a 
judge and a jury.1561 A summary trial is also meant to be relatively expeditious and informal.1562 The 
maximum penalty in a summary conviction for breaches of the rules on the creditworthiness 
assessment is a fine of € 4,000 or € 5,000 – for breaching the rules of the CCD and MCD, respectively – 
a year imprisonment, or both.1563 Both Statutory Instruments lay down a maximum penalty on 
conviction on indictment of a fine of €100,000, three years imprisonment, or both.1564 The Statutory 
Instruments also provide for fines for each day that a lender continues to breach the rules for which 
he is convicted.1565 Individuals working for a lender breaching the rules on the creditworthiness 
assessment can be punished with the same sanctions, if their consent, connivance, approval or wilful 
neglect can be proven.1566 Consenting means being aware of the offence and agreeing with it, whereas 
connivancing means tacitly agreeing with it. In turn, wilful neglect entails an intentional inaction or 
omission, while knowing that this inaction results in the breach.1567  
                                                          
1558 According to the High Court, the Financial Services Ombudsman should be given ‘appropriate latitude (…) in 
determining what the appropriate remedy is in the circumstances of each individual case.’ (Square Capital Ltd 
v. Financial Services Ombudsman [2009] IEHC 407). 
1559 Donnelly (2012), p. 257. For more about the Financial Services Ombudsman, see also Donnelly (2012), as 
well as https://www.financialombudsman.ie.  
1560 Regulation 11(3) S.I. 281/2010 and regulations 19(10) and 21(8) S.I. 142/2016. 
1561 Cf. art. 38.2 and 38.5 of the Irish Constitution; O’Donnell (2006), pp. 15-16;  
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/justice/criminal_law/criminal_offences/classification_of_crimes_in_crim
inal_cases.html (last visited 6 August 2016). 
1562 Clune v. Director of Public Prosecution [1981] ILRM 17. 
1563 Regulation 25(1)(a) S.I. 281/2010 in combination with sections 3 and 5(2) of Fines Act 2010, No. 8/2010, 
which is available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/act/8/enacted/en/print.html; Regulation 39(1)(a) 
S.I. 142/2016 in combination with sections 3 and 4(1) of Fines Act 2010. 
1564 Regulation 25(1)(b) S.I. 281/2010 and regulation 39(1)(b) S.I. 142/2016. 
1565 Regulation 25(2) S.I. 281/2010 and regulation 39(2) S.I. 142/2016. 
1566 Regulation 25(3)-(4) S.I. 281/2010 and regulation 39(3) S.I. 142/2016. 
1567 Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2016), pp. 81-82. 
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Both Statutory Instruments provide the CBI with the right to prosecute violations of the provisions 
regarding the creditworthiness assessment by means of summary proceedings.1568 Summary 
proceedings are a fast-track procedure at the High Court, with – in principle – only written 
pleadings.1569 Fast procedures help to alleviate an otherwise cumbersome criminal process, and hence 
increase the probability that a lender faces a sanction. Consequently, this option adds to the 
dissuasiveness of the regime. 
 
All in all, the abundance of available sanctions helps to enable proportionate and dissuasive 
enforcement. Lenders can face a range of administrative penalties that are dissuasive and can be 
proportionate in relation to violations of the rules on creditworthiness assessment.1570 The CBI can 
attach civil consequences to violations of the obligation to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness by 
granting consumers redress. This power of the CBI creates an efficient system of collective redress, 
which might be threatening to lenders.1571 Civil enforcement by borrowers is facilitated by section 44 
Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. Since the risks of receiving administrative 
sanctions and paying damages do not exclude each other – quite the contrary – lenders face double 
incentives to abide by the rules. Moreover, both the CBI and consumers can put pressure on lenders 
to comply with the rules. Finally, the possibility of criminal prosecution – with imprisonment as 
potential result – on top of the enforcement pyramid, adds to the dissuasiveness of the enforcement 
regime. 
 
5.2.3.2. Sanctions for violations of the rules of the Consumer Protection Code 2012  
The enforcement possibilities for the Consumer Protection Code – which is sometimes described as 
soft law1572 – are somewhat different from those for S.I. 281/2010 and 142/2016. Nonetheless, the 
available administrative enforcement measures are far from soft. Because section 33AN Central Bank 
Act 1942 penalises contravening a code of practice, the CBI can use the same administrative sanctions 
to enforce the Consumer Protection Code as it can use to ensure compliance with rules enshrined in 
                                                          
1568 Regulation 25(5) S.I. 281/2010 and regulation 39(4) S.I. 142/2016. 
1569 See http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/justice/civil_law/originating_summons.html (last visited 7 April 
2016). 
1570 Cf. sub-sections 4.2.2 and 3.2.2.2. 
1571 For merits and demerits of collective legal action, cf. footnote 1520.  
1572 See e.g. Kenna & Lynch-Shally (2014), p. 304. The High Court characterises codes of conducts adopted by 
the CBI as ‘not entirely a species of "soft" law, i.e., purely precatory statements not susceptible of legal 
enforcement’ (Irish Life and Permanent v. Financial Services Ombudsman [2012] IEHC 367, para. 55; Ryan v. 
Danske Bank [2014] IEHC 236, para. 14. Cf. Stepstone Mortgage Funding v. Fitzell [2012] IEHC 142, para. 5.2). 
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hard law.1573 Indirectly, criminal enforcement is possible too. The Central Bank of Ireland can issue a 
direction in writing which demands observance of the Consumer Protection Code. Not complying with 
this direction is a criminal offence and can lead to fines of € 2,000 and € 40,000, in case of, respectively, 
a summary conviction and a conviction on indictment.1574 This does not really add anything valuable 
to the arsenal of enforcement measures.  
 
Civil enforcement of the Consumer Protection Code 2012 is difficult, and case law is still developing. In 
several cases, questions about the civil consequences of violations of the Consumer Protection Code 
have been raised. According to the High Court, the status of a code of practice in civil law is not yet 
clear.1575 Although civil law consequences were attached several times to violations of a code of 
practice, this concerns only cases where the court had the discretionary power to allow or deny a 
financial service provider to take possession of a property.1576 The High Court has made clear that 
breaches of obligations under the Consumer Protection Code do not render the contract void, nor 
relieves borrowers from their (repayment) obligations, or lenders from their rights.1577 Hence, 
violations of the Consumer Protection Code by a lender do not entitle borrowers to relief, but offer 
them at best a defence against lenders who start proceedings.1578 In itself, this is not dissuasive enough 
to scare lenders off from violating the provisions of the Consumer Protection Code, but it creates an 
additional risk for the lender. Furthermore, while the CBI can grant redress to borrowers, based upon 
section 43 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013, section 44 of this act – which enables 
a customer to start a procedure for damages if he suffered losses – does not apply to the Consumer 
Protection Code.1579 
 
So, fewer enforcement measures exist for ensuring compliance with the Consumer Protection Code 
than for guaranteeing compliance with the obligations to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness, 
                                                          
1573 Cf. Loughlin & Murphy (2007), p. 16; Kenna & Lynch-Shally (2014), p. 306. 
1574 Section 117(3)-(4) Central Bank Act 1989, as amended in Schedule 3 of the Central Bank and Financial 
Services Authority of Ireland Act 2004. Cf. Ryan v. Danske Bank [2014] IEHC 236, para. 13. 
1575 Irish Life & Permament v. Duff [2013] IEHC 43, para. 54-72; Allied Irish Bank v. O'Brien [2015] IEHC 260; 
Ryan v. Danske Bank [2014] IEHC 236, para. 14. Cf. Kenna & Lynch-Shally (2014), pp. 314-315. 
1576 Irish Life & Permament v. Duff [2013] IEHC 43, para. 72; Ryan v. Danske Bank [2014] IEHC 236, para. 19-21. 
Cf. Stepstone Mortgage Funding v. Fitzell [2012] IEHC 142; Bank of Ireland v. Quinn [2016] IECA 30, para. 49-53. 
1577 Zurich Bank v. McConnon [2011] IEHC 75; Freeman v. Bank of Scotland [2014] IEHC 284, para. 17-18; Allied 
Irish Bank v. O'Brien [2015] IEHC 260, para. 40, 43. 
1578 Ryan v. Danske Bank [2014] IEHC 236, para. 22. 
1579 Section 43 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 allows the CBI to grant redress in case of a 
prescribed contravention, and a breach of the Consumer Protection Code qualifies as such (section 33AN 
Central Bank Act 1942). Section 44 Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013 enables a customer to 
start a procedure for damages if he suffered losses due to non-compliance with financial services legislation, 
and the Consumer Protection Code does not qualify as such.  
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pursuant to the transposed rules of the CCD and MCD. Criminal enforcement does not add new threats, 
whereas civil enforcement is difficult. Still, the administrative penalties are strong enough to deter, 
and offer enough proportionate enforcement possibilities.1580 
 
5.2.4. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of lending restrictions in 
German consumer law 
The transposition of the CCD into German law provoked an interesting debate among German 
academics about the available sanctions for penalising a breach of the rules on assessing a consumer’s 
creditworthiness.1581 One of the debated issues was whether the then available sanctions were 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and fulfilled the effet utile principle. There was broad 
agreement that the answer to this question was negative.1582 The German legislature responded to the 
criticism by significantly changing the sanctioning regime with the implementation of the MCD. 
Currently, German law provides for sanctions in both the BGB and the KWG. 
 
5.2.4.1. Sanctions in private law 
The BGB explicates the sanctions which a lender can face if violating the rules on the creditworthiness 
assessment, as contained in the civil code. In case of a breach the credit agreement is not void.1583 
Instead, together with the transposition of the substantive rules on the assessment of a consumer’s 
creditworthiness, specific sanctions have been introduced in the civil code, in § 505d BGB.  
 
§ 505d(1) BGB introduces two coexisting remedies for the consumer – which are penalties for the 
lender – which can only be applied if the borrower would be denied the loan if a (correct) 
creditworthiness assessment would have taken place.1584 These are (1) an interest rate reduction and 
(2) the right for the borrower to terminate the credit agreement, without being subject to a 
prepayment penalty. If the interest rate is reduced, it is diminished to either the prevailing market 
                                                          
1580 Cf. sub-sections 4.2.2 and 3.2.2.2. 
1581 See e.g. Hofmann (2010); Rott et al. (2011); Herrestal (2014); Barta & Braune (2014); Rott (2015), p. 11, 14; 
Buck-Heeb (2015), pp. 180-182; Olmor (2016). 
1582 See e.g. Hofmann (2010), pp. 1784-1785; Herresthal (2014), p. 500; Barta & Braune (2014), p. 329; Buck-
Heeb (2015), p. 181. A second debated issue was whether a consumer has the right to an individual private law 
remedy when the obligation to assess his creditworthiness is breached by the lender. This has already been 
discussed in sub-section 5.2.1. 
1583 See page 100 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the act for implementing the MCD (supra, footnote 
1480). 
1584 § 505d(1) BGB. It is not relevant whether the borrower actually got into arrears (cf. page 101 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum for the act for implementing the MCD). 
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interest rate for Pfandbriefe with a term equal to the fixed-rate-period of the loan, or to the three 
months interbank interest rate (Euribor). The credit agreement must stipulate which option applies. A 
borrower can also claim reduction of already paid interest.1585 The Explanatory Memorandum 
elucidates that this penalty is based upon the idea that the lender should not profit from his 
misbehaviour, and the borrower should not enjoy the advantages of a loan for free. Therefore, the 
interest rate is reduced to the rate of an almost riskless investment. Simultaneously, this allows the 
lender to still cover the costs of extending the loan. Hence, this penalty should provide the lender with 
incentives to conduct a correct creditworthiness assessment, and the borrower with an individual 
remedy. It was considered disproportionate to penalise the lender with a total loss of the entitlement 
to the interest, since it can be difficult to conduct a correct creditworthiness assessment, while right 
and wrong are not necessarily obvious in this situation. The rationale behind the right of the borrower 
to terminate the credit agreement without being subject to a prepayment penalty is enabling him to 
benefit from possibly decreased market interest rates, by refinancing the loan.1586 
 
§ 505d(2) BGB attaches another consequence to a lender’s failure to assess a consumer’s 
creditworthiness correctly. A lender cannot claim breach of duty (Pflichtverletzung) by the borrower, 
if the borrower cannot meet the obligations related to the credit agreement due to circumstances, 
which would have precluded the extension of the loan if a (correct) creditworthiness assessment would 
have taken place. Pflichtverletzung is a core notion in the German law of obligations, which needs to 
be proven in order to be able to claim damages for non-performance or delayed performance.1587 So, 
this sanction means that the lender cannot claim interest for late payment, certain legal costs 
(Rechtsverfolgungskosten), and damages related to the arrears. However, a lender can still terminate 
the contract if a borrower is in arrears, insofar as this right is not limited by § 499(3) BGB.1588  
 
§ 505d(1)-(2) BGB do not apply if the incorrect creditworthiness assessment is a result of the borrower 
who intentionally or with gross negligence withheld information or supplied false information.1589 § 
                                                          
1585 Page 102 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the act for implementing the MCD. 
1586 Pages 101-102 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the act for implementing the MCD. 
1587 §§ 280-286 BGB. For an introduction to and discussions of the concept of Pflichtverletzung, see e.g. 
Krajewski (2003), Benicke & Hellwig (2014) and the discussion of §§ 280-286 BGB in the second volume of the 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: Säcker et al. (2016). 
1588 See further page 103 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the act for implementing the MCD. This right to 
terminate the contract is governed by § 490 BGB and § 499 BGB. § 499(3) BGB implements art. 18(4) MCD, 
which obliges member states to ‘ensure that where a creditor concludes a credit agreement with a consumer 
the creditor shall not subsequently cancel or alter the credit agreement to the detriment of the consumer on 
the grounds that the assessment of creditworthiness was incorrectly conducted.’ 
1589 § 505b(3) BGB. Cf. art. 18(4) and 20(3) Directive 2014/17. 
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505d BGB applies as well to gratuitous loans and financial assistance to consumers, except for the 
sanction of reducing interest rates.1590 
 
All in all, it can be concluded that this civil sanctioning regime has created the possibility to impose 
proportionate sanctions, which it explicitly intended. The remedies reduce financial costs for the 
borrower, which may be very helpful for a consumer which apparently is not creditworthy. The 
measures also hurt the bank, which is necessary to discourage non-compliance, but not excessively, 
for instance, by reducing the interest rate until zero. The latter would go further than necessary. This 
also means that it is debatable whether the sanctions are dissuasive. The interest rate reduction can 
never put a lender worse off compared to abstaining from lending, except for the opportunity costs 
(alternative investment possibilities). At the same time, the probability of receiving this sanction is 
certainly not 100%, and depends on the knowledge of the consumer that a rule was breached and his 
willingness to litigate. Nevertheless, the other two sanctions can have negative consequences for a 
lender. Therefore, the combined effect of the three sanctions is likely dissuasive. The lender namely 
faces the risks of forgoing profits due to the reduced interest rate, losses due the termination of the 
credit agreement, and the inability to claim breach of duty if a borrower cannot meet his obligations. 
Especially this latter sanction was considered significant by German experts.1591 Yet, Knops (2015) 
identified a pitfall in the application of this sanction: the borrower needs to prove the causality 
between his inability to meet his obligations and the lender’s failure to conduct a (correct) 
creditworthiness assessment. 1592 This might be difficult to prove, which reduces the likelihood that 
this sanction is imposed upon a lender. At least, a merit of this last sanction is that it is not dependent 
on the consumer’s knowledge about the violation, and his willingness to start a court procedure.    
 
The degree of dissuasiveness is affected by other factors as well. A lender in breach of his duty to 
conduct a (correct) creditworthiness assessment does not only face the risk that an individual 
consumer starts to litigate. German consumers can also use out-of-court dispute settlement 
procedures – i.e. arbitration – when a lender has breached the obligation to assess the consumer’s 
creditworthiness.1593 This lowers the bar for a consumer to act when a lender breached his obligations, 
                                                          
1590 Supra, footnote 1503. Note that there is no interest paid for gratuitous loans and financial assistance. 
1591 Knops (2015), p. 12; Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (2015), p. 23.  
1592 Knops (2015), p. 13. 
1593 § 14(1) Unterlassungsklagengesetzes (UKlaG) (Injunctions Act), BGBl. I, 2002, 3422, 4346, available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/uklag/. Cf. art. 6 of the Gesetz zur Umsetzung der 
Wohnimmobilienkreditrichtlinie und zur Änderung handelsrechtlicher Vorschriften and pages 122-123 of the 
Explanatory Memorandum for this act (supra, footnotes 1484 and 1480). Note that art. 39 Directive 2014/17 
requires member states to ensure that appropriate and effective complaints and redress procedures for the 
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and thus increases the probability that a sanction is imposed on the lender. Therefore, this adds to the 
dissuasiveness of the system. Consumer organisations can file complaints against lenders too, when 
rules relating to consumer loans have been violated.1594 This is called Verbandsklage.1595 However, they 
cannot claim damages; only injunctive relief.1596 Therefore, this feature creates additional enforcement 
possibilities, but its potential in the context of ensuring compliance with the rules about assessing a 
consumer’s creditworthiness must not be overstated. 
 
5.2.4.2. Sanctions in public law 
After the transposition of art. 8 CCD in the KWG, it has been concluded in the German literature that 
no dissuasive sanctions existed to penalise violations of the obligation to assess a consumer’s 
creditworthiness.1597 Unfortunately, this is still true insofar as it concerns the requirements of the MCD 
which have been transposed into the KWG: nothing has changed in terms of available administrative 
sanctions. The problem is the lack of options to penalise a violation of § 18a KWG, which contains the 
obligation to conduct a creditworthiness assessment. BaFin can only issue an order – to the credit 
institution and its senior management – that is appropriate and necessary for stopping violations.1598 
However, the KWG does not list follow-up sanctions if a credit institution acts against this order. So, 
BaFin cannot use the enforcement pyramid, because escalating is impossible. Hence, this enforcement 
measure is not dissuasive, and in case of severe violations neither proportionate.  
 
What follows from this is that in Germany the mandatory creditworthiness assessment can only be 
enforced dissuasively by means of private law. Although the available civil sanctions are dissuasive, 
relying on enforcement by means of private law alone has considerable disadvantages.1599 Borrowers 
must be aware of the rules on creditworthiness, and must be willing to start a potentially time-
consuming court procedure. The the lender’s loss of the possibility to claim Pflichtverletzung, if he has 
breached the rules, is the only sanction which is not dependent on initiative of the borrower.  
                                                          
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes are in place. For a brief discussion of § 14 UKlaG, see Micklitz 
(2013), p. 341. The origin of the UKlaG is Directive 98/27 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
May 1998, OJ 1998, L 166/51, which has later been replaced by Directive 2009/22 of 23 April 2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, OJ 2009, L 110/30 (cf. Benöhr, 2014, pp. 147-149). However, the 
German legislature greatly widened the scope of the UKlaG: otherwise, these provisions would not be included 
in its scope. Not only the UKlaG provides for out-of-court dispute settlement procedures, but also the Länder 
can create additional procedures: see Micklitz (2013), pp. 338-339. 
1594 §§ 2(1), 2(2)(e), 3(1) and 4 UKlaG. 
1595 See e.g. Koch (2001); Alexander (2009), pp. 593-594. 
1596 See e.g. http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/class-and-group-actions/class-and-group-actions-
2016/germany (last visited 25 March 2016). Cf. Montag (2013), p. 174; Stadler (2014), footnote 30. 
1597 Herresthal (2014), p. 500; Barta & Braune (2014), p. 329; Ferretti et al. (2016), p. 67. 
1598 § 6(3) KWG. 
1599 See the discussion at the beginning of section 5.2. 
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5.3. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of lending 
restrictions in consumer law 
5.3.1. EU aspects of independent application and enforcement of lending restrictions in 
consumer law 
The CCD does not impose any requirements on the authorities which apply and enforce the national 
implementation of its rules. Instead, the MCD requires member states to establish public authorities 
or bodies, recognised or empowered by national law, for applying and enforcing the implemented 
rules.1600 Art. 5 Directive 2014/17 excludes self-regulation, by making clear that these authorities may 
neither be lenders nor credit intermediaries. In addition, the authorities must be granted adequate 
recourses and powers for investigating and enforcement. These must be exercised under their own 
authority, under supervision of judicial authorities, or by application to courts which are competent to 
grant the necessary decision.1601 So, these requirements aim at guaranteeing independence from the 
industry, albeit only at a general level. 
 
The MCD ensures that host supervisors have room to act against breaches by lenders established in 
another member state, by making the authority of the host member state responsible for ensuring 
compliance with the duty to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness.1602 The authorities in the host 
member state are also responsible for ensuring that a branch of a credit intermediary which is 
established in another member state, complies with the requirements of art. 20 MCD.1603 This prevents 
dependency on the willingness of a foreign authority to act against violations. 
 
5.3.2. Independent application and enforcement of lending restrictions in Dutch consumer law 
In the Netherlands, the Minister of Finance yearly sets the DSTI limits which, together with other rules, 
specify the obligation to prevent an overextension of credit to consumers. The AFM enforces these 
                                                          
1600 Cf. sub-section 5.2.1. 
1601 Art. 5(1) and 5(5) Directive 2014/17.  
1602 This is also true for credit institutions, if they supply loans across borders or through a branch, because the 
creditworthiness assessment is not a prudential requirement in the sense of art. 49 CRD IV, and thus falls 
outside that regime. 
1603 Art. 34(2) Directive 2014/17 (art. 20 of this directive requires credit intermediaries to accurately submit the 
necessary information provided by the consumer to the relevant lender). This is an exception to the 
passporting regime for credit intermediaries, as established in the MCD, in which the home state supervisor has 
the responsibility for ongoing supervision (art. 29-34 Directive 2014/17). 
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rules. The aspects of the Dutch legal framework which affect the independent application and 
enforcement of these rules have been discussed in sub-section 4.1.3. 
 
5.3.3. Independent application, enforcement and amendment of lending restrictions in Irish 
consumer law 
The Central Bank of Ireland is responsible for enforcing the rules of S.I. 281/2010, 142/2016 and the 
consumer protection codes by means of administrative sanctions, or criminal prosecution.1604 The 
degree of the independence of the CBI will influence its supervisory decisions, not only when it comes 
to enforcement, but also regarding its interpretation and application of the imprecise terms that 
originate from the CCD and MCD, and which determine the actual impact of the rules. Most aspects of 
the operational independence of the Central Bank of Ireland have already been discussed in sub-
sections 3.3.3 and 4.2.3. One aspect requires clarification, namely the amendment of the rules in the 
Consumer Protection Code. Section 117(1) Central Bank Act 1989 allows the CBI to amend codes of 
practices, after consultation with the Minister for Finance. This consultation requirement facilitates its 
accountability and transparency, without impairing its independence. Hence, within the perimeters as 
discussed before, the Central Bank of Ireland can relatively independently decide about strengthening 
or loosening these rules. 
 
The situation for changing the rules of the creditworthiness assessment is different. The CCD and MCD 
have been adopted at EU level, and implemented in Ireland by means of Statutory Instruments, drafted 
by the Department of Finance. The power to amend the rules on creditworthiness assessment and the 
attached consequences is thus in the first instance a matter of the EU legislator. In addition, within the 
boundaries set by the directives, the Minister for Finance can amend the rules in the Statutory 
Instruments.1605 Such a decision will be taken under control of the Irish parliament, which needs to 
confirm every Statutory Instrument adopted by a Minister within six months.1606 Henceforth, decisions 
about amendments will be made with political considerations in mind.  
 
                                                          
1604 Regulation 6 S.I. 142/2016 designates the CBI as competent authority to supervise compliance with S.I. 
142/2016. Moreover, the CBI is in general responsible for consumer protection in the area of financial services 
(Section 6A(2)(b) Central Bank Act 1942). 
1605 For instance, he could amend the rules in order to oblige lenders who provide consumer credit, to deny 
credit to consumers who are not creditworthy (like the Netherlands and Germany have done). 
1606 Sections 2-4 of the European Communities Act 1972, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1972/act/27/enacted/en/print. 
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5.3.4. Independent application and enforcement of lending restrictions in German consumer 
law 
The actual impact of the German rules on creditworthiness assessment depends on the interpretation 
of the imprecise terms by lenders and supervisors, and in the end courts. In the domain of private law, 
there is no supervisor to guide this interpretation, whereas BaFin can guide this interpretation in the 
sphere of banking law. Therefore, the degree of involvement by BaFin is crucial. Time will tell how 
BaFin’s supervision will take shape. However, it is conceivable that BaFin will not invest so much effort 
and sources in this area, since it has no mandate for protecting individual consumers.1607 Indeed, some 
describe BaFin’s supervision of the lending practices of banks as lax.1608 However, since March 2017 
further guidance on these rules depends less on BaFin and on courts, and more on the Federal 
Ministries of Finance and Justice & Consumer Protection, because the legislature authorised them to 
jointly issue a regulation which clarifies some aspects of the creditworthiness assessment in case of an 
application for mortgage credit. This reduces the aforementioned concerns about BaFin’s involvement. 
 
When it comes to enforcement, worries about BaFin’s inaction are even stronger. Due to the absence 
of a mandate for protecting individual consumers, BaFin will probably only act when widespread 
violations of the obligations related to the creditworthiness assessment affect the solvability of a bank 
or the stability of the financial system.1609 It is unlikely to act in case of a breach for the sake of 
protecting an individual consumer. This is problematic from the perspective of consumer protection. 
When preventing over-indebtedness is only a means to achieve the end of financial stability, this is less 
of a concern. The conclusions from this paragraph are underlined by the fact that, at least until the 
start of 2017, no single case is known where BaFin used its enforcement powers to act against a breach 
of § 18(2) (now: § 18a) KWG.1610 
 
Moreover, the discussion in sub-section 3.3.1 substantiated some concerns about the extent to which 
BaFin can act independently from political pressure. Such pressure can originate from two political 
concerns: ensuring consumer protection, or liberating home-owners from perceived restrictions. It is 
                                                          
1607 Cf. § 4(1a) FinDAG (supra, footnote 858). 
1608 Barta & Braune (2014), p. 329. 
1609 Hofmann (2010), p. 1784; Rott et al. (2011), p. 163; Barta & Braune (2014), p. 329. Cf. Micklitz (2013), p. 
347. See also an interview with the then president of BaFin: 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2013/fa_bj_2013_03_interview_koeni
g_verbraucher_en.html (last visited 31 March 2015).   
1610 Ferretti et al. (2016), p. 67. 
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more realistic to expect pressure to loosen restrictions than the other way around.1611 All in all, 
unfortunately, one cannot rely on public enforcement of the rules on the creditworthiness assessment. 
The regime lacks bite: there are no dissuasive sanctions and the likelihood that BaFin will act against 
violations is small. 
 
The question is whether civil enforcement actions will have a better fate. In Germany both individual 
consumers and consumer associations can react to a breach of the obligation to assess a consumer’s 
creditworthiness as laid down in the BGB. Consumer organisations might act, if widespread violations 
occur. Consumers will act if (1) they know that rules have been breached and if (2) the benefits for 
acting surpass the costs. The fact that the effectiveness of enforcement depends on these 
circumstances is a downside of relying on private enforcement.1612 However, with the increased 
guidance from the ministries, the rules on mortgage credit become clearer and detecting a breach thus 
easier. This facilitates enforcement by consumers. All in all, the incentives for actors to enforce the 
rules on creditworthiness assessment have not been ideally constructed in Germany. Yet, civil 
enforcement of the rules on mortgage credit may become more of a dissuasive threat to lenders, if 
the determinacy of these rules increases. 
 
5.4. Concluding remarks on the lending restrictions in consumer law 
The post-crisis turn towards responsible lending – preceded by the half-baked appetiser in the CCD – 
is based on the realistic assumption that a consumer needs protection, due to his vulnerability to 
making irrational decisions. The related policies can help to avoid over-indebtedness, as they are aimed 
at protecting consumers, rather than being aimed at preventing systemic consequences only. This 
comes with a wide scope in terms of persons governed: almost every natural or legal person who 
grants credit in the course of his trade, business or profession, is covered by the rules. Its principle-like 
rules allow tailored borrowing restrictions, but create vagueness too. Therefore, the actual impact of 
the rules depends to a certain degree on the interpretation of lenders and supervisors, and, ultimately, 
courts. Hence, public oversight and an active role of supervisors are important. This is especially 
problematic in Germany, considering the mandate and past practice of BaFin. It is recommended to 
conduct further research in this area within a number of years in order to empirically examine how 
supervisors interpret these provisions.  
                                                          
1611 The Bundesrat raised indeed concerns about the restrictions resulting from the implementation of the MCD 
(supra, footnote 1496). The voices in the political arena in the Netherlands and Ireland show the same 
tendency of politicians and others to be concerned about restrictions for home-owners. 
1612 Cf. sub-section 5.2. 
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Notwithstanding its potential, the concept of responsible lending will benefit from clarification. This 
can provide more guidance to lenders about the desired behaviour. Furthermore, it is a bit indistinct 
whether a consumer has a right to a remedy when a lender violates the duty to assess the consumer’s 
creditworthiness. Some may argue that this contradicts the consumer’s own responsibilities. Be that 
as it may, the enforcement regimes differ a lot among member states. Enforcement in the Netherlands 
is in principle administrative, but civil enforcement is an option as well. With regard to the latter, civil 
case law on the banks’ duty of care and the need to pay damages is not yet unequivocal, which reduces 
likelihood that damages have to be paid.1613 Germany has created both civil and administrative 
enforcement possibilities, but the latter regime will be virtually ineffective. For the former regime, it 
created new remedies for the consumer, such as the right of an interest rate reduction and the right 
to terminate the credit agreement, without being subject to a prepayment penalty. If rules become 
clearer due to guidance from the ministries, civil enforcement may become a dissuasive threat to 
lenders. In Ireland, administrative, criminal and civil enforcement is possible. Since the Central Bank of 
Ireland can require financial service providers to make appropriate redress to their customers, 
administrative and civil enforcement have become intertwined, and the possibility of borrowers to 
receive redress have been increased. The dissuasiveness of the enforcement measures differs between 
member states, as discussed in section 5.2. It is recommended, if the available information and data 
allows this, to assess within a number of years in which member state the degree of compliance is 
highest. 
 
From the perspective of creating the preconditions for effectiveness, there are two other major 
concerns. Firstly, a consumer who takes out general consumer credit receives significantly less 
protection than a consumer who takes out mortgage credit, although there are certainly no fewer 
problems regarding irresponsible lending in the unsecured credit market.1614 As Brown (2015) remarks: 
‘Consumer credit reflects consumers’ vulnerabilities to a greater extent than other financial services: 
essential but expensive for the poor, potentially dangerous for the unwary.’1615 This is a crucial 
weakness of the current regime, which needs to be repaired. These differences between the CCD and 
MCD enable regulatory arbitrage: switching from mortgage credit to consumer credit in order to avoid 
the rules, although the latter is more expensive and riskier. Member states can improve the transposed 
rules a bit, but because the rules on creditworthiness assessment in the CCD are mainly subject to 
maximum harmonisation, member states lack profound possibilities to address this flaw. Hence, 
                                                          
1613 Cf. sub-section 4.1.2.2. 
1614 Cf. Ramsay (2016). 
1615 Brown (2015), pp. 579-580. 
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amendment of the CCD is required.1616 Secondly, the current rules on the creditworthiness assessment 
in the CCD and MCD are not without gaps. Most prominently, the information requirements are not 
complete and fail to take into account the findings of the literature on credit scoring regarding the 
factors which should be included in a creditworthiness assessment. These and the other findings are 
summarised in table 5.1 below.1617 
 
All in all, the adoption of the MCD is a big step, and the adoption of the CCD a small step in the good 
direction, but there is certainly sufficient room, as well as necessity, for improvement. At least in case 
of the CCD, this calls for action at the EU level. 
 
  
                                                          
1616 Cf. sub-section 7.1.1.2. 
1617 In line with the discussion in section 5.2, this table includes an evaluation of the available civil sanctions. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of the analysis of lending restrictions in consumer law 
Determinacy and completeness Possibility proportionate and 
dissuasive enforcement 
Room for independent 
application, enforcement and 
amendment 
Qualitative evaluation, from high to low: yes, mostly, partly, barely, no 
Determinacy:  
 EU: CCD: barely; MCD: partly 
 NL: rules on consumer credit: 
mostly; rules on mortgage 
credit: yes 
 IE, DE: implementation CCD: 
barely; implementation MCD: 
partly 
 IE: CPC: mostly; CPCLM: barely 
 
Completeness:  
Encompassing scope:  
 EU: CCD: mostly (e.g. no credit 
free of interest); MCD: mostly 
(e.g. no equity release) 
 NL: rules on consumer credit: 
mostly; rules on mortgage 
credit: yes 
 IE: yes (due to the combination 
of the different rules) 
 DE: yes 
 
Absence gaps and silence:  
 EU: CCD: barely; MCD: partly 
(no explicit requirement to take 
existing debt and general 
economic conditions into 
account) 
 NL: mostly  
 IE: implementation CCD: barely; 
implementation MCD: partly; 
CPC: mostly, CPCLM: barely 
 DE: partly (duty to deny credit 
for consumer credit is 
improvement compared to 
CCD) 
  
Exceptions are subject to clear 
and protective conditions: 
 EU, NL, IE, DE: yes 
Proportionate enforcement:  
 
Availability whole range of 
sanctions, from light to severe:  
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: mostly 
 
Dissuasive enforcement: 
Availability high administrative 
fines: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: no 
 
Mandatory publication of 
sanctions, apart from specific 
exceptions: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: no 
 
Possibility to sanction individuals: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: no 
 
Availability threatening sanctions, 
like withdrawal licence: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: no 
 
Possibility criminal conviction: 
 NL, DE: no 
 IE: yes 
 
Availability dissuasive sanctions in 
private law: 
 NL: partly 
 IE: implementation CCD and 
MCD: yes; CPC and CPCLM: 
partly 
 DE: mostly 
 
Ability and willingness to act:  
Instrument has clear legal basis: 
 EU: mostly 
 NL: codes of conduct: barely; 
Thrk: yes 
 IE: yes 
 DE: yes 
 
Well-defined policy objectives: 
 EU: mostly 
 NL: codes of conduct: mostly; 
Thrk: partly 
 IE, DE: yes 
 
Corresponds to clear mandate 
supervisor: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: barely (BaFin has no 
mandate to protect individual 
consumers) 
 
Framework provides room for 
action: 
 NL, IE: yes 
 DE: barely (BaFin lacks 
sanctions)  
 
Operational independence: 
 AFM: yes 
 CBI: mostly 
 BaFin: barely/partly 
 
Use of guided discretion: 
 NL, IE: barely 
 DE: no 
 
Accountability mechanism: 
 NL, IE, DE: barely (not 
specifically for enforcement) 
  
6. The tax treatment of debt 
273 
 
6. The tax treatment of debt 
 
Where the previous chapters analysed rules that specifically aim at restricting debt, tax rules governing 
the treatment of debt have not necessarily been designed for that purpose, but nevertheless directly 
influence the amount of debt that consumers can borrow. Recent reforms of these rules have often 
been intended to reduce borrowing incentives and to limit debt.  
 
This chapter analyses the tax treatment of debt, and will not as such focus on tax rules on housing.1618 
However, mortgage interest deductibility cannot be isolated from these rules.1619 Therefore, table 6.1 
provides an overview of the relevant tax rules in each member state of the European Union. This table 
is based upon information from the IBFD Tax Research Platform.1620 A remarkable finding from a 
comparison of this table and the pre-crisis information from 2007 as documented in Wolswijk (2010) 
is that many member states significantly reformed their regime for mortgage interest deductibility in 
recent years.1621 For instance, in Portugal and Spain mortgage interest payments were deductible at a 
rate of 40% and 45% respectively, in 2007. Currently, in both countries interest payments are not 
deductible anymore for newly granted mortgages, while relief on interest payments for existing loans 
is available at a rate of only 15%.1622 Also Greece completely abolished mortgage interest deductibility, 
while Italy replaced the option to deduct interest payments at rates up to 45% with a tax credit of 19%. 
Furthermore, in Finland the part of the interest costs which can be deducted has been gradually 
limited: until 2011 it was possible to deduct 100% of the interest costs.1623 This was limited to 85% in 
2012 and subsequently reduced with 5 percentage points for each year, reaching a maximum of 25% 
in 2019.1624  
 
  
                                                          
1618 Cf. sub-section 2.3.2. 
1619 Cf. sub-section 2.1.1.2. 
1620 The data is obtained in April 2017 from the database of the IBFD (International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation): http://online.ibfd.org/kbase (see the country information on individual taxation).  
1621 See Wolswijk (2010), tables 8.1 and A8.2. 
1622 The cut-off date for existing and new loans is 31 December 2011 in Portugal and 31 December 2012 in 
Spain.  
1623 At a rate of 30%. 
1624 See inter alia the database of the IBFD: http://online.ibfd.org/kbase  
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Table 6.1: Tax treatment of housing in EU member states 
Country Mortgage interest rate 
deductibility 
Taxing 
imputed 
rents 
Capital 
gains tax 
on homes 
VAT on 
new 
homes 
Real estate 
/property 
tax 
Transfer tax, 
registration levies 
and/or stamp duties 
Austria N A N N  N Y (<1%) Y (3.5%) 
Belgium Y (at 45%) Y  N Y N Y (10-12.5%) 
Bulgaria Y (at 10%) B N N Y Y (<0.225%)  Y (<3%) 
Croatia N N N Y N Y (5%) 
Cyprus N N N C Y N Y (3-8%) 
Czech Republic Y (15-22%) N N Y D Y Y (4%) 
Denmark Y (up to ±27%) Y  N Y Y (1-3%) Y (0.6-2.1%) E 
Estonia Y (at 20%) N N Y N Y (<0.2%) 
Finland Y (at 30-34% for 45% 
(25% as of 2019) of the 
interest payments) F 
N N N Y (0.41-
0.9%) 
Y (4%) 
France N N N Y Y Y (5.1-5.8%) 
Germany N N N N Y (1.0-2.8%) Y (3.5-6.5%) 
Greece N G Y  Y (15%) Y Y Y (3%) 
Hungary N N Y (0-25%) Y Y Y (4%) 
Ireland Y (0-30%) → N (in 2018) H N N Y I  Y (0.2%) Y (1%) J 
Italy Y (19%) Y  N Y K Y (0.5-1.1%) Y (9%) 
Latvia N N N  Y Y (0.2-0.6%) Y (2%) 
Lithuania Y (at 15%) N  N Y Y (0.3-3.0%) N 
Luxembourg Y (up to 42%) L N M N Y Y Y (7%) 
Malta N N N N N Y (7%) 
Netherlands Y (up to 50% in 2017) N Y  N Y Y Y (2%) 
Poland N O N N Y Y Y (2%) 
Portugal N (but Y at 15% up to € 
296 if mortgage loan is 
contracted before 1-1-12) 
N N N Y Y 
Romania N N N Y P  Y (0.1-0.2%) Y (2-3%) 
Slovak Republic N N N Y Y N 
Slovenia N N Y Y Q  Y (0.3-1.1%) Y (2%) 
Spain N (but Y at 15% if house 
acquired before 1-1-13) 
N N Y R  Y  Y (6-6.5%) 
Sweden Y (at 30%) N Y (30%) S N Y (<0.75%) Y (3.5%) 
United Kingdom N N N N Y Y (0-12%) 
Source: IBFD (cf. footnote 1620). A Only interest for constructing or renovating a house is deductible. A If 
married and younger than 35 year when signing the mortgage contract. C Up to a certain amount, tax is 
exempted. D A reduced VAT-rate of 15% for applies to houses supplied under social policy, which includes 
smaller houses. E Apart from these percentages, also a fixed amount has to be paid. F The portion of the interest 
payments which is deductible is gradually reduced from 85% in 2012 to 25% in 2019. G Abolished with effect of 
1 January 2013. H Gradually outphased; applicable rate depends on date at which mortgage is taken out. 
Mortgage relief is abolished for all mortgages with effect from 1 January 2018. I A reduced rate of 13.5% 
applies. J A rate of 2% applies if the value of the house is larger than €1 million. K A reduced rate of 4-10% 
applies. L  Up to an amount of € 2000 per year. M Abolished as of 1 January 2017. N The maximum rate is 
gradually reduced with 0.5 percentage point per year from 52% in 2014 till 38% in 2042. O Interest payments for 
mortgage loans taken until 2006 are deductible. P A reduced rate of 5% applies to houses supplied under social 
policy. Q A reduced rate of 8.5% applies to houses supplied under social policy, which includes smaller houses. R 
A reduced rate of 10% applies. S Deferall is possible under conditions. 
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The structure of the sections will mirror the analytical framework used in this study. Firstly, the 
determinacy and completeness of the rules on the fiscal treatment of debt will be discussed, followed 
by an examination of the possibilities to enforce these rules in a proportionate and dissuasive manner. 
Finally, the independence in amending, applying and enforcing these rules is analysed.  
 
As it becomes clear from the table, Germany does not allow deduction of (mortgage) interest from the 
income tax. Consequently, this chapter does not contain separate sub-sections on the German tax 
treatment of debt. In the past, an own house subsidy (Eigenheimzulage) could be received in Germany 
for maximum eight years, upon fulfilling certain conditions.1625 Yet, from 1 January 2006 it is no longer 
possible to apply for an Eigenheimzulage.1626 Due to the maximum beneficial period of eight years, 
homeowners are no longer entitled to this subsidy. Besides, the Eigenheimzulage was not a form of 
mortgage interest deduction, but a tax subsidy which was independent of the manner of financing the 
residence.1627 As such, it did not directly stimulate debt-financing of an own home.  
 
In Germany, there is still a subsidy related to home-ownership, the Wohnungsbau-Prämie, which 
entails that people who contribute at least € 50 in a year to a Bauspar savings account, receive a 
subsidy of 8.8% of their saving contribution, at least over their savings up to € 512 (€ 1024 for a 
couple).1628 So, the maximum yearly subsidy is € 45 (€ 90 for a couple). This subsidy is only available 
for people with a low-to-medium income, namely not higher than € 25,600 (€ 51,200 for couples).1629 
Hence, this subsidy stimulates homeownership by incentivising people to use the Bauspar system to 
save for buying a house. Indirectly, this can encourage borrowing, because savings through the 
Bauspar system are generally accompanied by a mortgage loan, when an own home is acquired. 
However, these incentives are not only indirect, but also small, due to the low maximum yearly amount 
of the subsidy. Therefore, the Wohnungsbau-Prämie does not require additional discussion. 
 
                                                          
1625 See in particular §§ 1-9 of the Eigenheimzulagengesetz, BGBl. I, 1997, 734, available at http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/eigzulg/.  
1626 § 19(9) Eigenheimzulagengesetz. Cf. Hillman (2006) and Schmidt (2008). 
1627 § 9(2) Eigenheimzulagengesetz. 
1628 § 3 Wohnungsbau-Prämiengesetz (Housing Subsidies Act), BGBl. I, 1997, 2678, available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/wopg. See sub-section 4.3 of this study for a brief explanation of the 
Bauspar system. 
1629 § 2a Wohnungsbau-Prämiengesetz. 
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6.1. Determinacy and completeness of the rules on tax treatment of debt 
Before discussing national rules on the tax treatment of debt, the question is how EU tax law affects 
their determinacy and completeness. In the EU, legal acts on taxation have mostly been adopted under 
the shared competence regarding the internal market.1630 Allowing or prohibiting households to 
deduct interest expenses from their taxable income is part of a country’s income tax policy and thus 
concerns direct taxation. There are no treaty provisions enabling the harmonisation of direct taxes.1631 
Henceforth, until now only a handful of directives concerning direct taxes have been adopted, all based 
upon art. 115 TFEU, which requires unanimity in the Council.1632 None of these directives are relevant 
for the tax treatment of debt. So, EU law mainly affects direct taxation by means of negative 
integration, whereby the CJEU rules that certain national measures are prohibited, because of their 
negative impact on one of the four freedoms, and thus on the internal market. In its case law on direct 
taxes, the CJEU currently mainly relies on the “discrimination” rather than on the “obstacle” 
approach.1633 This means that the Court reviews whether a measure discriminates between domestic 
and foreign individuals or undertakings rather than examining whether a measure constitutes a free 
movement obstacle. Consequently, the case law of the CJEU is, in principle, only relevant in cross-
border situations, and not in purely internal situations. An influential and controversial case regarding 
mortgage interest deductibility (MID) in a cross-border situation is Renneberg.1634 Basically, the CJEU 
decided that member states must offer non-residents who earn almost all their income in the member 
state of employment the same tax advantage regarding MID as residents.1635 Apart from the fact that 
this body of case law only affects cross border situations, the issue discussed in Renneberg is not 
particularly relevant for this study, because it does not directly affect the determinacy and 
completeness of rules that restrict household debt levels. Accordingly, this body of case law will not 
be further discussed.   
 
                                                          
1630 Terra & Wattel (2012), p. 7. This competence is enshrined in art. 4(2)(a) TFEU. 
1631 Terra & Wattel (2012), pp. 16-17; Adamczyk (2013), pp. 24-25. For indirect taxes, art. 110-113 TFEU are 
available as legal basis.  
1632 Terra & Wattel (2012), p. 17. Art. 114 TFEU cannot serve as legal basis for adopting legal acts on direct 
taxes, due to art. 114(2) TFEU, which excludes fiscal provisions. 
1633 Terra & Wattel (2012), pp. 58-63. 
1634 Case C-527/06 Renneberg [2008] ECR I-7735. For a critical discussion, see e.g. Terra & Wattel (2012), pp. 
70-73. The issue at stake was whether denying a person who earns almost all his income in another member 
state, the possiliby to deduct mortgage interest is a violation of the provisions on the free movement of 
workers and capital. 
1635 Case C-527/06 Renneberg [2008] ECR I-7735, para. 60-64, 83. So, in Renneberg, the CJEU extended its 
Schumacker line of reasoning to MID (Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1994] ECR I-5535). 
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6.1.1. Determinacy and completeness of the Dutch rules on tax treatment of debt 
Compared to other EU member states, the Netherlands has a relatively generous regime of mortgage 
interest deductibility, as table 6.1 shows. Since 1 January 2013 a reformed regime is in force, reducing 
deduction possibilities. Simultaneously, a transitional regime is in place till 1 January 2043 for existing 
mortgage debt. Consequently, the Dutch regime for deducting mortgage interest has become even 
more complex than it already was.1636 This section starts with outlining the current rules on MID that 
affect the level of debt that households can take on and discusses the transitional regime insofar as 
necessary for understanding the determinacy and completeness of the rules. Likewise, conditions and 
exceptions are only analysed insofar as relevant for the overarching aim of this study. In addition, the 
rules concerning non-mortgage debt are briefly examined. 
 
While MID stimulates debt-financing of an own home, another tax rule incentivises financing of an 
own home partly with non-debt. People aged 18-40 years can namely once receive € 100,000 without 
having to pay gift tax, if the gift is for buying or improving an own home, or reducing the own home 
debt.1637 Normally the gift tax for this amount ranges between 10% and 30%.1638  
 
6.1.1.1. The main features of the tax treatment of debt, in particular mortgage interest deductibility  
Firstly, the position of the rules on MID within the Dutch income tax system needs to be clarified. The 
Dutch income tax system distinguishes three categories – Boxes – of taxable income, respectively 
taxable income from (1) work and dwelling, (2) substantial interest and (3) savings and investments. 
Primary dwellings and associated loans are located in Box 1, if satisfying certain conditions. All other 
debt – including consumer debt – is part of Box 3, which taxes income from savings and 
investments.1639  
 
In Box 3, a tax of 30% is levied on the assumed yield over the tax base of savings and investments at 1 
January of each year.1640 Previously the assumed yield was 4%, but on 1 January 2017 a refined system 
                                                          
1636 Cf. Albert (2013), p. 459; Arends & Bitter (2013). 
1637 Art. 33(5) and 33(7) Successiewet (Inherentance Act), available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002226. Some conditions apply: see art. 5 Uitvoeringsregeling schenk- en 
erfbelasting (Regulation on gift- and inherentance tax), available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0027018. 
1638 Art. 24(1) Successiewet. The tax percentage is 10%, 18%, or 30%, depending on whether the gift comes 
from parents, grandparents, or others, respectively.   
1639 In rare situations, a debt can be part of Box 2, when borrowing in order to obtain substantial interest. 
1640 Art. 2.13 and 5.2(1) Wet IB 2001. 
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for calculating the assumed yield came into force, to align better with actual yields in recent years.1641 
The tax base consists of the value of the assets minus the economic value of the debts which are part 
of Box 3.1642 Any part of the value of the tax base below € 25,000 (2017) (per person) is not taxed.1643 
Belongings which households use for personal aims are not counted as assets, unless they are 
predominantly meant as investment.1644 For instance, a car and furniture are not part of the tax base. 
Only debt above € 3000 reduces the tax base, while debt below that amount – or € 6000 if two persons 
are fiscal partners – is disregarded.1645  
 
The rules for taxing primary dwellings in Box 1 are totally different. Supposed advantages from a 
primary dwelling – imputed rent – are taxed at 0.75% of their value for most houses, but this 
percentage is lower for very cheap, and higher for very expensive houses.1646 The imputed rent is based 
upon the official appraisal value of the house, as determined in accordance with the Wet waardering 
onroerende zaken (Wet WOZ) (Act on Real Estate Valuation).1647 Associated costs for obtaining this 
income-generating house are deductible from taxable income. Therefore, interest on mortgage debt 
and costs for obtaining mortgage loans can be deducted, at least if satisfying the conditions of the Wet 
inkomstenbelasting 2001 (Wet IB 2001) (Act on income tax 2001) and the legislation based upon this 
act.1648  
 
Interest over mortgage debt is under certain conditions deductible from taxable income at – in 
principle –the marginal tax rate. The marginal rates in Box 1 differ per bracket: 36.55% for income up 
to € 19,981 (first bracket), 40.8% for income between € 19,982 and € 67,071 (second and third bracket) 
and 52% for any income above the lastmentioned amount (fourth bracket) (percentages and amounts 
                                                          
1641 Then, there are two classes, I and II, which each a different assumed yield, of 1.63% and 5.39% respectively. 
The taxable part of the tax base up to € 75,000 is for 67% assigned to yield class I and for 33% to yield class II. 
The part of the tax base between € 75.000 and € 975.000 is for 21% assigned to yield class I and for 79% to 
yield class II. Finally, any part of the tax base above € 975.000 is fully assigned to the second yield class (see art. 
II(C) Belastingplan 2016 and pages 9-14 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Belastingplan 2016, available 
at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2015-538.html and 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2015/09/15/belastingplan-2016 respectively (last 
visited 10 March 2017)).   
1642 Art. 5.3(1) and 5.3(3) of Wet IB 2001.  
1643 Art. 5.2(1) and 5.5 of Wet IB 2001.  
1644 Art. 5.3(2)(c) Wet IB 2001. 
1645 Art. 5.3(3)(f) Wet IB 2001. 
1646 Art. 3:112(1) Wet IB. 
1647 Art. 3:112(2) Wet IB. The Wet WOZ is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0007119.   
1648 Art. 3.110, 3.112 and 3.120 Wet IB 2001, available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011353.  
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of 2017).1649 However, since 1 January 2014 the rate at which mortgage interest payments can be 
deducted for the fourth bracket is reduced with 0.5 percentage point a year to 38% in 2042, which is 
the intended tax tariff in the second and third bracket at 1 January 2018.1650 In 2017, the maximum 
rate for deducting mortgage interest is 50%. 
 
Overall, the deductible costs are much higher than the taxed imputed rents.1651 Consequently, home 
ownership and borrowing are strongly subsidised and stimulated. Moreover, the supposed advantages 
from a primary dwelling – imputed rent – are not taxed insofar as they are larger than the costs of the 
primary dwelling – the deductible interest and costs.1652 Hence, if a homeowner has little or no 
mortgage debt for which interest can be deducted, the taxation of imputed rent is partly or completey 
waived.1653 This rule, in force since 1 January 2005, aims at incentivising households to redeem their 
debt and to reduce debt-financing of their home.1654 
 
6.1.1.2. Eligibility conditions for deducting mortgage interest 
With the view to reduce borrowing incentives, the Wet IB 2001 and related legislation have attached 
eligibility conditions – to qualify for MID – to the house, to the deductible interest and costs, and last 
but not least, to the mortgage debt for which interest can be deducted. Some of the rules governing 
these conditions are quite specific, but require nevertheless discussion, insofar as they are directly 
related to the amount of interest payments which can be deducted. 
 
Firstly, for interest and costs being eligible for MID, the house for which the mortgage loan is taken 
out, needs – in principle – to be owned by the debtor and must be his main residence, not temporarily, 
                                                          
1649 See 
https://belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontentnl/belastingdienst/prive/inkomstenbelasting/heffings
kortingen_boxen_tarieven/boxen_en_tarieven/overzicht_tarieven_en_schijven/ (last visited 10 March 2017). 
1650 This is enshrined in art. 2.10(2) and 2.10a(2) Wet IB 2010 and a result of the Wet maatregelen woningmarkt 
2014 II (Staatsblad, 2013, 583) available at: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2013-583.html (last 
visited 8 August 2016). Cf. Fiscale Encyclopedie De Vakstudie Inkomstenbelasting, Aantekening 1.23 (via Kluwer 
Navigator). For examples of the consequences, see Van den Berg (2013). 
1651 The advantages of owning an own home are taxed at a rather low rate, according to inter alia the Centraal 
Planbureau (2010, pp. 57-58) and Wieser & Mundt (2014, p. 257), in light of the reasoning that it is taxed 
because it is an investment good and thus a source of income. Cf. Van der Paardt (2013), pp. 126-127. 
1652 Art. 3.123a Wet IB 2001.  
1653 The reduction is equal to the difference between what the homeowner should have paid as imputed rent, 
and what he can deduct in relation to his house (art. 3.123a(1) Wet IB 2001). In other words: if the amount of 
imputed rent is higher than the amount of deductible interest and costs, the former is set equal to the latter. 
1654 Cf. Kastelein & Sour (2014), p. 491; Bruijsten & Van Rij (2007). 
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but permanent. These two issues are further delineated in the Wet IB 2001 and by case law.1655 In 
addition, conditions have been attached to the deductible interest and the deductible costs for 
obtaining mortgage loans. Interest and costs have to burthen the borrower; meaning that he really has 
to pay it.1656 Therefore, it is not allowed to receive a reduction via the backdoor. Traditionally, 
deductible costs are fees, notarial costs, registration fees for the cadaster, and the like.1657 Art. 
3.120(3)-(5) Wet IB 2001 contains some limitations on the time at which costs can be deducted, in 
order to avoid tax planning, but not on the total amount of deductible expenses.1658  
 
There are rules in place to prevent the deduction of interest payments on credit that is not used for 
financing an own home. Only interest paid for the so-called eigenwoningschuld (own home debt) is 
deductible.1659 Debt qualifies as own home debt if certain conditions have been fulfilled, and is part of 
Box 3 otherwise.1660 Firstly, the debt must be taken out in relation to the house.1661 This is the case if 
the loan is incurred for (a) buying an own house, up to the amount which it costs to acquire the house, 
(b) improving or maintaining an own house, up to the amount which it costs to improve or maintain 
the house and insofar as there is written evidence for these costs and (c) paying for the costs of 
acquiring the loans mentioned under (a) and (b), with for commission a maximum of 1.5% of the 
amount of the obtained mortgage loan and of € 3630.1662 So, if the amount of a mortgage loan is raised 
and the money is used for consumption, it is not allowed to deduct interest payments for this part of 
                                                          
1655 Art. 3:111(1) Wet IB. Interest for debt related to a house which is for sale, but was the main residence in at 
least one of the last three years can also be deducted. The same is true for a house which is empty or under 
construction, but meant as main residence in one the coming three years (art. 3.111(2)-(3) Wet IB). A house 
qualifies as under construction if construction work has started (Hoge Raad 3 October 2014, para. 3.3.1-3.3.7, 
NL:HR:2014:2872). The specific and detailed rules are not directly related to the deduction of interest and thus 
not of prime interest for this study: for a further discussion, see e.g. Kastelein & Sour (2014), pp. 444-454. 
1656 Besluit (decree) CPP2006/412M of 12 november 2006, Staatscourant 2006, nr. 228, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2006-228-p13-SC77766.html. See also section 5.2 of Besluit 
DGB2010/921 of 10 June 2010, Staatscourant 2010, nr. 8462, available at: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2010-8462.html (both last visited 6 August 2016). Cf. Kastelein & 
Sour (2014), p. 462. Note that the term “interest” is not defined in the Wet IB 2001, but only in case law (see 
HR 6 April 1938, B nr. 6634; HR 15 July 1980, BNB 1980/315). 
1657 Kastelein & Sour (2014), p. 459. See also the decrees mentioned in the previous footnote. 
1658 Art. 3.120(5) Wet IB 2001 states that commission is deductible in the year of obtaining the loan up to 1.5% 
of the amount of the obtained mortage loan and up to € 3630. Higher fees have to be spread over the entire 
term of the redemption (Art. 3.120(3)-(5) Wet IB 2001. Cf. Kastelein & Sour (2014), pp. 459-460). 
1659 Art. 3.120(1) Wet IB 2001. 
1660 Cf. Van Mourik (2013), p. 663. 
1661 Art. 3.119a(1)(a) Wet IB 2001. 
1662 Art. 3.119a and 3.123 Wet IB 2001. According to art. 3.119a(2)(c) Wet IB 2001 interest on debt which is 
used to pay for commission is only deductible insofar the commission is not higher than the percentage and 
amount of art. 3.120(5) Wet IB 2001, i.e. 1.5% of the amount of the obtained mortage loan and up to € 3630. 
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the loan.1663 It does not matter tor the eligibility for MID who supplied the loan; this can be family.1664 
Still, the burden to prove that a loan is meant for acquiring, maintaining or improving an own home is 
on the borrower who claims deductibility of interest for the debt.1665 
 
Since 1 January 2013, a new condition reduces deduction possibilities and previously existing 
incentives to abstain from redemption. Debt only qualifies as own home debt if the entire loan is 
redeemed in maximum 30 years, amortising each month no less than the monthly amount under an 
annuity scheme.1666 The amortisation obligation must be really satisfied, which is yearly verified.1667 In 
case of refinancing (part of) the own home debt, the existing amortisation schedule has to be 
continued in order to avoid circumvention.1668 If the outstanding amount of debt is higher than allowed 
according to the amortisation schedule, due to temporary arrears, the borrower does not immediately 
loose the right to deduct interest, but receives a year to undo the repayment backlog.1669 If the 
borrower is still in arrears after that year, interest paid for that loan becomes ineligible for MID, unless 
he plausibly shows that the arrears are a result of (1) a lack of repayment ability or (2) an unintentional 
mistake.1670 Only in these two situations interest remains deductible, if fulfilling certain conditions.1671 
A loan which became ineligible for MID due to a repayment backlog is moved to Box 3.1672 If the 
repayment backlog is repaired, the loan can become part of the own home debt again.1673 
 
However, for mortgages taken out before 1 January 2013, redemption was and remains no condition 
for being eligible for deducting interest. Because redemption was not mandatory before 2013, 
                                                          
1663 Kastelein & Sour (2014), p. 464. 
1664 See e.g. Hoge Raad 3 April 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:809. 
1665 See e.g. Hoge Raad 22 October 2004, para. 3.4-3.7, NL:PHR:2004:AH9156). Cf. Hoge Raad 27 April 2007, 
para. 3.3, NL:HR:2007:BA3865; Hof Amsterdam 13 October 2011, para. 4.8-4.10, NL:GHAMS:2011:BU1584; Hof 
Amsterdam 8 March 2012, para. 4.2.c, NL:GHAMS:2012:BV8669; Hof 's-Hertogenbosch 28 August 2013, para. 
4.7-4.8, NL:GHSHE:2013:3928; Hof Arnhem-Leeuwarden 3 September 2013, para. 4.2-4.3, 4.7, 4.10, 
NL:GHARL:2013:6476; Hof Amsterdam 13 March 2014, para. 4.5, NL:GHAMS:2014:1086; Hof Amsterdam 19 
February 2015, para. 4.2.4-4.2.5; NL:GHAMS:2015:547. 
1666 Art. 3.119a(1)(b)-(c) Wet IB 2001. With an annuity mortgage, the monthly gross debt service costs remains 
the same during the amortisation period. However, the part of the costs consisting of interest payments 
decreases over time. 
1667 This is verified for each loan; not for aggregrate own home debt, because not all debt has necessarily the 
same start date and maturity (art. 3.119c(1) and (7) Wet IB 2001. Cf. Van Mourik (2013), p. 664).  
1668 Art. 3.119c(3) Wet IB 2001. Cf. Van Mourik (2013), p. 664-665. 
1669 Art. 3.119e(1) Wet IB 2001. 
1670 Art. 3.119e(2) Wet IB 2001. 
1671 Art. 3.119e Wet IB 2001. Cf. Kastelein & Sour (2014), pp. 481-483; Arends & Bitter (2013). 
1672 Art. 3.119e(4) Wet IB 2001.  
1673 See especialy art. I(C) in the Voorstel van wet ter Wijziging van enkele belastingwetten en enige andere 
wetten (Overige fiscale maatregelen 2016) and para. 4.1 in the attached Explanatory Memorandum, available 
at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2015/09/15/overige-fiscale-maatregelen-2016 
(last visited 6 August 2016). 
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mortgages designed to profit maximally from the MID were commonplace, with as common feature 
that capital was built up on a separate account, and, normally, after thirty years used for (partial) 
redemption.1674 Under the transitional arrangements and a range of conditions, interest on these types 
of mortgage loans is deductible for a maximum of 30 years after taking out the loan, at least for the 
part of the debt which existed at 31 December 2012 (called “existing own home debt”).1675 Since any 
new debt is subject to the new rules, two regimes will coexist. When borrowers redeem (part of) their 
existing debt, the amount qualifying as existing own home debt diminishes.1676 However, refinancing 
existing own home debt with a similar new loan is allowed without losing the right to deduct 
interest.1677 
 
Thirdly, if a person borrows from a lender without information duty, the borrower needs to fulfil some 
information requirements towards the Belastingdienst (Tax Administration) in order to be eligible for 
MID.1678 This obligation is relevant when someone borrows from, for example, family members or 
foreign lenders.1679 The information is the date of taking the loan, its size at that time, its contractual 
duration and amortisation scheme, the monthly interest rate, and finally some information to identify 
the lender.1680  
 
Several types of debt are excluded from the own house debt; inter alia debt taken out for paying the 
interest on mortgage debt – so, interest over interest is not deductible – and debt with a maturity 
exceeding thirty years.1681 In addition, there are rules to avoid that people benefit more than thirty 
years from MID when moving: if a homeowner moves to a cheaper house, or starts to rent and the 
                                                          
1674 There are three main types of these mortgages. With these mortgage types the homeowner respectively 
(1) takes an endowment insurance, pays premiums and receives a lumpsum at the end to redeem the loan, (2) 
has a blocked savings account, which is unblocked at the end to redeem the loan or (3) has an investment 
account and uses the yield to redeem the loan (Gradus (2012), Kastelein & Sour (2014), pp. 492-494). 
1675 Art. 10bis.1, 10bis.2, 10bis.9 and 10bis.10 Wet IB 2001. Under some conditions also loan taken out in the 
first months of 2013 qualify as existing own home debt (art. 10bis.1(2)m 10bis.2(2) and 10bis.2b Wet IB 2001). 
For the conditions, see art. 10bis.1 to 10bis.12 Wet IB 2001. These are not directly relevant for this study, but 
are discussed in, among others, Kastelein and Sour (2014), pp. 494-516. Cf. Snoeks & Van Mourik (2014). 
1676 Art. 10bis.1(3) Wet IB 2001. 
1677 Art. 10bis.1(3) Wet IB 2001. More specifically, this right to deduct interest is retained if debt existing on 31 
December 2012 partly or completely is redeemed and refinanced not later than in the next calender year.  
1678 Art. 3.119a(1)(d) in combination with 3.119g(1) Wet IB 2001. 
1679 On the information duty of Dutch businesses, including banks, see in particular art. 52-53 of the Algemene 
wet inzake rijksbelastingen (AWR) (General act on state taxes), available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002320. 
1680 Art. 17b Uitvoeringsregeling inkomstenbelasting 2001, available at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0012031. 
1681 Art. 3.119a(6) Wet IB 2001. Also excluded are debt to the partner and and debt for buying (part of) a house 
from a partner, if the total debt increases due to this transaction. For more information, see Kastelein & Sour 
(2014), pp. 469-471. 
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previous own home debt is therefore higher than the current or non-existing own home debt, the 
difference is registered, together with the remaining amortisation duration in months. This is called 
the aflossingsstand (redemption position).1682 If the person at a later moment takes out a new 
mortgage loan, the maximum period of thirty years for MID will not start from scratch, but will 
continue with the freezed amortisation duration for the part not exceeding the redemption position. 
 
Another provision, created in 2004, seeks to prevent that borrowers who move finance their new 
house completely with debt – in order to benefit from MID – and not partly with the proceeds of the 
sale of their previous house.1683 If a homeowner moves, a so-called eigenwoningreserve (own home 
reserve) is created. This is the difference between the selling price of the house and the amount of 
own home debt at that moment, minus the costs for selling the house.1684 A positive own home reserve 
is subtracted from the new own home debt.1685 For example, if someone sells a house for € 200,000, 
his own home debt was € 110,000 before the sale and the costs for selling are € 5,000, his own home 
reserve is € 85,000. If he buys a new house for € 220,000, his maximum own home debt becomes € 
135,000. An own home reserve expires after three years if it cannot be settled with the own home 
debt.1686  
 
The provisions of the Wet IB 2001 contain more rules on moving, rules for partners and the situation 
that several people live together in one house, and rules on (temporary) letting, but these will not be 
discussed in this chapter, since they are not of direct relevance for this study.1687 Furthermore, not only 
interest and costs are deductible under the conditions discussed in this sub-section, but also periodic 
payments related to erfpacht (leasehold) and recht van opstal (leasehold estate) of an own home are 
deductible, without further limitations.1688 This gave rise to constructions to avoid the limitations to 
interest deduction. However, these constructions were on the radar of the Tax Administration and the 
                                                          
1682 Art. 3.119d(1) Wet IB 2001. Cf. Kastelein & Sour (2014), pp. 479-481. 
1683 Kastelein & Sour (2014), p. 467. Cf. Bruijsten & Van Rij (2007). 
1684 Art. 3.119aa(1) Wet IB 2001. Cf. Kastelein & Sour (2014), p. 467. Note that an existing own home reserve is 
reduced if moving to a more expensive house: the reduction is equal to the difference between the price of the 
house and the own house debt (art. 3.119aa(2)(a) Wet IB 2001). 
1685 Art. 3.119a(3) Wet IB 2001. 
1686 Art. 3.119aa(3) Wet IB 2001. So, if someone rents a house for more than three years, his own home reserve 
expires.  
1687 On partners and several people living together in one house, see e.g. art. 3.111(8)-(9), 3.115, 3.119a(4), 
3.119c(9), 3.119d(4) and 3.121 Wet IB 2001. On moving, see especially art. 3.119f Wet IB 2001. On (temporary) 
letting, see art. 3.113 and 3.114 Wet IB 2001. 
1688 Art. 3.120(1)(c) Wet IB 2001. 
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legislator, and the Supreme Court has recently struck down such a construction.1689 Eerenstein (2015) 
and the case notes on these recent cases of the Supreme Court provide more information on (the 
diminished prospects of) these constructions.1690 
 
Lastly, there is one important exception to the rule that interest may only be deducted if it concerns 
own home debt: in case a borrower is confronted with residual debt after selling his own home in the 
period of 29 October 2012 till 31 December 2017, interest and costs for this residual debt are 
deductible for fifteen years.1691 
 
6.1.1.3. Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of mortgage interest deductibility in the 
Netherlands 
It is beyond doubt that the Dutch regime for MID incentivises households to borrow when buying a 
house. It is equally true that a range of conditions limits the deduction of interest. This sub-section 
evaluates to what extent these conditions and other rules regarding MID are determinate and 
complete. 
 
Firstly, there are differences in the determinacy of conditions. Some lack vagueness and are thus 
determinate. An example is the rule that the tax on imputed rent is reduced when it is larger than the 
deductible costs. However, several other conditions are – more or less – indeterminate. Firstly, 
borderline cases cannot be avoided when interpreting the condition that the debt must be taken out 
for maintaining or improving the house. This is evidenced by the substantial amount of case law related 
to this requirement.1692 Although this vagueness creates uncertainty for borrowers, it is not necessarily 
problematic for the effectiveness of this condition, because of the requirement that a person who 
claims deductibility must prove that the debt is related to his house. Putting the burden of proof on 
the borrower reduces the possibilities to abuse the inherent degree of vagueness. Moreover, for some 
types of loans, specifically meant for financing maintenance or improvement of an own home, the 
bank directly checks the invoices, before providing the money. One of the reasons that banks adopted 
this practice is their responsibility for supplying information to the Tax Administration about deductible 
interest.1693 If provisions are somewhat vague, their interpretation by the Tax Administration, and 
                                                          
1689 Hoge Raad, 10 October 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2927, BNB 2015/38 or FED 2014/100. Cf. Hoge Raad, 19 
September 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2694, BNB 2015/11. 
1690 Ibidem.  
1691 Art. 3.120a Wet IB 2001. 
1692 Many of the cases referred to in footnote 1665 concern this condition. 
1693 Supra, footnote 1679. 
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especially courts, becomes more important. So, enforcement is more relevant in these circumstances. 
Therefore, at the moment that enforcement is weak, this possibility to deduct mortgage interest might 
provide borrowers with an opportunity to deduct too much interest.1694 
 
Another source of indeterminacy is the complexity of the Dutch regime of MID, which is hard to grasp. 
This regime becomes especially complex when all kind of rules interact, for instance, these on existing 
and current own home debt, the own home reserve and moving. Albert (2013) provides various 
examples of the difficulties which might arise in these situations. Due to this complexity, the system of 
MID becomes opaque and difficult to understand. This might impede its determinacy.1695 In general, 
complexity can facilitate creative compliance. Nevertheless, professionals should be able to 
understand the rules. The complexity does not seem to be of a degree that creative compliance is 
facilitated, or that it is difficult to assess whether a borrower abides by the rules or not. 
 
The abundance of specific rules on MID suggests that the regime is relatively complete. Indeed, many 
rules have been adopted to close loopholes. For instance, the rules on own home reserve intend to 
avoid that people indirectly finance consumption by a mortgage loan by using profit from the sale of 
the previous house for consumption, and take on new mortgage debt for buying the new house. 
Comparably, the rules on the redemption position greatly contribute to avoiding that borrowers profit 
longer than thirty years from MID. The condition that interest has to burthen on the borrower closes 
the door for discounts via the backdoor. All this contributes to the completeness of the rules. 
 
Moreover, several exceptions are subject to protective conditions. The time conditions attached to the 
possibility to deduct interest and costs for residual debt are an example. A protective condition 
regarding the obligation to redeem the mortgage loan is that the borrower in case of arrears needs to 
prove, on pain of losing the right to deduct interest, that the arrears are a result of either a lack of 
repayment ability or an unintentional mistake. Also, a protective condition is attached to the possibility 
to deduct interest on loans taken for financing the costs of acquiring own home debt: a loan for 
financing commission is only part of the own home debt up to 1.5% of the amount of the obtained 
mortgage loan, and up to € 3630. This prevents that interest is labelled as commission in order to 
circumvent the prohibition to deduct interest over interest. However, circumvention of this prohibition 
is possible up to the aforementioned amounts. Yet, it is incoherent to prohibit deducting interest paid 
over interest, but to allow the costs of acquiring own home debt to be part of the own home debt. 
                                                          
1694 This will be further discussed in sub-section 6.2.1.3. 
1695 Cf. sub-section 1.4.2.3. 
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Actually, such costs and interest are not fundamentally different, because both are costs related to 
homeownership, and a remuneration for borrowing. Moreover, allowing deducting interest paid on 
loans for financing the costs of acquiring own home debt is incoherent with the regulatory LTV ratio, 
which is gradually reduced to 100% (as of 1 January 2018). It provides incentives in the opposite 
direction as the LTV ratio, namely to borrow more. In fact, even when the regulatory LTV ratio reaches 
100%, it is possible to deduct interest for own home debt up to 101.5%.1696 This is possible, because 
the definition of mortgage credit in the Bgfo and the definition of own home debt in the Wet IB 2001 
are different: hence, the LTV ratio restricts only secured credit, whereas unsecured credit can be part 
of the own home debt. 
 
Moreover, the completeness is undermined by the fact that certain rules can be circumvented. For 
instance, the redemption position can be influenced by redeeming a large part of the loan just before 
selling the house. By doing so, the freezed amortisation duration has to be continued for a lower 
amount, and a new amortisation period of thirty years starts for a larger amount of “new” own home 
debt. Nevertheless, generally the rules hamper easy circumvention. For example, circumventing the 
own home reserve is possible by renting a house for more than three years before moving to a more 
expensive own house, but this is quite cumbersome.  
 
Overall, the Dutch regime of MID incentivises households to borrow, notwithstanding the taxation of 
imputed rent and the rules which restrict the deduction possibilities to a certain extent. A lot of 
conditions contribute to the completeness of the rules. Nevertheless, these rules suffer a bit from 
indeterminacy and incompleteness. The former results mainly from the condition that debt can be part 
of the own home debt if taken for maintaining or improving the house, and to some extent from the 
complexity of the regime. The incompleteness is particularly a consequence of some possibilities to 
circumvent rules.  
 
6.1.2. Determinacy and completeness of the Irish rules on fiscal treatment of debt 
Ireland has reformed its regime for mortgage interest relief (MIR) – this term is used in Ireland instead 
of mortgage interest deductibility – significantly since 2009. As of 1 May of that year, MIR was 
                                                          
1696 This percentage might be even higher if loans are taken for maintaining and improving the house and the 
costs of the maintenance and improvement do not fully translate in a higher house value. 
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restricted to the first seven years of a mortgage.1697 In 2010, it has been decided that mortgage loans 
taken out after 31 December 2011 (later changed in 31 December 2012) will not be eligible for MIR, 
and that the possibility to receive relief for mortgage interest will be entirely abolished, for every loan, 
after 31 December 2017.1698 However, the rule that MIR was restricted to the first seven years of a 
mortgage was abandoned for mortgages taken out in and between 2004 and 2011 (later changed in 
2012), in order to support people who bought their home during the housing bubble, and who would 
face financial difficulties if MIR would stop after seven years.1699 In addition, the rates at which 
mortgage interest relief is granted have been altered in 2010.1700  
 
Since October 2013, Ireland offers howeowners the possibility to claim 13.5% relief for costs for 
renovating their house, provided that these costs are higher than €4,405.1701 The maximum relief is € 
4,050.1702 Homeowners can claim relief until 31 December 2018.1703 The possibility to claim this relief 
is subject to various conditions, regarding the residences that qualify for relief, the contractors that 
are allowed to carry out the work, and the information that a taxpayer must provide to the Revenue 
Commissioners, the Irish governmental body responsible for taxation.1704 Most importantly, from the 
perspective of this study, this relief is granted for the costs of renovation, not for interest payments or 
other borrowing costs. So, it does not directly stimulate debt financing.  
 
                                                          
1697 Section 3 of Finance Act 2009, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/12/enacted/en/html (last visited 10 November 2015). Cf. the 
country survey of Ireland in the database of the IBFD: http://online.ibfd.org/kbase and O’Brien (2009), p. 68. 
1698 Section 7 of Finance Act 2010. Cf. section 9 of Finance Act 2012. These acts are available at respectively 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2010/act/5/enacted/en/html and 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2012/act/9/enacted/en/html (both last visited 12 November 2015). 
1699 See the second stage of the discussion in the Dáil Éireann, the Irish lower house and principal chamber of 
the parliament, accessible via: 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/bills28/bills/2010/0910/document1.htm (last visited 
12 November 2015). 
1700 Section 7 of Finance Act 2010. 
1701 Section 477B(1)-(3) Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (TCA 1997). Unfortunately, later amendments have not 
been integrated in the publically available official version of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, but an unofficial 
consolidated version is available at http://www.taxworld.ie/tca-1997/. Section 477B(1)-(3) TCA 1997 is inserted 
by section 5 Finance (No. 2) Act 2013, http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2013/act/41/enacted/en/html (both 
last visited 10 March 2017). The minimum costs of €4,405 are the costs excluding VAT; it is € 5,000 including 
VAT, but relief is not granted over VAT.  
1702 Section 477B(3)(c) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1703 Section 477B(2) TCA 1997 (including amendments), as amended by section 9 Finance Act 2015, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2015/act/52/enacted/en/html, and section 8 Finance Act 2016, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2016/act/18/enacted/en/html. These acts prolonged the date till 31 
December 2018; in the first instance, it was 31 December 2015. 
1704 Section 477B TCA 1997 (including amendments). This is further explained in the Tax and Duty Manual of the 
Revenue Commissioners, part 15-01-43, available at http://www.revenue.ie/en/about/foi/s16/income-tax-
capital-gains-tax-corporation-tax/part-15/15-01-43.pdf (last visited 8 August 2016).   
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6.1.2.1. The main features of mortgage interest relief in Ireland 
The Irish regime for mortgage interest relief is based upon sections 244 till 245 of the Taxes 
Consolidation Act 1997 (TCA 1997), and the acts amending these provisions, which are several of the 
yearly adopted Finance Acts.1705 Under the present rules, there are three relevant periods for 
determining whether a loan can be eligible for MIR.1706 Firstly, no interest relief is possible for loans 
taken out until 2003. The same is true for mortgage loans taken out since 2013.1707 Loans taken out in 
the years 2004-2012 are eligible for mortgage interest relief till 2017, if certain conditions have been 
fulfilled. This includes top up loans, which increase the amount of existing mortgage loans, if these top 
up loans are taken out in this period.1708 
 
The rate at which mortgage interest relief is granted, as well as the maximum relievable interest, differs 
for first time and non-first time buyers.1709 The rate is 15% for the latter category.1710 There is one 
exception to this rule: 30% interest relief is granted for loans taken out in or between 2004 and 2008, 
if the loan concerns a second or subsequent qualifying residence, but the first qualifying residence was 
purchased on or after 1 January 2004.1711 For non-first time buyers, the maximum amount of interest 
in a year for which relief can be obtained, is € 6000 for a couple and € 3000 for an individual.1712 This 
amount is called relievable interest. When the 15% rate applies, this results in a yearly maximum 
interest relief of € 900 and € 450, respectively.  
 
For first time buyers, the rate is 25% in the first and second year of receiving the relief, 22.5% in the 
third, fourth and fifth year of receiving the relief, and 20% in the sixth and seventh year of receiving 
the relief.1713 If someone moves within the first seven years, he is still treated as a first time buyer for 
                                                          
1705 Supra, footnote 1701. 
1706 Section 244(1)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments).  
1707 Note that the section 9 of the Finance Act 2013 adds some sub-sections to section 244 TCA 1997, namely 
section 244(7)-(10). This covers some specific situations where (part) of the relevant actions occurs after the 
cut-off date of 31 December 2012, but loans can nevertheless be eligible for MIR. Examples are loans agreed in 
2012, but partly taken out in 2013 (section 244(8) TCA 1997) or loans taken out in 2012 for constructing a 
house in 2013 (section 244(7)(b) TCA 1997).  
1708 Cf. Revenue Commissioners (2009).  
1709 Note that section 244(3) TCA 1997 (including amendments) regulates the situation that a first-time buyer 
marries (or becomes the civil partner of) a non first-time buyer. 
1710 Section 244(2(a)(i)(I) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1711 Section 244(2(a)(ii) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1712 Supra, footnote 1706. If the partner of the borrower dies and he hence becomes an individual instead of a 
couple, he is still granted a tax credit up to the maximum amount of a couple, according to section 244(6) TCA 
1997 (including amendments).  
1713 Section 244(2(a)(i)(II) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
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seven years.1714 After the seventh year, the rate for non-first time buyers (15%) applies. Top-up loans 
can profit from the first time buyer rate, as long as this rate still applies to the already existing qualifying 
loan; otherwise the rate for non-first time buyers applies.1715 As an exception to these rules, for loans 
taken out in and between 2004 and 2008, 30% interest relief is granted, in every year till 2017.1716 For 
first time buyers, the relievable interest is € 20,000 for a couple, and € 10,000 for an individual.1717 So, 
a couple can receive a yearly relief up to € 6000 (if the 30% rate applies). For every buyer, first-time or 
not, the maximum amount of interest relief can never exceed the amount which reduces the income 
tax to zero.1718 
 
Currently, the Irish government is considering extending the mortgage interest relief scheme for a few 
years after 2017, on a tapered basis, in order to support homeowners who would otherwise be faced 
with strongly rising financing costs after 31 December 2017. Three options are considered.1719 Firstly, 
MIR can be granted to its current recipients at 75% of the current level in 2018, 50% in 2019, 25% in 
2020, and zero from 2021. The second option is to reduce the maximum ceiling per individual/couple 
to €2,250/€4,500 in 2018, €1,500/€3,000 in 2019, €750/€1,500 in 2020, and zero thereafter. The third 
option is the same as the first option, but only for homeowners who were first-time buyers during the 
peak of the housing boom, namely between 2004 and 2008.  
 
6.1.2.2. Eligibility conditions for mortgage interest relief in Ireland 
In order to qualify for mortgage interest relief, loans must be taken out between 2004 and 2012, and 
need to meet several other eligibility conditions: interest relief can solely be granted for interest paid 
in respect of a qualifying loan, in relation to a qualifying residence.1720  
 
A qualifying residence is a house in a state of the European Economic Area, which is used as the sole 
or main residence of the taxpayer, his former partner, or a dependent relative who uses the house 
rent-free and without any other consideration.1721 A dependent relative is a widowed parent of the 
                                                          
1714 Tax and Duty Manual, part 08.03.08, para. 11, available at 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/about/foi/s16/income-tax-capital-gains-tax-corporation-tax/part-08/08-03-08.pdf 
(last visited 8 August 2016). 
1715 Revenue Commissioners (2009). 
1716 Supra, footnote 1711. 
1717 Supra, footnote 1706. Cf. footnote 1712 for the situation that the partner of the borrower dies. 
1718 Section 244(2)(b)(ii) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1719 Tax Strategy Group (2016), para. 55-72. Cf. https://www.kildarestreet.com/wrans/?id=2017-02-
28a.416&s=speaker%3A433 (last visited 10 March 2017). 
1720 Section 244(1)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1721 Ibidem.  
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taxpayer or his partner, or another relative ‘who is incapacitated by old age or infirmity from 
maintaining himself or herself’.1722 The taxpayer does not necessarily have to own the house; it matters 
whether it is his home for the greater part of the time.1723 So, interest for a loan related to a secondary 
residence is not eligible for MIR. One exception exists to this general rule: if the taxpayer acquired a 
new sole or main residence, but has not yet disposed his previous sole or main residence, the latter 
shall still be treated as a qualifying residence for a period of a year after acquiring the new home.1724 
This exception is subject to conditions: the taxpayer must show – to the satisfaction of the inspector – 
that he intends to dispose of his previous sole or main residence, and has taken and is taking all 
reasonable steps necessary for doing this.1725 So, temporarily, two houses can simultaneously be a 
qualifying residence. 
 
Whether a loan is a qualifying loan is determined by its aim: it is a qualifying loan, if used ‘solely for 
the purpose of defraying money employed in the purchase, repair, development or improvement of a 
qualifying residence or in paying off another loan or loans used for such purpose.’1726 Hence, the 
purpose of the loan, and not its secured or unsecured status determines the eligibility of the interest 
paid for it for MIR. If part of the loan is used for other purposes than purchasing, repairing, developing 
or improving the qualifying residence, the amount of interest which qualifies as relievable interest is 
reduced pro rata.1727  
 
The TCA 1997 includes two exceptions to the general rule determining whether a loan is a qualifying 
loan. One restricts the “qualifying loan” concept, whereas the other extends it. Firstly, there are 
situations where a loan is not regarded as a qualifying loan, although it meets the aforementioned 
requirements. This is the case if the loan is meant for defraying money for buying a house from the 
taxpayer’s spouse, or buying a house which is previously sold by the taxpayer or his spouse.1728 This 
rule prevents several types of abuse of the system of MIR with a view of obtaining more interest relief. 
Firstly, a couple cannot enjoy the benefits of a first-time buyer for the second time by swapping the 
house among them. Also, it is no option to raise the loan at the moment of the repurchase of the house 
                                                          
1722 Section 466(2) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1723 Tax and Duty Manual, part 08.03.08, para. 13 (supra, footnote 1714). 
1724 Section 244(5) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1725 Ibidem. 
1726 Section 244(1)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments).  
1727 See e.g. Office of the Chief Inspector of Taxes (1998), pp. 18-20. 
1728 Section 244(4)(a)(i)-(ii) TCA 1997 (including amendments). However, these rules do not apply if the 
taxpayer who buys the house is separated from his or her spouse (section 244(4)(b) TCA 1997 (including 
amendments)). 
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or the purchase from the spouse, and use the extra debt for other purposes, such as consumption.1729 
Moreover, a loan is not considered a qualifying loan if the house is purchased from a person connected 
to the buyer and it appears that the purchase price substantially exceeds the house value, or when the 
house is repaired, developed or improved by a person connected to the home owner and the costs of 
this work substantially exceeds its value.1730 In this situation, it would have been possible to overpay 
the person concerned, in order to raise the amount of the loan for which interest relief can be given, 
and receive the overpaid money back from that person. This overpaid amount will however not be 
considered as a qualifying loan. So, these restrictions of the “qualifying loan” concept aim at preventing 
abuse.  
 
The “qualifying loan” concept is extended by the second exception, which concerns a bridging loan and 
is related to the exception to the rule about the qualifying residence, as discussed above. If the 
taxpayer moves to a new sole or main residence, but has not yet disposed his previous sole or main 
residence, he can receive interest relief on a bridging loan. This is defined as a loan which is used to 
‘defray in whole or in part the cost of the acquisition or the disposal or both’.1731 Interest relief is given 
for a maximum of one year, as if the taxpayer pays no other relievable interest.1732 In other words, the 
maximum relievable interest for a bridging loan is € 6000 for a couple or € 3000 for an individual, on 
top of the maximum relievable interest for a “normal” qualifying loan. The taxpayer must proof the 
existence of the bridging loan and the associated interest payments, and is not allowed to use the loan 
for other purposes.1733 
 
6.1.2.3. Evaluating the determinacy and completeness of mortgage interest relief in Ireland 
The outphasing of mortgage interest relief by the Irish legislature completely removes these tax-
induced borrowing incentives. The question is as how to evaluate the determinacy and completeness 
of the rules governing the mortgage interest relief which can be received until 31 December 2017, and 
probably afterwards for a few more years on a tapered basis. In particular, it is relevant whether the 
restrictive rules are determinate and complete. 
 
                                                          
1729 Cf. Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 Notes for Guidance, Part 8, pp. 18-19. These notes are available at 
http://www.revenue.ie/en/practitioner/law/notes-for-guidance/tca/ (last visited 12 November 2015). 
1730 Section 244(4)(a)(iii) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1731 Section 245(1)(b) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1732 Section 245(1) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1733 Section 245(1)-(2) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
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Firstly, the time restrictions – only loans taken out in the years 2004 till 2012 can be eligible for MIR – 
are clear and encompassing and thus determinate and complete.1734 Secondly, the rules determining 
the rate at which relief can be granted and the maximum relievable interest are determinate as well, 
as each rate and each maximum relievable amount is assigned to a well-defined category of persons. 
Moreover, there are rules for some otherwise indistinct situations, such as the case that a first-time 
buyer marries a non-first-time buyer.1735 The existence of rules for these situations thwarts 
circumvention. Hence, their completeness is safeguarded. In principle, the rules on the houses that are 
considered as qualifying residence are clear too. However, abuse of the exceptions for the dependent 
relative and the not yet disposed previous sole or main residence cannot be excluded. Yet, these risks 
are relatively contained, since it is possible to verify the existence of the dependent relative, and the 
exception for the unsold house applies only for one year.  
 
Another risk for the determinacy and completeness of the system is the qualifying loan concept, 
because the purpose of the loan determines its eligibility for MIR. Rules relying on the purpose of a 
transaction are inherently vague. This vagueness is mainly an issue for loans which are meant for 
improving a house, because it is needs to be verified whether such a loan is fully used to that end. 
However, the Tax and Duty Manual of the Revenue Commissioners lists examples of the types of costs 
which can and cannot be financed by a qualifying loan.1736 Furthermore, verification is possible by 
means of invoices, so also these risks are contained.1737 Several other forms of circumvention are 
counteracted by the rules which restrict the qualifying loan concept. As mentioned before, they are 
helpful to avoid certain types of circumvention, such as overpayment for house improvement, or 
overborrowing and using the money for other purposes.  
 
6.2. The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of the rules on 
tax treatment of debt 
Enforceability is an irrelevant precondition for effectiveness of norms which are purely incentivising 
instead of prohibiting.1738 The tax incentives provided by MID illustrate this: people will not be 
                                                          
1734 There are only few exceptions to this rule (supra, footnote 1707). These exceptions only deal with the 
transition from 2012 to 2013. They are clear and do not hamper the determinacy and completeness of the time 
restrictions. 
1735 Supra, footnote 1709. 
1736 Tax and Duty Manual, part 08.03.08, para. 12 (supra, footnote 1714). 
1737 Still, it cannot be excluded that a consumer has enough savings to pay for the improvement, but uses a loan 
in order to profit from MIR. 
1738 Cf. sub-section 1.4.3. 
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punished for not using all the possibilities to deduct interest. However, regimes for MID contain 
restrictions as well. It makes sense to analyse to what extent they can be enforced proportionately and 
dissuasively.  
 
Contrary to the instruments analysed in the previous chapters, generally the borrowers and not the 
lenders are the addressees of the rules governing MID. Hence, enforcement mainly is directed towards 
the borrowers. This means that some of the operationalisations to assess whether proportionate and 
dissuasive measures can be imposed, as discussed in the analytical framework, are not useful, since 
they concern the situation that lenders are the recipients. Yet, several insights remain valid: 
proportionate enforcement is possible if a range of enforcement measures is available, from light to 
severe sanctions, and sanctions are dissuasive if the expected costs of violating the rules outweigh the 
expected benefits, which requires the possibility to impose large fines.  
 
6.2.1. Enforcing the Dutch rules on tax treatment of debt 
Borrowers are incentivised to comply with the Dutch rules governing mortgage interest deductibility, 
since they will lose deduction possibilities if certain conditions are not fulfilled. Then, the loan will 
move to Box 3. Most importantly, this concerns the conditions on the relation of the debt to the own 
home and the amortisation requirements.1739 Also sanctions can be imposed, if rules have been 
violated. In the Netherlands, powers to impose fines for violations of tax laws are affected by various 
areas of law. The general framework for administrative sanctions is provided by Chapter 5 of the Awb, 
the general administrative law act.1740 Moreover, specific tax law applies, since the Algemene wet 
inzake rijksbelastingen (AWR) (General act on state taxes) includes provisions on enforcement.1741 Both 
acts, as well as relevant case law, refer to and are influenced by principles, rules and concepts of 
criminal law.1742 
 
When the Tax Administration discovers violations of fiscal rules, for instance regarding MID, it can 
choose to impose administrative sanctions, or to expedite the matter by means of criminal law.1743 It 
cannot do both, according to the una via principle, as codified in art. 5:44 Awb. The Tax Administration 
uses the Protocol AAFD to choose between these two options. It is in force since 1 July 2015 and 
                                                          
1739 Art. 3.119a, 3.119c and 3.119e Wet IB 2001. 
1740 Supra, footnote 727.  
1741 The AWR is available at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002320.  
1742 Cf. e.g. De Kleer (2005), Maigret (2010) and Feteris (2015).  
1743 Cf. Knoester & Vermeij (2012). 
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replaces previous guidelines on the same matter.1744 Although this protocol contains “only” policy rules 
and no law, it has legal consequences, because art. 4:84 Awb instructs administrative authorities to 
act in accordance with its policy rules, unless this has disproportionate consequences for one or more 
interested parties, due to special circumstances.1745 According to the Protocol AAFD, the Tax 
Administration will opt for criminal prosecution in case of violations resulting in disadvantages of more 
than € 100,000 and a suspicion of intent.1746 So, normally, violations of rules regarding MID are 
threatened with administrative sanctions instead of criminal prosecution. 
 
6.2.1.1. Administrative fines 
The AWR distinguishes two types of administrative fines: the default surcharge (verzuimboete) and the 
punitive penalty (vergrijpboete). The first category is not relevant for this study, since it concerns late 
or non-payment of taxes and the like.1747 The second category enables sanctioning of violations of rules 
regarding MID.1748 Art. 67d AWR allows imposing a punitive penalty of maximum 100% over the tax 
levied, if the tax assessment was incorrect or incomplete due to the intent of the taxpayer. Art. 67e 
AWR enables inflicting an administrative fine, if too little tax is levied due to the intent or gross 
negligence of the taxpayer. Then, the maximum fine is 100% of the additional levied tax. In both cases, 
the maximum fine is 300%, if the violations concern Box 3 income.  
 
The policy rules of the Tax Administration on imposing administrative fines, the Besluit Bestuurlijke 
Boeten Belastingdienst (BBBB) set the standard percentages for fines, which are lower than the 
aforementioned maximum percentages.1749 If tax is underpaid due to gross negligence of the taxpayer, 
                                                          
1744 The Protocol AAFD, with as full name Protocol aanmelding en afdoening van fiscale delicten en delicten op 
het gebied van douane en toeslagen, is available at 
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/besluiten/2015/06/24/blkb2015-572-fr-protocol-aafd (last visited 2 
October 2015).  
1745 Cf. De Kleer (2005). For motivating a decision, an administrative authority can simply refer to policy rules 
(art. 4:82 Awb). Interested parties can invoke a policy rule before a court.  Normally, a court reviews the policy 
rules itself, their application to the concrete case and finally the use of discretion by the administrative body, in 
this case the Tax Administration (Van Emmerik & Saris, 2014, p. 128). 
1746 Paragraph 2.1 Protocol AAFD. Nevertheless, several criteria may induce the Tax Administration to opt for 
criminal prosecution in case of lower amounts. This includes the situation that the suspected person has an 
exemplary function, for instance when he is a tax consultant, and also situations where the suspected person 
cooperated with a tax consultant or is a reoffender (see paragraphs 2.2(b), 2.2(c) and 2.2(f) of Protocol AAFD). 
1747 Art. 67a-67cb AWR. 
1748 Art. 67d-67e AWR are the provisions which enable the Tax Administration to impose punitive penalties for 
violating rules regarding MID. 
1749 The BBBB are available at https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stcrt-2016-34921.pdf (last visited 6 
August 2016). 
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the standard fine is 25% of the amount of underpaid tax.1750 This percentage is 50% in case of intent.1751 
The fine can be decreased, if it is disproportionate in relation to the severity of the violation, or for 
sake of the financial situation of the offender.1752 The severity of the violation or the fact that the 
violation was committed together with other offences can justify an increase of the fine above the 
standard percentage.1753 In case of recividism, the standard percentage of the fine can be doubled.1754  
 
If a fine is imposed for underpaid taxes, this is normally accompanied with tax interest, which has to 
be paid to the Tax Administration. Currently, the interest rate is the minimum rate of 4%. It is calculated 
over a period starting half a year after the end of the period to which the tax is related.1755 The tax 
interest in itself is often already perceived as a punishment, since it is much higher than current market 
interest rates. 
 
Intent or gross negligence as a necessary condition for imposing a fine 
The previous paragrahs have shown that the presence of intent or gross negligence is a necessary 
condition for enabling the imposition of an administrative fine. Intent means committing the violation 
knowingly and wilfully (willens en wetens).1756 The Supreme Court has lowered the bar for proving 
intent by introducing the concept “conditional intent” (voorwaardelijk opzet, dolus eventualis), which 
means knowingly and wilfully accepting the significant chance that certain consequences will take 
place, for instance, that the tax assessment is incorrect.1757 With regard to the aforementioned 
provisions of the AWR, this means that the person concerned is aware of and accepts the significant 
                                                          
1750 Para. 25(2), 25(9) and 26(4) BBBB. But see 26(3) BBBB, which suggest that the amount of the fine in case of 
a art. 67d AWR is a percentage of the whole amount of tax which has to be paid. 
1751 Para. 25(3) BBBB 
1752 Para. 7 BBBB. 
1753 Para. 8 BBBB. 
1754 Para 8(2)-(4) BBBB. For more circumstances which may induce decreasing or increasing the standard 
percentages, see para. 6-8, 25(5) and 26(11) BBBB 
1755 Art. 30fc(1)-(2) and 30hb(1) AWR. 
1756 De Hullu (2012), pp. 210-225; Maigret (2010). The policy rules of the Tax Administration on imposing 
administrative fines, the Besluit Bestuurlijke Boeten Belastingdienst (BBBB) have also incorporated a definition 
of intent: ‘Opzet is het willens en wetens handelen of nalaten, leidend tot het niet of niet binnen de daarvoor 
gestelde termijn heffen of betalen van belasting.’ (para. 25(3)).   
1757 In Dutch, the first definition of voorwaardelijk opzet was ‘zich willens en wetens blootstelt aan de geenszins 
als denkbeeldig te verwaarlozen kans dat (…)’ (Hoge Raad 9 November 1954, NJ 1955, 55). Later, the defintion 
changed to “bewust/willens en wetens de aanmerkelijke kans aanvaarden dat...” (cf. De Hullu (2012), p. 228), 
Bruijsten (2012a). An important case in this regard is: Hoge Raad 25 March 2003, NJ 2003, 552, para. 3.6. 
Examples of cases in tax law where voorwaardelijk opzet played a role, are Hoge Raad 13 February 2004, BNB 
2004/160 (para. 3.1) and Hoge Raad 3 December 2010, BNB 2011/59 (para. 3.6.1-3.6.2). In para. 25(3) BBBB 
conditional intent is defined as: ‘Onder voorwaardelijk opzet wordt verstaan het willens en wetens aanvaarden 
van de aanmerkelijke kans dat een handelen of nalaten tot gevolg heeft dat te weinig belasting geheven is of 
kan worden dan wel niet of niet binnen de termijn betaald is.’ 
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chance of an incorrect or too low assessment due to his behaviour. Intent has to be present at the 
moment of committing the offence.1758 Gross negligence (grove schuld) means negligence which is so 
reprehensible that it comes close to intent.1759 Because the burden for proving that certain actions 
constitute a punishable offence is on the Tax Administration, it needs to prove intent, conditional 
intent or gross negligence.1760 
 
No fine will be imposed if someone violated tax rules, for instance, regarding MID, but could 
nevertheless reasonably believe he acted in accordance with these rules. Then, the person concerned 
has a defendable standpoint (pleitbaar standpunt), and intent or gross negligence is absent.1761 
Whether a standpoint is defendable is determined objectively. This means that it is evaluated whether 
sufficient arguments for the standpoint exist, while it is not relevant whether the person concerned 
brings these arguments.1762 However, the background of the person concerned is taken into account 
for determining this; high requirements exist for professionals.1763 Bruijsten (2012b) discusses twelve 
rules of thumb for recognising whether a standpoint is defendable.  
 
Intent or gross negligence if a tax consultant is involved 
The rules governing the imposition of an administrative fine are partly different when a tax consultant 
is involved. In a nutshell, a consultant can receive a fine as well, if he (1) intentionally cooperates with 
the taxpayer in committing the offence, (2) causes the taxpayer to commit the offence, (3) persuades 
the taxpayer to commit the offence, or (4) supports the taxpayer in commiting the offence.1764 
                                                          
1758 Hoge Raad 3 December 2010, BNB 2011/59, para. 3.6.2. 
1759 Hoge Raad 23 June 1976, NL:HR:1976:AX3678, BNB 1976/199; Hoge Raad 19 December 1990, 
NL:HR:1990:ZC4481, BNB 1992/217, para. 4.5. Para. 25(2) BBBB defines gross negligence as: ‘Grove schuld is 
een in laakbaarheid aan opzet grenzende mate van verwijtbaarheid en omvat mede grove onachtzaamheid. 
Daarbij kan gedacht worden aan laakbare slordigheid of ernstige nalatigheid. Bij grove schuld had 
belanghebbende redelijkerwijs moeten of kunnen begrijpen dat zijn gedrag tot gevolg kon hebben dat te weinig 
belasting zou worden geheven of betaald.’ 
1760 See e.g. Hoge Raad 15 April 2011, NL:HR:2011:BN6350, V-N 2011/20.4, para. 4.11.3. 
1761 See e.g. Hoge Raad 11 July 1984, NL:HR:1984:BH6683, BNB 1984/268, para. 4; Hoge Raad 7 September 1988, 
L:HR:1988:ZC3892, BNB 1988/319, para. 4.4. Cf. Bruijsten (2012b). The concept of pleitbaar standpunt is also 
defined in para. 4 of the BBBB: ‘Van een pleitbaar standpunt is sprake als een door belanghebbende ingenomen 
standpunt, gelet op de stand van de jurisprudentie en de heersende leer, in die mate juridisch pleitbaar of 
verdedigbaar is dat belanghebbende redelijkerwijs kan menen juist te handelen.’ 
1762 Bruijsten (2012b). 
1763 So, for professionals it is more difficult to plea that they acted wrongly, but reasonably believed to act in 
accordance with the rules (Sitsen, 2014). 
1764 Art. 5:1(2) Awb in combination with art. 67o(1) AWR. Note that the tax payer himself cannot be punished in 
the second situation. Sanctioning the consultant is possible, because the Awb and AWR incorporated several 
concepts for punishing people who cooperate with or support the offender: see e.g. Hendriks (2007), Van de 
Kerkhof (2009), Valkenburg (2010), pp. 91-102; Maigret (2010); Knoester & Vermeij (2012); Huygen van Dyck-
Jagersma & Rijksen (2015). 
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Moreover, the question is whether the taxpayer is punishable in situations where the tax consultant 
filled the tax return. On the one hand, it is difficult to prove the required intent or gross negligence of 
the taxpayer in this situation. On the other hand, it is undesirable that the taxpayer can hide behind 
his tax consultant to escape a fine. The Dutch Supreme Court ruled that proven (conditional) intent or 
gross negligence of the tax consultant is not automatically attributable to the taxpayer.1765 So, the Tax 
Administration has to prove the (conditional) intent or gross negligence of the taxpayer. However, in 
certain situations this proof is presumably delivered, with a so-called bewijsvermoeden.1766 This means 
that it depends on a taxpayer’s exercise of due care and cooperation with the tax consultant whether 
(conditional) intent or gross negligence is assumed to be present.1767 Conditional intent of the taxpayer 
can only be presumed, if at least three conditions have been fulfilled.1768 Firstly, the taxpayer did not 
sufficiently control the progress of the work of the tax consultant. Secondly, this lack of control invoked 
the significant chance that the consultant would not do his job correctly, with underpaid taxes as result. 
Thirdly, the taxpayer has consciously accepted this chance.1769 Hence, proving intent or gross 
negligence of the taxpayer can be difficult for the Tax Administration when a tax consultant is involved. 
 
Sanctioning in case of creative compliance 
Everything discussed until now in this sub-section concerns relatively obvious violations of tax rules. 
However, it is also possible that rules are creatively complied with; meaning that a gap is used to act 
against the spirit of the rules, although they are not violated to the letter. The Tax Administration is 
not empty-handed to act against this kind of circumvention. The Supreme Court namely developed the 
dogma of fraus legis: abuse of tax law.1770 A fiscal construction only can qualify as fraus legis, if the 
decisive reason behind it is paying less tax while the construction is against the purpose and tendency 
of the law.1771 Crucial for determining whether the decisive reason behind a tax construction is paying 
less tax, is whether it has other advantages than circumventing taxes.1772 Resorting to fraus legis for 
                                                          
1765 Hoge Raad 1 December 2006, NL:HR:2006:AU7741, BNB 2007/151, para. 3.3-3.4. Cf. Van der Wal (2007). 
1766 Hoge Raad 1 December 2006, NL:HR:2006:AU7741, BNB 2007/151, para. 3.5-3.6. 
1767 Ibidem. 
1768 See section 8.1 in Bruijsten (2012a). 
1769 Hoge Raad HR 29 februari 2008, NL:HR:2008:BC5346, BNB 2008/156, para. 3.7.2. 
1770 Hoge Raad 26 May 1926, NJ 1926, 723. 
1771 Wolf (2014), p. 313; Bruijsten (2015). Cf. Hoge Raad 27 December 1967, ECLI:NL:HR:1967:AX6049, BNB 
1968/80; Hoge Raad 21 November 1984, ECLI:NL:HR:1984:AC8603, BNB 1985/32; Hoge Raad 16 September 
1992, ECLI:NL:HR:1992:ZC5102, BNB 1994/2; Hoge Raad 13 July 2001 ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB2642, BNB 2001/398 
and NTFR 2001/1034; Hoge Raad 10 August 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB3138, BNB 2001/399 and NTFR 
2001/1211. 
1772 Bruijsten (2015). Hoge Raad 22 July 1982, ECLI:NL:HR:1982:AW9473, BNB 1982/243; Hoge Raad 7 
December 1983, ECLI:NL:HR:1983:AW8750, BNB 1984/21. 
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prohibiting a fiscal construction is considered an ultimum remedium.1773 For various reasons, generally, 
no punitive penalty is imposed in a situation of fraus legis.1774 Therefore, inventing a tax construction 
to abuse loopholes to underpay taxes is a game without downside risk: in the worst case you have to 
abide by the rules that you are trying to circumvent, but you will never have to pay a fine.1775 
Nevertheless, there is at least one risk: the obligation to pay interest over the amount of underpaid 
tax. As discussed at the beginning of this sub-section, the tax interest itself is often already perceived 
as a punishment. 
 
6.2.1.2. Criminal prosecution 
Criminal prosecution is unlikely when rules regarding MID have been violated, considering the criteria 
of the Protocol AAFD, but nevertheless possible.1776 The AWR enables the imposition of criminal 
sanctions in certain situations where tax is underpaid due to intentional actions of the taxpayer. More 
specifically, art. 69(2) AWR penalises a taxpayer who intentionally lodges an incorrect or incomplete 
tax assessment, with underpaid tax as a result. This offence can be punished with imprisonment up to 
six years or a fine of maximum € 82,000.1777 If the amount of underpaid tax is more than this maximum 
fine, the fine can be raised to 100% of the underpaid tax.1778 Intent or conditional intent has to be 
proven, but only with respect to lodging an incorrect or incomplete tax assessment, not with regard to 
underpaying taxes.1779 This is different from the conditions for imposing administrative fines, as 
included in art. 67d and 67e AWR, which also require proof of the fact that the taxpayer intentionally 
underpaid tax. Like in an administrative case, a taxpayer can invoke the dogma of a defendable 
standpoint (pleitbaar standpunt) in order to avoid punishment.1780 
 
                                                          
1773 Bruijsten (2015). Hoge Raad 25 October 2000, ECLI:NL:HR:2000:AA7846, BNB 2001/123. 
1774 Snijders (2014), Baron & Bekker (2014, 2015). 
1775 Snijders (2014). 
1776 See the beginning of section 6.2.1. 
1777 Art. 69(2) AWR in combination with art. 23(4) and 23(9) Wetboek van Strafrecht (Criminal Code) (available 
at http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001854) and art. I of Besluit van 10 november 2015 tot wijziging van de 
bedragen van de categorieën, bedoeld in artikel 23, vierde lid, van het Wetboek van Strafrecht (available at 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/stb-2015-420.html). 
1778 Art. 69(2) AWR. 
1779 Art. 69(2) AWR. This is a deliberate choice of the legislator (see pages 20-24 of the Explanatory 
Memorandom to the AWR: MvT, Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 470, nr. 3, available at 
http://resolver3.kb.nl/resolve?urn=sgd%3Ampeg21%3A19931994%3A0005928 (last visited 6 August 2016)).   
1780 Cf. Hoge Raad 6 March, 2012, NL:HR:2012:BQ8596, para. 7.3-7.4; Hoge Raad 8 February 2005, 
NL:HR:2005:AR3719, para. 3.6.4. 
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6.2.1.3. Evaluating the possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of the Dutch rules on tax 
treatment of debt 
This discussion reveals that proportionate enforcement of violations of the rules regarding mortgage 
interest deductibility is possible. The magnitude of the fine can be varied, depending on various 
aspects. Actually, the Tax Administration is obliged to respect the principle of proportionality when 
imposing sanctions. The consequences of non-compliance with a condition for qualifying as own home 
debt are severe, namely losing the option to deduct interest for the part of the debt not meeting the 
conditions. This is not necessary always proportional, but certainly dissuasive. Also, a disuassive 
application of punitive penalties is possible: with fines up to 100% of underpaid taxes, the most severe 
sanctions are dissuasive enough to deter.1781 However, it is debatable whether the standard fines – 
25% on underpaid taxes in case of gross negligence, and 50% in case of (conditional) intent – are high 
enough to be dissuasive. This depends largely on the chance of getting caught, and the likelihood of 
receiving sanctions if caught.  
 
The chance of getting caught is mainly an empirical question, which inter alia depends on the type of 
violation and the capacity of the Tax Administration to investigate tax assessments. It is known that 
the Tax Administration lacks manpower to check tax assessments.1782 However, this is not really a 
problem for ensuring compliance with the rules on MID, since the Tax Administration receives most 
information about these loans from banks, which already verify whether interest is deductible.1783 This 
information can be checked automatically, using software. If a person borrows from a lender without 
information duty, the borrower needs to fulfil some information requirements towards the Tax 
Administration.1784 Only in these situations, the Tax Administration cannot lean upon verification by 
banks, and has to do the work itself, also verifying invoices for improvement of the house. 
 
Furthermore, the likelihood of receiving sanctions, if caught, is affected by several legal issues. Firstly, 
the possibility to impose sanctions is hindered – albeit legitimately – by the requirement to prove 
intent, conditional intent or gross negligence. Even in case of conditional intent – which is easier to 
                                                          
1781 Criminal law even allows imprisonment for violations of tax law, but it is not realistic to expect this in case 
of a violation of a rule regarding MID. 
1782 See e.g. the broadcast of Zembla of 25 September 2014: http://www.npo.nl/zembla/25-09-
2014/VARA_101369809. Zembla broadcasts the results of investigative journalism. For the reaction of the 
Secretary of State of Finance, who is politically responsible for the Tax Administration, to this broadcast, see 
this letter to the parliament https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2014/09/29/brief-over-
uitzending-zembla (both last visited 6 August 2016). Cf. Vakstudie Nieuws (2014).  
1783 Cf. sub-sections 6.1.1.2 and 6.1.1.3. 
1784 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.2. 
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prove than intent – the Tax Administration needs to show that a taxpayer was aware of the fact that 
his behaviour invoked the significant chance that he will underpay taxes, and that he consciously 
accepted that chance. Proving this can be difficult for the Tax Administration, especially when a tax 
consultant is involved. Moreover, a taxpayer can try to avoid sanctions by invoking the dogma of 
defendable standpoint. Especially in case of complex rules, a judge will more easily honour a taxpayer’s 
argument that he reasonably believed he acted in accordance with the rules. Since rules on mortgage 
interest deductibility are sometimes quite complex,1785 it is easy to imagine that a taxpayer who 
violated some of these rules, can make the case that his standpoint is defendable. Then, no sanction 
is imposed. Lastly, if someone circumvented rules on MID and the dogma of fraus legis is applied, 
normally no punitive sanction is imposed. So, if a taxpayer abuses a loophole in the regime of MID, it 
might be possible in certain cases to prohibit the construction, but without punishment. 
 
All in all, this discussion shows that imposing sanctions is not always easy for the Tax Administration. 
A dissuasive sanctioning regime cannot be completely guaranteed. Nevertheless, not all the obstacles 
to dissuasive sanctioning can be removed, since some of them are indispensable from a legal point of 
view. This concerns the need to prove (conditional) intent or gross negligence and to abstain from 
imposing sanction in case of a defendable standpoint or fraus legis. However, since banks already verify 
the eligibility for MID for most loans, the risk of violations of the rules is relatively small. Therefore, the 
need to penalise persons is small as well.  
 
6.2.2. Enforcing the Irish rules on fiscal treatment of debt 
For understanding the enforcement possibilities of the rules regarding MIR, it is essential to know how 
the relief is granted to households. Since 2002, most of the mortgage interest relief is granted at 
source, meaning that it is provided via lenders, who reduce a borrower’s mortgage repayment by the 
amount of tax relief to which he is entitled.1786 In turn, the lenders can reclaim the money from the 
Revenue Commissioners.1787 Tax relief is only granted at source for qualified loans which are secured 
by mortgages on qualifying residences situated in Ireland.1788 For other qualifying loans – which are, 
                                                          
1785 As evidenced by the discussion in sub-section 6.1.1. 
1786 Section 244A TCA 1997 (including amendments), inserted by means of section 23 Finance Act 2001, 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2001/act/7/enacted/en/html. 
1787 The Revenue Commissions have been established by means of S.I. 2/1923, Revenue Commissioners Order, 
1923, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1923/sro/702/made/en/print (last visited 6 August 
2016). Cf. Donnelly & Walsh (2002), p. 7. 
1788 Section 244A(1)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments).  
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most importantly, unsecured loans for repairing, improving or developing an own home – interest 
relief is claimed through a tax return.1789 
 
In the tax relief at source system, home owners who want to receive MIR, need to apply for it by means 
of an online form at the website of the Revenue Commissioners, and to provide the required 
information.1790 From then on, they are required to report changes in their personal status or the status 
of the property, if affecting the amount of relievable interest.1791 The Revenue Commissioners provide 
the lenders who participate in the tax relief at source system – being most lenders relevant for this 
study1792 – monthly with a report containing the necessary information for operating the system.1793 
The lenders have to settle the relief with the actual interest payments.1794 Moreover, they have to 
provide the Revenue Commissioners with all kind of information.1795 This enables the Revenue 
Commissioners to assess whether the claimed interest relief is correct. Collins and Walsh (2010) rightly 
conclude that the “tax relief at source” system reduces the risk of fraud, since borrowers and lenders 
must cooperate in order to engage in fraud.1796 Hence, this system creates an extra layer of control 
and facilitates the enforcement of the provisions on MIR.  
 
In Ireland, the penalties for breaching the rules regarding MIR are included in Part 47 of the Taxes 
Consolidation Act 1997. It allows the Revenue Commissioners to impose civil penalties or to opt for 
criminal prosecution. The level of required proof differs between civil and criminal proceedings. In the 
first case, the Revenue Commissioners must proof the case ‘on the balance of probabilities’, while facts 
must be ‘beyond on all reasonable doubt’ in crimimal cases.1797  
                                                          
1789 Interest relief is also granted via a tax return when the tax payer borrows from a lender who is not qualified 
for operating in the regime for tax relief at source (section 244A(2)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments). Most 
lenders - including all banks licensed in EU member states – are qualified lenders (see section 244A(3) TCA 1997 
(including amendments).  
1790 See http://www.revenue.ie/en/online/mortgage-interest-relief.html (last visited 13 November 2015). The 
obligation to apply is included in regulation 7 S.I. 558/2001, named Mortgage Interest (Relief at Source) 
Regulations 2001 and available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2001/si/558/made/en/print. 
1791 Regulation 7(3) S.I. 558/2001. 
1792 Supra, footnote 1789. 
1793 Regulation 6 S.I. 558/2001. 
1794 Cf. http://www.revenue.ie/en/online/mortgage-interest-relief.html (last visited 14 November 2015). 
1795 See section 244(5) TCA 1997 (including amendments) and regulations 5 and 8 S.I. 558/2001 and Regulation 
2 S.I. 424/2011, Mortgage Interest (Relief at Source) Regulations 2011 and available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2011/si/424/made/en/print. A lender can receive a fine of € 3,000 for not 
supplying this information, which will be increased to € 4000 if the failure still exists after the end of the year 
(section 1052(1) TCA 1997 (including amendments), which refers to Schedule 29, column 1, which lists section 
244A TCA 1997)). 
1796 Collins & Walsh (2010), p. 9. 
1797 Donnelly & Walsh (2002), p. 196. 
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6.2.2.1. Civil penalties 
Two provisions enable penalising a person who violates rules regarding mortgage interest relief with 
the aim of claiming too much relief/underpaying tax. Firstly, section 1056(1)-(2) TCA 1997 penalises 
making knowingly a false statement in reference to the income tax which results in differences in the 
amount of income taxe which is and has to be paid, in order to obtain any allowance, reduction, rebate 
or repayment of tax. This can be receiving more MIR than entitled to. The magnitude of the fine 
depends on the difference between the tax which is paid due to the false statement, and the tax which 
has to be paid. This is referred to as ‘the specified difference’. The magnitude also depends on the 
manner in which the offender is convicted.1798 In case of a summary conviction and a specified 
difference of less than € 1520, the maximum sanction is a fine of 25% of this difference, imprisonment 
for a year, or both.1799 In case of a summary conviction and a specified difference equal or larger than 
€ 1520, the maximum sanction is a fine of € 1520, imprisonment for a year, or both.1800 In case of 
conviction on indictment, the maximum sanction is a fine of 25% and/or 2 years imprisonment.1801  
 
Secondly, section 1077E TCA 1997 enables imposing sanctions when a person deliberately makes a 
false, overstated or otherwise incorrect claim in connection to mortgage interest relief.1802 
Alternatively, a fine can be inflicted if a person submits an incorrect return, statement or claim 
regarding MIR, without taking reasonable care.1803 The TCA 1997 does not define what ‘deliberately’ 
and ‘failure to take reasonable care’ mean. The Revenue Commissioners have published how they 
understand these terms.1804 Deliberate behaviour is understood in accordance with its normal 
meaning.1805 According to Code of Practice for Revenue Audit and other Compliance Interventions, this 
entails that ‘indicators [are] consistent with intent to default or alternatively, (…) a breach that cannot 
                                                          
1798 For the difference between a summary conviction and a conviction on indictment, see sub-section 5.2.3.1. 
1799 Section 1056(3)(a)(i) TCA 1997. 
1800 Section 1056(3)(a)(ii) TCA 1997. 
1801 Section 1056(3)(b) TCA 1997. In general, larger sanctions are possible, but since the maximum specified 
difference is € 6000 in case of fraud with MIR, the sanction can never be larger than that mentioned in section 
1056(3)(b)(i) TCA 1997. 
1802 Section 1077E(2),(5) TCA 1997. Note that these two sub-sections, 2 and 5, both distinguish three situations 
in which a person is liable to a penalty. Claiming too much MIR by means is punishable under each of these 
three situations (note that section 244A TCA 1997 is listed in column 1 of Schedule 29, too which sub (a) of 
these two sub-sections refers). 
1803 Section 1077E(1),(5) TCA 1997. 
1804 Revenue Commissioners (2015), para. 5.6. 
1805 This statement in the Code of Practice is in accordance with Irish case law, where it is confirmed that acts 
ought to be understood, in the first instance, using literal interpretation. Taxation statutes in particular need to 
be understood in accordance with the common and ordinary use of the words (see Gaffney v. The Revenue 
Commissioners [2013] IEHC 651).  
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be explained solely by carelessness’.1806 One of these indicators is ‘providing incomplete, false or 
misleading documents or information’.1807 Consequently, the existence of deliberate behaviour is not 
difficult to prove, since a subjective factor like intent is assumed to exist in the presence of certain 
objective factors, namely incomplete or false information. The test of reasonable care is defined as 
‘whether a taxpayer of ordinary skill and knowledge, properly advised, would have foreseen as a 
reasonable probability or likelihood the prospect that an act (or omission) would cause a tax 
underpayment, having regard to all the circumstances’.1808 Arguably, it is not difficult for the Revenue 
Commissioners to show that this test is fulfilled if certain acts or omissions of the taxpayer are the 
reason for an overstated amount of MIR. 
 
The magnitude of the fine imposed based upon section 1077E TCA 1997 depends on various 
circumstances. It is 100% of the incorrectly obtained relief if deliberate actions have caused this 
difference between the improperly obtained and correct MIR.1809 However, section 1077E(4) TCA 1997 
introduces various grounds for reducing this percentage. The penalty is reduced to 10%, if the offender 
voluntarily notifies the Revenue Commissioners before an investigation is started and discloses all 
relevant information.1810 The penalty is reduced to 50%, if the offender submits all relevant information 
to the Revenue Commissioners after having been notified that an investigation will start, but before it 
actually starts.1811 Finally, the penalty is reduced to 75%, if the offender cooperates fully with the 
Revenue Commissioners during the investigation.1812 If careless actions led to incorrectly obtained 
interest relief, the rules distinguish even more different maximum penalty percentages, varying 
between 3% and 40%, depending on the magnitude of the difference between the correct and 
incorrect amount of MIR (more or less than 15%), and the (moment of) cooperation with the Revenue 
Commissioners (with a comparable system as for deliberate actions).1813 
                                                          
1806 Revenue Commissioners (2015), para. 5.6(a). 
1807 Ibidem. 
1808 Ibidem, para. 5.6(b). 
1809 Section 1077E(4),(11)-(12) TCA 1997. 
1810 Section 1077E(4) TCA 1997. 
1811 Ibidem. These rules gave rise to case law about the effects of starting an investigation on the possibilities to 
disclose information. See e.g. Gaffney v. The Revenue Commissioners [2013] IEHC 651; Murphy v. The Revenue 
Commissioners [2015] IEHC 670. 
1812 Ibidem. 
1813 If the difference is more than 15%, the penalty is 40% of this difference; otherwise it is 20% (section 
1077E(7)(a) TCA 1997). However, if the offender voluntarily notifies the Revenue Commissioners before an 
investigation is started and discloses all relevant information, the penalty is reduced to 5% or 3%, in case of a 
difference between correct and incorrect MIR of respectively more than or maximum 15% (section 1077E(7)(b) 
TCA 1997). If the offender submits all relevant information to the Revenue Commissioners after having been 
notified that an investigation will start, but before it actually starts, the penalty is reduced to 20% or 10% 
respectively, in case of a difference between correct and incorrect MIR of respectively more than or maximum 
15%. Finally, if the offender cooperates fully with the Revenue Commissioners during the investigation, the 
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Yet, not only the offender, but also persons assisting him are liable to a penalty. Under section 
1056(2)(b) TCA 1997, a person who assists or induces someone to make a false statement or submit 
an incorrect return is subject to the same penalty as the offender. In addition, section 1055 TCA 1997 
enables the punishment of ‘[a]ny person who deliberately assists in or induces the making or delivery 
for any purposes of income tax (…) of any incorrect return, account, statement or declaration’ with a 
penalty of €4,000. 
 
If the Revenue Commissioners collect underpaid tax which resulted from an incomplete or incorrect 
claim in connection to mortgage interest relief, not only a fine can be imposed, but also interest will 
be levied. The interest will be calculated ‘on the date when the tax becomes due and payable until 
payment’.1814 The current interest rate is 0.0219% per day, which means 8% per year.1815 The Revenue 
Commissioners can publish a list of persons who have received a fine.1816  
 
6.2.2.2. Criminal prosecution 
Section 1078 TCA 1997 includes both general and specific provisions criminalising certain offences. 
According to the general provision, the Revenue Commissioners may institute criminal proceedings if 
someone knowingly claims, obtains or attempts to claim or obtain relief to which he is not entitled, 
and for this purpose deceives, omits or uses other dishonest means, such as providing false, 
incomplete or misleading information.1817 This list of criminalised specific offences includes knowingly 
or wilfully providing incorrect information in relation to any tax, and claiming or obtaining relief to 
which the person, to his own knowledge, is not entitled.1818 Hence, someone who knowingly or wilfully 
obtains MIR to which he is not eligible can face criminal sanctions. 
 
The maximum sanction for these violations depends on the manner in which the offender is convicted. 
In case of a summary conviction, the maximum sanction is a fine of € 5,000 or imprisonment for a year 
                                                          
penalty is reduced to 30% or 15%, in case of a difference between correct and incorrect MIR of respectively 
more than or maximum 15%. 
1814 Section 1080(2)(a) (ii) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1815 Section 1080(2)(c) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
1816 Section 1086 TCA 1997 (including amendments). Cf. Donnelly & Walsh (2012), pp. 142-145. 
1817 Section 1078(1A)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments). Also punishable is someone who knowingly or 
recklessy assists, incutes or induces a person with obtaining MIR to which he is not eligible (section 
1078(1A)(b)-(c) TCA 1997 (including amendments)). 
1818 Section 1078(2)(a),(c) TCA 1997 (including amendments).  
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or both.1819 The fine may be mitigated by the Revenue Commissioners to a fourth of the original 
fine.1820 In case of a conviction on indictment, the maximum sanction is a fine of € 126,790 or 
imprisonment for 5 years or both.1821 
 
6.2.2.3. Evaluating the possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement of the Irish rules on fiscal 
treatment of debt 
Under Irish rules, proportionate enforcement of falsely obtained MIR is possible, as the magnitude of 
the sanctions can be varied. When using section 1077E TCA 1997 as legal basis for punishment, a 
proportionate sanctioning system is actually automatically applied.  
 
Fines up to 100% can be inflicted, which is a deterrent magnitude. Furthermore, the tax at source 
system increases the likelihood that someone who obtains too much MIR receives a sanction, because 
it provides the Revenue Commissioners with information and makes fraud more difficult. In addition, 
several legal issues are relevant for the chance of receiving sanctions if caught. It matters how easily 
the required proof can be provided. When section 1056 TCA 1997 is used as the legal basis for imposing 
penalties, it must be proven that the taxpayer knowingly made a false statement to obtain more MIR 
than entitled to, while section 1077E TCA 1997 requires proof of either deliberate or careless actions. 
As explained above, proving deliberate and especially careless actions is not difficult. However, the 
maximum fine for careless actions which led to underpaid tax is only 40%. All in all, it seems not difficult 
to impose deterrent sanctions. Hence, their dissuasiveness is guaranteed. Moreover, the high interest 
rate levied on overdue tax, 8% per year, adds to the dissuasiveness of the sanctions. 
 
6.3. Independent amendment, application and enforcement of the rules on tax 
treatment of debt 
Since tax rules on the treatment of debt are not aimed at the financial sector, but at citizens, the risk 
that these rules are insufficiently applied and enforced due to capture is small. Therefore, 
independence of the actors who apply and enforce these rules is not the main issue at stake. Yet, there 
is still the underlying risk that unpopular decisions which benefit the longer-term general interests are 
                                                          
1819 Section 1078(3)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments).  Summary convictions are given in a court with a 
judge without a jury, whereas indictable convictions are given by a court with a judge and a jury (cf. Donnelly & 
Walsh (2002), pp. 13-14, 17). 
1820 Section 1078(3)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments).   
1821 Section 1078(3)(a) TCA 1997 (including amendments). 
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not taken. In this context, the main concern is to what extent a parliament is willing to take decisions 
which restrict MID/MIR. Therefore, instead of following the operationalisation as set forth in sub-
section 1.4.4, this section focusses on the independence of member states to decide on these issues, 
and on the procedures which the EU has created for influencing member states’ economic and fiscal 
policies. Subsequently, it will be discussed to what extent national authorities are pushed towards 
enforcing the tax rules, since a lack of enforcement may stimulate non-compliance. Yet, since this is 
less of a concern than for the instruments discussed in the previous chapters, the latter discussion will 
be kept short.  
 
6.3.1. EU influences on the amendment of the rules on tax treatment of debt 
The EU has no competences in the field of income taxation. Still, EU law can affect income taxation 
through negative integration, when conflicts with the internal market arise. Moreover, the Union can 
influence member states’ policies on mortgage interest deductibility by giving recommendations 
within the framework of economic governance in the EU. This framework – to be discussed below – 
governs the coordination of member states’ economic policies, in particular fiscal policies. Using the 
framework of economic governance to issue recommendations about MID is not only a theoretical 
possibility. In 2012 the Netherlands received the recommendation to gradually reform the housing 
market, among other things, by phasing out mortgage interest deductibility.1822 Between 2013 and 
2015, the Netherlands was recommended to accelerate the planned reduction of the maximum 
deductible percentage of mortgage interest.1823  
 
Basically, there are two reasons why it is possible that a tax measure like MID receives attention in the 
framework of economic governance in the EU. Firstly, allowing the deduction of mortgage interest has 
fiscal consequences, which can be considerable. Secondly, MID has a profound influence on the level 
                                                          
1822 Recommendation 5 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 
2012 of the Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of the Netherlands, 2012-
15, OJ 2012, C 219/88. 
1823 Recommendation 2 of the Council Recommendation of 9 July 2013 on the National Reform Programme 
2013 of the Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of the Netherlands, 2012-
2017, OJ 2013, C 217/89; Recommendation 2 of the Council Recommendation of 8 July 2014 on the National 
Reform Programme 2014 of the Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
the Netherlands, 2014, OJ 2014, C 247/88; Recommendation 2 of the Council Recommendation of 14 July 2015 
on the 2015 National Reform Programme of the Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 
Stability Programme of the Netherlands, OJ 2015, C 272/83. Aside, the recommendations acknowledged the 
economic situation: in 2013 it stated that an accelerated reform should take into account the impact of the 
economic environment, whereas the strengthened recovery was cited in 2015 as a reason for accelerating the 
reduction of the maximum deductible interest. 
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of household debt, which, as of 2011, is one of the indicators considered in the macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIP), one of the procedures within the framework of economic governance in 
the EU.1824  
 
The question is how imperative these recommendations are. In other words, it is relevant to what 
extent the system of economic governance in the EU restricts the independence of member states in 
amending the rules on the tax treatment of debt. Therefore, a brief discussion of this framework is 
necessary for understanding the content and force of these recommendations.  
 
The framework of economic governance in the European Union governs the coordination of member 
states’ economic policies.1825 Predominantly, it is a rule-based system, although there is room for 
discretionary choices and coordination.1826 Art. 121 and 126 TFEU constitute the basic framework for 
achieving this coordination: the former sets out the multilateral surveillance procedure (MSP), which 
essentially deals with the coordination of economic policies, while the latter creates the excessive 
deficit procedure (EDP), with as goal the restriction of government debt and deficits. Both procedures 
have further been elaborated by two regulations – together called the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
– which were adopted in 1997 and have been amended several times by other regulations since.1827 
The MSP and EDP are called the preventive and corrective arm of the SGP, respectively. In 2011, a third 
                                                          
1824 Cf. European Commission (2015a), pp. 29-31. 
1825 Art. 5 TFEU instructs member states to coordinate their economic policies and provides the Council with 
the competence to ‘adopt measures, in particular broad guidelines for these policies’. Art. 120-126 TFEU 
further details the procedures and conditions for this process. 
1826 Armstrong (2013), pp. 608-613. Cf. Verdun (2013), pp. 26-28, 33. For a discussion of the history of this 
framework, see e.g. Verdun (2004, 2013), De Streel (2013), Lastra & Louis (2013). For a discussion of the 
rationale behind the framework of economic governance and the arguably ordoliberal principles behind it, see 
respectively Louis (2010), pp. 979-981; Nedergaard & Snaith (2015), pp. 1096-1104. Moreover, for the rationale 
of the framework of economic governance, see also para. 58-59 of Case C-370/12 Pringle (EU:C:2012:756) and 
para. 100 of Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others (EU:C:2015:400). 
1827 The SGP was established in 1997 with Council Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997, OJ 1997, L 209/1 and 
Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997, OJ 1997, L 209/6. It was reformed in 2005 with Council Regulation 
1055/2005 of 27 June 2005, OJ 2005, L 174/1 and Council Regulation 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005, OJ 2005, L 
174/5. The SGP was reformed again in 2011, when the Six-Pack was adopted, consisting of five regulations and 
a directive: Regulation 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, OJ 
2011, L306/1; Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, OJ 
2011, L306/12; Council Regulation 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011, OJ 2011, L306/33. For a discussion of the 
reforms in 2005 and 2011, see respectively Amtenbrink & De Haan (2003, 2006), Louis (2004, 2006), Smits 
(2004), Hodson & Maher (2004), Schelkle (2007) and Amtenbrink (2011, 2012), Ruffert (2011), Adamski (2012).  
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procedure was created, the MIP, a species of the MSP.1828 The EDP is not particularly relevant for this 
study, but the MSP and MIP require some further explanation.1829  
 
In 2013, the framework of economic governance in the EU was reformed through the adoption of the 
Two-Pack, two regulations applying to the member states that have adopted the euro.1830 One of these 
regulations allows for enhanced surveillance for member states experiencing or ‘threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability (…), leading to potential adverse spill-over 
effects on other Member States in the euro area’.1831 Since high household debt levels might have 
consequences for financial stability, the possibility of putting member states under enhanced 
surveillance requires attention. 
 
6.3.1.1. The impact of the multilateral surveillance procedure on the fiscal independence of member 
states 
According to the procedure envisaged in Article 121 TFEU and the regulations based upon this 
provision, the economic policies of the member states must be in conformity with the broad guidelines 
of the economic policies (BGEP).1832 These guidelines are issued in the course of a yearly policy cycle, 
which was reformed in 2011 with the creation of European Semester, a clearer cycle of policy 
surveillance and coordination, aiming at improving economic coordination and policy coherence.1833 
The cycle starts in November with several reports of the Commission, including the Annual Growth 
Survey, which identifies the economic priorities for the EU, and a recommendation for the BGEP. 
Thereafter, the Council formulates the BGEP and reports to the European Council, which concludes 
                                                          
1828 MIP: Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, OJ 2011, 
L306/25. Enforcement of MIP: Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
November 2011, OJ 2011, L306/8.  
1829 The EDP creates the procedure to enforce abidance by the maximum thresholds of 60% government debt 
and 3% government deficit. This is not of prime relevance for this study. 
1830 Art. 1(3) Regulation 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, OJ 2013, 
L140/1 and art. 1(3) Regulation 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, OJ 
2013, L140/11. In 2012, 25 member states have also adopted the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (the so-called Fiscal Compact), which mainly has created 
additionial obligations for member states to achieve a balanced budget and reduce government debt (art. 3-4).   
1831 Art. 1(1)(a) Regulation 472/2013. 
1832 Articles 120 and 121(1)-(3) TFEU. For the regulations, see footnote 1827. 
1833 See art. 2-a Regulation 1466/1997 (after amendment with Regulation 1175/2011). For the integration of 
the MIP in the European Semester, see.art. 1(2) and 6(4) Regulation 1176/2011. See also art. 4 Regulation 
473/2013. For more information about the European Semester, see also European Commission (2015c), Annex 
2, European Commission (2015d); http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/index_en.htm; 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/how-european-semester-works/ (both last 
visited 18 April 2016).  
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about the BGEP. Subsequently, member states adopt Stability or Convergence Programmes, containing 
medium term budgetary plans and strategies for achieving sustainable growth, which must be 
consistent with the BGEP.1834 During the summer, the Council adopts, with a qualified majority, 
country-specific recommendations for the member states, which are endorsed by the European 
Council. These country-specific recommendations seek to ensure that the economic policies of 
member states are in accordance with the BGEP, and do not jeopardise the proper functioning of the 
EMU.1835 The Commission can as well issue a warning to a member state, in ‘the event of a significant 
observed deviation from the adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective’.1836 This 
can result in a Council recommendation containing policy measures to return to the adjustment path 
towards the medium-term budgetary objective.1837 Finally, the Council can, after having established 
that a member state has not taken effective action in reaction to its recommendation, require euro 
area member states to lodge an interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of its GDP with the Commission.1838 
No such sanction is available for not respecting the BGEP.  
 
Hence, a country-specific recommendation in the MSP is not subject to any other coercion than peer 
pressure, unless it is concerned with deviations from the medium-term budgetary objective of a 
member state. Consequently, although a country-specific recommendation requesting a reform of the 
regime for MID pushes a member state in a certain direction, it does do not really restrict the member 
state’s decionsion-making powers. Disregarding the recommendation has little consequences. This 
conclusion is supported by the literature, which highlights weaknesses in the MSP.1839 The European 
Semester integrated the national and European cycles of policy-making. This increases the chance that 
member states adhere to recommendations issued in the context of the MSP. It might also intensify 
the pressure on member states to comply with these recommendations, whereas the process of 
adopting BGEP may increase the acceptance of the recommendations by member states.1840 
                                                          
1834 Art. 3(1) and 7(1) Regulation 1466/1997. Member states which have adopted the euro, must submit 
Stability Programmes, whereas the other EU member states need to submit Convergence Programmes (cf. art. 
2 Regulation 1466/1997).  
1835 Article 121(4) TFEU. 
1836 Art. 6(2) and 10(2) Regulation 1466/1997.  
1837 Ibidem. 
1838 Art. 4(1) Regulation 1173/2011. The Council decides on this sanction, on recommendation of the 
Commission, which shall come within 20 days after the Council decided that the member state concerned took 
no effective action. The Commission recommendation is adopted, unless a qualified majority in the Council 
rejects it within 10 days (art. 4(2) Regulation 1173/2011). Note that according to art. 121(4) TFEU decisions of 
the Council in the MSP are taken with qualified majority voting. Hence, the legality of introducing reverse 
qualified majority voting by secondary EU law can be contested (for a discussion, see Palmstorfer (2014)). 
1839 See e.g. Adamski (2012), pp. 1340-1342. On these kind of weaknesses before the reforms of 2011, see e.g. 
Amtenbrink and De Haan (2003), pp. 1076-1085; Amtenbrink and De Haan (2006), p. 404. 
1840 Amtenbrink & Repasi (2017), section 3.1.1.1. 
6. The tax treatment of debt 
310 
 
Nevertheless, if member states are unwilling to comply, they face few consequences. So, although the 
MSP may influence member states’s policies, it does not significantly restrict their powers to design 
the rules governing mortgage interest deductibility. The aforementioned recommendations regarding 
MID received by the Netherlands serve as an example of the uncertainty about the actual influence of 
the MSP. When the Netherlands was recommended for the first time to phase out MID, in 2012, Dutch 
political parties had already agreed on limiting deductibility of mortgage interest to mortgages, for 
which borrowers redeem at least as much as under an annuity scheme.1841 So, this reform does not 
stem from EU pressure. Instead, it might be that the decision to gradually reduce the maximum rate 
at which mortgage interest payments can be deducted (with 0.5 percentage point per year), taking 
effect since 2014, is influenced by the country-specific recommendation issued in 2013.1842 Certainly, 
the Netherlands did not comply with the country-specific recommendations of 2014 and 2015 to 
accelerate the reform of the system of MID. This example suggest that compliance with EU 
recommendations depends on national political willingness. However, in-depth research is necessary 
to find out the actual influence on the MSP on political decisions. 
 
6.3.1.2. The impact of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure on the fiscal independence of member 
states 
The MIP copies some features from the MSP, but also differs from it in significant aspects. This 
procedure is part of the EU response to the economic crisis, as it was considered important to monitor, 
within the context of economic policy coordination in the EU, economic developments in addition to 
public debt.1843 The MIP is concerned with macroeconomic imbalances, which are defined as ‘any trend 
giving rise to macroeconomic developments which are adversely affecting, or have the potential 
adversely to affect, the proper functioning of the economy of a Member State or of the [EMU], or of 
the Union as a whole’.1844 Basically, this can be any trend with adverse macroeconomic effects, 
regardless of its origin. In order to support the identification and monitoring of (potential) imbalances, 
the MIP is equipped with a scoreboard, consisting of a variety of indicators with indicative thresholds 
                                                          
1841 Political parties agreed this in April 2012, in the same agreement where they decided to reduce the LTV 
ratio (supra, footnote 1141). The recommendation was issued in July 2012.  
1842 See sub-section 6.1.1 about this measure. It would require an in-depth case study to find out what political 
forces where exactly at play when deciding about this reform. 
1843 Cf. recital 7 of the preamble Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. 
1844 Article 2(1) Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 
2011. 
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serving as alert levels.1845 The indicators include private sector debt, which is the debt of households 
and firms.1846 The Commission has the power to change the indicators and their thresholds.1847  
 
The MIP consists of a preventive and a corrective arm. The first step in the procedure, in its preventive 
arm, entails that the Commission writes an annual report, assessing the movement of the indicators in 
order to identify and monitor imbalances.1848 This so-called alert mechanism consists of the 
interpretations of the scoreboard and a report thereof, the Alert Mechanism Report, written by the 
Commission and published at the start of a yearly cycle of the European Semester. This report is 
discussed in the Council, as a part of the multilateral surveillance, and in the Eurogroup.1849 Taking 
these discussions into account or in case of unexpected, urgent economic developments which require 
analysis, the Commission can undertake an in-depth review of a member state, analysing the 
circumstances in the respective country in detail, as well as the origins of any detected imbalances.1850 
For instance, in its in-depth reviews of the Netherlands, the Commission considers the regime of MID 
as an important origin of the high household debt levels.1851 If the Commission concludes from its 
review that imbalances exists, the Council may, based on a recommendation of the Commission, give 
country-specific recommendations to the member state concerned in accordance with the procedure 
of the MSP.1852 So, for example, if the Commission concludes that the levels of household debt 
adversely affect the proper functioning of the Dutch economy or the EMU, it can recommend the 
Council to give a recommendation to the Netherlands for addressing this imbalance, even if the 
imbalance is not (yet) considered excessive. Actually, the country-specific recommendations to the 
Netherlands about mortgage interest deductibility originate from this procedure. In the previous sub-
section, it was already concluded that a country-specific recommendation issued under the MSP may 
influence the policies of a member state, but does not decisively restrict its regime for the tax 
treatment of debt.  
 
                                                          
1845 Article 4 Regulation 1176/2011. 
1846 For the exact definition of private debt, see e.g. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tipspd10 (last 
visited 15 October 2015) 
1847 Article 4(5)-(7) Regulation 1176/2011. 
1848 Article 3(1) Regulation 1176/2011. 
1849 Art. 3(5) Regulation 1176/2011. 
1850 Art. 5 Regulation 1176/2011. 
1851 See e.g. the reports of the in-depth reviews of the Netherlands in 2014 and 2015: European Commission 
(2014h), p. 35; European Commission (2015b), p.24. 
1852 Art. 6 Regulation 1176/2011. 
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The corrective arm starts, if the Commission considers that an excessive imbalance exists. Then, the 
Council may, again based on a Commission recommendation, establish the existence of such an 
excessive imbalance and provide policy recommendations, as well as a deadline before which the 
member state concerned must submit a corrective action plan, containing policy actions and their 
social and economic impact.1853 The Council evaluates the corrective action plan, based on a 
Commission report, and could approve it or request a new one.1854 In case of approval, the plan is 
endorsed by means of a recommendation, which lists the policy actions required.1855 The Commission 
monitors the implementation of the policy actions.1856 If the Commission considers that the member 
state concerned did not take the policy actions, it recommends the Council to establish non-
compliance, which is done unless a qualified majority in the Council decides otherwise within 10 
days.1857 This voting modality is called reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV).1858 
 
Another secondary Union law act has created the possibility to apply sanctions to a member state 
neglecting Council recommendations in the corrective arm of the MIP.1859 This only applies to euro 
area countries.1860 If a member state does not implement the corrective action plan within the 
deadlines, an interest-bearing deposit of 0.1% of GDP of the member state concerned must be 
imposed by the Council, based on a recommendation of the Commission.1861 This deposit turns into an 
annual fine of the same magnitude if the Council establishes non-compliance for the second successive 
time.1862 Such a fine can also be imposed, if the Council requests a new corrective action plan of the 
member states concerned for two successive times.1863 RQMV applies to voting about these 
sanctions.1864 Figure 6.1 below shows the working of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure for 
euro area countries. Moreover, if the Council adopted two successive recommendations in the same 
procedure, because a member states has not submitted a sufficient corrective action plan, or because 
it has not taken the recommended corrective action, the Commission must propose the Council to 
                                                          
1853 Art. 7 and 8 Regulation 1176/2011. 
1854 Art. 8 Regulation 1176/2011. 
1855 Art. 8(2) Regulation 1176/2011. 
1856 Art. 9 Regulation 1176/2011. 
1857 Art. 10 Regulation 1176/2011. 
1858 Cf. footnote 1838. 
1859 Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011, OJ 2011, 
L306/8. 
1860 Art. 1(2) Regulation 1174/2011. 
1861 Art. 3(1) Regulation 1174/2011. 
1862 Art. 3(2) Regulation 1174/2011. 
1863 Art. 3(2)(a) Regulation 1174/2011. 
1864 Art. 3(3) Regulation 1174/2011. 
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suspend part or all of the commitments or payments for programmes of the member state financed 
by the European Structural and Investment Funds.1865 
 
The MIP differs from the MSP regarding procedural issues and enforceability and has the potential to 
constrain member states’ decisions on the tax treatment of debt if – but only if – they experience high 
household debt levels. Namely, if household debt levels are labelled as an excessive imbalance, the 
corrective arm of the MIP starts, and member states can face recommendations that are enforceable 
with sanctions. Nevertheless, even then the member state is in charge of deciding on the policies to 
pursue, because the corrective action plan, as submitted by the member state, is at the heart of the 
corrective arm. The Council must approve this corrective action plan. It may reject the plan if the 
member state neglects a key policy area, which the tax treatment of debt is in certain member states. 
Hence, the review process by the Commission and the Council, and the threat of rejection restricts the 
freedom of the member state concerned to decide on the design of the regime for MID. However, this 
restriction is still abstract. At least, until now no sanctions have been imposed in the MIP. 
 
Two other aspects reduce the likelihood that the MIP will actually restrict member states in deciding 
how to design the rules governing the fiscal treatment of debt, namely the political character of the 
decision-making process in the MIP, and the incredibility of imposing financial sanctions. Firstly, the 
political character of the decisions in the MIP is less present than in the MSP, because the former 
procedure is “semi-automatic”, due to the use of RQMV in the later stages of the procedure. This 
makes it more difficult for the Council to block Commission recommendations as a result of political 
bargaining. Nevertheless, the Council can in the end take decisions, so peer pressure characterises the 
MIP.1866 This diminishes the credibility of imposing far-reaching measures that reduce a member 
state’s room of manoeuvre. 
 
 
                                                          
1865 Art. 23(9) Regulation 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013, OJ 
2013, L 347/320. 
1866 Cf. Adamski (2012), pp. 1353, 1364. For earlier, similar, conclusions on the MSP before its reform in 2011, 
see e.g. Amtenbrink and De Haan (2003), p. 1076; Louis (2004), pp. 577-586; Amtenbrink and De Haan (2006), 
p. 404. 
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Figure 6.1: The working of the macroeconomic imbalance procedure 
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Commission writes in-depth review for each MS with (potential) imbalances, taking into account 
inter alia (1) the discussion of the Council and Eurogroup, (2) Council recommendations  and (3) 
policy intentions of the MS. The Commission shall stay in dialogue with MS.
MS submits corrective action plan
Council assesses corrective action plan, based on a 
Commission report
Council, based on a Commission 
recommendation considers corrective 
action plan insufficient
Council, based on a Commission recommendation, 
considers corrective action plan sufficient: it 
endorses plan by means of a recommendation, 
listing the policy actions and deadlines
Council assesses whether recommended corrective 
action is taken, based on a Commission report
Council considers corrective action is 
taken: procedure in abeyance
Council considers corrective action is not taken: it 
establishes non-compliance and new deadlines, 
based on Commission recommendation, using 
RQMV
Council, based on 
Commission 
recommendation, 
using RQMV, imposes 
interest-bearing 
deposit of 0.1% of GDP 
on MS
Council, based on a Commission 
recommendation, using RQMV, imposes 
annual fine of 0.1% of GDP on MS if for 2nd 
time insufficient corrective action plan
Council, based on 
Commission 
recommendation, using 
RQMV, imposes annual 
fine of 0.1% of GDP on 
MS if for 2nd time non-
compliance is established
Council, based on a Commission 
recommendation, abrogates its 
recommendations if MS is no longer 
affected by excessive imbalances
= preventive arm
= corrective arm
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Moreover, decisions taken by the Commission and the Council remain dependent on the political will 
to take them. This willingness seems to be limited, as many scholars have acknowledged.1867 It is telling 
in this regard that the corrective arm of the MIP has never been applied until now, even though 
imbalances in a range member states have been labelled as “excessive” from 2014-2017.1868 The 
Commission created additional categories of imbalances and currently distinguishes between “no 
imbalances”, “imbalances”, “excessive imbalances” and “excessive imbalances with corrective action”. 
Member states are subjected to specific monitoring, if whatever type of imbalances are present, but 
the corrective arm is only started in case of the imbalances of the last category.1869 Seemingly, these 
additional categories – which are not formally recognised by Regulation 1176/2011 – have been 
created to avoid initiating the corrective arm. Secondly, several scholars point at the incredibility of 
imposing financial sanctions on a member state suffering from economic problems, since this will 
worsen the situation even more.1870 This reduces the threat for member states of facing sanctions. 
Hence, the actual likelihood that the MIP restricts a member state’s policy choices is low.  
 
All in all, it can be concluded that the MIP may influence member states’ policies by drawing attention 
to certain problems, and by creating pressure to reform. Nevertheless, it does not significantly restrict 
the independence of member states in deciding how to design the rules governing the tax treatment 
of debt.1871 Recommendations in the preventive arm are not enforceable.1872 If the corrective arm 
starts, the member state has the initiative in choosing policies to pursue for remedying imbalances. 
Whether the Council, based on recommendations of the Commission, takes decisions against the 
member state depends on political will. Moreover, if such recommendations are given, the possibility 
to enforce them with financial sanctions is not entirely credible, although the threat of cutting back 
money coming from the European Structural and Investment Funds might be more credible. For these 
                                                          
1867 Hodson (2013) observes that the Commission is reluctant to be too critical towards member states 
experiencing macroeconomic imbalances (p. 193). For comparable remarks, see Common Market Law Review 
(2012), p. 1559; Kastrop et al. (2014), p. 611 Adamski (2016), p. 191. Cf. Moschella (2014), pp. 1273-1274, 
1282-1283; Seyad (2015), pp. 257-258. Wolf (2015) qualifies the Commission as a political body, captured by 
member states (p. 72). 
1868https://ec.europa.eu/info/node/4320/ (last visited 12 August 2017). However, Smits (2015) provides an 
alternative explanation for flexibility in enforcement decisions regarding the SGP, which mutatis mutandis also 
applies to the MSP: the fact that structural reforms are becoming more important means that the effects of 
such reforms are only visible with a delay (pp. 1161-1162). Then, fast enforcement might not be appropriate.  
1869 European Commission (2016b), pp. 6-7.  
1870 Ruffert (2011), p. 1803; Adamski (2012), pp. 1341-1342, 1347; De Streel (2014), p. 98. Cf. Catania (2011), p. 
6; Adamski (2016), p. 190. 
1871 Cf. Hodson (2015), who concludes that the Six-Pack, which includes the MIP, is softer than it looks (p. 155). 
1872 Cf. art. 288 TFEU, which states that ‘[r]ecommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.’ 
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reasons, the likelihood of decisive restrictions on member states’ possibilities to decide on the tax 
treatment of debt is low.1873  
 
6.3.1.3. The impact of enhanced surveillance on tax policies of member states 
When a member state experiences or is threatened with serious difficulties regarding its financial 
stability, which likely spill over to other euro area member states, the Commission – not the Council – 
can decide to subject the country to enhanced surveillance.1874 For assessing whether this is the case, 
the Commission shall inter alia base itself on the scoreboard of the MIP and the in-depth reviews of 
the member states.1875 So, enhanced surveillance will only be an option if household debt levels have 
far-reaching consequences for financial stability. Member states are not confronted with it in normal 
circumstances.  
 
When a member state is subject to enhanced surveillance, it must adopt measures with the aim of 
addressing the sources or potential sources of the difficulties, in cooperation with the Commission, 
which acts in liaison with the ECB, the European Supervisory Authorities and the ESRB.1876 The member 
state must take into account any recommendations issued under the MSP, MIP and EDP. So, if it turns 
out that the regime for MID in a certain member state contributes to high household debt levels, which 
in turn create financial instability, the member state must address this regime. However, it is difficult 
to imagine that such a close and causal link between MID and financial instability can be proven. 
Otherwise, the enhanced surveillance mainly entails that the member states are obliged to provide 
certain information, must consult, and cooperate with, the Commission – acting in liaison with the ECB, 
the European Supervisory Authorities, the ESRB and, where appropriate, the IMF – in adopting 
measures aimed at addressing the (potential) sources of difficulties, and will receive review missions 
of the Commission, ECB and relevant European Supervisory Authorities.1877 If the Commission, based 
upon the review missions, concludes that additional measures are necessary, the Council, ‘on a 
proposal from the Commission, may recommend to the Member State concerned to adopt 
                                                          
1873 These findings have been confirmed by the European Commission (2014i), which concluded, in its economic 
governance review, that the MIP ‘contributed to a shared understanding among Member States of their 
specific and common policy challenges and the policy response. However, there is a need to improve the 
implementation of the relevant policy recommendations, and find the tools that improve the incentives for 
Member States to adopt and implement the necessary policies.’ (p. 8) (italics added). 
1874 Art. 2(1) Regulation 472/2013. 
1875 Art. 2(2) Regulation 472/2013. 
1876 Art. 3(1) Regulation 472/2013. 
1877 Art. 3(3) and 3(5) Regulation 472/2013. 
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precautionary corrective measures or to prepare a draft macroeconomic adjustment programme.’1878 
The Council can opt for making its recommendation public. These decisions are adopted by qualified 
majority.1879 Regulation 472/2013 does not specify sanctions. Therefore, Hodson (2014) rightly 
concludes that its bark looks worse than its bite.1880 Indeed, for influencing a member state’s decisions 
on designing the regime for MID, Regulation 472/2013 does not add stronger pressure mechanisms 
than the MIP. However, if a member state were subjected to enhanced surveillance due to high 
household debt levels causing financial instability, the Commission and the EU financial supervisors 
become more involved in the actual decision-making process, and thus have more opportunities to 
influence decisions. Still, it remains the question whether domestic decision-makers will really be 
influenced by these EU actors.  
 
6.3.2. Independent amendment and enforcement of the Dutch rules on tax treatment of debt 
Whether under EU pressure or not, decisions on amending rules regarding MID are made at a national 
level. In the Netherlands, most rules regarding MID are part of primary law, namely the Wet IB 2001. 
The parliament adopts primary law. Decisions on more detailed aspects of the rules regarding MID are 
taken by the Tax Administration, which is part of the Ministry of Finance. These details can be relevant, 
especially for the determinacy and completeness of the rules. Nevertheless, all of the examined rules 
are part of the Wet IB 2001, except for the condition that interest has to burthen on the borrower, 
which results from a decree, and except for a few issues solved by case law.1881 So, the parliament 
decides on almost all main issues. It has not created rules which explicitly leave room for discretionary 
choices by the Tax Administration, so their application requires no separate discussion. 
 
The enforcement of the rules on MID belongs to the tasks of the Tax Administration. Its discretion is 
not steered towards acting. A concern in that respect is that the workload at the Tax Administration 
might be a reason to abstain from enforcement.1882 When acting, its discretion is guided towards 
imposing proportionate sanctions. Due to the principle of proportionality, the magnitude of the fine 
has to be tuned to the seriousness of the offence and other relevant circumstances.1883 The Tax 
Administration further restricted its own discretion by adopting the BBBB, which include policy 
                                                          
1878 Art. 3(7) Regulation 472/2013. 
1879 Ibidem. 
1880 Hodson (2014), p. 198. 
1881 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1. 
1882 Cf. sub-section 6.2.1.3 and footnote 1782. 
1883 Art. 5:46(2) Awb. This provision specifically concerns sanctions. See also art. 3:4(2) Awb, which codifies the 
proportionality principle, as applying to all decisions of administrative organs. 
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guidelines on the magnitude of the fines.1884 These guidelines are not hard: deviating from them is 
possible, if substantiated. Hence, this is a situation of guided discretion. Since the Tax Administration 
is part of the Ministry of Finance, it is accountable to parliament. 
 
6.3.3. Independent amendment, application and enforcement of the Irish rules on tax 
treatment of debt 
In Ireland, almost all rules regarding MIR have been enshrined in the TCA 1997 and are thus part of 
primary law, adopted by the Houses of the Oireachtas. Yet, some aspects of the rules have been 
determined or clarified by the Revenue Commissioners.1885 In some of these cases, they exercise de 
jure discretion; in other cases de facto discretion, even if the law does not grant it.1886 Although the 
Revenue Commissioners are subject to control of the Minister for Finance, they are independent 
insofar as performing their functions under tax acts or statutory instruments.1887  
 
The Revenue Commissioners only possess limited discretion regarding enforcement decisions. Firstly, 
they have to decide whether to settle, to opt for civil penalties, or initiate a criminal procedure. It is 
unlikely, in light of their own code of practice, that the Revenue Commissioners will start a criminal 
procedure.1888 There are two legal bases for imposing civil penalties, sections 1056 and 1077E TCA 
1997, each with a different procedures and, consequently, with different implications for the degree 
of discretion when deciding about the penalties. If the Revenue Commissioners use section 1056 TCA 
                                                          
1884 Cf. sub-section 6.2.1.1. These guidelines limit all three types of discretion. 
1885 An example of a clarification by the Revenue Commissioners is the Tax Briefing on the eligibility of top-up 
loans for MIR (Revenue Commissioners (2009); cf. the discussion in sub-section 6.1.2.1). An example of a rule 
set by them is the pro rata approach regarding the purpose of a qualifying loan: if part of a loan is used for 
other purposes than purchasing, repairing, developing or improving the qualifying residence, only a pro rata 
part of the interest is considered as ineligible for MIR (cf. sub-section 6.1.2.2). 
1886 The pro rata approach, mentioned in the previous footnote, is opposite to the literal text of section 
244(1)(a) TCA 1997, as indeed acknowledged in the relevant Tax Briefing (Office of the Chief Inspector of Taxes 
(1998), p. 18.) Their policy is against the literal meaning of the section, notwithstanding the fact that Irish acts, 
in the first instance, ought to be interpreted in accordance with their literal meaning (Gaffney v. The Revenue 
Commissioners [2013] IEHC 651)). An example of the exercise of de jure (subsuming) discretion is that a home 
owner is temporarily allowed to receive relief for his previous own residence, but only if he shows, to the 
satisfaction of the inspector, that he took all reasonable steps necessary for disposing it (cf. sub-section 
6.1.2.2). There is no guidance for using this discretion. 
1887 Regulation 9 S.I. 2/1923 (supra, footnote 1787; section 101 Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Act 
2011, No. 10/2011, available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2011/act/10/section/101/enacted/en/index.html 
1888 In their Code of Practice, the Revenue Commissioners (2015) includes non-exhaustive and non-binding lists 
with offences that probably will be prosecuted, as well as criteria for consideration to guide their decisions 
(para. 7.2-7.4). Moreover, it states that criminal prosecution is only started against the most serious tax 
offenders and offences: so, it will probably never be used against claiming too much interest relief (para. 7.1). 
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1997 as a basis for penalising offenses, a court imposes the fine. This section only provides maximum 
sanctions, but no further guidance. If section 1077E TCA 1997 serves as a basis for imposing fines, 
procedural issues are different. The section prescribes a sophisticated regime for determining the 
magnitude of the sanction, and prescribes the procedure to follow.1889 Hence, the choice for the 
amount of the fine is guided, and the degree of discretion left for the Revenue Commissioners is 
limited.  
 
Nevertheless, another provision increases the discretion of the Revenue Commissioners considerably. 
They namely have the power to mitigate any fine or sanction imposed with maximum 50%, even 
penalties arising from a judgement.1890 Apart from this maximum percentage for mitigating penalties, 
the TCA 1997 provides no further rules to guide choices regarding mitigation. Hence, this discretion of 
the Revenue Commissioners is quite large, especially considering the possibility to overrule court 
decisions.  
 
6.4. Concluding and comparative remarks 
In the past decade, possibilities to deduct mortgage interest have been reduced in many European 
countries, including the Netherlands and Ireland.1891 During this period, in Germany the option to 
deduct mortgage interest rates from income tax did not even exist. Moreover, the previous regime for 
subsidising homeownership, the Eigenheimzulage was not dependent of the manner of financing the 
residence and did not directly stimulate debt-financing of an own home. The Dutch and Irish regimes 
for mortgage interest deductibility or relief differ considerably, also in their complexity. The Dutch 
rules are more complex, mainly with the aim to restrict deduction possibilities and to prevent that 
homeowners deduct interest which is not used for financing their own home. Some of these rules are 
                                                          
1889 The envisaged procedure entails that the Revenue Commissioners first try to impose the sanction in a 
settlement procedure (Section 1077B(1)(a) TCA 1997 and p. 22 of the Explanatory Memorandum of the Finance 
(No. 2) Bill 2008, available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=10390 (last visited 5 January 
2016)). When they are unable to agree on the terms of the settlement with the tax payer, a Revenue Officer 
shall notify the tax payer, by means of an opinion, that he is liable to a penalty. This opinion shall include the 
provision on which the penalty is based, the relevant circumstances and the amount of the penalty. This 
opinion may be amended at any time. If the recipient of the opinion does not agree with the opinion, within 30 
days in writing, and does not pays the fine, the Revenue Officer may apply to a court. Then, the court will 
determine whether the tax payer is liable to a fine (section 1077B(1)-(3) TCA 1997). Hence, this procedures 
provides the Revenue Commissioners with more options, but still strictly guides their discretion, which has to 
be acclaimed for ensuring the effectiveness by battling unchecked capture or pressure. 
1890 Section 1065 TCA 1997. 
1891 Because the analytical framework has been applied somewhat differently in this chapter, no summary table 
will be included in the conclusion. 
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necessary due to the fact that the Dutch system is more generous than the Irish system in granting 
compensation for paid mortgage interest. For instance, because the Netherlands offers MID for thirty 
years, it has a rule preventing homeowners from deducting interest for more than thirty years.1892 
While the Netherlands has created a rule to prevent that homeowners deduct more interest after 
moving by increasing the mortgage loan, instead of using the proceeds from selling their previous 
home, Ireland just set a maximum percentage and amount for second and subsequent buyers, which 
removes many incentives to increase debt-financing after moving. 1893 Part of the complexity of the 
Dutch rules is also a result of the introduction of incentives to redeem debt, by only allowing MID for 
annuity loans, contrary to the Irish rules. However, when the Irish system of MIR is phased out, the 
incentives to redeem debt will return.1894  
 
The comparison of the Dutch and Irish regimes reveals that both countries can learn from design 
choices in the other country. For instance, the Dutch system includes rules that preclude deducting 
artificially increased interest rates, while receiving a reduction via the backdoor.1895 Instead, the Irish 
rules prevent that homeowners can claim too much relief by purchasing or repairing a house for an 
artificially high price.1896 
 
Both member states have involved lenders for executing the rules on MID/MIR and providing 
information about borrowers. This helps to reduce and detect violations. While both member states 
provide for proportionate and dissuasive sanctions to punish violations of tax laws, the ease with which 
they can impose them is different. The Revenue Commissioners can easier prove a deliberate or 
careless action of an Irish homeowner than the Belastingdienst can prove (conditional) intent or gross 
negligence of a Dutch homeowner.1897 Therefore, enforcement will be easier in Ireland. 
 
The independence of national actors to decide on the tax treatment of debt is limited by the powers 
which EU actors – mainly the Commission and the Council – have received in the system of economic 
governance in the EU. These European actors can exert influence on member states, but are unable to 
decisively limit the freedom of national governments, because of the weakness of the EU governance 
                                                          
1892 This is the rule on the redemption position. Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.2. 
1893 The Dutch rules on the own home reserve have been discussed in sub-section 6.1.1.2, and the Irish ceiling 
for second and subsequent buyers in sub-section 6.1.2.1. 
1894 Sub-section 7.1.2.3 offers some suggestions to reduce the incentives to borrow in the Dutch system of MID. 
1895 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.2. 
1896 Cf. sub-section 6.1.2.2. 
1897 Cf. sub-sections 6.2.1.1, 6.2.1.3, 6.2.2.1, 6.2.2.3. 
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in place.1898 Nevertheless, country-specific recommendations have become more specific in the post-
crisis years.1899 After the reform of the system of economic governance, they often point to specific 
policy areas. Consequently, pressure on member states with respect to their tax policies has increased. 
Nationally, the parliaments have given the bodies responsible for taxation a different degree of 
discretion and guidance when applying and enforcing tax law.  
  
                                                          
1898 Sub-section 7.3.2 offers some suggestions for improvement. 
1899 Cf. Dawson (2015), p. 985.  
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7.  Rethinking household debt regulation in the EU and 
its member states from a systemic perspective 
 
At the start of this decennium almost none of the legislation to restrict household debt levels analysed 
in the previous chapters existed. There were no macroprudential measures in European capital 
requirements legislation, no regulatory LTI and LTV caps in the analysed member states, much more 
generous regimes for mortgage interest deduction or relief and no mandatory creditworthiness 
assessment before providing a mortgage loan, as now required by the MCD. The institutional 
landscape looked very different too, without the ESRB, the SSM, the macroprudential authorities with 
powers to intervene in financial markets, and the MIP to push member states to adopt reforms for the 
sake of macro-financial stability. All these instruments, as well as the actors which are empowered to 
use them, have been analysed in this study with a view of discovering whether the preconditions for 
effectiveness are present for these instruments. It has been discussed to what extent these 
instruments are determinate and complete, whether they can be enforced proportionately and 
dissuasively, and whether they can be applied independently. This final chapter aims at advancing the 
analysis one additional step. Building upon the findings of the previous chapters and upon an analysis 
of the interaction between the various instruments and actors, it draws conclusions about the rules in 
the EU, the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany, and proposes changes to better fulfil preconditions for 
effectiveness. To be sure, macroprudential policy in Europe is, much like our understanding of it, still 
in its infancy.1900 Therefore, a certain degree of humility is called for when drawing conclusions and 
proposing changes.  
 
This chapter proceeds with highlighting findings and trends about the ever-increasing number of 
instruments to restrict household debt levels. In addition, it examines the interaction between the 
instruments in light of the household debt determinants. Finally, it offers suggestions to exploit the 
complementarities between the instruments and allocate them in a way that supports their potential 
effectiveness. The second section draws conclusions about the mechanisms to enforce the 
instruments, and mentions possibilities for improvement. Section 7.3 starts with the finding that the 
players involved received a range of new tasks in the past years. It points to some trends and examines 
the interaction between the actors. Last, but certainly not least, this section underlines the areas 
where improvement is necessary to ensure that instruments can be used effectively.  
                                                          
1900 Aikman et al. (2015), p. 1102. 
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7.1. An increasing number of instruments 
The four previous chapters examined several types of instruments: regulatory capital- and funding-
based instruments, direct LTV, DSTI, LTI and DTI limits, lending restrictions in consumer law and the 
tax treatment of household debt. Some interesting findings stand out when transcending the analysis 
of each compartment of law and taking an overarching perspective.  
 
7.1.1. EU and national action: findings and trends 
Both the EU and its member states have been active to create new instruments. The EU has adopted 
the CRR and CRD IV, which included new macroprudential instruments, as well as the CCD and MCD. 
Member states have reformed their regimes for mortgage interest deduction or relief and have 
adopted or are adopting LTV, DSTI, LTI and DTI limits. Arguably, the EU played a role as well in the 
creation of these caps, because the ESRB facilitated discussion and mutual learning, and issued a 
recommendation on these instruments.1901  
 
7.1.1.1. Available macroprudential instruments and the design of LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI limits 
EU legislation created the macroprudential capital-based instruments which target policies related to 
lending to households. They are uniform in the whole Union, in terms of design, but not in terms of 
use, as competent and designated authorities can exercise national options and discretions to increase 
capital requirements. Until now, none of the examined authorities has used these powers in relation 
to consumer and mortgage loans, apart from a minor tightening of one criterion by the Central Bank 
of Ireland.1902 Most of the examined macroprudential supervisors – namely DNB, BaFin and the ECB – 
currently only have the instruments at their disposal for counteracting undesirable credit 
developments and high household debt levels that have been created by the CRR and CRD IV. 
Consequently, they lack instruments that go beyond banking regulation and supervision. Admittedly, 
in the Netherlands, there is a system of regulatory maximum LTV, DSTI and LTI ratios in place since 
2013, but the Minister of Finance – and not DNB – is in charge of setting and adjusting these ratios. In 
Germany, the possibility to set LTV, DSTI and DTI limits is under construction and expected to be 
finalised in 2017. Instead, in Ireland, the CBI has set LTI and LTV caps in 2015 and has the power to 
adjust them. 
                                                          
1901 See e.g. European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2013/1 of 4 April 2013, OJ 2013, C 170/01. 
1902 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1.2 and https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/other/html/index.en.html (last 
visited 16 June 2016). 
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In all three examined member states, LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI limits are or can be in place, beyond 
banking regulation. The creation of such instruments is a trend in the EU.1903 In all three member states, 
the scope of these caps is or will be set as wide as possible, in order to reduce circumvention 
possibilities. The Netherlands and Ireland have opted for different approaches to achieve that aim, 
because the Irish – as well as the proposed German – caps are explicitly macroprudential rules, 
whereas the Dutch caps have been built upon conduct of business rules, which have consumer 
protection as primary goal.1904 The rules of the Irish and proposed German caps are more broad-
brushed than their Dutch counterparts, due to their explicit macroprudential character. This enables a 
macroprudential use of the rules, but decreases the protection for an individual household, because 
they are not binding in relation to a single consumer.1905  
 
7.1.1.2. Dangerous differences between rules for mortgage credit and for other consumer credit 
A general trend – visible in several areas – is that mortgage credit is more regulated and subject to 
stricter rules than general consumer credit. For instance, in the Netherlands, self-regulatory DSTI limits 
exist for consumer credit, compared to the regulatory DSTI caps for mortgage credit. In Ireland, there 
are only LTI limits for secured loans. Furthermore, the rules on assessing creditworthiness in the CCD 
lack detail and bite compared to their counterparts in the MCD. Admittedly, there are good reasons to 
prioritise rules for mortgage credit, since housing and housing loans can be subject to boom-busts 
dynamics; this risk is smaller for consumer credit. Furthermore, mortgage lending involves large sums 
of money. Nevertheless, having protective rules for consumer credit is essential too, because it can 
function as a substitute for mortgage credit. Current legislation does not always prevent this. 
Furthermore, in many member states a significant share of the total amount of lending to households 
consists of consumer loans, as illustrated in graph 7.1.1906 Finally, consumer credit is often more 
expensive and riskier than mortgage credit, and especially used by vulnerable groups.1907  
 
                                                          
1903 Cf. table 2.2 and https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/other/html/index.en.html (last visited 16 
June 2016). 
1904 See sub-sections 4.1.1, 4.2.1 and 4.4. 
1905 See section 4.4 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.  
1906 Graph 7.1 is based upon data from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB: 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9689405 (retrieved 5 July 2016). The share of outstanding 
consumer loans in the total amount of outstanding loans to households is calculated by adding the ‘MFI loans 
for house purchase to domestic households’ and ‘MFI loans for consumption and other purposes to domestic 
households’ and calculating the share of the latter category. About MFIs, see 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/mfi/general/html/index.en.html (last visited 5 July 2016). Consumer 
loans can be provided too by other lenders than MFIs, so the actual share of consumer loans might be higher, 
but these percentages give a first indication of the importance of consumer loans.  
1907 Cf. section 5.4. 
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Steps are necessary to address these issues, both at the level of the EU and its member states. Ireland 
and Germany can improve protection for consumers who take out consumer loans by adding specificity 
to the provisions for assessing creditworthiness, which would decrease their current indeterminacy.1908 
This is possible, as shown by practice in the Netherlands, where codes of conducts further detail this 
obligation.1909 There is also room for improvement in Netherlands, as the norms in the codes of 
conduct are not entirely coherent with the regulatory norms.1910 Ireland can also enhance consumer 
protection and repair the current gaps in the LTV and LTI limits, by requiring lenders to take unsecured 
credit into account when calculating loan-to-income ratios. Although this will be much easier after the 
credit registry becomes operational, it is already possible now.1911 
 
The main priority for the EU needs to be the aligning of the CCD and MCD, and the addressing of 
existing shortcomings. The MCD already attempts to be coherent with the CCD by often using a 
                                                          
1908 Cf. sub-sections 5.1.3.1 and 5.1.4. 
1909 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.1. 
1910 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.2 and table 4.2. 
1911 Cf. sub-section 4.2.1.3. 
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comparable approach and by regularily referring to the CCD, especially concerning definitions.1912 Still, 
there are significant differences between both directives in their approach to consumer protection.1913 
More coherence would be achieved by integrating the two legal acts into one directive and bringing 
their approaches in line.1914 This integration must be accompanied with an amendment of the provision 
on creditworthiness assessment for general consumer credit – currently art. 8 CCD – which falls 
significantly short of offering meaningful consumer protection, especially due to its vagueness and 
gaps.1915 What makes matters worse, art. 8 CCD is subject to maximum harmonisation, barring one 
specific exception. So, member states lack possibilities to solve this problem. Consumer protection has 
actually decreased in several member states – for instance in Ireland – after the adoption of the 
CCD.1916 Hence, it is up to the EU to ensure high standards of consumer protection. Eventually, art. 8 
CCD could simultaneously be changed into a minimum harmonisation provision. If the EU is not able 
to achieve higher standards, a solution is to change art. 8 CCD into a minimum harmonisation provision, 
without any further substantial amendment of the rules. It is presently submitted that this is not the 
best option to ensure high lending standards, since member states might be reluctant to increase their 
requirements due to regulatory competition. It might also undermine the unity of the internal market. 
However, minimum harmonisation is not unprecedented, as the provisions on creditworthiness 
assessment in the MCD are also subject to minimum harmonisation. Furthermore, derogations from 
uniform internal market provisions are repeatedly allowed in other areas as well for reasons of 
consumer protection.1917 More importantly, for the EU, the internal market is not an end in itself, but 
a means to improve ‘the well-being of its people’.1918 Offering ‘a high level of protection’ is another 
means.1919 If over-indebtedness and its negative consequences cannot be prevented due to the pursuit 
of uniform, but low standards, it might be wise to rebalance the intermediate goals of achieving an 
internal market and offering a high level of protection, in order to increase the well-being of European 
people and the stability of the internal market.  
 
On the contrary, the case for creating maximum harmonisation rules regarding the creditworthiness 
assessment in the area of mortgage credit is weak, as the amount of cross-border transactions is low; 
                                                          
1912 See e.g. art. 4 Directive 2014/17. 
1913 See sub-section 5.1.1. Cf. Brown (2015), pp. 564-566. 
1914 Schäfer (2014) also advocates the integration of the CCD and MCD into one directive (p. 216). 
1915 See sub-sections 5.1.1.1 and 5.4. 
1916 On decreased consumer protection in Ireland, see Donnelly & White (2013), pp. 9-10. Cf. Brown (2015), p. 
569. 
1917 See e.g. Case 220/83 Commission v France [1986] ECR 3663, para. 20; Case C-288/89 Gouda [1991] ECR I-
4007; Case C-265/12 Citroën Belux [2013], ECLI:EU:C:2013:498, para. 37-38. 
1918 Cf. Buijze (2014), p. 73. 
1919 Cf. art. 3 TEU. 
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only 1%, according to earlier research.1920 Indeed, graph 7.2 shows that lenders in most member states 
supply (much) less than 1% of their mortgage loans across borders, with the exception of lenders in 
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg.1921 It is highly questionable whether harmonisation will increase 
cross-border transactions, given that issues like language play a crucial role in decisions of consumers 
where to buy goods or to use services.1922 Most likely, there will be a strong home bias in case of 
mortgage borrowing, because borrowers will intuitively trust local lenders more than foreign 
lenders.1923 While the amount of cross-border transactions is rather low, maximum harmonisation 
might actually lead to a lower level of consumer protection. Furthermore, it deprives member states 
of possibilities to fine-tune consumer protection to the relevant domestic circumstances. Therefore, 
the subsidiarity principle would not fulfilled, if the EU would adopt maximum harmonisation measures 
on creditworthiness assessment for mortgage loans.1924 Instead, minimum harmonisation measures 
                                                          
1920 Supra, footnote 1367. 
1921 Graph 7.2 is based upon data from the Statistical Data Warehouse of the ECB (supra, footnote 1906). The 
share of cross-border mortgage lending is based upon the difference between ‘MFI loans for house purchase to 
euro area households ‘ and ‘MFI loans for house purchase to domestic households’. 
1922 Thommes et al. (2015), pp. 48, 56-57, 66-67, 69. 
1923 A Dutch study to consumer behaviour in the mortgage markets shows that Dutch consumers have a strong 
preference for Dutch lenders (EIM, 2011, pp. 15-16). 
1924 The EU could do this in the exercise of its competences related to consumer protection and the internal 
market, which are both shared competences (art. 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(f) TFEU). The MCD and CCD are based upon 
(what is currently) art. 114 TFEU. This legal basis, related to the EU’s internal market competence, is often used 
to adopt measures that seek to ensure a high level of consumer protection (cf. art. 169(2)(a) TFEU). 
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on creditworthiness assessment can be justified, since they allow for the establishment of minimum 
lending standards across the Union, whilst enabling member states to enact stricter and more fine-
tined rules. Minimum harmonisation is necessary from the perspective of consumer protection and 
financial stability in order to avoid a regulatory race to the bottom and regulatory arbitrage, as well as 
to ensure an equivalent and high level of protection. A high level of consumer protection contributes 
to the stability of the financial system, which in turn is in the interest of the whole E(M)U.1925 Building 
upon this study, further, detailed, research is required to clarify how the CCD and MCD can be 
integrated best, while offering a high level of consumer protection, possibilities to fine-tune rules to 
national circumstances, and a fairly uniform regime across the EU. 
 
7.1.1.3. Compliance or over-compliance? Balanced and protective rules to withstand risks 
Interestingly, in both the Netherlands and Ireland, in recent years lenders seemed to prefer to abide 
by the standard rules and are cautious to use existing exception possibilities.1926 A first question is what 
drives this attitude. In the Netherlands, a report of Ernst & Young (2015) – based upon interviews with 
respondants working in the financial industry and, to a lesser extent, supervisors and interest groups 
– provided several potential explanations for this behaviour.1927 One is that the high regulatory burden, 
resulting from the increasing amount of new rules, led to standardisation, with as consequence that 
exceptions are rarely used. In addition, lenders seem to treat soft guidance of the supervisor as binding 
regulation.1928 Another factor mentioned in the report is that the indicators on the AFM dashboard 
have been constructed in a manner which leads to a lower ranking when exceptions are used.1929 
Nevertheless, the AFM does not consider the use of exception clauses to the LTI and LTV limits as 
problematic, if justified by good reasons.1930 Other or additional explanations than those provided for 
in the report of Ernst & Young are conceivable too. Firstly, the degree of risk-aversion might have 
grown in the aftermath of the crisis. Secondly, the current low-profit environment for commercial 
banks might stimulate standardisation, because the use of exceptions might be time-consuming and 
thus costly. On the contrary, it can also be argued that this low-profit environment stimulates risk-
seeking, in a quest for profit.  
 
                                                          
1925 Cf. Schoenmaker & Wierts (2016), p. R54. 
1926 Ernst & Young (2015), p. 56; McBride (2016).  
1927 Ernst & Young (2015), pp. 7, 51, 56, 76. 
1928 This phenomenon is observed more frequently with respect to guidance of the supervisor in the context of 
principle-based regulation (Black, 2008, p. 449; De Vries, 2013, p. 345). 
1929 Ernst & Young (2015), p. 56. 
1930 As indicated by an official of the AFM in an interview. 
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A second question is how to evaluate and respond to this behaviour. The report of Ernst & Young 
qualifies the observed behaviour as over-compliance, which leads to a larger, indirect, regulatory 
burden.1931 The report does not draw the conclusion that some rules need to be abolished or relaxed 
in order to decrease this regulatory burden – instead, it proposes to be clearer about the interpretation 
of soft guidance.1932 Yet, especially in Ireland, some people are arguing that the macroprudential rules 
should be relaxed, because of their negative consequences.1933 Without further research, it is difficult 
to assess whether the behaviour of lenders can be qualified as over-compliance, or whether there are 
currently good reasons to be careful with lending. In any case, it can help if a supervisor communicates 
that using exceptions in a good way is allowed. However, policymakers, regulators and supervisors 
need to be reticent with relaxing rules, as long as the exceptions provide sufficient room to 
accommodate lending to situations where exceeding LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI limits does not involve 
many risks. If that is case, the rules are not the problem. It might very well be the case that the degree 
of risk-aversion is currently high, as a consequence of the recent crisis. However, rules must be able to 
contain lending during a boom, when over-optimism soars and risk-aversion might swiftly turn into 
risk-seeking.1934 Although over-regulation and unnecessary restrictions must be avoided, rules – 
including the conditions for using exceptions – must be able to withstand the pressure which is being 
built during a boom.  
 
7.1.1.4. Information is invaluable 
Another noteworthy finding, not limited to one particular instrument, is the importance of available 
information via a credit registry. Accessible and reliable information is necessary for lenders to be able 
to calculate a DSTI or LTI ratio and assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness. This is no surprise. It is 
less well known that a well-functioning credit registry is also vital for macroprudential supervisors. 
They need information to understand potential risks. Moreover, the interview with an official of the 
Central Bank of Ireland revealed the importance of access to a fully-fledged credit registry with loan-
level data to adequately calibrate DSTI and DTI limits. Ensuring the availability of reliable data will not 
be easy; it will encounter resistance. This is evidenced by the fact that the original proposal of the CCD 
contained a provision that obliged member states to set up credit registries, which was later 
                                                          
1931 Ibidem, p. 78. 
1932 Ernst & Young (2015), p. 103. 
1933 See the brief summary of the public debate in Ireland in sub-section 4.2.1.3. In the Netherlands and 
Germany similar arguments were raised in response to the recommendation to reduce the LTV limit and the 
proposal to create the legal basis for borrower-based caps, respectively. 
1934 Cf. sub-section 2.1.1.1. 
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removed.1935 Nevertheless, it is important to strive for the availability of reliable data, albeit while 
simultaneously respecting data protection requirements and privacy.1936 
 
7.1.1.5. Valuation rules may not be catchy, but are still crucial 
The restrictive effects of loan-to-value ratios – be it as borrower-based caps or as used in capital 
requirements legislation or the MCD – crucially depends on the prudence of the valuation of the house. 
However, valuation requirements differ substantially between member states and between fields of 
law. The CRR prescribes the use of either the market value or the mortgage lending value. The latter is 
the prudent value of the house, taking into account long-term sustainable aspects of the property, 
while disregarding speculative elements.1937 In Germany, using the market value is prescribed for 
calculating the macroprudential LTV cap, whereas using the mortgage lending value is mandatory for 
issuing Pfandbriefe.1938 Both valuation methods can be used for other purposes.1939 In Ireland, the 
macroprudential LTV ratio must be calculated with the lowest of either the market value of the 
property, or the price agreed in the contract.1940 Instead, the Netherlands interpreted art. 19 MCD as 
precluding the use of the price paid for the house as its value.1941 For calculating the LTV limit, it allows 
four valuation methods: (1) the building costs of the house, (2) the market value of the house, (3) 
model-based valuation (but only if the LTV ratio is lower than 90%), and (4) the most recent official 
appraisal value based upon to the Wet WOZ (but only if the LTV ratio is lower than 90%, or for people 
who already live in house).1942 
 
The definitions of the market value differ in EU, Irish and German law, while Dutch law does not contain 
a definition at all.1943 The core of these definitions is the price at which a house would exchange at the 
date of the valuation between a willing buyer and a willing seller in an arm’s-length transaction, after 
                                                          
1935 Ferretti (2013), pp. 803-804. 
1936 Among others, Ferretti (2009, 2010, 2013), Jentzsch (2007) and Pyykkö (2013) discuss issues related to 
privacy and data protection in the context of credit registries. To increase the availability of reliable, loan-level 
data, the ECB has started the project AnaCredit: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money_credit_banking/anacredit/html/index.en.html (last visited 12 August 
2017).  
1937 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1.1. 
1938 Cf. sub-sections 4.3.1.2 and 3.1.3.1. 
1939 If German banks use the mortgage lending value, as allowed in the CRR, requirements of the § 16(2) 
PfandBG and the BelWertV must be met (§ 10(1)(8) KWG in combination with § 22 Solvabilitätsverordnung 
(supra, footnote 642). 
1940 Cf. sub-section 4.2.1.1. 
1941 Supra, footnote 1082. 
1942 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.2. 
1943 Cf. art. 4(76) CRR, art. 115(6) Bgfo, regulation 2(1) S.I. 47/2015, § 194 Baugesetzbuch. 
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proper marketing and assuming that parties act knowledgeably and prudently, without pressure. The 
market value may include short-term and speculative elements. Therefore, this and the other allowed 
valuation methods, except for the mortgage lending value, do not prevent overvaluation of a house 
due to boom dynamics.  
 
7.1.2. Interacting instruments  
An array of instruments affects the level of debt which households can take on. These instruments can 
complement, substitute or conflict with each other, which is relevant for their final effectiveness.1944 
Complementary instruments reinforce each other, if they affect different aspects of the borrowing and 
lending process or if they target different household debt determinants. An advantage of the presence 
of substitutive measures is that regulators or supervisors are able to choose between instruments and 
select the most suitable tool for a particular situation. However, a potential drawback is that 
overlapping instruments might increase the regulatory burden for borrowers and lenders. Then, 
cutting red tape could be desirable. Finally, instruments are undermined if they conflict with each 
other, for instance, when the resulting incentives for regulatees are contradictory.  
 
Hereafter, various various interactions between the examined instruments are discussed, starting with 
the relationships among the instruments that are part of the domain of prudential regulation. 
Subsequently, the view will be broadened in several steps, by reviewing respectively the interaction 
between prudential regulation and consumer law, regulatory instruments and tax policy, and the 
instruments analysed in this study and other available measures.  
 
7.1.2.1. The interaction between capital-, funding- and credit-based instruments 
The level of EU involvement is different for capital-, funding- and credit-based instruments. All the 
capital-based measures are governed by EU legislation, while funding-based instruments are often 
partly subject to EU legislation and partly to national rules. In turn, credit-based tools are almost 
entirely a national matter.  
 
Chapter 3 illustrates that the completeness of the rules governing (sectoral) capital requirements 
varies per type of instrument. Furthermore, effects of a measure can leak away, because a bank that 
is subjected to higher capital requirements can meet this demand in various ways. Increasing capital 
requirements will not necessarily restrict lending, even though this might be a secondary aim, besides 
                                                          
1944 Cf. sub-section 1.4.1. 
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increasing resilience, (for some of the instruments). Moreover, regardless how well designed the rules 
within the CRR and CRD IV may be, they only apply to credit institutions and investment firms.1945 
Although this does not mean that an increase in capital requirements will have no effect on lending 
decisions, these instruments are far from perfect, if used for that purpose. This is also true for funding 
requirements, where similar concerns can be raised. Instead, credit-based instruments – i.e. borrower-
based LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI ratios – can be expected to be much more effective in restricting 
lending – if set at the right level – because circumvention is difficult, at least if the possibility of 
substituting general consumer credit for mortgage credit is cut off. 
 
Nevertheless, capital- and funding-based instruments are more than imperfect substitutes for credit-
based instruments. Capital requirements are mainly complementary to direct LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI 
limits, because they work differently. Assuming that capital is costly, capital requirements affect the 
price of lending and, hence, always exert incentives, no matter the magnitude of the loan.1946 Instead, 
direct LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI limits are hard quantity restrictions, which only work at the margin. 
Arguably, price incentives are less paternalistic than quantity restrictions, because there is no hard 
constraint. They offer, however, also less protection, not only because they can be more easily 
avoided, but also because contradictory price incentives can be stronger, especially during a boom.1947 
 
In terms of function, the various capital-, funding- and credit-based instruments are complementary 
too. DSTI, LTI and DTI caps are most appropriate for preventing repayment problems and over-
indebtedness, because they are directly concerned with affordability. In fact, they reduce the 
probability of default (PD). Furthermore, they are more protective than a LTV ratio, because income is 
less subject to boom dynamics than house prices. A borrower-based LTV limit is complementary to 
DSTI, LTI and DTI limits, because it decreases the loss given default (LGD) – from the perspective of the 
bank – and the risk of residual debt – from the perspective of the borrower. This is certainly relevant, 
because research has shown that over-indebtedness is often the result of unexpected events, like 
unemployment, divorce or illness.1948 Repayment problems after such a shock cannot completely be 
prevented by DSTI, LTI and DTI limits.  
 
                                                          
1945 If, for instance, insurers have mortgage loans on their balance sheet, the Solvency II Directive (supra, 
footnote 614) requires them to hold capital for these exposures, but these capital requirements do not contain 
rules related to the LTV ratio, nor possibilities to increase capital requirements for macroprudential reasons. 
1946 See sub-section 2.3.1.2 for a discussion on the costs of capital. 
1947 Cf. De Nicolò et al. (2012), p. 5. 
1948 See sub-section 2.1.2.4. 
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Capital requirements are complementary to borrower-based limits, because they increase the 
resilience of lenders, by creating a buffer to absorb losses. Borrower-based caps do not have that 
effect. Because the risk of losses is larger for loans with a higher LTV ratio, a differentiation of the 
amount of required capital depending on the actual LTV ratio is justified. The various capital-based 
instruments are partly substitutive and partly complementary to one another. They are substitutive, 
since several instruments can be used to raise risk-weights for household loans, but only partly, due to 
relevant differences. Consequently, the assortment of measures enables selecting the most 
appropriate tool for a particular situation. Increasing risk-weights for sectoral capital requirements is 
useful if specific developments in the housing sector demand higher capital requirements or when 
differentiation based upon the actual risk level of a loan is necessary. Instead, the countercyclical 
capital buffer (CCB) or the leverage ratio can be increased when action is necessary due to overall 
credit conditions or general developments. Due to these differences, supervisors can use the 
instruments complementary. 
 
LTV requirements in funding-based instruments are complementary to those in capital- and credit-
based instruments in another manner. Firstly, they prevent that the lender does not care about the 
repayment capacity of the borrower, because he can pass on all the risks. Secondly, they inhibit that 
the consequences of a default of a borrower spread through the financial system. A LTV ratio of 80% 
for covered bonds namely means that the part of the loan above 80% of the house value cannot serve 
as collateral for covered bond. So, the holder of the covered bond is only affected by a default of the 
borrower if the LGD is higher than 20% of the house value; this is unlikely, if the house that serves as 
collateral can be sold. Thirdly, LTV ratios related to funding combat the circumvention of LTV ratios in 
capital requirements. Banks can namely circumvent higher capital requirements for mortgage loans by 
removing them (partly) from their balance sheet, for instance through securitisation. Currently, these 
three functions of LTV requirements in funding-based instruments cannot be accomplished well, 
because there are no LTV ratios in place for all relevant types of funding. Therefore, it is recommended 
to incorporate LTV requirements in, most notably, the rules on securitisation. Specifically, these rules 
should require the originator to keep the part of the loan above a certain LTV limit – for instance 90% 
– on their own balance sheet. Then, the originator should be obliged to hold sufficient capital for this 
part of the loan, by means of the normal rules on sectoral capital requirements for residential real 
estate. This simultaneously prevents circumvention of capital requirements and completely passing on 
the risks related to the loan to another party.  
 
LTV, DSTI, LTI and DTI requirements in capital-, funding- and credit-based instruments are thus mainly 
complementary and to a lesser extent substitutive, albeit imperfectly. Therefore, it is recommended 
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to use them accordingly, and to avoid using capital-based instruments as a full substitute for credit-
based instruments. While increasing risk-weighted capital requirements can be useful, it creates the 
risk of pushing lending activities to less regulated sectors.  
 
7.1.2.2. The interaction between prudential regulation and consumer protection 
Microprudential regulation and consumer protection 
Both microprudential and macroprudential regulation share some aims and methods with consumer 
law. One of the most important purposes of microprudential regulation is reducing credit risk, which 
is ‘the risk of a loss because of the failure of a counter-party to perform according to a contractual 
arrangements, for instance due to a default by a borrower’.1949 This strongly resembles the rationale 
behind the creditworthiness assessment, as prescribed by EU consumer legislation, namely avoiding 
repayment problems. The methods to achieve these goals are partially similar too. Art. 79(a) CRD IV 
prescribes competent authorities to ensure that ‘credit-granting is based on sound and well-defined 
criteria’. These sound criteria might very well include some sort of creditworthiness assessment. 
Furthermore, the same credit-scoring model might be used to assess a consumer’s creditworthiness, 
as required by the CCD and MCD, as well as to calculate risk-weights in the context of the IRB 
approach.1950 
 
Nevertheless, the mandatory creditworthiness assessments complements and surpass the rules in 
microprudential regulation. Firstly, the perspective is different, namely not preventing problems for 
the lender, but for the borrower. This often coincides, but not always. Without consumer protection 
rules, there are several situations in which a lender might provide a loan to a consumer, even though 
this might cause problems for this person. This may happen if a lender is insured against credit risk, 
due to a mortgage guarantee or sufficient collateral. Alternatively, the lender may be able to pass on 
the risk, or he may have other risk preferences than the borrower. In all these examples, it might be in 
the interest of the lender to supply the loan, even if it creates significant risks for the borrower. 
Consumer protection rules force a lender to consider the interests of the borrower. Secondly, the rules 
on mandatory creditworthiness, especially those in the MCD, are much more specific than the 
aforementioned phrase in art. 79(a) CRD IV. Thirdly, the rules of the CCD and MCD apply to all lenders, 
not only to credit institutions and investment firms. All in all, the rules on creditworthiness assessment 
add more detail and another perspective for banks, while they create new obligations for other 
lenders. 
                                                          
1949 De Haan et al. (2009), p. 305.  
1950 Cf. sub-section 3.1.1.1. 
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Macroprudential regulation and consumer protection 
Likewise, macroprudential regulation and consumer protection exhibit shared aims, in particular the 
prevention of debt accumulation for households. One might wonder whether macroprudential DSTI, 
LTI, DTI and LTV requirements are redundant, because of the mandatory creditworthiness assessment, 
which already ought to prevent that households take on too much debt.   
 
Here too, the perspective of macroprudential regulation and consumer protection differs. The latter is 
concerned with preventing over-indebtedness for the sake of the protection of an individual consumer, 
whereas macroprudential regulation seeks to prevent debt accumulation in order to reduce systemic 
risks and their negative consequences. Indeed, the MCD does not explicitly require lenders to take 
macroeconomic or systemic conditions into account in the creditworthiness assessment. It is true that 
art. 18(1) MCD requires to ‘take appropriate account of factors relevant to verifying the prospect of 
the consumer to meet his obligations under the credit agreement’. Also, recital 55 of the preamble of 
the MCD and the EBA guidelines on creditworthiness assessment further specify that a lender should 
make prudent allowances for potential negative scenarios in the future.1951 However, these 
requirements are not clear and binding enough to guarantee that lenders will sufficiently do this. 
Moreover, lenders – especially smaller ones – do not have the same capabilities as macroprudential 
supervisors to signal systemic risks. Hence, even if a lender complies with the rules on creditworthiness 
assessment and sees no reason related to the individual consumer to confine a loan, further 
macroprudential restrictions may still be necessary, due to systemic developments, for instance an 
emerging bubble. Therefore, although macroprudential regulation and consumer protection can 
indeed be partly substitutive – in protecting households for over-indebtedness – they are especially 
intended to be complementary. 
 
In reality, member states have made different choices in combining macroprudential regulation and 
consumer protection, each with its own merits and demerits. In Ireland, it is required to assess a 
consumer’s creditworthiness – because of the implementation CCD and MCD – or the suitability and 
affordability of credit – due to the Consumer Protection Code. Simultaneously, static macroprudential 
maximum LTI and LTV ratios apply, subject to proportionate limits. Not every housing loan needs to be 
below this limit, but a lender must on average comply with them on a yearly basis. If the German LTV 
ratio will be activated, its design is comparable to the Irish borrower-based caps, due to the excess 
quota (although the German rules include more exceptions, such as the de minimus threshold). In 
these two member states, the macroprudential rules are complementary to consumer protection. Yet, 
                                                          
1951 Supra, footnote 1402. 
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some might argue that these double layers create red tape. In the Netherlands, LTV, DSTI and LTI caps 
are fully integrated into the rules to protect consumers and thus binding for each and every individual, 
unless exceptions are used. Therefore, there is only one layer of rules. This leads to less red tape, but 
also entails that macroprudential supervisors cannot use borrower-based caps as a non-static 
instrument complementary to consumer law.   
 
In order to fully grasp the interaction between LTV, DSTI, LTI and/or DTI caps on the one hand and the 
mandatory creditworthiness assessment on the other hand, the nature of these rules requires 
attention too. Section 1.4.2.3 discussed three archetypes of norms, namely (1) a straightforward and 
encompassing rule, (2) a complex and detailed rule and (3) a principle. None of the examined 
macroprudential and consumer protection rules perfectly fits in one of these archetypes, but many of 
them approximate one archetype more than another. Although they are not pure principles, the rules 
on mandatory creditworthiness assessment display many principle-like features, due to the use of 
relatively vague terms, which point more towards a certain goal than that they really restrict. This is 
especially true for the requirements of the CCD, and to a lesser extent for those in the MCD, which 
include several more specific rules. The Irish LTV and LTI limits – as well as the proposed German caps 
– resemble features of the first archetype of a rule, by being relatively straightforward and 
encompassing, without a lot of details. Instead, the Dutch LTV, DSTI and LTI limits are rather detailed 
and more like the second archetype of a rule. These differences affect the potential effectiveness of 
these rules, as well as their interaction.  
 
The Dutch legal design demonstrates one option to combine principles with strict rules. Provisions in 
the Wft and Bgfo oblige lenders to prevent an overextension of credit and to create their own criteria 
to achieve that. This is a form of principle-based regulation. The regulatory LTV, DSTI and LTI caps are 
based upon these provisions, thereby transforming the principle-based system into a relatively 
detailed and complex rule-based system. It is rather determinate and complete, although it is allowed 
to exceed the caps, if certain conditions are met. The exceptions for specific situations are mostly rule-
based.1952 However, the general exception for exceeding the LTI limit is a combination of procedural 
rules and substantial principles.1953 According to the literature, gaps and creative compliance are the 
main potential weaknesses of a detailed rule, because regulatees may resort to ‘box-ticking and formal 
compliance with the rules, but act against their purpose, circumventing the restrictions set by these 
                                                          
1952 See e.g. art. 4(2)-(3) and 5(3)-(4) Trhk. 
1953 Art. 4(1) Trhk. See also art. 5(5)(d) Trhk for a principle-like exception. 
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rules as much as possible.’1954 Instead, principles are credited for their ability to accommodate to new 
developments and to prevent creative compliance, as well as for increasing ownership of the 
norms.1955 The Dutch system combines advantages of both archetypes: the detailed rules provide 
strictness and hard maximum ratios, whereas the overarching principle is still able to minimise risks 
related to new developments, and can function as a safety net.1956 Nevertheless, the practice in the 
Netherlands shows that it is deemed unacceptable, in light of legal certainty, to consider behaviour 
that respects the detailed rule as a violation of the overarching principle.1957  
 
In Ireland and Germany, the rules on mandatory creditworthiness assessment display many principle-
like features, because they kept the implementation of the CCD and MCD close to the text of the EU 
directives. This form of principle-based regulation involves significant risks, despite the 
aforementioned advantages. The vagueness of the provisions creates room for bending the rules, 
among other things, by choosing a favourable interpretation. Lenders may ‘get away with the 
minimum level of conduct possible; and thus (…) inadequate protection to consumers’.1958 The extent 
to which this risk realises, will partly depend on the supervisor. Definitely, these are not purely 
theoretical risks: principle-based regulation is considered to have been a contributing factor to the 
financial crisis in Ireland and the UK.1959 The chief executive of the British financial supervisor famously 
said that principle-based regulation does not work with people “who have no principles”.1960 Indeed, 
Luyendijk (2015), a Dutch anthropologist who conducted more than 200 interviews with people who 
work(ed) in the City, predominantly in investment banking, describes the culture in the City as amoral, 
also after the crisis.1961 This may not be true for the culture in every member state and every field of 
finance, but these anecdotes provide sufficient reasons to be careful with solely relying on principles. 
Furthermore, principles decrease legal certainty. Paradoxically, the resulting quest for certainty might 
lead to an increasing number of supervisory guidelines, which are treated as if they were rules.1962 A 
report of Ernst & Young (2015) shows that this actually happens in the Netherlands.1963 Then, the result 
is a detailed set of norms, almost like the rule of the second archetype, but more opaque. 
                                                          
1954 Van ‘t Hof (2016). Cf. Black (2008), p. 426; Brown & Scott, p. 475. 
1955 Cf. sub-section 1.4.2.3. 
1956 In Dutch law, also the duty of care can serve as a safety net to reduce lending behavior which is harmful for 
consumers. On this duty of care as a safety net, see Broekhuizen (2016), pp. 153, 156. 
1957 See the discussion of the motives for creating regulatory DSTI, LTI and LTV limits, as described at the start of 
sub-section 4.1.1.2. 
1958 Black (2008), p. 426.  
1959 See e.g. O’Sullivan & Kennedy (2010), p. 232. 
1960 Cited in: O’Sullivan & Kennedy (2010), p. 232; Black (2012), p. 1042; O’Sullivan & Kinsella (2013), p. 7. 
1961 Luyendijk (2015), in particular chapter 6.  
1962 Black (2008), p. 449. 
1963 Ernst & Young (2015), pp. 51, 76. 
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The relatively straightforward Irish and German LTV and LTI caps can serve as a backstop for the softer 
consumer protection rules. These hard macroprudential rules provide an upper limit to lending, in case 
credit is provided too easily due to euphoria, competitive pressure, or other reasons. This combination 
allows exploiting advantages of both archetypes of rules. Still, Ireland and Germany combine relatively 
vague consumer protection rules with broad-brushed macroprudential rules. The resulting freedom 
for lenders may stimulate own responsibility and thus identification with the aim of avoiding over-
indebtedness. However, this system offers less protection for an individual household than the 
relatively detailed Dutch rules on LTV, DSTI and LTI limits. Therefore, in Ireland and Germany, creating 
more detailed macroprudential rules may become necessary in the future, especially if competition 
leads to pressure to circumvent the rules.  
 
These interactions, as well as the analysis in the chapters 3-5 itself, reveal that legal details are of 
utmost importance for determining the impact of regulatory instruments. In that sense, it is surprising 
that legal research into macroprudential instruments is so scarce. Therefore, it is highly recommended 
to analyse macroprudential instruments in other member states than the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Germany in a similar fashion, and in other areas than household debt regulation. This could further 
our understanding of the necessary legal conditions for guaranteeing effective macroprudential policy. 
 
7.1.2.3. The interaction between regulatory instruments and tax policy 
The effects of regulation depend on the interaction with tax policy. Mortgage interest deduction or 
relief subsidises debt-financing of the own home, by reducing debt-financing costs. Basically, it 
provides opposite incentives than the regulatory instruments that aim to restrict borrowing. Hence, 
these instruments are in clear conflict with each other when it comes to the main direction in which 
they work. The situation is more nuanced – but not fundamentally different – when considering the 
interaction in more detail. The possibility to deduct interest or to receive relief affects the actual DSTI 
ratio by creating a difference between gross and net debt-financing costs. It allows a higher gross DSTI 
ratio, while the effect on the net DSTI ratio is unclear: it is lowered due to the subsidy, but that enables 
the household to take on more debt, which in turn leads to a higher DSTI ratio. The Dutch rules 
governing the DSTI limits take MID into account and allow a much lower DSTI ratio when no MID is 
possible.1964 The Irish LTI limit does not differentiate between households which can and cannot 
receive interest relief. The possibility of mortgage interest deduction elevates the actual LTV ratio, 
because a household can take on more debt. Hence, household leveraging is stimulated, with all the 
                                                          
1964 Cf. sub-section 4.1.1.2. 
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attendant risks.1965 It is incoherent to provide a price incentive to leverage on the one hand, and to 
restrict leverage by a quantitative limit on the other hand. In the Netherlands, there is another reason 
why the system of MID is not at par with the regulatory LTV limit. In tax law, substance prevails over 
form, which is not true for financial law. As a result, even when the regulatory LTV ratio is 100% (in 
2018), it is possible to deduct interest for own home debt up to 101.5%.1966  
 
Nevertheless, some rules related to MID in the Netherlands stimulate the redemption of debt, and 
thus reduce the distorted incentives that are provided by MID. An example is the rule that the taxation 
of imputed rent is waived, insofar it is higher than the outstanding amount of mortgage debt.1967 
Another example is the mandatory redemption of the entire mortgage loan in maximum 30 years as 
eligibility condition for MID.1968 This reduces the actual LTV ratio over time. 
 
Stimulating home ownership by means of a relief that is independent of the manner of financing the 
residence, mitigates conflicts between instruments that aim to prevent over-indebtedness and 
leveraging on the one hand, and tax policies that try to stimulate home ownership on the other hand. 
The German Eigenheimzulage, phased out by now, was an example of such a policy.1969 While the 
subsidy provides households with additional means to use for debt-financing, this only supports 
borrowing indirectly (and mildly, compared to MID). While the Irish system of MIR is being phased out, 
the Dutch system of MID needs to be reformed, which could be done along these lines. Then, relief 
can be granted at a much lower rate than the rates at which interest can be currently deducted. 
Conceptually, such a reform is not at odds with the rationale behind the present regime, which treats 
mortgage interest as costs for a supposedly income-generating house. The use of savings for financing 
a house namely implies forgoing other investment possibilities – thus, there are opportunity costs. 
Some of the features of the current system can be retained; for example, the mandatory amortisation 
requirement as eligibility condition for households which finance their home with debt. If policymakers 
consider this a drastic reform, they can at least accelerate the pace of reducing the maximum rate for 
deducting mortgage interest.1970 Moreover, they can solve the conflict between the LTV limit and the 
maximum amount of debt for which interest can be deducted by prohibiting the deduction of interest 
for debt that exceeds the LTV limit.  
                                                          
1965 Cf. sections 1.1 and 2.1; Admati & Hellwig (2013), chapter 2; Mian & Sifu (2015), chapters 2-4. 
1966 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.3. 
1967 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.1. 
1968 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.2. 
1969 Cf. the first pages of chapter 6. 
1970 Cf. sub-section 6.1.1.1. 
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7.1.2.4. The interaction with other instruments  
Lenders may have various reasons to provide loans, even if the risk of repayment problems is 
substantial. Many of the resulting problems are addressed or mitigated by the instruments that have 
been examined in this study. For instance, while lenders do not internalise all the effects of their 
policies on others, the mandatory creditworthiness assessment stimulates them to take the borrower’s 
perspective into account.1971 Borrowers and lenders will probably not internalise the effects of their 
actions on financial stability either – such as boom-bust dynamics generated by widespread leverage 
among households – but LTI and LTV caps can prevent these problems.1972 Furthermore, LTV limits 
related to funding can reduce incentives to neglect and the possibilities to pass on risks. Minimum 
lending standards, created by LTV, DSTI and LTI caps and consumer law, can shield against a race to 
the bottom as a result of competitive pressure (taking into account that hard rules will perform better 
than principles under pressure). Finally, these instruments also protect borrowers against their own 
behavioural biases or their tendency to borrow in order to keep up with their peers.1973 
 
Although the mandatory creditworthiness assessment and the LTV, DSTI, LTI and DTI caps mitigate 
these problems, they will be more effective when complemented with other policies. Well-designed 
policies to increase financial literacy may reduce borrower’s behavioural biases.1974 Misaligned 
incentives due to sales targets, fees and bonuses can be mitigated by making fees and bonuses 
dependent on the long-term performance of a portfolio instead of only on a sales target, and by 
reducing the fee if certain risks are neglected.1975 Mian and Sufi (2015) propose a type of mortgage 
which induces lenders to take the risks of a potential boom and of leverage into account, namely the 
shared-responsibility mortgage.1976 This entails that the risk of a decreasing house price is partly or 
fully born by the lender, if and when it materialises.1977 This proposal exhibits some similarities with a 
                                                          
1971 Cf. sub-section 7.1.2.2. 
1972 On the effects on financial stability, see sub-sections 1.1 and 2.1.1 and Mian & Sufi (2015), chapters 2-4. 
1973 Cf. sub-sections 2.1.2.2-2.1.2.3. 
1974 Cf. sub-section 2.3.3.1. 
1975 The EBA already published guidelines on sound remuneration policies under Articles 74(3) and 75(2) 
Directive 2013/36. These can be found at https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-
policy/remuneration/guidelines-on-sound -remuneration-policies# (last visited 6 July 2016). In particular 
sections 8, 14 and 15.7 are relevant for aligning incentives.  
1976 Mian & Sufi (2015), chapter 12. 
1977 Accordingly, the lender is incentivised to care about the movement of the cycle (Mian & Sufi, 2014, pp. 179-
180). In addition, the authors argue that this construction reduces the risk of painful deleveraging, since 
borrowers receive downside protection. In order to avoid moral hazard, Mian and Sufi (2015) propose to 
measure a house price decline by means of an index of the average house price in a certain area and not by the 
actual price of the house in question. In addition, the authors argue that this construction reduces the risk of 
painful deleveraging, since borrowers receive downside protection. In order to avoid moral hazard, Mian and 
Sufi (2015) propose to measure a house price decline by means of an index of the average house price in a 
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mortgage guarantee scheme. If implemented correctly, without removing responsibility for the 
borrower, this could contribute to internalising risks.  
 
7.1.3. Exploiting complementarities and allocating instruments  
7.1.3.1. Combining the mandatory creditworthiness assessment with an adjustable LTV limit 
The separation of consumer protection and macroprudential rules – as is the case in Ireland and 
Germany – creates another avenue to exploit complementarities between these rules, namely the 
possibility to empower the macroprudential authority to adjust the LTV limit, and to use it 
countercyclically or differentiate it between regions, if necessary. The Central Bank of Ireland faces no 
legal obstacle to adjust the LTV ratio, and to use it countercyclically. BaFin will also be able to adjust 
the LTV limit.1978 In contrast, DNB cannot directly control the LTV limit. 
 
Among academics and supervisors, there is no consensus on whether a variable or regionally 
differentiated LTV limit would be desirable and feasible. Yet, there are macroprudential authorities 
which have countercyclically adjusted LTV limits over time,1979 or differentiated them regionally.1980 
Furthermore, several studies find that countercyclical LTV limits are more effective than constant LTV 
limits in leaning against the cycle and restricting volatility in house prices and credit supply.1981 The 
restrictive effects of a static LTV cap on the borrowing capacity of a household will decrease during a 
boom, due to the sharply rising house prices.1982 This fits in with observations made by Goodhart 
(2015), who supports a countercyclical use of macroprudential measures in order to mute speculative 
euphoria, but simultaneously warns that, even then, ‘in practice the confidence that a boom brings 
with itself leads to macro-prudential measures being far less than necessary’.1983 
                                                          
certain area and not by the actual price of the house in question (p. 172). Otherwise, the homeowner might be 
tempted to reduce maintenance. 
1978 It depends on the legal details whether this is the case. 
1979 This includes the Monetary Authority of Singapore (see e.g. Wong et al., 2013, pp. 28-29) and the Korean 
financial supervisory authority (see e.g. Chang (2010), pp. 9-20). 
1980 For instance, the Korean financial supervisory authority imposed stricter LTV limits for designated areas in 
Seoul, the central bank of New Zealand started with setting LTV limits for loans secured on houses in Auckland, 
before it later broadened the scope of the restrictions on the rest of New Zealand. Also, the Norwegian 
supervisor imposed stricter rules on exceptions to the LTV limits for loans secured on houses in Oslo. However, 
it is important to understand the causes behind regional differences for selecting the optimal response. 
Hekwolter of Hekhuis et al. (2017) found that strongly rising house prices in Dutch cities are not accompanied 
by an increase in credit, but are driven by supply shortage. This implies that supply side measures are more 
suitable to address regional differences in house prices than differentiated LTV limits. 
1981 See e.g. Mendicino & Punzi (2014), pp. 338, 349-354; Lambertini et al. (2013), pp. 1503, 1520; Bruneau et 
al. (2016), p. 42. 
1982 Cf. Benes et al. (2016), pp. 17-18. 
1983 Goodhart (2015), p. 608. 
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Whether a countercyclical LTV limit is indeed desirable in order to reduce procyclicality in house prices 
and credit supply depends on the design and calibration of the LTV limit. Firstly, if loan-to-value ratios 
are calculated with the mortgage lending value of the house, short-term and speculative elements are 
not included in the valuation, which reduces procyclicality. However, in the Netherlands, Ireland and 
Germany, LTV limits are calculated with market values or other valuation methods which tolerate 
including these elements.1984 Secondly, if a LTV limit is well below 100%, it will already function 
countercyclically, because people have to save more to buy a house, if house prices rise. 
 
The procyclical effect of the housing cycle on the borrowing capacity of households can also be 
contained by DSTI, LTI and DTI limits, but only to the extent that these are not procyclical. Income is 
less procyclical than house prices.1985 Still, some aspects of income are probably procyclical, for 
instance fees and other variable income components, as well as wage growth. Also, the number of 
people receiving unemployment benefits instead of a salary will grow during a recession.1986 All in all, 
the empirical literature reports mixed results with respect to the cyclicality of real wages.1987 However, 
not only the degree of cyclicality of income, but also that of the DSTI, LTI and DTI limits matters. These 
may work procyclical, inter alia because banks are probably more lenient with using exceptions during 
an upswing. The Dutch Financial Stability Committee has also warned against procyclical elements in 
the calculation of the Dutch DSTI and LTI limits.1988 Recently, Nibud has changed some of elements in 
this calculation to make the norms less procyclical.1989 To the extent that income or DSTI, LTI and DTI 
limits are procyclical, their protection against the procyclical effect of the housing cycle on the 
borrowing capacity of households diminishes.  
 
In the absence of factors which contain the procyclicality of house prices, it might be desirable to allow 
a  macroprudential authority to lower the LTV limit within a certain margin, if deemed necessary in 
light of an impending boom (even if this is socially challenging). An adjustable LTV cap must be 
subjected to a form of guided discretion, like the countercyclical capital buffer (CCB).1990 This can be 
                                                          
1984 Cf. sub-section 7.1.1.5. To use the mortgage lending value, this concept needs to be further developed in 
law and standards. In practice, a LTV ratio based on the mortgage lending value will be lower than a LTV ratio 
based on the market value. 
1985 Cf. sub-section 2.3.1.2. 
1986 According to the De Nederlandsche Bank (2015), the Dutch system of calculating LTI limits is characterised 
by some procyclical elements (p. 13). 
1987 See e.g. Messina et al. (2009).   
1988 See the accounts of the meeting of 12 November 2013 (supra, footnote 1166). 
1989 Nibud (2016), pp. 18, 46-47. 
1990 The existence of the CCB does not make a countercyclical use of the LTV cap redundant, because the latter 
can be expected to be more restrictive, since it is much more difficult to circumvent. The same is true when 
comparing a countercyclical LTV limit with a countercyclical leverage ratio, as proposed by, among others, 
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built on early-warning indicators combining house price growth, price-to-income and price-to-rent 
ratios, and mortgage credit growth. The first three indicators can be used to estimate to what extent 
house prices are overvalued. Overvaluation stimulates households to take on more debt.1991 Indicators 
based on credit growth are considered as good predictors of financial crises.1992 Admittedly, it will be 
difficult to construct good indicators to detect a boom well in advance, and distinguish it from a 
moderate increase in house prices. The exact design and calibration of the indicators must be figured 
out by economic research, to ensure a reliable early-warning system, which is crucial considering the 
importance of timing for countercyclical macroprudential instruments.1993 It might be necessary to 
differentiate the early-warning indicators and the (countercyclical) LTV limit for certain segments of 
regions of the housing market.1994  
 
7.1.3.2. Allocating LTV and LTI limits in the EU  
There is an ongoing discussion about the level at which macroprudential regulation and supervision 
should be exercised. The Vice-President of the ECB, Constâncio (2015a,b), has argued in favour of 
creating a European framework for LTV and LTI limits, with a crucial role for the ECB in applying them; 
several others support this plea.1995 Whether borrower-based caps can be employed best at national 
or European level depends on the origins of household debt determinants and credit bubbles, as well 
as on the possibilities to guarantee the effectiveness of these instruments. 
 
The origins of credit bubbles and the allocation of LTV and LTI limits 
LTV and LTI limits, insofar used in a macroprudential fashion, aim to prevent credit bubbles. Most of 
the identified drivers of booms and busts have their origin in both national and international 
developments, and are influenced by national as well as European rules and policies. These identified 
drivers are deregulation, low interest rates, abundant liquidity, buoyant economic growth, tax policies, 
                                                          
Schoenmaker & Wierts (2015, 2016). Moreover, capital-based and credit-related instruments are 
complementary (cf. sub-section 7.1.2.1). 
1991 Cf. sub-sections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2. 
1992 Cf. sub-section 2.1.1.1, in particular footnote 250. 
1993 The literature as discussed in sub-section 2.1.1.1 shows that indicators are, generally, either based upon 
credit (or house price) growth, or upon the deviation of credit (or house prices) from a certain trend (e.g. the 
credit-to-GDP gap). 
1994 For instance, in both the Netherlands and Ireland house price growth is currently strongest in the capital. 
Art. 124(2) CRR explicitly allows differentiating sectoral risk-weights between property segments. This would be 
possible for other instruments as well, but only if segments or regions can be clearly delineated. There is the 
risk that the border between segments or regions is considered arbitrary or unfair (e.g. if a house in one 
municipality is subject to another LTV limit than a house 100 meters away in another municipality). 
1995 See e.g. Merler (2015), pp. 35-41. 
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overoptimistic expectations and perverse incentives.1996 Also, several researchers have investigated 
the synchronisation or comovement of credit cycles among countries in order to understand at which 
level these cycles are determined.1997 Most studies detect considerable comovement, but also 
substantial differences between the credit and house price cycle in various OECD and E(M)U 
countries.1998 Some researchers have found that the heterogeneity between cycles in EMU member 
states is more pronounced for mortgage credit cycles1999, and others that it increased after the 
introduction of the euro.2000 These differences in house price and credit cycles are confirmed by the 
fact that some EU member states experienced pronounced booms and busts, in contrast to others.2001 
Dissimilarities in regulation and market structures can partly explain cyclical differences between 
countries.2002 Consequently, even a common driver of the cycle or a common shock may have an 
asymmetric impact in EU member states. Schüler et al. (2015) conclude that their results  
 
‘support the notion that countercyclical macroprudential policies in the EU need to be tailored 
to country-specific phases [but that the] considerable co-movement of financial cycles across 
the countries analysed [also] suggests a strong need for coordination and reciprocity in the 
implementation of country-specific measures.’2003  
 
                                                          
1996 See sections 1.1 and 2.1. 
1997 Still, comovement does not explain where the credit cycle is determined, because it can be the result of a 
common factor that drives the cycles in various countries – for instance monetary policy within the euro area – 
or it can be caused by the transmission of a shock in one country to another (cf. Igan et al. (2011), p. 224). It 
matters for the allocation of macroprudential policy which of these rivalling explanations is true, but it is hard 
to distinguish between them. 
1998 Igan et al. (2011) discovered comovement of house price and credit cycles between 18 advanced OECD 
countries. They found that cycles can move together simultaneously or with a lag (pp. 225-226). The presence 
of lags favours the explanation that shocks in one country are transmitted to another. Claessens et al. (2011) 
found that credit cycles of 21 advanced OECD countries are for 75% of the time in the same phase – upturn or 
downturn – while this number is 59% for house price cycles (Clasessens et al. (2011), table 3. Hirata et al. 
(2012) found similar percentages (table 6)). Schuler et al. (2015) found that financial cycles – measured by a 
composite indicator which includes credit and house price cycles – in 13 EU member states move together for 
two-thirds of the time and that their concordance varies between 53% and 78% (Schüler et al. (2015), p. 5).  
1999 Samarina et al. (2015) found substantial heterogeneity between cycles in 14 EMU member states, both in 
terms of direction and amplitude, especially for the household mortgage credit cycles (pp. 10-13, 26-27). They 
disentangle synchronisation of credit cycles into two aspects, namely direction and amplitude (p. 2). In 
addition, they differentiate between the total credit cycle, the credit cycle for non-financial business and the 
household mortgage credit cycle (p. 7). 
2000 Merler (2015), pp. 7, 11. A similar divergence is found by Lane (2016), p. 12. 
2001 Cf. section 1.1. 
2002 Perhaps, even cultural preferences might play a role, since some researchers found effects of culture on 
households’ financial decisions (see e.g. Guiso et al. (2006), pp. 38-39; Breuer et al. (2014, 2015)) 
2003 Schüler et al. (2015), p. 35. 
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If coordination and mandatory reciprocity are indeed necessary, the EU must be involved, be it through 
(1) adopting a legal provision that mandates reciprocity, (2) a coordinating actor at EU level, or (3) a 
European supervisor who employs the LTV and LTI limits, differentiated for each member state. Among 
others, Schoenmaker and Wierts (2016) advocate for strong involvement of the ECB in guaranteeing 
financial stability, in order to ensure consistency.2004 Schoenmaker (2011, 2013) argues that 
supranational financial integration, financial stability and national financial policies cannot be 
combined, coining this the financial trilemma. Others stress that national differences in tax policies, 
laws, market structures and circumstances may necessitate diverging (macroprudential) regulation in 
order to guarantee financial stability and consumer protection, even if this means that there is no 
entirely single rulebook.2005 If regulation – and not only supervision – needs to be differentiated for 
each member state, it is difficult to establish the required uniform framework to enable a European 
supervisor to use of LTV and LTI limits. 
 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the allocation of LTV and LTI limits  
Whether coordination and mandatory reciprocity are indeed necessary and how this eventually could 
be combined with dissimilar national regulation, depends inter alia on the possibilities to guarantee 
the effectiveness of these instruments. The analysis of the LTV, DSTI and LTI limits in the Netherlands 
and Ireland reveals that these member states have set their scope as wide as possible in order to 
prevent circumvention.2006 In terms of types of lenders covered by the LTV limit, Germany has done 
this as well.2007 The design of these rules prevents regulatory arbitrage by means of lending from 
abroad or by means of lending through a branch of a credit institution established in another member 
state. Mandatory reciprocity is thus unnecessary to ensure completeness. Moreover, currently the 
completeness of borrower-based caps can only be guaranteed at national level. Harmonising the rules 
regarding LTV and LTI caps by including them in the CRR or CRD IV is harmful for their scope, because 
these legal acts only apply to credit institutions and investment firms. Harmonising borrower-based 
limits by means of another legal act and designating the ECB as supervisor does not guarantee 
completeness either, since the scope of the ECB’s supervisory tasks is limited to credit institutions. 
Hence, the effectiveness of LTV, DSTI and LTI limits can be better ensured with national than with EU 
regulation and supervision. What follows from this is that currently the subsidiarity principle is 
evidently not fulfilled for any EU action that proposes the opposite.2008 Guaranteeing an encompassing 
                                                          
2004 Schoenmaker & Wierts (2016), p. R54. 
2005 See e.g. Babis (2015), p. 781; Andenas & Chiu (2013), pp. 335-336, 348-349. 
2006 Cf. sub-sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. 
2007 Cf. sub-section 4.3.1.2. Yet, the scope of the LTV limit is reduced by the numerous exceptions to the loans 
covered by it. 
2008 Cf. sub-section 1.2.2 on the subsidiarity principle.  
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scope at EU level would require a wide expansion of regulatory and supervisory powers at EU level, 
which is not proportionate if the same goal can also be achieved with coordinated national 
macroprudential action. 
 
It may be necessary to coordinate macroprudential action in the presence of strong global or EU-wide 
drivers of a credit bubble. If these are present, and some, but not all, member states set LTV and LTI 
caps, credit possibly flows to the member states with the least restrictions; and create a bubble in 
those countries. Any resulting financial instability might spill over to other member states. Realising 
coordinated EU-wide macroprudential action is difficult for member states, so the subsidiarity principle 
is fulfilled for EU legislative action enabling this. The subsidiarity principle might especially be satisfied 
if some national macroprudential supervisors are well-equipped to take action, contrary to others, 
since the possibility of setting LTV and LTI caps is a condition sine qua non for EU-wide coordinated 
action.2009 Instead, the proportionality principle is only fulfilled for such EU legislative action, if the 
ESRB – the EU-wide macroprudential authority – cannot sufficiently achieve the required coordination. 
Otherwise, any new proposal goes further than necessary. This potential role of the ESRB will be 
discussed in sub-section 7.3.3.4. 
 
What this discussion reveals is the complex relationship between the internal market, financial 
stability, and the division of competences between the EU and its member states. It shows that the 
aims of financial stability and integration of financial markets do not always coincide, although 
diverging macroprudential regulation and supervision may serve the higher goal of the stability and 
integrity of the internal market. It also demonstrates that the application of the subsidiarity principle 
does not always lead to the conclusion that the EU is better able than the member states to achieve a 
certain objective, for instance, maintaining financial stability.  
 
7.2. Enough enforcement possibilities? Findings and trends 
7.2.1. The heritage of the past and the reforms of the present 
Traditionally, the EU has granted its member states plenty of freedom for choosing how to enforce EU 
law, as long as the principles of effectiveness and equivalence are fulfilled.2010 An important rationale 
                                                          
2009 On the relationship between the subsidiarity principle and well and less advanced situations in various 
member states, see case C-508/13 Estonia v Parliament and Council [not yet published], para. 53-54 (cf. 
Panara, 2016, pp. 320-321). 
2010 See e.g. sub-section 5.2.1. 
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for this procedural autonomy is the substantial differences between member states’ legal systems, not 
least in terms of enforcement. Indeed, possibilities to enforce the rules that restrict household debt 
levels often significantly depend on the underlying characteristics of the national legal system and past 
legal choices. For example, in Ireland, there are constitutional difficulties with imposing penalties on 
offenders outside courts.2011 Nevertheless, in order to increase the efficiency of enforcement, the CBI 
acquired wide administrative powers over the past years, including possibilities to settle.2012 In the 
Netherlands, the general framework for administrative law has been substantially reformed in the past 
decades – with the phased adoption of the Awb – among other things to create a coherent system that 
allows for administrative enforcement. Nowadays, wide administrative enforcement possibilities for 
supervisors exist in the Netherlands. Meanwhile, Rott (2007) finds that, in the area of consumer law, 
Germany has traditionally relied on private enforcement.2013 Indeed, private law is most important for 
enforcing the rules regarding creditworthiness assessment, while administrative enforcement in this 
area is weak. Moreover, there are fewer administrative enforcement possibilities in Germany than in 
the Netherlands and Ireland in the area of capital requirements. These differences between member 
states reveal the heritage of past national traditions of enforcement systems. 
 
At the same time, since 2013, there is a trend towards more uniform and more dissuasive enforcement 
law in the area of financial regulation and supervision, among other things, due to requirements in EU 
law that go beyond the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The CRD IV prescribed some 
minimum requirements for sanctions, like the possibility to penalise managers, the possibility to 
impose high fines and the mandatory publication of administrative sanctions, if no appeal is possible 
anymore. This certainly contributed to the availability of dissuasive sanctions, in all member states. It 
reduces possibilities for regulatory arbitrage by preventing that banks establish themselves in member 
states where they cannot receive substantial sanctions.2014 The adoption of the SSM regulation, which 
enabled the ECB to impose several sanctions, is another harmonising factor with respect to 
enforcement. Since the ECB supervises the most significant banks in the euro area, actual enforcement 
will probably become similar across the euro area.  
 
The MCD has exerted harmonising influences regarding enforcement in the area of consumer 
protection in the field of financial services. It namely steers towards administrative enforcement. 
Administrative enforcement has certain attributes which likely make it more effective and thus more 
                                                          
2011 See e.g. Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2016), pp. 19-27 and sub-section 3.2.2.2. 
2012 Before 2004, imposed regulatory sanctions required confirmation by the High Court (Breslin, 2013, p. 62).  
2013 Rott (2007), p. 305. 
2014 On differences in sanctioning regimes in various member states, see e.g. Schneider (2014), pp. 19, 21-22. 
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dissuasive than private enforcement.2015 The MCD thus contributes to increasing the credibility of the 
sanctions for violations of the rules on creditworthiness assessment. Still, preventing capture is a 
prerequisite for effective administrative enforcement. The MCD does not guarantee that. Section 7.3 
discusses in more detail how to deal with capture.  
 
Another interesting trend is the increasing interaction between public and private enforcement 
regarding upholding lending standards. In the Netherlands, courts, as well as the arbitration tribunal 
for financial services, have – on occasions – granted damages to borrowers, when lenders violated 
regulatory DSTI caps.2016 This case law is, however, not yet very coherent. In Ireland, the Central Bank 
and the Financial Services Ombudsman possess, under certain conditions, powers to grant consumers 
respectively redress and compensation, to be paid by the lender, if a lender violated rules related to 
the mandatory creditworthiness assessment.2017 Consumers can also start a procedure for damages, if 
these rules have been violated.2018 These interactions increase the dissuasiveness of the regime, 
because they create additional incentives for lenders to comply with the rules. 
 
The possibility of proportionate and dissuasive enforcement is a precondition for effectiveness; a 
condition sine qua non for effective regulation of household debt levels. However, this study also 
revealed that the availability of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions is not enough to guarantee 
effectiveness. The discussed minimum requirements in EU law are in itself not enough. The pre-crisis 
situation in Ireland showed that, even with all the necessary sanctions available, supervisors were 
reluctant to use them, because they were captured. Hence, it is crucial that supervisors are able to 
withstand industry and political pressure. This will be further discussed in section 7.3.  
 
7.2.2. Reinforcing enforcement 
The availability of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for effective regulation of household debt levels. The discussed findings and trends reveal areas for 
possible improvements. Firstly, Germany needs to complete the enforcement pyramid for BaFin. In 
some instances, BaFin can issue an order to a bank, but cannot penalise the bank if it neglects this 
order.2019 Hence, BaFin cannot use the enforcement pyramid in that situation: escalation is impossible. 
                                                          
2015 Cf. section 5.2. 
2016 Cf. sub-section 4.1.2.2. 
2017 Cf. sub-section 5.2.3.1. 
2018 Ibidem. 
2019 Cf. sub-sections 3.2.2.3 and 5.2.4.2. 
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In addition, the menu of available enforcement measures is more limited in Germany than in the 
Netherlands and Ireland. For example, the Dutch supervisors can – unlike the CBI and BaFin – impose 
an order for incremental penalty payments.2020 Instead, the Central Bank of Ireland can – in contrast 
to DNB, BaFin and the ECB – suspend the provision of any financial service up to 12 months.2021 So, 
other supervisors have more enforcement measures at their disposal than BaFin, and hence more 
options to choose the most appropriate response to a violation. 
 
Secondly, the Irish approach of integrating public and private enforcement offers modes for improving 
the potential effectiveness and efficiency of enforcement. Other member states can bestow the 
supervisor as well with the power to grant redress to a consumer who suffered losses due to the 
violation of a rule by a lender. Of course, this must be designed carefully, respecting procedural rights 
of a lender, and avoiding the removal of a borrower’s responsibilities when taking out a loan, especially 
because it is difficult to determine the amount of suffered damage for which a borrower cannot be 
held responsible.2022 There are strong arguments against this option as well, especially that courts are 
better fit for this task than supervisors. Furthermore, in Germany, BaFin does not even possess a 
mandate for consumer protection. Another promising avenue is allowing consumers to start 
proceedings for damages when they incurred losses due to a violation of regulatory requirements by 
a lender.2023 Proving this may be easier than demonstrating that a lender violated his duty of care.2024 
If correctly designed, this adds incentives for lenders to comply with legislation, and also mitigates the 
risk of capture to some extent, by enabling private enforcement, even were public enforcement fails. 
Admittedly, there are complications, because supervisory involvement will often be needed to 
determine whether a regulatory requirement is violated or not. This might only be different in case of 
violations of a straightforward rule, or in case of gross violations. Both options to create a private 
enforcement mechanism besides existing public mechanisms are mainly relevant for conduct of 
business and consumer protection rules, because the likelihood that a consumer incurs losses due to 
non-compliance of a lender is the largest in these areas. Instead, it is difficult to prove causality 
between a lender’s non-compliance with prudential regulation and losses born by a borrower.  
 
                                                          
2020 Cf. sub-section 3.2.2.1. 
2021 Cf. sub-section 3.2.2.2. Note that the ECB can exercise this power versus Irish banks. 
2022 The less is left of a borrower’s own responsibility, the more the image of the rational consumer is 
abandoned in favour of an image of a vulnerable consumer.  
2023 Cf. section 44 of Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
2024 Cf. sub-sections 4.1.2.2 and 5.2.3.1. Under this option, a court can still determine the importance of a 
borrower’s own responsibility. This option helps to align public and private law, but might hinder an 
autonomous development of the concept of duty of care within private law.   
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7.3. Powerful players: findings and trends regarding the involved actors 
7.3.1. Increasing and differing duties 
Currently, we are witnessing a huge increase in the number of tasks bestowed upon financial 
regulators and supervisors. They are exercising microprudential, as well as macroprudential powers, 
and became responsible too – although some already were – for consumer protection in the area of 
financial services. Supervisory choices are of utmost importance in determining the actual impact of 
prudential regulation and consumer protection, not least because chapter 5 has shown that the 
interpretation of the rules on the mandatory creditworthiness assessment by the supervisors will be 
crucial for their ultimate impact. The pivotal role of these supervisory actors means that they can 
expect a lot of pressure, both from the industry and from politicians. Indeed, the experience of the 
past few years in the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany shows that the instruments examined in this 
study receive considerable attention in public and parliamentary debates; displeasure about new rules 
was publically voiced. Industry lobbying is as present as ever, as observed by multiple scholars.2025 So, 
ensuring sufficient independence of regulators and supervisors is also more important than ever. 
 
The development of existing institutional frameworks has not kept pace with the increasing amount 
of tasks bestowed upon supervisors and central banks. Because the instutional frameworks differ 
significantly between the examined member states, the type of remaining problems also varies. Since 
Ireland has opted for a unitary model, the CBI can align the various instruments that it possesses owing 
to its responsibility for financial stability, effective regulation of financial service providers and 
markets, and consumer protection in the area of financial services.2026 Meanwhile, Colaert (2015) 
warns that integrating various mandates involves the risk of neglecting one or more objectives, 
because the supervisor might seek to raise its profile through action in the most visible areas, such as 
consumer protection.2027 This may be true, but it is unclear whether this risk outweighs the benefits of 
integrating these complementary functions. In practice, the CBI can exercise its tasks relatively 
independently, despite the restrictions on its independence.2028 Instead, the challenge is to accompany 
all these tasks with sufficient accountability mechanisms.2029 
                                                          
2025 Mészáros (2013), pp. 171-172; Baker (2013), p. 427. Cf. Wolf (2015), p. 147. 
2026 These are all equally important objectives, besides its primary objective of maintaining price stability 
(section 6A Central Bank Act 1942). 
2027 Colaert (2015), p. 1586. Cf. Ferran (2015), pp. 115-116. 
2028 Cf. sub-sections 3.3.1 and 4.2.3. Cf. Masciandaro et al. (2008), who found that regulators inside a central 
bank are often more independent than regulators outside a central bank (p. 838). 
2029 See further sub-section 7.3. 
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Due to the twin-peaks model, regulatory responsibilities in the Netherlands are more scattered among 
several actors, necessating discussion among them. This makes aligning the various instruments more 
difficult2030, and results in the situation that DNB cannot directly control the DSTI, LTI and LTV limits, 
which hinders their use as macroprudential instruments. DNB’s powers have increased, but much less 
than those of the CBI. Moreover, DNB’s independence is not fully guaranteed, because the Minister of 
Finance can override DNB’s decisions about the macroprudential instruments. 
 
In Germany the most important remaining problems are that BaFin lacks sufficient independence (and 
thus might be unable to withstand political pressure from the BMF)2031, and that instruments and 
mandates do not always fully match. BaFin is empowered to use the available micro and 
macroprudential instruments, and is responsible for ensuring compliance with rules to protect 
consumers.2032 However, the Bundesbank has the primary responsibility for financial stability, 2033 and 
BaFin lacks a mandate to to protect individual consumers. For several reasons, these issues can be 
problematic. A mismatch between instruments and mandate might undermine commitment to the 
goals of the instruments, at least in theory. Furthermore, the division of macroprudential tasks means 
that no actor bears full ownership for macroprudential policy.2034 Also, the mutual dependencies in the 
macroprudential framework might hamper swift action. 
 
At EU level, one of the challenges resulting from the involvement of various actors is avoiding duplicate 
work in some areas. The ESRB and the ECB share macroprudential tasks, which are partly overlapping. 
For instance, both the ECB and the ESRB evaluate proposed national flexibility measures.2035 While the 
scope of the powers of the ESRB is broader (it may issue recommendations related to any systemic risk 
or macroprudential instrument), the topping-up powers of the ECB are hard instead of soft. 
 
                                                          
2030 The FSC, in which DNB, the AFM en the Ministry of Finance take part, can provide a forum for discussion 
among them about aligning macroprudential instruments. Yet, the FSC lacks formal powers to coordinate the 
application of macroprudential instruments. 
2031 Cf. sub-section 3.3.1. 
2032 While BafIn is empowered to use these instruments, prudential tasks are shared between BaFin and the 
Bundesbank (§ 6(1) KWG. Cf. § 4 FinDAG (supra, footnote 858). For the tasks of the Deutsche Bundesbank, see 
§§ 6, 6b and 7 KWG, and § 1 FinStabG). 
2033 § 1 FinStabG (supra, footnote 212). 
2034 Besides the Bundesbank and BaFin, the Financial Stability Committee is a relevant actor. It discusses factors 
related to financial stability and may issue warnings and recommendations to draw attention to and to address 
risks (§§ 2-3 FinStabG). According to the established macroprudential policy framework, BaFin will generally 
only take action after a discussion of the issues within the Financial Stability Committee (as indicated in an 
interview with an official of BaFin). 
2035 The ESRB is asked to do so in the context of art. 458 CRR, and the ECB as a result of its topping-up powers. 
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So, generally, at national level, macroprudential powers cannot be exercised with a sufficient degree 
of independence, and guided discretion is not broadly used. Most macroprudential authorities 
examined in this study published a macroprudential strategy, explaining their decision-making 
process.2036 While this provides a good indication of the process, it falls short of true guided discretion, 
because it is too general to bind decision-makers. The use of guided discretion beyond the CCB and 
some general rules for art. 124 and 164 CRR is limited. Even limited use of guided discretion helps to 
signal risks, to take decisions and to diminish the risk of inaction or inadequate action. However, even 
if authorities use a form of guided discretion, it is not publically known which indicators and thresholds 
are used.2037 Then, the mechanism cannot function as an external yardstick to evaluate the 
performance of the macroprudential supervisor and to detect inaction or inadequate action. 
Consequently, the expanded macroprudential powers are mainly exercised discretionarily.  
 
7.3.2. Interaction between actors: politics and supervision intertwined 
The interaction between politicians, regulators and supervisors differs per instrument and member 
state. The Central Bank of Ireland is very powerful and can largely operate on its own – domestically. 
It even received some regulatory powers, such as those with which it created the LTI and LTV limits.2038 
Moreover, learning from its pre-crisis errors, Ireland bolstered the supervisory independence by 
appointing relative outsiders for key functions within the central bank. The previous and current 
Governor are academics instead of high-ranked officials from the Ministry for Finance, while some 
other important positions are occupied by foreigners, including the Deputy Governor responsible for 
financial regulation, consumer protection and enforcement.2039 This creates behavioural distance 
between the central bank, the government and the industry and reduces the possibility to capture the 
CBI. In the Netherlands and Germany, there will be more interaction between political actors and 
supervisors, because the Ministry of Finance possesses meaningful powers in these member states 
and participates in the Financial Stability Committee. In the Netherlands, this could result in 
                                                          
2036 Cf. sub-sections 3.3.2.1, 4.13, 4.2.3 and 4.3.3.2. 
2037 Ibidem. According to information obtained via interviews, the CBI uses guided discretion mechanisms 
internally, while DNB and BaFin do currenty not use guided mechanisms to decide about the use of other 
macroprudential instruments than the CCB. Note that the activation of the German LTV limit is steered by some 
general guidance, which will possibly be further specified. The ECB relies predominantly on model-based 
analyses to decide about taking macroprudential action (European Central Bank (2016), p. 10). It is not clear 
whether any predefined outcomes of these models, for instance, certain significance levels related to risks, will 
trigger action. So, it cannot function as an external yardstick to evaluate the ECB’s performance and to detect 
inaction or inadequate action. This will be difficult anyhow, because the outcome of economic models can 
easily be sensitive to the precise set up and use of statistical techniques, or to the inclusion or exclusion of 
certain variables. 
2038 Section 48(1) Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) Act 2013. 
2039 Cf. sub-sections 4.2.3 and 3.3.3. 
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institutional disagreement about the use of instruments to restrict household debt levels, because 
both the Minister of Finance and DNB have instruments at their disposal. Moreover, the Minister is 
allowed to override the exercise of DNB’s powers to use the capital-based macroprudential 
instruments, which may increase the risk of inadequate action. In Germany, the risk of inaction or 
inadequate action is magnified by the possibility that the Minister of Finance exerts influence on BaFin 
if unpopular decisions need to be taken, as well as by a potentially slower decision-making process, 
due to the division of macroprudential tasks between various actors. If BaFin intends to activate the 
macroprudential LTV limit, it must consult various ministries. Also, the Minister of Finance must explain 
the reasons for adopting or amending the LTV limit before the committee on financial supervision of 
the Bundestag. Hence, while accountability requirements are high, they might become a hurdle to 
activate the LTV limit, especially because the relatively low independence of BaFin makes it more 
difficult to resist pressure.2040 
 
The interaction is affected too by the involvement of private actors. In the Netherlands, the self-
regulatory role of the financial industry regarding the DSTI ratios for consumer credit is noteworthy.2041 
Self-regulation means more room for discretionary choices by lenders and arguably less consumer 
protection.2042 Especially in Ireland and Germany, private actors have a role in enforcing the mandatory 
assessment of a consumer’s creditworthiness / the suitability and affordability of a loan. Presumably, 
for detecting violations and interpreting certain behaviour as permitted or not, these private actors 
will be partly dependent on the know-how and actions of supervisors.  
 
The involvement of EU actors as an additional force in the interactive process of regulating household 
debt diminishes the influence of politicians and the industry. The ECB’s possibility to top up capital-
based macroprudential measures reduces the risk of inaction or inadequate action. Besides the ECB, 
two EU agencies are involved in the process of regulating and supervising household debt. Firstly, the 
EBA can influence rules in the field of banking regulation and customer protection by means of its 
technical standards and guidelines.2043 These technical standards and guidelines will be drafted in an 
iterative process with national supervisors. Secondly, the ESRB can issue warnings and 
recommendations, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism. It needs to inform the Commission and 
the Council about these warnings and recommendations, and keep the Council updated about their 
follow-up.2044 Consequently, it is conceivable that the ESRB will receive political pressure from the 
                                                          
2040 Cf. sub-section 4.3.3.2. 
2041 Cf. sub-sections 4.1.1.1 and 4.1.3.1. 
2042 Cf. sub-section 7.1.2.2 on principle-based regulation. 
2043 Cf. sub-sections 3.1.1 and 5.1.1.2. 
2044 Art. 16-18 Regulation 1092/2010. 
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Council about a recommendation. In turn, the ESRB could try to use the Council to exert political 
pressure on a member state to comply with a recommendation. 
 
Finally, a member state can be pushed to adopt certain policies in relation to household debt through 
the framework of economic governance, most importantly through the MIP. This process involves the 
Commission and the peers of the respective member state in the Council. The findings of sub-section 
6.3.1 suggest that it is possible to exert influence on a member state, but that it is questionable 
whether this will be enough if a member state is unwilling to adopt the recommended policy. After all, 
it remains a highly political process. At least, the procedure helps to stay focussed on risks related to 
macro-financial stability. However, reforms of the MIP are necessary to live up to its aims of preventing 
and correcting developments that create financial instability. Member states are namely not always 
willing or able to adopt prudent policies, as the crisis revealed for, inter alia, Ireland and Spain, which 
did not act sufficiently to prevent housing bubbles. This may be explained by the pursuit of rivalling 
aims, conflicts of interest, or political difficulties in adopting policies with long-term benefits, but short-
term costs.2045 One avenue for reform, along the lines of art. 5 Regulation 473/2013, is to create 
stronger independent national bodies that stimulate governments to pursue prudent policies.2046 
These bodies could provide independent assessments of governmental policies, subject to a comply-
or-publically-explain mechanism. These assessments may help governments to weigh interests and 
may provide them with additional arguments to explain their choices to the voters. Still, the hurdles 
which governments must overcome to adopt prudent policies will continue to exist.  
 
Another avenue for reform would be to reduce the room for politically influenced decision-making by 
the Commission, for instance, by subjecting it stronger to the advice of independent bodies. In 
addition, the lobbying of the member states at the Commission may be counterbalanced by increasing 
the accountability of the Commission towards the European Parliamen, by strengthening the Economic 
Dialogue. This dialogue enables the relevant committee of the European Parliament to invite, among 
others, the President of the Council and the Commission to discuss, inter alia, the results of the 
multilateral surveillance carried out, Council recommendations addressed to member states in the 
                                                          
2045 An example of pursuing rivalling aims is promoting home ownership and avoiding a housing bubble. 
Conflicts of interest can, among other things, occur because financial booms can fill the budget, due to 
increased revenues from construction taxes, consumption and the like (Kincaid & Watson (2015), p. 790; Borio 
(2014), p. 190). 
2046 These bodies would be similar to the independent bodies mentioned in art. 5 Regulation 473/2013, and to 
the competiveness authorities proposed in The Five Presidents’ Report (European Commission (2015), pp. 7-8).  
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MSP, and recommendations issued under the corrective arm of the MIP.2047 De la Parra (2017) 
concluded that the Economic Dialogue has created a forum for publicly debating European economic 
governance.2048 However, the Commission has only to give account after decisions have been taken, 
not during the process. Also, it faces no consequences. To strengthen the Economc Dialogue, the 
European Parliament can be involved earlier in the process. Then, the input of the parliament can be 
taken into account. Without amending the treaties, it is difficult to accomplish more far-reaching 
changes than these types of reform. Further details of option for reform can be the topic of further 
research. 
 
The involvement of political actors in determining the policy objectives of each instrument – which is 
a form of ex ante control of the supervisor – varies significantly between instruments. The EU legislator 
has added policy objectives for each of the capital-based instruments, but some are clearer than 
others. Especially the aims of art. 124 and 164 CRR and Pillar 2 measures are vague, meaning that 
discussion about their objectives is ongoing among supervisors and agencies.2049 During the adoption 
of the German legal basis for setting a macroprudential LTV limit, a clear policy objective was included 
in the law by the legislator. On the contrary, the Irish legislator was not involved in determining the 
objectives of the LTI and LTV limits, because it granted the CBI a broad power to adopt regulations. 
Concrete objectives, especially if they are quantified, help to hold a supervisor to account, as can be 
learned from the discussions about accountability of central banks.2050 Nevertheless, quantifying a 
financial stability objective is difficult. 
 
In addition, the interaction between supervisors and other actors in the context of accountability 
arrangements differs significantly for the various instruments. For instance, justification towards EU 
institutions, the ESRB, and the EBA is required for using national flexibility measures – not for refraining 
from using them. Public justification is required for decisions about the CCB, but not for decisions about 
the tools of art. 124 and 164 CRR. Whereas a supervisor can impose macroprudential Pillar 2 measures 
while involving almost no other actors, setting a LTV limit in Germany requires consulting a range of 
actors and even discussion with the parliament.2051 This also shows that accountability requirements 
                                                          
2047 Art. 2-ab Regulation 1466/97 (after amendment by Regulation 1175/2011), art. 14 Regulation 1176/2011. 
Cf. art. 121(5) TFEU. See also art. 18 Regulation 472/2013. 
2048 De La Parra (2017), p. 116. 
2049 See e.g. the references in footnote 516. 
2050 Cf. De Haan et al. (1999), pp. 172-178. 
2051 Cf. sub-section 4.3.3.2. 
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are often one-sided (with the CCB as an exception): using an instrument requires explanation, but not 
using it does not.2052 
 
All in all, this sub-section shows that (macroprudential) regulation and supervision is often 
substantially intertwined with politics, but this interaction is not always designed optimally. The 
adoption of regulation requires political involvement, without sacrificing the objective of ensuring 
financial stability, while the supervisors who implement regulation need to be both independent and 
accountable.2053 The next sub-section discusses the tricky question of finding the right balance 
between independence and political involvement.  
 
7.3.3. Institutional improvement: ensuring effectiveness, while avoiding autocrats  
7.3.3.1. Independence and accountability   
It is a delicate issue how much independence a macroprudential authority should have. The high 
political involvement in the regulation of household debt levels, especially in the Netherlands and 
Germany, is not without reasons. Compared to monetary policy, macroprudential decisions have a 
more direct impact on the natural and legal persons involved.2054 Moreover, a macroprudential 
supervisor has a wider array of instruments at its disposal, which can be highly targeted in nature.2055 
Therefore, macroprudential choices have more direct distributional consequences than monetary 
policy choices. This provides a strong argument in favour of bestowing a macroprudential supervisor 
with a lower degree of independence and a higher degree of accountability than a central bank in its 
monetary policy capacity.2056 In fact, the far-reaching nature of supervisory powers underlies the 
German choice for a financial supervisor, BaFin, which is not independent.2057 It is also telling that the 
ESRB, and the Dutch and German Financial Stability Committees are all bodies without legally binding 
powers.2058  
 
                                                          
2052 Similarly, the LTV and maturity restrictions which BaFin can enact need to be reviewed every six months, 
but the use of the exceptions requires no review. 
2053 Views on the role of politics in regulation differ. For instance, Brown & Scott (2011) state ‘that European 
countries have been rather less successful in separating regulation from politics’ (p. 475). Meanwhile, Tombs 
(2015) criticises the insulation of regulation from democratic politics (p. 68). 
2054 Alexander (2015a), pp. 170-171; Tridimas (2016), p. 90. Cf. Goodhart (2015), p. 609; Wolfers & Voland 
(2014), pp. 182-185.   
2055 Cf. sub-sections 2.3. 
2056 Garicano & Lastra (2010), pp. 616-617; Alexander (2015a), pp. 170-171; Ter Kuile et al. (2015), p. 165. 
2057 Wolfers & Voland (2014), p. 182. 
2058 These bodies can only issue recommendations subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism. 
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Meanwhile, macroprudential policy is a textbook example of a field where strong conflicts are present 
between short-term costs (tightening of rules) and long-term benefits (financial stability).2059 In 
addition, the complex tasks – monitoring a convoluted and completely interrelated financial system 
and deciding about the necessity of taking action – requires involvement of experts. These are the core 
arguments for independence of regulators and supervisors.2060 Indeed, this is reflected in the 
institutional choices in some jurisdictions. The Irish macroprudential regulator and supervisor, the 
central bank, can act relatively independently.2061 DNB and the ECB, which are both designated to 
exercise the macroprudential powers included in the CRR and CRD IV, can act independently too.2062  
 
In the coming years, it is necessary to provide the macroprudential supervisors in each member state 
with binding powers and sufficient independence. Guaranteeing their independence is no luxury, 
because, as Mészáros (2013) argues, ‘macroprudential approaches will, if anything, be subject to much 
greater political pressure (be it from state or private interests) because it is intended to be more far 
reaching, systemically oriented and interventionist than its microprudential forebear.’2063 Meanwhile, 
for the aforementioned reasons, independence must be accompanied with meaningful 
accountability.2064 This poses the difficult dilemma of combining independence and accountability, as 
illustrated by Baker (2013): 
 
‘This leaves macroprudential regulators with a tricky political conundrum to solve: the question 
of how to arm themselves with sufficient institutional autonomy, policy capability, and 
discretion to neutralize procyclical political pressures. It is important, therefore, for 
macroprudential authorities to have some institutional insulation to enable them to 
implement countercyclical policies, but this immediately brings them into potential conflict 
with legislative bodies, who seek to call them to account.’2065 
 
                                                          
2059 Cf. Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board (2014), p. 2. 
2060 Cf. sub-section 1.4.4; Alesina & Tabellini (2007, 2008). 
2061 Cf. sub-sections 3.3.1 and 4.2.3. 
2062 Cf. sub-section 3.3.1. 
2063 Mészáros (2013), p. 174. Cf. Baker (2013), p. 429. 
2064 A macroprudential authority should not have the same degree of independence as the ECB (in its monetary 
policy function) has, since the ECB cannot be held accountable in a meaningful fashion, due to absence of 
possibilities to attach consequences to its failures (see e.g. Amtenbrink (1999). Cf. Claeys et al. (2014), p. 6). 
2065 Baker (2013), p. 429. 
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Despite this tricky conundrum, renouncing a meaningful accountability mechanism and opting for 
unlimited independence is not the appropriate way forward.2066 Not only the distributional 
consequences justify some form of political involvement, but the need to warrant effective 
macroprudential action demands a well-designed accountability mechanism too.2067 This relates to a 
core issue in this study: if macroprudential policy is a black box and supervisors do not need to justify 
their (in)action, capture and political pressure can proliferate unnoticed and unchecked.2068 Therefore, 
decision-making about using macroprudential instruments should be characterised by two main 
elements. Firstly, decisions need to be taken by independent supervisors, insofar as possible based 
upon a mechanism of guided discretion (purely rule-based macroprudential policy is not possible, due 
to the complex and possible unforeseeable contingencies under which decisions need to be taken).2069 
These decisions need to be transparent and guided by clear policy objectives. Secondly, the 
accountability of supervisors needs to fostered, among other things by a semi-override mechanism.2070 
A certain degree of EU involvement is helpful and necessary to create a balanced and potentially 
effective system. These issues will be discussed in the following sub-sections.  
 
7.3.3.2. Improving policy objectives, transparency and the use of guided discretion   
Sub-section 7.3.1 briefly summarised the current use of guided discretion by macroprudential 
authorities. When the positive aspects of their practices are combined and further developed, 
promising mechanisms for guided discretion can be created. This means that guided discretion 
mechanisms – with predefined thresholds or outcomes that trigger action or explanation – are used 
for as many macroprudential instruments as possible; not only for the CCB.2071  
 
A successful use of discretion requires a clear objective for each instrument.2072 To ensure democratic 
legitimacy of regulatory action, the legislator needs to be involved in setting this objective. This is a 
                                                          
2066 A decade ago, Masciandaro et al. (2008) concluded that countries differ less in their vision on appropriate 
accountability mechanisms than on their vision on the appropriate level of independence (p. 838). 
2067 Note that designing good supervisory governance structures is not only ‘nice to have’, but critical for 
ensuring that supervisors stick to their mandate (Enriques & Hertig, 2011, pp. 362-365).  
2068 Cf. sub-section 1.4.4.1. Alesina & Tabellini (2008) argue (and model) that regulators are normally better 
protected against lobbying/capture than politicians (p. 440). 
2069 Cf. sub-section 1.4.4.1.; Wyplosz (2011), p. R23. 
2070 While both concepts have already been explained in sub-section 1.4.4, their application to macroprudential 
policy requires a more detailed discussion, especially because the findings of this study will be integrated into 
it. 
2071 Note that the ESRB recommended macroprudential authorities to use guided discretion for ‘decisions on 
the application, deactivation or calibration of time-varying macro-prudential instruments’ (recommendation 
C1(b) of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2013/1).  
2072 Cf. Amtenbrink & Lastra (2008), pp. 118-121; Lastra (2013), p. 224. 
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form of ex ante control on the supervisor.2073 This control can be improved by further specifying the 
objectives of the macroprudential instruments where these objectives are currently unclear. This 
concerns particularly art. 124 and 164 CRR and Pillar 2 measures. Eventually, to make the 
responsibilities of a supervisor clearer, the objective of an instrument can be linked to an intermediate 
objective of macroprudential policy, as recommended by the ESRB. One of them is preventing and 
mitigating excessive credit growth and leverage.2074 If the legislator desires to increase its ex ante 
control, it can create restrictions, as the German Bundestag did. This restricts the room of manoeuvre 
of a macroprudential authority, more so than the room of manoeuvre which a central bank has for 
monetary policy where it genererally has freedom to calibrate its instruments. However, a clear risk is 
that politicians create restrictions which are an obstacle to effective macroprudential policy. 
Therefore, alternatively, the legislator can require the macroprudential authority to develop a guided 
discretion mechanism, and to consult the Ministry of Finance in this process. A guided discretion 
mechanism has also the advantage of further specifying the objective of an instrument, which supports 
holding the authority to account.2075  
 
If the legislator worries that a macroprudential authority will use the instrument without caring about 
negative side effects, it can require taking these effects into account, for instance by setting 
contributing to economic growth as secondary aim. The monetary policy objective of the ECB and the 
objective of the UK’s Financial Policy Committee are constructed in this manner.2076 Although such a 
secondary objective is difficult to quantify, it stimulates authorities to take the effects of their decisions 
on economic growth into account. However, it must be absolutely clear that (medium and long-term) 
financial stability is the supervisor’s primary objective.2077 Otherwise the problems related to the 
inaction bias and time-inconsistency are not solved. 
 
Guided discretion mechanism can be used for more instruments than currently is the case; it can, for 
instance, also be applied to art. 124 and 164 CRR and the borrower-based caps in the three member 
states. Ideally, a guided discretion mechanism is used both internally and externally, meaning that 
supervisors are transparent about the framework guiding the decisions, including the indicators and 
                                                          
2073 Cf. sub-section 1.4.4, in particular footnote 181. 
2074 Recommendation A(2)(a) of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2013/1.  
2075 Cf. De Haan et. (1999) on clear and quantified objectives of monetary policy (p. 177). 
2076 See art. 127(1) TFEU and sections 9C(1) and 9C(4) of the Financial Services Act 2012, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/pdfs/ukpga_20120021_en.pdf. 
2077 Cf. (sub-)sections 4.2.3 and 4.4. 
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their thresholds, and about the use of discretion.2078 Decisions require justification in light of the 
relevant developments, the supervisory mandate, and the objective of the instrument. In this way, a 
guided discretion mechanism can function as early-warning mechanism – through the use of indicators 
and thresholds as signals – as well as a device to steer supervisors towards their mandate and to reduce 
the risk of unobservable capture. 2079 The latter is impossible without an external yardstick, for which 
transparency is a precondition. Currently, transparency requirements vary a lot among 
macroprudential instruments. They are high for, exempli gratia, the CCB, but low for, for instance, art. 
124 and 164 CRR. A yardstick and transparency also facilitate accountability, by enabling evaluation of 
supervisory action, which is much harder for macroprudential than for monetary policy, because the 
objectives of the latter are better quantifiable.2080 So, guided discretion mechanisms need to consist 
of three core elements: (1) early-warning indicators with thresholds, (2) an act-or-explain principle, 
and (3) transparency about (1) and (2). 
 
The design of a guided discretion mechanism also determines which types of discretion are 
restricted.2081 If indicators with thresholds solely function as an early-warning mechanism, only the 
supervisor’s subsuming discretion is affected, because the thresholds determine whether a 
development is classified as risky or not. If there is an act-or-explain principle if a threshold is exceeded, 
the administrative discretion in strict sense is limited as well. The wording of the rules determines how 
much interpretative discretion is left for a supervisor, and how prescriptive a guided discretion 
mechanism really will be. So, when designing a guided discretion mechanism, all three types of 
discretion need to be considered.   
 
To be sure, there are some caveats, of which two stand out. Firstly, macroprudential policy is still in its 
infancy, and apart from the fact that regulators and supervisors are still creating policy frameworks 
                                                          
2078 Cf. McDonnell (2013), p. 134; Gandrud & Hallerberg (2015), pp. 782-783. Note that the ESRB recommended 
member states to ‘ensure that macro-prudential policy decisions and their motivations are made public in a 
timely manner, unless there are risks to financial stability in doing so, and that the macro-prudential policy 
strategies are set out and published by the macro-prudential authority’ (recommendation D1 of European 
Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2011/3). In addition, it recommended macroprudential authorities to 
foster the transparency of their policy (recommendation C1(c) of European Systemic Risk Board 
Recommendation 2013/1). 
2079 Cf. Liedorp et al. (2013), who explain that transparency reduces the chances for interference with the work 
of a banking supervisor (as well as it increases its legitimacy and predictability) (p. 311). They distinguish 
between political, economic, procedural, policy and operational transparency (pp. 313-316). Transparency 
about a guided discretion mechanism is a form of procedural transparency.  
2080 For instance, the ECB’s objective of price stability is quantified as an inflation rate below, but close to, 2% 
for the euro area as a whole. Intermediate objectives already help to evaluate macroprudential policy, because 
they are more specific than the overall objective. However, they still need to be quantified.  
2081 See sub-section 1.4.4.2 for an explanation of the three types of discretion. 
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and finding out what works best, the quest for finding reliable and well-functioning indicators of 
systemic risks is still ongoing.2082 Furthermore, some systemic risks are hard to measure by means of 
quantitative indicators.2083 Moreover, as the economic and legal situation is subject to change, 
developing indicators remains work in progress. Nevertheless, although indicators are not perfect, 
they can be made as suitable as possible and, subsequently, be used in the daily work of a 
macroprudential supervisor. Moreover, this problem is less pronounced for household debt 
developments than for other systemic risks, because the risk of a credit bubble is easier to quantify 
than, for instance, the risk of contagion due to interconnectedness.2084 For instruments for which there 
are no suitable indicators available, the strategy and decision-making process of a macroprudential 
authority can be made more concrete and transparent than currently is the case, for instance, by 
explaining the methods that are used to evaluate systemic risks.2085 The supervisor’s discretion can be 
influenced by requiring regular public evaluation of the relevant developments.  
 
Secondly, in some instances a supervisor does not want to be transparent about systemic risks in order 
to prevent market panic.2086 Again, this concern is absent for household debt, since information about 
house prices is publicly available. Furthermore, for indicators and situations where full transparency 
might indeed be inappropriate, information can only be disclosed to the actor to which the supervisor 
is accountable.2087 Finally, practice shows that transparency of macroprudential supervisors, and 
publication of data related to financial stability is certainly possible. For instance, the Dutch Financial 
Stability Committee publishes minutes of its meetings, and, in 2016, the Central Bank of Ireland 
decided to do the same.2088 Also, the ECB, DNB, the CBI and the Bundesbank all regularly publish 
reports with data about systemic risks. 
 
                                                          
2082 See e.g. Giese et al. (2014) and Ibáñez-Hernándeza et al. (2015). Cf. sub-section 7.1.3.1 for a discussion of 
the type of indicators which can be used in relation to household debt levels. 
2083 Sarlin & Nyman (2015), p. 401. Indicators need not necessarily be quantitative or numerical, but can also be 
visual. Among others, Sarlin (2016) and Flood et al. (2016) provide a range of examples of visual maps to 
identify systemic risks. 
2084 Cf. European Systemic Risk Board (2016a), p. 20. But see the difficulties for finding suitable indicators for 
the CCB (supra, footnote 2084). 
2085 Cf. Committee on the Global Financial System (2016), pp. 13-15. 
2086 Supra, footnote 2078. 
2087 Note that Enriques & Hertig (2011, p. 377) and Ferran (2014, p. 19) also advocate greater transparency for 
financial supervisors – although they do not discuss macroprudential supervisors – while recognising that 
transparency is inappropriate in emergency situations and the like. 
2088 See http://www.financieelstabiliteitscomite.nl/nl/publicaties and 
https://www.centralbank.ie/news/article/central-bank-commission-meeting-minutes-published (last visited 23 
June 2016). 
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7.3.3.3. Fostering accountability  
The involvement of the legislator in setting policy objectives for all the instruments, combined with 
greater transparency, and the use of guided discretion, contributes to the ability and willingness of a 
supervisor to act, and facilitates holding the supervisor to account. In an optimal accountability 
mechanism, a supervisor may face consequences for its (in)action, among other things to create 
incentives to act adequately.2089 Supervisors are subject to various accountability mechanisms – for 
instance, reporting requirements, (re)appointment procedures, and the threat of a revocation of the 
powers which they received. While some of these mechanisms attach consequences to inadequate 
action, they do not allow for swift and targeted accountability.2090 Accountability can be fostered by 
strengthening some of the existing or proposed mechanisms, in order to create a wider palette of 
accountability mechanisms. 
 
Firstly, for certain instruments, specific accountability arrangements have been developed, but not for 
others. Developing specific arrangements for the latter group of instruments would increase 
accountability. An example is requiring public justification for both using and refraining from using art. 
124 and 164 CRR, to be explained in light of the objectives of the instrument.2091 Also, public 
consultation can be made mandatory for decisions on all macroprudential instruments – except for 
emergency situations which require immediate action. The supervisor could be required to publish 
contributions, and to respond in detail to the contributions of certain actors, especially those of the 
Minister of Finance, but also those of consumer organisations.2092 This increases its accountability, 
whilst maintaining its independence. This fits in a trend towards more transparency in financial 
supervision, as inter alia visible in the German requirement to explain the reasons for adopting or 
amending the LTV limit before the committee on financial supervision of the Bundestag.2093 
 
Secondly, one-sided mechanisms for reviewing, justifying and overriding decisions – which currently 
only increase the inaction bias – could be transformed into two-sided mechanisms. For instance, the 
German rules for the LTV limit may be amended to require not only review of the restrictions, but also 
of the exceptions.2094 Moreover, periodic review of developments in the housing market can be made 
                                                          
2089 Cf. footnote 171. 
2090 For more information on accountability mechanisms, see the references in footnotes 171-174.  
2091 Cf. (sub-)sections 3.4 and 7.3.2. 
2092 Cf. the Central Bank (Supervision and Enforcement) (Amendment) Bill 2016, as discussed in sub-section 
4.2.3. 
2093 See sub-section 4.3.3.2. Cf. art. 20-21 Regulation 1024/2013. 
2094 Cf. sub-section 4.3.1.2. 
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compulsory, combined with an obligation to justify any decision related to LTV limit. Also, the Dutch 
override-mechanism with respect to regulatory powers of DNB and the AFM can be improved, by 
amending it to allow the Minister of Finance to use it also if DNB and the AFM adopt generally binding 
regulations which are inadequate, and not only if these regulations are burdensome.2095 This would 
also be better in line with the vision of the Dutch Ministry of Finance that DNB needs to be decisive 
(slagvaardig) in its supervision.2096 Now, the override mechanism is only aimed at restricting DNB if it 
is too decisive.  
 
In general, the accountability mechanisms between the supervisor and the legislator can also be 
improved by taking these aforementioned issues into account. This means that the parliament – or the 
government/Minister of Finance on its behalf – can ask questions about macroprudential decisions or 
the outcome of a periodic review – the review needs to be mandatory to increase accountability – or 
provide input to consultation to the supervisor. The latter is required to respond in detail. If decisions 
about the use of a macroprudential instrument are subject to a guided discretion mechanism, and the 
supervisor deviates from the guidance, the legislator or the Minister of Finance is allowed to issue a 
public recommendation, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism. This semi-override mechanism 
simultaneously achieves the objectives of ensuring supervisory independence and increasing 
accountability.2097 Since a recommendation will be issued by another actor, this mechanism differs 
from an act-or-explain principle attached to a threshold value in a guided discretion mechanism. 
Because a recommendation can only be issued if the supervisor deviates from the ex ante guidance, 
the supervisor is protected against active involvement of the legislator or Ministry of Finance. This 
possibility to issue a recommendation, subject to a comply-or-explain mechanism, should not replace 
similar powers of Financial Stability Committees to issue such recommendations, since these are not 
primarily aimed at increasing accountability. 
 
Meanwhile, even if the legislator or Minister of Finance only has a semi-override mechanism at its 
disposal, tightening or activating macroprudential instruments becomes more difficult, if the 
supervisor already lacks independence, like BaFin due to the legal and technical supervision of the 
BMF.2098 Therefore, although the aforementioned mechanism in general improves accountability, it is 
not suitable for application to every macroprudential authority; for instance not to BaFin, unless it 
becomes more independent. 
                                                          
2095 Cf. sub-section 3.3.1. 
2096 Cf. Ministerie van Financiën (2011), pp. 11-12.  
2097 This semi-override mechanism respects the supervisory independence, because it is not binding. 
2098 Cf. sub-sections 3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2. 
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Also, as discussed, in the Netherlands already a hard override mechanism exists. If it is reformed, it can 
further increase the accountability of the supervisor. Besides making it two-sided, it is important to 
make it rule-based. This ensures accountability and avoids political pressure for the wrong reasons. 
Firstly, subjective elements must be reduced. Currently, it can be triggered if rules are ‘burdensome’. 
Changing this into ‘demonstrable burdensome or inadequate’ makes it two-sided and more objective. 
Secondly, insofar as it concerns macroprudential instruments, the use of the override-mechanism 
could be limited to the situation that the supervisor takes decisions on macroprudential rules which 
significantly deviate from the guidance, while its justification is highly questionable. Of course, this 
must be further detailed, in light of the specific instruments and ex ante guidance. Thirdly, any use of 
the override mechanism needs to be explained in light of achieving the objectives of the respective 
instrument.  
 
7.3.3.4. Limiting inaction by allowing limited EU involvement  
Despite these mechanisms to reduce the inaction bias, every national actor faces pressure to abstain 
from tightening macroprudential requirements. To further reduce this risk, it is necessary to allow EU 
involvement – albeit limited – since actors at EU level are probably less prone to pressure of national 
politicians and the national industry. Currently, the ESRB is the most obvious candidate for this task, 
since it has already been allotted the tasks of identifying and prioritising systemic risks, as well as 
issuing recommendations for remedial action to, among others, member states and supervisors.2099 
The ECB would have been another candidate for this role, were it not that the scope of its actions is 
limited to the euro area and to credit institutions.2100 
 
It is recommendable to provide the ESRB with limited legally binding powers. This would enable the 
ESRB to require national supervisors to act. In this way, its powers function as a second override-
mechanism, besides the national possibilities to override a supervisory decision. Of course, these 
powers must be circumscribed and subject to strict conditions in order to avoid that the ESRB takes 
the actual macroprudential decisions and the division of competences is eroded. Firstly, the ESRB must 
only be able to require macroprudential supervisors to use their powers in an emergency situation, 
where urgent action is indispensable to avert potentially serious negative consequences for financial 
stability.2101 In the absence of an emergency situation, it is inappropriate to cut across the 
                                                          
2099 Art. 3 and 15-18 Regulation 1092/2010. 
2100 Moreover, there is a risk that the ECB becomes too powerful, without being subject to meaningful checks. 
2101 This inevitable vague definition of an emergency situation displays similarities with the definition of the 
situation which allows using the enhanced surveillance procedure: cf. art. 1(1)(a) and 2(1) Regulation 472/2013. 
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opportunities of national supervisors to take action. Furthermore, the ESRB needs to demonstrate that 
adverse cross-border effects of inaction are present; otherwise, it is a purely national issue.2102 
Moreover, if an instrument is subject to a guided discretion mechanism, the ESRB can only require 
action if supervisory decisions significantly deviate from the guidance, while the justification is highly 
questionable. An ESRB assessment team can evaluate the national measures and justifications, and 
prepare the decisions of the Advisory Technical Committee and ultimately the General Board.2103 In 
the absence of such a mechanism, the ESRB can only use this power if its research demonstrates the 
potentially serious negative consequences for financial stability, caused by inadequate action. 
Furthermore, to ensure sufficient support for the decisions and to avoid that decisions will be taken 
lightly, the ESRB should decide by means of a two-thirds majority.2104 Decisions must be made public 
automatically to foster transparency and to increase pressure to comply with them.2105 
 
Finally, it is necessary to create a decision-making procedure that reconciles the exercise of legally 
binding powers by the ESRB with the Meroni doctrine, as it stands after the ESMA-short selling case.2106 
Most likely, the ESRB cannot require national supervisors to tighten national macroprudential 
measures, without permission of or objection possibilities for the Commission or the Council. Indeed, 
such a power in the hands of the ESRB would imply the exercise of a wide margin of discretion – 
especially in light of the potential distributional consequences of these decisions – which cannot be 
sufficiently delineated by conditions and criteria.2107 The required involvement of EU institutions could 
be modelled along the lines of art. 18 Regulation 1093/2010, which allows the EBA to adopt individual 
decisions requiring authorities to take necessary action, on condition that the Council determined the 
existence of an emergency situation. However, this provision is subject to some serious limitations, 
                                                          
2102 This condition is not difficult to fulfil, since financial instability often has cross-border effects: see e.g. sub-
section 1.2.1 and Schoenmaker & Wierts (2016), p. R54. Note that the presence of potential adverse spillover 
effects to other euro area member states is also a condition for allowing the use of the enhanced surveillance 
procedure: cf. art. 1(1)(a) and 2(1) Regulation 472/2013. 
2103 Assessment teams of the ESRB consist of a mix of staff from the ESRB and from national authorities. On the 
position of assessment teams in the organisational structure of the ESRB, see: 
http://www.esrb.europa.eu/shared/pdf/Organisational-Chart.pdf (last visisted 16 August 2017). 
2104 Cf. art. 10 Regulation 1092/2010. 
2105 Currently, it requires a separate decision to make an ESRB warning or recommendation public (art. 18 
Regulation 1092/2010).  
2106 For these cases: supra, footnote 169. 
2107 Although it is possible to impose similar conditions and criteria upon the ESRB as those imposed upon 
ESMA for exercising its powers of prohibiting certain short-selling activities, the power of requiring national 
authorities to tighten macroprudential requirements involves a much wider margin of discretion than the 
disputed power of ESMA. See art. 28 Regulation 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
March 2012, OJ 2012, L 86/1 and para. 41-54 of Case C-270/12 United Kingdom v European Parliament and 
Council [2014]. For a discussion of this case, see e.g. Adamski (2014), Scholten & Van Rijsbergen (2014) and 
Bergström (2015). 
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while this crucial role of the Council easily results in a situation where political factors trump financial 
stability.2108 Alternatively, the ESRB could receive the power to adopt draft decisions, to which the 
Commission or the Council can object within a short period of time.2109 Objecting should only be 
allowed for a limited number of reasons of public interest, for example that it can be plausibly shown 
that the tightening of the macroprudential requirements will be disproportionate in relation to its 
objective. This design creates a shield against too much political involvement, and a form of 
accountability for the use of these powers by the ESRB.  
 
Granting the ESRB some binding powers allows it also to coordinate macroprudential action in the 
presence of global or EU-wide drivers of a credit bubble, as touched upon in sub-section 7.1.3.2. 
However, EU-wide coordinated action is only possible if national authorities are empowered to set LTV 
and LTI caps. The process of creating a legal basis to activate borrower-based limits can be lengthy, as 
the German example highlights. Therefore, timely macroprudential policy requires that the legal basis 
is established in advance. The ESRB has already recommended member states to ensure that 
macroprudential authorities can directly control or recommend the use of at least one instrument to 
mitigate and prevent excessive credit growth, with LTV and LTI limits listed as indicative 
instruments.2110 Obviously, this does not ensure an effective use of the caps, since member states can 
ignore the ESRB recommendation or comply with it, but without giving the macroprudential authority 
direct control over the caps. Hence, it is strongly advised that the ESRB recommends member states 
to ensure that macroprudential authority can directly control macroprudential instruments. In 
addition, ideally, member states face more pressure to comply with ESRB recommendations, even 
before an emergency situation arises. A possibility to increase pressure is to include non-complied 
ESRB recommendations in the country-specific recommendations under the system of economic 
governance in the EU. Issuing these kinds of country-specific recommendations is possible: in 2016, 
Sweden has been recommended to ‘[e]nsure that the macro-prudential authority has the legal 
mandate to implement measures to safeguard financial stability in a timely manner.’2111  
 
The ESRB can as well contribute to improving operational independence for macroprudential 
supervisors. It already recommended member states to ensure that ‘in the pursuit of its objective, the 
                                                          
2108 Cf. Adamski (2014), p. 822. 
2109 This design would copy some aspects of the decision-making procedure within the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (cf. art. 18 Regulation 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014, OJ 
2014, L225/1). 
2110 Recommendations A and B of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2013/1. 
2111 Council Recommendation of 12 July 2016 on the 2016 National Reform Programme of Sweden and 
delivering a Council opinion on the 2016 Convergence Programme of Sweden, OJ 2016, C 299/53. 
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macro-prudential authority is as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political 
bodies and from the financial industry’.2112 Furthermore, according to the ESRB, a macroprudential 
authority should be able to initiate macroprudential policies and to control appropriate instruments 
for realising its objectives.2113 While the recommendaton about operational independence lacks 
specifity, the follow-up report from 2014 contains compliance criteria.2114 Yet, these are not exhaustive 
in light of the literature on supervisory independence.2115 The ESRB can contribute to improving 
independence for macroprudential supervisors by being more specific ex ante in future 
recommendations.2116 
 
The discussed options to involve the ESRB in limiting inaction and coordinating EU-wide 
macroprudential action respect the proportionality principle, by being suitable and not going further 
than necessary to achieve these objectives. However, if it turns out that the ESRB is not able to attain 
these aims, it might be necessary to adopt a directive on macroprudential regulation and supervision. 
This directive could require member states to guarantee sufficient independence for macroprudential 
supervisors, and oblige them to create the legal basis for borrower-based instruments. Adopting a 
directive – instead of a regulation – allows the EU to provide member states with crucial flexibility in 
making design choices, by imposing only a few basic requirements.  
 
Thus, the present research strongly suggests that macroprudential policy in the EU should be built on 
an institutional framework in which decisions are taken by independent supervisors, based on 
mechanisms of guided discretion, with top up possibilities for the Minister of Finance and the ESRB, 
under strict conditions. Yet, more research is necessary to examine how this can be operationalised 
for different kinds of macroprudential instruments. Suitable indicators and thresholds need to be 
found. To allow practical implementation, the proposed institutional features need to be expounded 
per member state and per instrument, explaining how this can be integrated in existing processes and 
relationships. Using guided discretion in macroprudential policy helps to overcome an inaction bias, 
which might have devastating effects, as well as to foster supervisory accountability. Let the academic 
literature further take up this theme.   
                                                          
2112 Recommendation 2011/3, E(1). In the literature, operational independence is also called functional or 
decision-making independence: cf. sub-section 1.4.4.1, in particular footnote 164. 
2113 Recommendations A2 & C4 of European Systemic Risk Board Recommendation 2011/3. 
2114 European Systemic Risk Board (2014c), p. 32. 
2115 See sub-section 1.4.4 for a detailed discussion of measuring supervisory independence. 
2116 International organisations are currently also actively promoting supervisory independence. For instance, 
the International Monetary Fund (2013, 2014b) has published analytical and comparative papers on the 
institutional framework of macroprudential policy (cf. International Monetary Fund, Financial Stability Board 
and Bank for International Settlements, 2016). Also in its peer review reports the IMF evaluates national 
frameworks and issues recommendations for improvements (e.g. International Monetary Fund (2016e, 2017)). 
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Hoofdstuk 1: Introductie 
Omdat hoge schuldniveaus van huishoudens een belangrijke rol speelden in de crises die Europa vanaf 
2008 troffen, is er de afgelopen jaren op zowel Europees als nationaal niveau een breed palet aan 
maatregelen genomen om oplopende schulden in te perken. De hoge schuld creëerde namelijk 
kwetsbaarheid voor zowel individuele huishoudens als het gehele financiële systeem. Vandaar dat 
financiële regelgeving en de structuur van het financieel toezicht grondig werden veranderd, 
belastingregels werden hervormd en nieuw financieel consumentenrecht werd geïntroduceerd.  
 
Dit roept de vraag op in hoeverre instrumenten op Europees en nationaal niveau aan de juiste 
randvoorwaarden voldoen om effectief kunnen zijn in het beïnvloeden van huishoudelijke 
schuldniveaus. De juridische vormgeving van de nieuwe wet- en regelgeving is hiervoor van cruciaal 
belang. Terwijl de economische literatuur over de nieuwe regelgeving snel groeit, is het juridisch 
onderzoek hiernaar beperkt. Mede in het licht van de grote diversiteit in schuldniveaus tussen lidstaten 
is het tevens de vraag waar de EU en waar de lidstaten actie moeten ondernemen. Het antwoord op 
deze vraag wordt voor wat betreft het optreden van de EU deels bepaald door de randvoorwaarden 
voor effectiviteit, doordat het subsidiariteitsbeginsel een belangrijke rol speelt in de 
bevoegdheidsverdeling tussen de EU en haar lidstaten. Op grond van dit beginsel mag de EU immers 
slechts optreden ‘indien en voor zover de doelstellingen van het overwogen optreden niet voldoende 
door de lidstaten (…) kunnen worden verwezenlijkt, maar (…) beter door de Unie kunnen worden 
bereikt.’2117 
 
Dit onderzoek beantwoordt de vraag in hoeverre instrumenten gericht op regulering van schuld van 
huishoudens effectief kunnen zijn vanuit interdisciplinair perspectief. Het onderzoek bevindt zich op 
het snijvlak van recht en economie. Het onderzoeksobject is recht dat een economisch doel dient en 
het analytisch raamwerk integreert inzichten vanuit zowel economische als juridische sub-disciplines. 
Ook het doel van het onderzoek – het analyseren van de nieuwe wet- en regelgeving binnen het 
bestaande juridische kader, teneinde na te gaan of de instrumenten effectief kunnen zijn – combineert 
beide disciplines. Niettemin is de gebruikte methode vooral juridisch, namelijk interpretatie van 
juridische teksten op basis van letterlijke, teleologische en systematische uitleg. Deze interpretatie 
                                                          
21172117 Art. 5(3) Verdrag betreffende de Europese Unie.  
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betreft meerdere rechtssystemen; het onderzoek is namelijk ook rechtsvergelijkend. Naast Europese 
regelgeving, wordt de wet- en regelgeving in Nederland, Ierland en Duitsland geanalyseerd. Deze 
lidstaten zijn gekozen op basis van variatie in schuldniveaus en variatie in de instrumenten om deze 
schuldniveaus in te dammen.  
 
Het analytisch raamwerk om vast te stellen in hoeverre de instrumenten aan randvoorwaarden 
voldoen om effectief te kunnen zijn, is kwalitatief. Hiermee is het complementair aan bestaand 
empirisch, kwantitatief onderzoek naar deze instrumenten. Gebaseerd op bestaande literatuur, gaat 
dit onderzoek voor elk instrument na in hoeverre: 
1. het bepaald en compleet is; 
2. het handhaafbaar is met proportionele en afschrikwekkende sancties; 
3. het onafhankelijk kan worden toegepast, gehandhaafd, en aangepast. 
Verder gaat het onderzoek na of de relatie tussen de verschillende instrumenten niet conflicterend, 
maar, waar nodig, complementair of inwisselbaar is. De eerste drie criteria worden op onderstaande 
wijze geoperationaliseerd. Daarbij is er een inherente spanning aanwezig tussen de bepaaldheid en de 
compleetheid bij de keuze voor regulering gebaseerd op harde regels of op principes.  
 
Bepaaldheid en compleetheid Mogelijkheid van proportionele 
en afschrikwekkende 
handhaving 
Ruimte voor onafhankelijke 
toepassing, handhaving en 
aanpassing 
Bepaaldheid:  
 de regels zijn niet vaag, 
ambigu of onduidelijk: 
interpretatie in 
overeenstemming met hun 
gebruikelijke betekenis, in het 
licht van de context en doelen 
volstaat om het instrument te 
begrijpen 
 
Compleetheid: 
 de reikwijdte omvat alle 
relevante typen schuld, 
kredietnemers en 
kredietverstrekkers 
 er zijn geen mazen door 
inconsistentie of 
onvolledigheid 
 uitzonderingen zijn slechts 
toegestaan onder duidelijke 
en beschermende 
voorwaarden 
Proportionele handhaving:  
 er is een heel scala aan 
sancties beschikbaar, van licht 
naar zwaar  
 
Afschrikwekkende handhaving: 
 er kunnen hoge bestuurlijke 
boetes worden opgelegd 
 publicatie van de opgelegde 
sancties is verplicht, 
behoudens specifieke 
uitzonderingen 
 het is mogelijk individuen te 
straffen 
 er zijn strenge sancties zoals 
het intrekken van de 
vergunning beschikbaar 
 strafrechtelijke vervolging is 
mogelijk 
 de mogelijkheid en 
bereidwilligheid om op te 
treden wordt gefaciliteerd 
door een duidelijke 
rechtsgrondslag voor het 
instrument, goed 
gedefinieerde doelen die 
corresponderen met het 
mandaat van de 
toezichthouder, en een 
raamwerk dat handelen 
mogelijk maakt 
 de toezichthouder is 
operationeel onafhankelijk; 
er is geen interferentie door 
de uitvoerende macht of de 
onder toezicht staande 
sector 
 de besluitvormingsprocedure 
is gebaseerd op geleide 
beoordelingsvrijheid 
 er is een 
verantwoordingsmechanisme 
aanwezig  
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Om op een goed fundament te bouwen, wordt in hoofdstuk 2 de bestaande literatuur over de 
oorzaken van hoge schuldniveaus onderzocht. De hoofdstukken drie tot en met zes passen het 
analytisch raamwerk toe op verschillende soorten instrumenten, respectievelijk een aantal 
instrumenten op het gebied van kapitaaleisen (hoofdstuk 3), directe debt-service-to-income (DSTI), 
loan-to-income (LTI), debt-to-income (DTI) en loan-to-value (LTV) ratio’s limieten (hoofdstuk 4), 
consumentenrecht (hoofdstuk 5) en de hypotheekrenteaftrek (hoofdstuk 6).  
 
Hoofdstuk 2: De oorzaken van hoge huishoudelijke schulden en instrumenten om die te 
beïnvloeden 
Bestaand onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat er vele oorzaken voor hoge schuldniveaus zijn. 
Terugkerende verklaringen zijn irrationele besluitvorming en opvattingen bij consumenten (onder 
meer over stijgende huizenprijzen), securitisatie (wat kredietgevers de mogelijkheid geeft risico’s door 
te schuiven), deregulering, kapitaalinstroom, belastingregels die huisbezit en lenen stimuleren, 
financiële ongeletterdheid, gepercipieerd inkomen van de sociale omgeving, gebrek aan controle en 
prudentie en, ten slotte, plotselinge inkomensterugval, bijvoorbeeld door werkloosheid, scheiding, 
stijgende rentes of ziekte.  
 
Bestaande literatuur laat tevens zien dat de effectiviteit van instrumenten om kredietverstrekking te 
beïnvloedend varieert. Directe limieten voor DSTI, LTI, DTI en LTV ratio’s zijn effectief bevonden in het 
beperken van kredietverlening aan huishoudens. Ook voor kapitaaleisen zijn er positieve resultaten 
gevonden, maar is het beeld toch meer gemengd. Hierbij is het van cruciaal belang dat het weglekken 
van de effecten van het instrument via arbitrage wordt voorkomen. Belastingmaatregelen, zoals 
beperkingen van de hypotheekrenteaftrek, blijken een significant effect te hebben op schuldniveaus. 
Ten slotte is de literatuur overwegend positief over methoden om de kredietwaardigheid van 
consumenten te onderzoeken, zoals inmiddels verplicht is op grond van consumentenrecht. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3: Kapitaal- en financieringseisen 
De randvoorwaarden voor effectiviteit zijn onvoldoende vervuld voor de regelgeving op het gebied 
van kapitaaleisen. De regels voor banken die interne modellen gebruiken om de hoeveelheid kapitaal 
te bepalen, kunnen niet effectief worden gebruikt om kapitaaleisen te verhogen, vanwege hun 
onvolledigheid en vage bewoordingen. Voor eisen die worden opgelegd m.b.v. tweede pijler-
maatregelen of het nationale flexibiliteitspakket zijn deze gebreken afwezig. Hier is echter reciprociteit 
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niet verplicht, zodat de eisen niet gelden voor banken die grensoverschrijdend of via bijkantoren 
krediet verstrekken. Bovendien gelden alle eisen enkel voor banken, die hun extra kapitaalbehoefte 
ook op andere manieren kunnen voldoen dan door het beperken van kredietverlening.  
 
De verschillen tussen lidstaten op het gebied van beschikbare sancties om kapitaaleisen te handhaven, 
zijn verkleind sinds de invoering van de Richtlijn Kapitaalvereisten.2118 Niettemin zijn er nog steeds 
belangrijke verschillen. Opvallend genoeg is de handhavingspyramide in Duitsland incompleet, 
vergeleken met Nederland en Ierland. Verder is de ECB voor het opleggen van niet-financiële sancties 
afhankelijk van nationale toezichthouders. De praktijk moet laten zien of dit problemen geeft bij het 
afschrikwekkend hanteren van sancties.  
 
De doelen van de gecreëerde instrumenten sluiten goed aan bij het mandaat van De Nederlandsche 
Bank (DNB), de Central Bank of Ireland en de Europese Centrale Bank (ECB), dat expliciet ook 
macroprudentieel is. Dit kan helpen om gecommitteerd te zijn aan deze doelen. Het mandaat van de 
Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), de Duitse federale toezichthouder, omvat 
macroprudentiële taken, maar dit is niet geëxpliciteerd.  
 
De mate van onafhankelijkheid verschilt significant tussen de toezichthouders. In Nederland kan de 
minister van Financiën DNB vragen macroprudentiële instrumenten aan te passen, als deze een 
onredelijke belasting creëren voor de financiële markten. Er is niet gespecificeerd wanneer dit het 
geval is. Indien DNB weigert, kan de minister vervangende regels instellen. Bij de Ierse centrale bank 
zijn er bewust buitenstaanders op belangrijke posten benoemd om de feitelijke onafhankelijkheid te 
vergroten. Het Ministerie van Financiën kan echter nog wel invloed uitoefenen via deelname aan het 
besluitvormend orgaan van de centrale bank. BaFin, de Duitse toezichthouder staat onder toezicht van 
het federale Ministerie van Financiën, die controle kan uitoefenen op bepaalde belangrijke aspecten 
van BaFin’s werk. Wel wordt de invloed op individuele toezichtsbeslissingen uitgesloten door vooraf 
vastgestelde richtlijnen. Wanneer BaFin regulerende taken uitoefent, kan die invloed niet worden 
uitgesloten. 
 
Ook de mate waarin het institutionele raamwerk bijdraagt aan actieve toepassing, handhaving en 
aanpassing van instrumenten – onafhankelijk van druk vanuit de politiek en de sector – verschilt sterk 
per toezichthouder en instrument. Zo zet het systeem van geleide beoordelingsruimte (guided 
discretion) bij de contracyclische kapitaalbuffer toezichthouders aan om tot actie over te gaan. Voor 
                                                          
2118 Richtlijn 2013/36 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 26 juni 2013, OJ 2013, L176/338. 
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het verhogen van risicogewichten middels art. 124/164 van de verordening kapitaalvereisten is zo’n 
systeem in ontwikkeling. Dat is echter algemeen verwoord en daardoor onvoldoende sturend. Bij het 
nationale flexibiliteitspakket werken procedures juist een (pro)actieve toepassing tegen. Mechanismes 
voor geleide beoordelingsvrijheid kunnen specifieker worden gemaakt om de neiging tot inactiviteit 
(inaction bias) verder te verkleinen. Het ‘top-up’ mechanisme dat de ECB ter beschikking staat, draagt 
bij aan het verminderen van de neiging tot inactiviteit. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4: DSTI, LTI en LTV limieten 
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de DSTI, LTI, DTI en LTV limieten, die in elk van de onderzochte landen recent 
zijn geïntroduceerd, of in ontwikkeling zijn. Het verfijnde Nederlandse systeem is compleet en is niet 
alleen van toepassing op hypothecair, maar ook op consumptief krediet. Hierdoor is het moeilijker 
regels te omzeilen. Niettemin maken de verschillen tussen de normen voor consumptief en 
hypothecair krediet het moeilijker te voorkomen dat er mazen in de regels ontstaan. Doordat de 
normen voor consumptief krediet bovendien gebaseerd zijn op zelfregulering, is het niet uit te sluiten 
dat ze worden vastgesteld met een lager beschermingsniveau. Voor de normen voor hypothecair 
krediet is het grootste probleem dat de onafhankelijke toezichthouders er weinig invloed op hebben. 
Dientengevolge mist DNB, als macroprudentiële autoriteit, een belangrijk instrument.  
 
In Ierland zijn de regels simpeler van opzet, doordat de LTI limieten niet zijn gedifferentieerd naar 
inkomen. Dit brengt het risico met zich mee dat het beschermingsniveau voor huishoudens met lage 
inkomens onvoldoende is. In Ierland is flexibiliteit geïntroduceerd, doordat een bepaald percentage 
van de leningen de limieten mag overschrijden. Het voornaamste probleem van de Ierse regels is dat 
consumptief bijlenen niet wordt uitgesloten. Ondanks politieke druk om de LTV en LTI limieten te 
versoepelen, heeft de Ierse centrale bank deze instrumenten in stand weten te houden.  
 
Daarentegen is het Duitse wetsvoorstel om de juridische basis te creëren voor DSTI, DTI en LTV limieten 
behoorlijk uitgekleed door de Bundestag. Doordat BaFin slechts een LTV limiet kan instellen, kan 
consumptief bijlenen niet worden voorkomen. Bovendien heeft de LTV limiet wel een breed 
toepassingsbereik, maar tevens veel uitzonderingen. Door BaFin’s beperkte onafhankelijkheid is het 
de vraag of de toezichthouder in staat is een strenge LTV limiet in te stellen bij politiek druk. 
 
Nederlandse samenvatting 
438 
 
Hoofdstuk 5: Kredietrestricties in het consumentenrecht 
De EU heeft ook in het consumentenrecht regels geïntroduceerd om overkreditering te voorkomen. 
De Richtlijn Consumentenkrediet uit 2008 gaat nog grotendeels uit van de geïnformeerde en rationele 
consument.2119 Ook verbindt de richtlijn geen consequenties aan het niet naleven van de 
kredietwaardigheidstoets. Bovendien is deze toets onbepaald door het gebrek aan specifieke regels, 
waardoor hij onvoldoende bescherming kan bieden. Omdat de richtlijn voornamelijk 
maximumharmonisatie voorschrijft, worden lidstaten beperkt in hun mogelijkheden om consumenten 
beter te beschermen. In de Richtlijn Hypothecair Krediet is de kredietwaardigheidstoets wel 
uitgewerkt en moet krediet worden geweigerd als een consument aan de kredietovereenkomst kan 
voldoen.2120 Dit reflecteert een post-crisis trend naar een beeld van de kwetsbare consument die 
bescherming nodig heeft. Toch zijn ook hier de bevindingen uit de academische literatuur niet volledig 
meegenomen als het gaat om de informatie die een kredietverstrekker dient in te winnen. Zo hoeft 
geen rekening gehouden te worden met de algemene economische omstandigheden. Evenmin is het 
verplicht bestaande schulden mee te nemen. Bovendien zorgt het gebrek aan 
consumentenbescherming in het geval van consumptief krediet ervoor dat consumptief bijlenen om 
een huis te financieren niet wordt uitgesloten.  
 
Lidstaten hebben de regels om consumenten te beschermen deels in het publiekrecht en deels in het 
privaatrecht opgenomen, wat invloed heeft op de randvoorwaarden voor effectiviteit. In Nederland 
zijn de regels geïmplementeerd in het bestaande publiekrechtelijke systeem van LTV en LTI ratio’s. In 
Ierland gelden er naast deze regels voor hypothecair krediet tevens door de centrale bank ingestelde 
richtsnoeren uit de Consumer Protection Code 2012.2121 Die bieden meer bescherming dan de Richtlijn 
Hypothecair Krediet. In Duitsland zijn de richtlijnen getransponeerd in zowel privaat- als publiekrecht. 
Hierdoor kan ook de handhaving zowel via het privaat- als publiekrecht plaatsvinden, hoewel die 
laatste mogelijkheid waarschijnlijk ineffectief is, gezien het gebrek aan sancties en mandaat van BaFin 
om individuele consumenten te beschermen. In Ierland is het palet aan beschikbare sancties het 
breedst, met zowel privaat-, publiek- en strafrechtelijke sancties. Bovendien kan de centrale bank 
kredietverstrekkers verplichten een schadevergoeding te betalen aan consumenten die zijn 
benadeeld. Dit maakt sancties afschrikwekkender. Het probleem van puur privaatrechtelijke sancties 
is immers dat de drempel om te gaan procederen hoog is en consumenten een informatieachterstand 
hebben ten opzichte van de kredietverstrekker en de toezichthouder. In Nederland is de handhaving 
                                                          
2119 Richtlijn 2008/48 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 23 april 2008, OJ 2008, L 133/66. 
2120 Richtlijn 2014/17 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 4 februari 2014, OJ 2014, L60/34. 
2121 De Consumer Protection Code 2012 is beschikbaar via https://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/consumer-
protection/other-codes-of-conduct. 
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in principe publiekrechtelijk, door de Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM). Doordat de normen echter 
doorwerken in de zorgplicht, kunnen consumenten ook zelf een procedure starten bij een overtreding 
van de normen. De jurisprudentie op dit gebied is echter nog niet eenduidig, wat het voor 
consumenten moeilijker maakt van te voren in te schatten wat hun kansen zijn. 
 
Hoofdstuk 6: De fiscale behandeling van schulden 
In veel Europese landen is de mogelijkheid hypotheekrenteaftrek te claimen afgeschaft of beperkt in 
de afgelopen decennia. In Duitsland zijn belastingvoordelen voor huizenbezitters volledig afgeschaft; 
in Ierland wordt de belastingkorting op de hypotheekrente uitgefaseerd. Ook in Nederland zijn 
hervormingen doorgevoerd, waaronder de beperking dat renteaftrek enkel mogelijk is voor 
hypotheken waarop minimaal annuïtair wordt afgelost. Het Nederlandse systeem van regels is veel 
complexer dan het Ierse systeem, vooral om misbruik van de genereuze mogelijkheden voor aftrek te 
voorkomen. Nederlandse regels met betrekking tot de aflossingsstand en eigenwoningreserve zijn 
zodanig vormgegeven dat renteaftrek niet mogelijk is, als huiseigenaren winst van de verkoop van een 
eerdere woning of al afgeloste schuld niet gebruiken voor de aankoop van een nieuwe woning, maar 
daarvoor opnieuw geleend geld gebruiken. De gedetailleerde vormgeving van de regels minimaliseert 
het risico op misbruik van mazen in de wet. Dit risico wordt verder beperkt door de bewijslast dat 
kosten zijn gemaakt voor de verbouwing van het huis bij de belastingbetaler te leggen. Verder checkt 
de bank de facturen al. Ook in Ierland worden de kredietverstrekkers ingeschakeld bij de controle van 
de informatie waarop het belastingvoordeel berust. Dit beperkt de mogelijkheden voor fraude en 
faciliteert de handhaving. In zowel Nederland als Ierland is proportionele en afschrikwikkende 
handhaving mogelijk. In Ierland is het echter eenvoudiger om (grove) nalatigheid of (voorwaardelijk) 
opzet te bewijzen, waardoor het opleggen van sancties eenvoudiger is.  
 
De nationale vrijheid om de hypotheekrenteaftrek vorm te geven wordt begrensd door de 
bevoegdheden die de Europese Commissie en de Raad hebben ontvangen in het systeem voor 
economisch bestuur in de EU. Deze EU instituties kunnen invloed uitoefenen op het beleid van 
lidstaten, maar kunnen dat niet bepalen, omdat het systeem gebaseerd blijft op peer pressure en er 
geen wil lijkt te zijn om binnen de procedures te escaleren. Toch zijn de land-specifieke aanbevelingen 
de afgelopen jaren concreter geworden. Na de hervormingen in 2011 wijzen ze vaak naar specifieke 
beleidsterreinen. De facto is de druk op lidstaten hierdoor toegenomen.  
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Hoofdstuk 7: De regulering van huishoudelijke schulden vanuit een systematisch perspectief 
Ten slotte wordt de interactie tussen de verschillende instrumenten onderzocht in hoofdstuk 7. Ook 
worden enkele trends met betrekking tot de regulering van kredietverstrekking aan huishoudens 
besproken. Opvallend is dat op Europees niveau en in elke onderzochte lidstaat het verstrekken van 
hypothecair krediet strikter wordt gereguleerd dan consumptief krediet. Het is nodig om de regels 
voor consumptief krediet te verbeteren. De interactie tussen verschillende soorten instrumenten is 
divers.  
 
De verschillende prudentiële instrumenten zijn veelal complementair aan elkaar, omdat ze een ander 
doel dienen. Ze kunnen echter tevens als imperfecte substituten fungeren. De regels voor 
consumentenbescherming en de prudentiële eisen zijn deels overlappend, maar het perspectief 
verschilt. Lidstaten combineren dit type regels op verschillende manieren. In Nederland zijn ze 
geïntegreerd in één gedetailleerde set aan regels, die als uitwerking dient voor een overkoepelende 
open norm. Dit zorgt ervoor dat de regels bepaald en ook compleet zijn, en moeilijker te omzeilen zijn. 
In Ierland en Duitsland hebben de regels op het gebied van consumentenbescherming kenmerken van 
principes, terwijl de macroprudentiële LTV en LTI limieten relatief eenvoudig zijn. Dit combineert de 
voordelen van principes en eenvoudige regels. De grove opzet van de regels creëert ook het risico op 
mazen. Het naast elkaar bestaan van macroprudentiële maatregelen en regels voor 
consumentenbescherming zorgt ervoor dat LTV limieten aangepast kunnen worden door de 
macroprudentiële autoriteit en contra-cyclisch gebruikt kunnen worden. Gezien de reikwijdte van LTI 
en LTV limieten die worden gecreëerd op nationaal niveau en relevante institutionele verschillen 
tussen lidstaten, moeten bevoegdheden om deze instrumenten te gebruiken nationaal blijven om hun 
effectiviteit te garanderen. 
 
De mogelijkheden om regels op het gebied van financieel toezicht en consumentenbescherming te 
handhaven zijn in toenemende mate versterkt en geharmoniseerd. Ook de daadwerkelijke handhaving 
van prudentiële instrumenten zal waarschijnlijk uniformer worden, doordat de ECB bevoegd is dit te 
doen voor significante instellingen. In Nederland en Ierland is er een toenemende interactie zichtbaar 
tussen publieke en private handhaving. De Central Bank of Ireland heeft de bevoegdheid ontvangen 
om schadevergoeding toe te kennen aan benadeelde consumenten, wat het afschrikwekkende 
karakter van de beschikbare handhavingsmaatregelen vergroot.  
 
De taken van financiële toezichthouders zijn sterk uitgebreid sinds de crisis, doordat macroprudentiële 
bevoegdheden zijn gecreëerd. Ook hebben sommige toezichthouders – zoals Bafin en de Ierse centrale 
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bank – extra taken op het gebied van consumentenbescherming ontvangen. Hun mandaat is echter 
niet altijd aangepast. Ook laten zowel de onafhankelijkheid als de verantwoordingsplichten van 
toezichthouders veelal te wensen over, onder meer door de politieke betrokkenheid bij de 
besluitvorming. In dit kader is het aanpassen van eenzijdige mechanismes om besluiten van 
toezichthouders te annuleren of te wijzingen aanbevelingswaardig. Zulke mechanismes in Nederland 
en Duitsland zijn er nu op gericht om streng handelen van toezichthouders te beperken; niet om hun 
slagvaardigheid te bevorderen. Zulke aanpassingen zouden de onafhankelijkheid van de 
toezichthouders vergroten. De verantwoordingsplicht van toezichthouders kan tevens worden 
versterkt door hen te verplichten bij consultaties gedetailleerd te reageren op inzendingen van 
bepaalde partijen, zoals de minister van Financiën. Ook kan de minister de bevoegdheid ontvangen 
om de toezichthouder een publieke aanbeveling te doen om een instrument in te zetten, mocht de 
toezichthouder afwijken van de vooraf ingestelde richtlijnen. Een dergelijk mechanisme, vergezeld van 
een pas-toe-of-leg uit principe, kan de neiging tot inactiviteit verkleinen. Verder kan bij de toepassing 
van instrumenten als art. 124 en 164 Verordening Kapitaalvereisten2122 en LTV en LTI kan sterker 
gebruikt worden gemaakt van geleide beoordelingsvrijheid. Dat zou moeten bestaan uit early-warning 
indicatoren met drempelwaarden, (2) een pas-toe-of-leg-uit principe en (3) transparantie over (1) en 
(2). Hiermee wordt de neiging tot inactiviteit verkleind, en wordt het afleggen van verantwoording 
gefaciliteerd.  
 
Ten slotte is het aanbevelenswaardig om het Europees Comité voor Systeemrisico’s (ESRB) 
gelimiteerde bindende bevoegdheden te geven, namelijk om in noodgevallen nationale 
toezichthouders op te dragen om op te treden. Deze bevoegdheid kan worden gebruikt als onderzoek 
aantoont dat uitstel van handelen ernstige negatieve gevolgen heeft voor de financiële stabiliteit. Deze 
bevoegdheid, die moet worden vormgegeven binnen de Meroni doctrine, maakt het tevens mogelijk 
dat de ESRB het macroprudentiële beleid binnen de EU coördineert, wanneer dat nodig is. Het beleid 
van lidstaten kan verder worden beïnvloed via de aanbevelingen binnen de procedures voor 
economisch bestuur in de EU. De governance van deze procedures kan worden verbeterd om de 
effectiviteit ervan te versterken. Een mogelijkheid is om onafhankelijke adviesorganen een grotere rol 
toe te kennen. Ook kan het Europees Parlement vroeger in het proces van de Economische Dialoog 
worden betrokken, zodat de Commissie en de Raad van minister meer verantwoording moeten 
afleggen over het al dan niet doen van aanbevelingen aan lidstaten.  
  
                                                          
2122 Verordening 575/2013 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 26 juni 2013, OJ 2013, L176/1 
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